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To pick the changes from:
faad6645e1128ec2 ("x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID feature bit for the Bus Lock Threshold")
159013a7ca18c271 ("x86/its: Enumerate Indirect Target Selection (ITS) bug")
f9f27c4a377a8b45 ("x86/cpufeatures: Add "Allowed SEV Features" Feature")
b02dc185ee86836c ("x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_FEATURE_APX")
d88bb2ded2efdc38 ("KVM: x86: Advertise support for AMD's PREFETCHI")
This causes these perf files to be rebuilt and brings some X86_FEATURE
that may be used by:
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memcpy-x86-64-asm.o
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memset-x86-64-asm.o
And addresses this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header differences:
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
Please see tools/include/uapi/README for further details.
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Cc: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: James Clark <james.clark@linaro.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kishon Vijay Abraham I <kvijayab@amd.com>
Cc: Manali Shukla <manali.shukla@amd.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/aFBWAI3kHYX5aL9G@x1
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/perf/perf-tools
Pull perf tools updates from Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo:
"perf report/top/annotate TUI:
- Accept the left arrow key as a Zoom out if done on the first column
- Show if source code toggle status in title, to help spotting bugs
with the various disassemblers (capstone, llvm, objdump)
- Provide feedback on unhandled hotkeys
Build:
- Better inform when certain features are not available with warnings
in the build process and in 'perf version --build-options' or 'perf -vv'
perf record:
- Improve the --off-cpu code by synthesizing events for switch-out ->
switch-in intervals using a BPF program. This can be fine tuned
using a --off-cpu-thresh knob
perf report:
- Add 'tgid' sort key
perf mem/c2c:
- Add 'op', 'cache', 'snoop', 'dtlb' output fields
- Add support for 'ldlat' on AMD IBS (Instruction Based Sampling)
perf ftrace:
- Use process/session specific trace settings instead of messing with
the global ftrace knobs
perf trace:
- Implement syscall summary in BPF
- Support --summary-mode=cgroup
- Always print return value for syscalls returning a pid
- The rseq and set_robust_list don't return a pid, just -errno
perf lock contention:
- Symbolize zone->lock using BTF
- Add -J/--inject-delay option to estimate impact on application
performance by optimization of kernel locking behavior
perf stat:
- Improve hybrid support for the NMI watchdog warning
Symbol resolution:
- Handle 'u' and 'l' symbols in /proc/kallsyms, resolving some Rust
symbols
- Improve Rust demangler
Hardware tracing:
Intel PT:
- Fix PEBS-via-PT data_src
- Do not default to recording all switch events
- Fix pattern matching with python3 on the SQL viewer script
arm64:
- Fixups for the hip08 hha PMU
Vendor events:
- Update Intel events/metrics files for alderlake, alderlaken,
arrowlake, bonnell, broadwell, broadwellde, broadwellx,
cascadelakex, clearwaterforest, elkhartlake, emeraldrapids,
grandridge, graniterapids, haswell, haswellx, icelake, icelakex,
ivybridge, ivytown, jaketown, lunarlake, meteorlake, nehalemep,
nehalemex, rocketlake, sandybridge, sapphirerapids, sierraforest,
skylake, skylakex, snowridgex, tigerlake, westmereep-dp,
westmereep-sp, westmereep-sx
python support:
- Add support for event counts in the python binding, add a
counting.py example
perf list:
- Display the PMU name associated with a perf metric in JSON
perf test:
- Hybrid improvements for metric value validation test
- Fix LBR test by ignoring idle task
- Add AMD IBS sw filter ana d'ldlat' tests
- Add 'perf trace --summary-mode=cgroup' test
- Add tests for the various language symbol demanglers
Miscellaneous:
- Allow specifying the cpu an event will be tied using '-e
event/cpu=N/'
- Sync various headers with the kernel sources
- Add annotations to use clang's -Wthread-safety and fix some
problems it detected
- Make dump_stack() use perf's symbol resolution to provide better
backtraces
- Intel TPEBS support cleanups and fixes. TPEBS stands for Timed PEBS
(Precision Event-Based Sampling), that adds timing info, the
retirement latency of instructions
- Various memory allocation (some detected by ASAN) and reference
counting fixes
- Add a 8-byte aligned PERF_RECORD_COMPRESSED2 to replace
PERF_RECORD_COMPRESSED
- Skip unsupported event types in perf.data files, don't stop when
finding one
- Improve lookups using hashmaps and binary searches"
* tag 'perf-tools-for-v6.16-1-2025-06-03' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/perf/perf-tools: (206 commits)
perf callchain: Always populate the addr_location map when adding IP
perf lock contention: Reject more than 10ms delays for safety
perf trace: Set errpid to false for rseq and set_robust_list
perf symbol: Move demangling code out of symbol-elf.c
perf trace: Always print return value for syscalls returning a pid
perf script: Print PERF_AUX_FLAG_COLLISION flag
perf mem: Show absolute percent in mem_stat output
perf mem: Display sort order only if it's available
perf mem: Describe overhead calculation in brief
perf record: Fix incorrect --user-regs comments
Revert "perf thread: Ensure comm_lock held for comm_list"
perf test trace_summary: Skip --bpf-summary tests if no libbpf
perf test intel-pt: Skip jitdump test if no libelf
perf intel-tpebs: Avoid race when evlist is being deleted
perf test demangle-java: Don't segv if demangling fails
perf symbol: Fix use-after-free in filename__read_build_id
perf pmu: Avoid segv for missing name/alias_name in wildcarding
perf machine: Factor creating a "live" machine out of dwarf-unwind
perf test: Add AMD IBS sw filter test
perf mem: Count L2 HITM for c2c statistic
...
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Pull more kvm updates from Paolo Bonzini:
Generic:
- Clean up locking of all vCPUs for a VM by using the *_nest_lock()
family of functions, and move duplicated code to virt/kvm/. kernel/
patches acked by Peter Zijlstra
- Add MGLRU support to the access tracking perf test
ARM fixes:
- Make the irqbypass hooks resilient to changes in the GSI<->MSI
routing, avoiding behind stale vLPI mappings being left behind. The
fix is to resolve the VGIC IRQ using the host IRQ (which is stable)
and nuking the vLPI mapping upon a routing change
- Close another VGIC race where vCPU creation races with VGIC
creation, leading to in-flight vCPUs entering the kernel w/o
private IRQs allocated
- Fix a build issue triggered by the recently added workaround for
Ampere's AC04_CPU_23 erratum
- Correctly sign-extend the VA when emulating a TLBI instruction
potentially targeting a VNCR mapping
- Avoid dereferencing a NULL pointer in the VGIC debug code, which
can happen if the device doesn't have any mapping yet
s390:
- Fix interaction between some filesystems and Secure Execution
- Some cleanups and refactorings, preparing for an upcoming big
series
x86:
- Wait for target vCPU to ack KVM_REQ_UPDATE_PROTECTED_GUEST_STATE
to fix a race between AP destroy and VMRUN
- Decrypt and dump the VMSA in dump_vmcb() if debugging enabled for
the VM
- Refine and harden handling of spurious faults
- Add support for ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES
- Add #VMGEXIT to the set of handlers special cased for
CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y
- Treat DEBUGCTL[5:2] as reserved to pave the way for virtualizing
features that utilize those bits
- Don't account temporary allocations in sev_send_update_data()
- Add support for KVM_CAP_X86_BUS_LOCK_EXIT on SVM, via Bus Lock
Threshold
- Unify virtualization of IBRS on nested VM-Exit, and cross-vCPU
IBPB, between SVM and VMX
- Advertise support to userspace for WRMSRNS and PREFETCHI
- Rescan I/O APIC routes after handling EOI that needed to be
intercepted due to the old/previous routing, but not the
new/current routing
- Add a module param to control and enumerate support for device
posted interrupts
- Fix a potential overflow with nested virt on Intel systems running
32-bit kernels
- Flush shadow VMCSes on emergency reboot
- Add support for SNP to the various SEV selftests
- Add a selftest to verify fastops instructions via forced emulation
- Refine and optimize KVM's software processing of the posted
interrupt bitmap, and share the harvesting code between KVM and the
kernel's Posted MSI handler"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (93 commits)
rtmutex_api: provide correct extern functions
KVM: arm64: vgic-debug: Avoid dereferencing NULL ITE pointer
KVM: arm64: vgic-init: Plug vCPU vs. VGIC creation race
KVM: arm64: Unmap vLPIs affected by changes to GSI routing information
KVM: arm64: Resolve vLPI by host IRQ in vgic_v4_unset_forwarding()
KVM: arm64: Protect vLPI translation with vgic_irq::irq_lock
KVM: arm64: Use lock guard in vgic_v4_set_forwarding()
KVM: arm64: Mask out non-VA bits from TLBI VA* on VNCR invalidation
arm64: sysreg: Drag linux/kconfig.h to work around vdso build issue
KVM: s390: Simplify and move pv code
KVM: s390: Refactor and split some gmap helpers
KVM: s390: Remove unneeded srcu lock
s390: Remove unneeded includes
s390/uv: Improve splitting of large folios that cannot be split while dirty
s390/uv: Always return 0 from s390_wiggle_split_folio() if successful
s390/uv: Don't return 0 from make_hva_secure() if the operation was not successful
rust: add helper for mutex_trylock
RISC-V: KVM: use kvm_trylock_all_vcpus when locking all vCPUs
KVM: arm64: use kvm_trylock_all_vcpus when locking all vCPUs
x86: KVM: SVM: use kvm_lock_all_vcpus instead of a custom implementation
...
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KVM x86 misc changes for 6.16:
- Unify virtualization of IBRS on nested VM-Exit, and cross-vCPU IBPB, between
SVM and VMX.
- Advertise support to userspace for WRMSRNS and PREFETCHI.
- Rescan I/O APIC routes after handling EOI that needed to be intercepted due
to the old/previous routing, but not the new/current routing.
- Add a module param to control and enumerate support for device posted
interrupts.
- Misc cleanups.
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Indirect Target Selection (ITS) bits
To pick the changes from:
24ee8d9432b5744f ("x86/CPU/AMD: Add X86_FEATURE_ZEN6")
2665281a07e19550 ("x86/its: Add "vmexit" option to skip mitigation on some CPUs")
8754e67ad4ac692c ("x86/its: Add support for ITS-safe indirect thunk")
159013a7ca18c271 ("x86/its: Enumerate Indirect Target Selection (ITS) bug")
This causes these perf files to be rebuilt and brings some X86_FEATURE
that will be used when updating the copies of
tools/arch/x86/lib/mem{cpy,set}_64.S with the kernel sources:
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memcpy-x86-64-asm.o
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memset-x86-64-asm.o
And addresses this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header differences:
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
Please see tools/include/uapi/README for further details.
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: James Clark <james.clark@linaro.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250519214126.1652491-4-acme@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
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Conflicts:
tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Per the APM [1]:
Some processors, identified by CPUID Fn8000_0008_EBX[IbrsSameMode]
(bit 19) = 1, provide additional speculation limits. For these
processors, when IBRS is set, indirect branch predictions are not
influenced by any prior indirect branches, regardless of mode (CPL
and guest/host) and regardless of whether the prior indirect branches
occurred before or after the setting of IBRS. This is referred to as
Same Mode IBRS.
Define this feature bit, which will be used by KVM to determine if an
IBPB is required on nested VM-exits in SVM.
[1] AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual Pub. 40332, Rev 4.08 - April
2024, Volume 2, 3.2.9 Speculation Control MSRs
Signed-off-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosry.ahmed@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250221163352.3818347-2-yosry.ahmed@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Shorten X86_FEATURE_AMD_HETEROGENEOUS_CORES to X86_FEATURE_AMD_HTR_CORES
to make the last column aligned consistently in the whole file.
No functional changes.
Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250415175410.2944032-4-xin@zytor.com
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Shorten X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT to
X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_VMEXIT to make the last column aligned
consistently in the whole file.
There's no need to explain in the name what the mitigation does.
No functional changes.
Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250415175410.2944032-3-xin@zytor.com
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It is a special file with special formatting so remove one whitespace
damage and format newer defines like the rest.
No functional changes.
[ Xin: Do the same to tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h. ]
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250415175410.2944032-2-xin@zytor.com
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Whack this thing because:
- the "unknown" handling is done only for this vuln and not for the
others
- it doesn't do anything besides reporting things differently. It
doesn't apply any mitigations - it is simply causing unnecessary
complications to the code which don't bring anything besides
maintenance overhead to what is already a very nasty spaghetti pile
- all the currently unaffected CPUs can also be in "unknown" status so
there's no need for special handling here
so get rid of it.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250414150951.5345-1-bp@kernel.org
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To pick up the changes in:
841326332bcb13ae x86/cpufeatures: Generate the <asm/cpufeaturemasks.h> header based on build config
440a65b7d25fb06f x86/mm: Enable AMD translation cache extensions
767ae437a32d6447 x86/mm: Add INVLPGB feature and Kconfig entry
b4cc466b97359011 cpufreq/amd-pstate: Replace all AMD_CPPC_* macros with masks
98c7a713db91c5a9 x86/bugs: Add X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2_USER
8f64eee70cdd3bb8 x86/bugs: Remove X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB
8442df2b49ed9bcd x86/bugs: KVM: Add support for SRSO_MSR_FIX
70792aed14551e31 x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID feature bit for Idle HLT intercept
968e9bc4cef87054 x86: move ZMM exclusion list into CPU feature flag
c631a2de7ae48d50 perf/x86/intel: Ensure LBRs are disabled when a CPU is starting
38cc6495cdec18a4 x86/sev: Prevent GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR interception for Secure TSC enabled guests
288bba2f4c8be1e1 x86/cpufeatures: Remove "AMD" from the comments to the AMD-specific leaf
877818802c3e970f x86/bugs: Add SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO support
8ae3291f773befee x86/sev: Add full support for a segmented RMP table
0cbc0258415814c8 x86/sev: Add support for the RMPREAD instruction
7a470e826d7521be x86/cpufeatures: Free up unused feature bits
Addressing this perf tools build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header differences:
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
Please see tools/include/uapi/README for further details.
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Venkat Rao Bagalkote <venkat88@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250410001125.391820-10-namhyung@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 speculation mitigation updates from Borislav Petkov:
- Some preparatory work to convert the mitigations machinery to
mitigating attack vectors instead of single vulnerabilities
- Untangle and remove a now unneeded X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB flag
- Add support for a Zen5-specific SRSO mitigation
- Cleanups and minor improvements
* tag 'x86_bugs_for_v6.15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/bugs: Make spectre user default depend on MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2
x86/bugs: Use the cpu_smt_possible() helper instead of open-coded code
x86/bugs: Add AUTO mitigations for mds/taa/mmio/rfds
x86/bugs: Relocate mds/taa/mmio/rfds defines
x86/bugs: Add X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2_USER
x86/bugs: Remove X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB
KVM: nVMX: Always use IBPB to properly virtualize IBRS
x86/bugs: Use a static branch to guard IBPB on vCPU switch
x86/bugs: Remove the X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB check in ib_prctl_set()
x86/mm: Remove X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB checks in cond_mitigation()
x86/bugs: Move the X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB check into callers
x86/bugs: KVM: Add support for SRSO_MSR_FIX
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The functionalities of {disabled,required}-features.h have been replaced with
the auto-generated generated/<asm/cpufeaturemasks.h> header.
Thus they are no longer needed and can be removed.
None of the macros defined in {disabled,required}-features.h is used in tools,
delete them too.
Signed-off-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250305184725.3341760-4-xin@zytor.com
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X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB was introduced in:
2961298efe1e ("x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags")
to have separate flags for when the CPU supports IBPB (i.e. X86_FEATURE_IBPB)
and when an IBPB is actually used to mitigate Spectre v2.
Ever since then, the uses of IBPB expanded. The name became confusing
because it does not control all IBPB executions in the kernel.
Furthermore, because its name is generic and it's buried within
indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(), it's easy to use it not knowing
that it is specific to Spectre v2.
X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB is no longer needed because all the IBPB executions
it used to control are now controlled through other means (e.g.
switch_mm_*_ibpb static branches).
Remove the unused feature bit.
Signed-off-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosry.ahmed@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250227012712.3193063-7-yosry.ahmed@linux.dev
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To pick up the changes in this cset:
a0423af92cb31e6f ("x86: KVM: Advertise CPUIDs for new instructions in Clearwater Forest")
0c487010cb4f79e4 ("x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_FEATURE_AMD_WORKLOAD_CLASS feature bit")
1ad4667066714369 ("x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_FEATURE_AMD_HETEROGENEOUS_CORES")
104edc6efca62838 ("x86/cpufeatures: Rename X86_FEATURE_FAST_CPPC to have AMD prefix")
3ea87dfa31a7b0bb ("x86/cpufeatures: Add a IBPB_NO_RET BUG flag")
ff898623af2ed564 ("x86/cpufeatures: Define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET")
dcb988cdac85bad1 ("KVM: x86: Quirk initialization of feature MSRs to KVM's max configuration")
This addresses these perf build warnings:
Warning: Kernel ABI header differences:
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
Please see tools/include/uapi/README for further details.
Reviewed-by: James Clark <james.clark@linaro.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241203035349.1901262-5-namhyung@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
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This feature is an AMD unique feature of some processors, so put
AMD into the name.
Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241025171459.1093-2-mario.limonciello@amd.com
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To pick up changes from:
149fd4712bcd perf/x86/intel: Support Perfmon MSRs aliasing
21b362cc762a x86/resctrl: Enable shared RMID mode on Sub-NUMA Cluster (SNC) systems
4f460bff7b6a cpufreq: acpi: move MSR_K7_HWCR_CPB_DIS_BIT into msr-index.h
7ea81936b853 x86/cpufeatures: Add HWP highest perf change feature flag
78ce84b9e0a5 x86/cpufeatures: Flip the /proc/cpuinfo appearance logic
1beb348d5c7f x86/sev: Provide SVSM discovery support
This should be used to beautify x86 syscall arguments and it addresses
these tools/perf build warnings:
Warning: Kernel ABI header differences:
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
Please see tools/include/uapi/README for details (it's in the first patch
of this series).
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
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mitigation changes
To pick the changes from:
95a6ccbdc7199a14 ("x86/bhi: Mitigate KVM by default")
ec9404e40e8f3642 ("x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob")
be482ff9500999f5 ("x86/bhi: Enumerate Branch History Injection (BHI) bug")
0f4a837615ff925b ("x86/bhi: Define SPEC_CTRL_BHI_DIS_S")
7390db8aea0d64e9 ("x86/bhi: Add support for clearing branch history at syscall entry")
This causes these perf files to be rebuilt and brings some X86_FEATURE
that will be used when updating the copies of
tools/arch/x86/lib/mem{cpy,set}_64.S with the kernel sources:
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memcpy-x86-64-asm.o
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memset-x86-64-asm.o
And addresses this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header differences:
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ZirIx4kPtJwGFZS0@x1
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
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To pick up the changes from:
598c2fafc06f ("perf/x86/amd/lbr: Use freeze based on availability")
7f274e609f3d ("x86/cpufeatures: Add new word for scattered features")
This should address these tools/perf build warnings:
Warning: Kernel ABI header differences:
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240408185520.1550865-6-namhyung@kernel.org
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 SEV updates from Borislav Petkov:
- Add the x86 part of the SEV-SNP host support.
This will allow the kernel to be used as a KVM hypervisor capable of
running SNP (Secure Nested Paging) guests. Roughly speaking, SEV-SNP
is the ultimate goal of the AMD confidential computing side,
providing the most comprehensive confidential computing environment
up to date.
This is the x86 part and there is a KVM part which did not get ready
in time for the merge window so latter will be forthcoming in the
next cycle.
- Rework the early code's position-dependent SEV variable references in
order to allow building the kernel with clang and -fPIE/-fPIC and
-mcmodel=kernel
- The usual set of fixes, cleanups and improvements all over the place
* tag 'x86_sev_for_v6.9_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (36 commits)
x86/sev: Disable KMSAN for memory encryption TUs
x86/sev: Dump SEV_STATUS
crypto: ccp - Have it depend on AMD_IOMMU
iommu/amd: Fix failure return from snp_lookup_rmpentry()
x86/sev: Fix position dependent variable references in startup code
crypto: ccp: Make snp_range_list static
x86/Kconfig: Remove CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT
Documentation: virt: Fix up pre-formatted text block for SEV ioctls
crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_SET_CONFIG command
crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_COMMIT command
crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS command
x86/cpufeatures: Enable/unmask SEV-SNP CPU feature
KVM: SEV: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe
crypto: ccp: Add panic notifier for SEV/SNP firmware shutdown on kdump
iommu/amd: Clean up RMP entries for IOMMU pages during SNP shutdown
crypto: ccp: Handle legacy SEV commands when SNP is enabled
crypto: ccp: Handle non-volatile INIT_EX data when SNP is enabled
crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy TMR allocation when SNP is enabled
x86/sev: Introduce an SNP leaked pages list
crypto: ccp: Provide an API to issue SEV and SNP commands
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 FRED support from Thomas Gleixner:
"Support for x86 Fast Return and Event Delivery (FRED).
FRED is a replacement for IDT event delivery on x86 and addresses most
of the technical nightmares which IDT exposes:
1) Exception cause registers like CR2 need to be manually preserved
in nested exception scenarios.
2) Hardware interrupt stack switching is suboptimal for nested
exceptions as the interrupt stack mechanism rewinds the stack on
each entry which requires a massive effort in the low level entry
of #NMI code to handle this.
3) No hardware distinction between entry from kernel or from user
which makes establishing kernel context more complex than it needs
to be especially for unconditionally nestable exceptions like NMI.
4) NMI nesting caused by IRET unconditionally reenabling NMIs, which
is a problem when the perf NMI takes a fault when collecting a
stack trace.
5) Partial restore of ESP when returning to a 16-bit segment
6) Limitation of the vector space which can cause vector exhaustion
on large systems.
7) Inability to differentiate NMI sources
FRED addresses these shortcomings by:
1) An extended exception stack frame which the CPU uses to save
exception cause registers. This ensures that the meta information
for each exception is preserved on stack and avoids the extra
complexity of preserving it in software.
2) Hardware interrupt stack switching is non-rewinding if a nested
exception uses the currently interrupt stack.
3) The entry points for kernel and user context are separate and GS
BASE handling which is required to establish kernel context for
per CPU variable access is done in hardware.
4) NMIs are now nesting protected. They are only reenabled on the
return from NMI.
5) FRED guarantees full restore of ESP
6) FRED does not put a limitation on the vector space by design
because it uses a central entry points for kernel and user space
and the CPUstores the entry type (exception, trap, interrupt,
syscall) on the entry stack along with the vector number. The
entry code has to demultiplex this information, but this removes
the vector space restriction.
The first hardware implementations will still have the current
restricted vector space because lifting this limitation requires
further changes to the local APIC.
7) FRED stores the vector number and meta information on stack which
allows having more than one NMI vector in future hardware when the
required local APIC changes are in place.
The series implements the initial FRED support by:
- Reworking the existing entry and IDT handling infrastructure to
accomodate for the alternative entry mechanism.
- Expanding the stack frame to accomodate for the extra 16 bytes FRED
requires to store context and meta information
- Providing FRED specific C entry points for events which have
information pushed to the extended stack frame, e.g. #PF and #DB.
- Providing FRED specific C entry points for #NMI and #MCE
- Implementing the FRED specific ASM entry points and the C code to
demultiplex the events
- Providing detection and initialization mechanisms and the necessary
tweaks in context switching, GS BASE handling etc.
The FRED integration aims for maximum code reuse vs the existing IDT
implementation to the extent possible and the deviation in hot paths
like context switching are handled with alternatives to minimalize the
impact. The low level entry and exit paths are seperate due to the
extended stack frame and the hardware based GS BASE swichting and
therefore have no impact on IDT based systems.
It has been extensively tested on existing systems and on the FRED
simulation and as of now there are no outstanding problems"
* tag 'x86-fred-2024-03-10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (38 commits)
x86/fred: Fix init_task thread stack pointer initialization
MAINTAINERS: Add a maintainer entry for FRED
x86/fred: Fix a build warning with allmodconfig due to 'inline' failing to inline properly
x86/fred: Invoke FRED initialization code to enable FRED
x86/fred: Add FRED initialization functions
x86/syscall: Split IDT syscall setup code into idt_syscall_init()
KVM: VMX: Call fred_entry_from_kvm() for IRQ/NMI handling
x86/entry: Add fred_entry_from_kvm() for VMX to handle IRQ/NMI
x86/entry/calling: Allow PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS being used beyond actual entry code
x86/fred: Fixup fault on ERETU by jumping to fred_entrypoint_user
x86/fred: Let ret_from_fork_asm() jmp to asm_fred_exit_user when FRED is enabled
x86/traps: Add sysvec_install() to install a system interrupt handler
x86/fred: FRED entry/exit and dispatch code
x86/fred: Add a machine check entry stub for FRED
x86/fred: Add a NMI entry stub for FRED
x86/fred: Add a debug fault entry stub for FRED
x86/idtentry: Incorporate definitions/declarations of the FRED entries
x86/fred: Make exc_page_fault() work for FRED
x86/fred: Allow single-step trap and NMI when starting a new task
x86/fred: No ESPFIX needed when FRED is enabled
...
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Zen, APIC MSR fence changes
To pick the changes from:
1e536e10689700e0 ("x86/cpu: Detect TDX partial write machine check erratum")
765a0542fdc7aad7 ("x86/virt/tdx: Detect TDX during kernel boot")
30fa92832f405d5a ("x86/CPU/AMD: Add ZenX generations flags")
04c3024560d3a14a ("x86/barrier: Do not serialize MSR accesses on AMD")
This causes these perf files to be rebuilt and brings some X86_FEATURE
that will be used when updating the copies of
tools/arch/x86/lib/mem{cpy,set}_64.S with the kernel sources:
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memcpy-x86-64-asm.o
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memset-x86-64-asm.o
And addresses this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header differences:
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
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Add CPU feature detection for Secure Encrypted Virtualization with
Secure Nested Paging. This feature adds a strong memory integrity
protection to help prevent malicious hypervisor-based attacks like
data replay, memory re-mapping, and more.
Since enabling the SNP CPU feature imposes a number of additional
requirements on host initialization and handling legacy firmware APIs
for SEV/SEV-ES guests, only introduce the CPU feature bit so that the
relevant handling can be added, but leave it disabled via a
disabled-features mask.
Once all the necessary changes needed to maintain legacy SEV/SEV-ES
support are introduced in subsequent patches, the SNP feature bit will
be unmasked/enabled.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@profian.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240126041126.1927228-2-michael.roth@amd.com
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Any FRED enabled CPU will always have the following features as its
baseline:
1) LKGS, load attributes of the GS segment but the base address into
the IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE MSR instead of the GS segment’s descriptor
cache.
2) WRMSRNS, non-serializing WRMSR for faster MSR writes.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231205105030.8698-7-xin3.li@intel.com
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WRMSRNS is an instruction that behaves exactly like WRMSR, with
the only difference being that it is not a serializing instruction
by default. Under certain conditions, WRMSRNS may replace WRMSR to
improve performance.
Add its CPU feature bit, opcode to the x86 opcode map, and an
always inline API __wrmsrns() to embed WRMSRNS into the code.
Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@intel.com>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231205105030.8698-2-xin3.li@intel.com
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 cpu feature updates from Borislav Petkov:
- Add synthetic X86_FEATURE flags for the different AMD Zen generations
and use them everywhere instead of ad-hoc family/model checks. Drop
an ancient AMD errata checking facility as a result
- Fix a fragile initcall ordering in intel_epb
- Do not issue the MFENCE+LFENCE barrier for the TSC deadline and
X2APIC MSRs on AMD as it is not needed there
* tag 'x86_cpu_for_v6.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/CPU/AMD: Add X86_FEATURE_ZEN1
x86/CPU/AMD: Drop now unused CPU erratum checking function
x86/CPU/AMD: Get rid of amd_erratum_1485[]
x86/CPU/AMD: Get rid of amd_erratum_400[]
x86/CPU/AMD: Get rid of amd_erratum_383[]
x86/CPU/AMD: Get rid of amd_erratum_1054[]
x86/CPU/AMD: Move the DIV0 bug detection to the Zen1 init function
x86/CPU/AMD: Move Zenbleed check to the Zen2 init function
x86/CPU/AMD: Rename init_amd_zn() to init_amd_zen_common()
x86/CPU/AMD: Call the spectral chicken in the Zen2 init function
x86/CPU/AMD: Move erratum 1076 fix into the Zen1 init function
x86/CPU/AMD: Move the Zen3 BTC_NO detection to the Zen3 init function
x86/CPU/AMD: Carve out the erratum 1386 fix
x86/CPU/AMD: Add ZenX generations flags
x86/cpu/intel_epb: Don't rely on link order
x86/barrier: Do not serialize MSR accesses on AMD
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Add a synthetic feature flag specifically for first generation Zen
machines. There's need to have a generic flag for all Zen generations so
make X86_FEATURE_ZEN be that flag.
Fixes: 30fa92832f40 ("x86/CPU/AMD: Add ZenX generations flags")
Suggested-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/dc3835e3-0731-4230-bbb9-336bbe3d042b@amd.com
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tldr; Just FYI, I'm carrying this on the perf tools tree.
Full explanation:
There used to be no copies, with tools/ code using kernel headers
directly. From time to time tools/perf/ broke due to legitimate kernel
hacking. At some point Linus complained about such direct usage. Then we
adopted the current model.
The way these headers are used in perf are not restricted to just
including them to compile something.
There are sometimes used in scripts that convert defines into string
tables, etc, so some change may break one of these scripts, or new MSRs
may use some different #define pattern, etc.
E.g.:
$ ls -1 tools/perf/trace/beauty/*.sh | head -5
tools/perf/trace/beauty/arch_errno_names.sh
tools/perf/trace/beauty/drm_ioctl.sh
tools/perf/trace/beauty/fadvise.sh
tools/perf/trace/beauty/fsconfig.sh
tools/perf/trace/beauty/fsmount.sh
$
$ tools/perf/trace/beauty/fadvise.sh
static const char *fadvise_advices[] = {
[0] = "NORMAL",
[1] = "RANDOM",
[2] = "SEQUENTIAL",
[3] = "WILLNEED",
[4] = "DONTNEED",
[5] = "NOREUSE",
};
$
The tools/perf/check-headers.sh script, part of the tools/ build
process, points out changes in the original files.
So its important not to touch the copies in tools/ when doing changes in
the original kernel headers, that will be done later, when
check-headers.sh inform about the change to the perf tools hackers.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231121225650.390246-8-namhyung@kernel.org
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KVM: x86: SVM changes for 6.6:
- Add support for SEV-ES DebugSwap, i.e. allow SEV-ES guests to use debug
registers and generate/handle #DBs
- Clean up LBR virtualization code
- Fix a bug where KVM fails to set the target pCPU during an IRTE update
- Fix fatal bugs in SEV-ES intrahost migration
- Fix a bug where the recent (architecturally correct) change to reinject
#BP and skip INT3 broke SEV guests (can't decode INT3 to skip it)
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Add support for "DebugSwap for SEV-ES guests", which provides support
for swapping DR[0-3] and DR[0-3]_ADDR_MASK on VMRUN and VMEXIT, i.e.
allows KVM to expose debug capabilities to SEV-ES guests. Without
DebugSwap support, the CPU doesn't save/load most _guest_ debug
registers (except DR6/7), and KVM cannot manually context switch guest
DRs due the VMSA being encrypted.
Enable DebugSwap if and only if the CPU also supports NoNestedDataBp,
which causes the CPU to ignore nested #DBs, i.e. #DBs that occur when
vectoring a #DB. Without NoNestedDataBp, a malicious guest can DoS
the host by putting the CPU into an infinite loop of vectoring #DBs
(see https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1278496)
Set the features bit in sev_es_sync_vmsa() which is the last point
when VMSA is not encrypted yet as sev_(es_)init_vmcb() (where the most
init happens) is called not only when VCPU is initialised but also on
intrahost migration when VMSA is encrypted.
Eliminate DR7 intercepts as KVM can't modify guest DR7, and intercepting
DR7 would completely defeat the purpose of enabling DebugSwap.
Make X86_FEATURE_DEBUG_SWAP appear in /proc/cpuinfo (by not adding "") to
let the operator know if the VM can debug.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230615063757.3039121-7-aik@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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There was never a doubt in my mind that they would not fit into a single
u32 eventually.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
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To pick the changes from:
3d8f61bf8bcd69bc ("x86: KVM: Add common feature flag for AMD's PSFD")
3763bf58029f3459 ("x86/cpufeatures: Redefine synthetic virtual NMI bit as AMD's "real" vNMI")
6449dcb0cac73821 ("x86: CPUID and CR3/CR4 flags for Linear Address Masking")
be8de49bea505e77 ("x86/speculation: Identify processors vulnerable to SMT RSB predictions")
e7862eda309ecfcc ("x86/cpu: Support AMD Automatic IBRS")
faabfcb194a8d068 ("x86/cpu, kvm: Add the SMM_CTL MSR not present feature")
5b909d4ae59aedc7 ("x86/cpu, kvm: Add the Null Selector Clears Base feature")
84168ae786f8a15a ("x86/cpu, kvm: Move X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC to its native leaf")
a9dc9ec5a1fafc3d ("x86/cpu, kvm: Add the NO_NESTED_DATA_BP feature")
f8df91e73a6827a4 ("x86/cpufeatures: Add macros for Intel's new fast rep string features")
78335aac6156eada ("x86/cpufeatures: Add Bandwidth Monitoring Event Configuration feature flag")
f334f723a63cfc25 ("x86/cpufeatures: Add Slow Memory Bandwidth Allocation feature flag")
a018d2e3d4b1abc4 ("x86/cpufeatures: Add Architectural PerfMon Extension bit")
This causes these perf files to be rebuilt and brings some X86_FEATURE
that will be used when updating the copies of
tools/arch/x86/lib/mem{cpy,set}_64.S with the kernel sources:
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memcpy-x86-64-asm.o
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memset-x86-64-asm.o
And addresses this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ZGTTw642q8mWgv2Y@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/acme/linux
Pull perf tools fixes from Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo:
- Add Adrian Hunter to MAINTAINERS as a perf tools reviewer
- Sync various tools/ copies of kernel headers with the kernel sources,
this time trying to avoid first merging with upstream to then update
but instead copy from upstream so that a merge is avoided and the end
result after merging this pull request is the one expected,
tools/perf/check-headers.sh (mostly) happy, less warnings while
building tools/perf/
- Fix counting when initial delay configured by setting
perf_attr.enable_on_exec when starting workloads from the perf
command line
- Don't avoid emitting a PERF_RECORD_MMAP2 in 'perf inject
--buildid-all' when that record comes with a build-id, otherwise we
end up not being able to resolve symbols
- Don't use comma as the CSV output separator the "stat+csv_output"
test, as comma can appear on some tests as a modifier for an event,
use @ instead, ditto for the JSON linter test
- The offcpu test was looking for some bits being set on
task_struct->prev_state without masking other bits not important for
this specific 'perf test', fix it
* tag 'perf-tools-fixes-for-v6.3-1-2023-03-09' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/acme/linux:
perf tools: Add Adrian Hunter to MAINTAINERS as a reviewer
tools headers UAPI: Sync linux/perf_event.h with the kernel sources
tools headers x86 cpufeatures: Sync with the kernel sources
tools include UAPI: Sync linux/vhost.h with the kernel sources
tools arch x86: Sync the msr-index.h copy with the kernel sources
tools headers kvm: Sync uapi/{asm/linux} kvm.h headers with the kernel sources
tools include UAPI: Synchronize linux/fcntl.h with the kernel sources
tools headers: Synchronize {linux,vdso}/bits.h with the kernel sources
tools headers UAPI: Sync linux/prctl.h with the kernel sources
tools headers: Update the copy of x86's mem{cpy,set}_64.S used in 'perf bench'
perf stat: Fix counting when initial delay configured
tools headers svm: Sync svm headers with the kernel sources
perf test: Avoid counting commas in json linter
perf tests stat+csv_output: Switch CSV separator to @
perf inject: Fix --buildid-all not to eat up MMAP2
tools arch x86: Sync the msr-index.h copy with the kernel sources
perf test: Fix offcpu test prev_state check
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To pick the changes from:
8415a74852d7c247 ("x86/cpu, kvm: Add support for CPUID_80000021_EAX")
This only causes these perf files to be rebuilt:
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memcpy-x86-64-asm.o
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memset-x86-64-asm.o
And addresses these perf build warnings:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ZAYlS2XTJ5hRtss7@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
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Add the CPU feature bit for LKGS (Load "Kernel" GS).
LKGS instruction is introduced with Intel FRED (flexible return and
event delivery) specification. Search for the latest FRED spec in most
search engines with this search pattern:
site:intel.com FRED (flexible return and event delivery) specification
LKGS behaves like the MOV to GS instruction except that it loads
the base address into the IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE MSR instead of the
GS segment’s descriptor cache, which is exactly what Linux kernel
does to load a user level GS base. Thus, with LKGS, there is no
need to SWAPGS away from the kernel GS base.
[ mingo: Minor tweaks to the description. ]
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230112072032.35626-2-xin3.li@intel.com
|
|
To pick the changes from:
5e85c4ebf206e50c ("x86: KVM: Advertise AVX-IFMA CPUID to user space")
af2872f622547656 ("x86: KVM: Advertise AMX-FP16 CPUID to user space")
6a19d7aa5821522e ("x86: KVM: Advertise CMPccXADD CPUID to user space")
aaa65d17eec372c6 ("x86/tsx: Add a feature bit for TSX control MSR support")
b1599915f09157e9 ("x86/cpufeatures: Move X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH from bit 18 to bit 19 of word 11, to leave space for WIP X86_FEATURE_SGX_EDECCSSA bit")
16a7fe3728a8b832 ("KVM/VMX: Allow exposing EDECCSSA user leaf function to KVM guest")
80e4c1cd42fff110 ("x86/retbleed: Add X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH")
7df548840c496b01 ("x86/bugs: Add "unknown" reporting for MMIO Stale Data")
This only causes these perf files to be rebuilt:
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memcpy-x86-64-asm.o
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memset-x86-64-asm.o
And addresses this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiaxi Chen <jiaxi.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Y6CD%2FIcEbDW5X%2FpN@kernel.org/
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
To pick the changes from:
257449c6a50298bd ("x86/cpufeatures: Add LbrExtV2 feature bit")
This only causes these perf files to be rebuilt:
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memcpy-x86-64-asm.o
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memset-x86-64-asm.o
And addresses this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sandipan Das <sandipan.das@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Y1g6vGPqPhOrXoaN@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
To pick the changes from:
7df548840c496b01 ("x86/bugs: Add "unknown" reporting for MMIO Stale Data")
This only causes these perf files to be rebuilt:
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memcpy-x86-64-asm.o
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memset-x86-64-asm.o
And addresses this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YysTRji90sNn2p5f@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
To pick the changes from:
2b1299322016731d ("x86/speculation: Add RSB VM Exit protections")
28a99e95f55c6185 ("x86/amd: Use IBPB for firmware calls")
4ad3278df6fe2b08 ("x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior")
26aae8ccbc197223 ("x86/cpu/amd: Enumerate BTC_NO")
9756bba28470722d ("x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRS")
3ebc170068885b6f ("x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpb")
2dbb887e875b1de3 ("x86/entry: Add kernel IBRS implementation")
6b80b59b35557065 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability")
a149180fbcf336e9 ("x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk")
15e67227c49a5783 ("x86: Undo return-thunk damage")
a883d624aed463c8 ("x86/cpufeatures: Move RETPOLINE flags to word 11")
aae99a7c9ab371b2 ("x86/cpufeatures: Introduce x2AVIC CPUID bit")
6f33a9daff9f0790 ("x86: Fix comment for X86_FEATURE_ZEN")
51802186158c74a0 ("x86/speculation/mmio: Enumerate Processor MMIO Stale Data bug")
This only causes these perf files to be rebuilt:
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memcpy-x86-64-asm.o
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memset-x86-64-asm.o
And addresses this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Cc: Wyes Karny <wyes.karny@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Yvznmu5oHv0ZDN2w@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
tl;dr: The Enhanced IBRS mitigation for Spectre v2 does not work as
documented for RET instructions after VM exits. Mitigate it with a new
one-entry RSB stuffing mechanism and a new LFENCE.
== Background ==
Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) was designed to help
mitigate Branch Target Injection and Speculative Store Bypass, i.e.
Spectre, attacks. IBRS prevents software run in less privileged modes
from affecting branch prediction in more privileged modes. IBRS requires
the MSR to be written on every privilege level change.
To overcome some of the performance issues of IBRS, Enhanced IBRS was
introduced. eIBRS is an "always on" IBRS, in other words, just turn
it on once instead of writing the MSR on every privilege level change.
When eIBRS is enabled, more privileged modes should be protected from
less privileged modes, including protecting VMMs from guests.
== Problem ==
Here's a simplification of how guests are run on Linux' KVM:
void run_kvm_guest(void)
{
// Prepare to run guest
VMRESUME();
// Clean up after guest runs
}
The execution flow for that would look something like this to the
processor:
1. Host-side: call run_kvm_guest()
2. Host-side: VMRESUME
3. Guest runs, does "CALL guest_function"
4. VM exit, host runs again
5. Host might make some "cleanup" function calls
6. Host-side: RET from run_kvm_guest()
Now, when back on the host, there are a couple of possible scenarios of
post-guest activity the host needs to do before executing host code:
* on pre-eIBRS hardware (legacy IBRS, or nothing at all), the RSB is not
touched and Linux has to do a 32-entry stuffing.
* on eIBRS hardware, VM exit with IBRS enabled, or restoring the host
IBRS=1 shortly after VM exit, has a documented side effect of flushing
the RSB except in this PBRSB situation where the software needs to stuff
the last RSB entry "by hand".
IOW, with eIBRS supported, host RET instructions should no longer be
influenced by guest behavior after the host retires a single CALL
instruction.
However, if the RET instructions are "unbalanced" with CALLs after a VM
exit as is the RET in #6, it might speculatively use the address for the
instruction after the CALL in #3 as an RSB prediction. This is a problem
since the (untrusted) guest controls this address.
Balanced CALL/RET instruction pairs such as in step #5 are not affected.
== Solution ==
The PBRSB issue affects a wide variety of Intel processors which
support eIBRS. But not all of them need mitigation. Today,
X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT triggers an RSB filling sequence that mitigates
PBRSB. Systems setting RSB_VMEXIT need no further mitigation - i.e.,
eIBRS systems which enable legacy IBRS explicitly.
However, such systems (X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED) do not set RSB_VMEXIT
and most of them need a new mitigation.
Therefore, introduce a new feature flag X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE
which triggers a lighter-weight PBRSB mitigation versus RSB_VMEXIT.
The lighter-weight mitigation performs a CALL instruction which is
immediately followed by a speculative execution barrier (INT3). This
steers speculative execution to the barrier -- just like a retpoline
-- which ensures that speculation can never reach an unbalanced RET.
Then, ensure this CALL is retired before continuing execution with an
LFENCE.
In other words, the window of exposure is opened at VM exit where RET
behavior is troublesome. While the window is open, force RSB predictions
sampling for RET targets to a dead end at the INT3. Close the window
with the LFENCE.
There is a subset of eIBRS systems which are not vulnerable to PBRSB.
Add these systems to the cpu_vuln_whitelist[] as NO_EIBRS_PBRSB.
Future systems that aren't vulnerable will set ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO.
[ bp: Massage, incorporate review comments from Andy Cooper. ]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
|
|
To pick the changes from:
28a99e95f55c6185 ("x86/amd: Use IBPB for firmware calls")
This only causes these perf files to be rebuilt:
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memcpy-x86-64-asm.o
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memset-x86-64-asm.o
And addresses this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Yt6oWce9UDAmBAtX@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
To pick the changes from:
f43b9876e857c739 ("x86/retbleed: Add fine grained Kconfig knobs")
a149180fbcf336e9 ("x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk")
15e67227c49a5783 ("x86: Undo return-thunk damage")
369ae6ffc41a3c11 ("x86/retpoline: Cleanup some #ifdefery")
4ad3278df6fe2b08 x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior
26aae8ccbc197223 x86/cpu/amd: Enumerate BTC_NO
9756bba28470722d x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRS
3ebc170068885b6f x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpb
2dbb887e875b1de3 x86/entry: Add kernel IBRS implementation
6b80b59b35557065 x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability
a149180fbcf336e9 x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk
15e67227c49a5783 x86: Undo return-thunk damage
a883d624aed463c8 x86/cpufeatures: Move RETPOLINE flags to word 11
51802186158c74a0 x86/speculation/mmio: Enumerate Processor MMIO Stale Data bug
This only causes these perf files to be rebuilt:
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memcpy-x86-64-asm.o
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memset-x86-64-asm.o
And addresses this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YtQM40VmiLTkPND2@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
To pick the changes from:
d6d0c7f681fda1d0 ("x86/cpufeatures: Add PerfMonV2 feature bit")
296d5a17e793956f ("KVM: SEV-ES: Use V_TSC_AUX if available instead of RDTSC/MSR_TSC_AUX intercepts")
f30903394eb62316 ("x86/cpufeatures: Add virtual TSC_AUX feature bit")
8ad7e8f696951f19 ("x86/fpu/xsave: Support XSAVEC in the kernel")
59bd54a84d15e933 ("x86/tdx: Detect running as a TDX guest in early boot")
a77d41ac3a0f41c8 ("x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD Fam19h Branch Sampling feature")
This only causes these perf files to be rebuilt:
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memcpy-x86-64-asm.o
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memset-x86-64-asm.o
And addresses this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sandipan Das <sandipan.das@amd.com>
Cc: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YrDkgmwhLv+nKeOo@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
Processor MMIO Stale Data is a class of vulnerabilities that may
expose data after an MMIO operation. For more details please refer to
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst
Add the Processor MMIO Stale Data bug enumeration. A microcode update
adds new bits to the MSR IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, define them.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
|
|
To pick the changes from:
991625f3dd2cbc4b ("x86/ibt: Add IBT feature, MSR and #CP handling")
This only causes these perf files to be rebuilt:
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memcpy-x86-64-asm.o
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memset-x86-64-asm.o
And addresses this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YkSCx2kr4ambH+Qe@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
To pick the changes from:
fa31a4d669bd471e ("x86/cpufeatures: Put the AMX macros in the word 18 block")
7b8f40b3de75c971 ("x86/cpu: Add definitions for the Intel Hardware Feedback Interface")
This only causes these perf files to be rebuilt:
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memcpy-x86-64-asm.o
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memset-x86-64-asm.o
And addresses this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YjzZPxdyLjf76gM+@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
To pick the changes from:
d45476d983240937 ("x86/speculation: Rename RETPOLINE_AMD to RETPOLINE_LFENCE")
Its just a comment fixup.
This only causes these perf files to be rebuilt:
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memcpy-x86-64-asm.o
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memset-x86-64-asm.o
And addresses this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YiyiHatGaJQM7l/Y@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
|
The RETPOLINE_AMD name is unfortunate since it isn't necessarily
AMD only, in fact Hygon also uses it. Furthermore it will likely be
sufficient for some Intel processors. Therefore rename the thing to
RETPOLINE_LFENCE to better describe what it is.
Add the spectre_v2=retpoline,lfence option as an alias to
spectre_v2=retpoline,amd to preserve existing setups. However, the output
of /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2 will be changed.
[ bp: Fix typos, massage. ]
Co-developed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
|
|
To pick the changes from:
690a757d610e50c2 ("kvm: x86: Add CPUID support for Intel AMX")
This only causes these perf files to be rebuilt:
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memcpy-x86-64-asm.o
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memset-x86-64-asm.o
And addresses this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
Cc: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YflQCEO9FRLeTmlB@kernel.org/
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
|
