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Use asm_inline() to instruct the compiler that the size of asm()
is the minimum size of one instruction, ignoring how many instructions
the compiler thinks it is. ALTERNATIVE macro that expands to several
pseudo directives causes instruction length estimate to count
more than 20 instructions.
bloat-o-meter reports minimal code size increase
(x86_64 defconfig with CONFIG_ADDRESS_MASKING, gcc-14.2.1):
add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 5/1 up/down: 2365/-1995 (370)
Function old new delta
-----------------------------------------------------
do_get_mempolicy - 1449 +1449
copy_nodes_to_user - 226 +226
__x64_sys_get_mempolicy 35 213 +178
syscall_user_dispatch_set_config 157 332 +175
__ia32_sys_get_mempolicy 31 206 +175
set_syscall_user_dispatch 29 181 +152
__do_sys_mremap 2073 2083 +10
sp_insert 133 117 -16
task_set_syscall_user_dispatch 172 - -172
kernel_get_mempolicy 1807 - -1807
Total: Before=21423151, After=21423521, chg +0.00%
The code size increase is due to the compiler inlining
more functions that inline untagged_addr(), e.g:
task_set_syscall_user_dispatch() is now fully inlined in
set_syscall_user_dispatch():
000000000010b7e0 <set_syscall_user_dispatch>:
10b7e0: f3 0f 1e fa endbr64
10b7e4: 49 89 c8 mov %rcx,%r8
10b7e7: 48 89 d1 mov %rdx,%rcx
10b7ea: 48 89 f2 mov %rsi,%rdx
10b7ed: 48 89 fe mov %rdi,%rsi
10b7f0: 65 48 8b 3d 00 00 00 mov %gs:0x0(%rip),%rdi
10b7f7: 00
10b7f8: e9 03 fe ff ff jmp 10b600 <task_set_syscall_user_dispatch>
that after inlining becomes:
000000000010b730 <set_syscall_user_dispatch>:
10b730: f3 0f 1e fa endbr64
10b734: 65 48 8b 05 00 00 00 mov %gs:0x0(%rip),%rax
10b73b: 00
10b73c: 48 85 ff test %rdi,%rdi
10b73f: 74 54 je 10b795 <set_syscall_user_dispatch+0x65>
10b741: 48 83 ff 01 cmp $0x1,%rdi
10b745: 74 06 je 10b74d <set_syscall_user_dispatch+0x1d>
10b747: b8 ea ff ff ff mov $0xffffffea,%eax
10b74c: c3 ret
10b74d: 48 85 f6 test %rsi,%rsi
10b750: 75 7b jne 10b7cd <set_syscall_user_dispatch+0x9d>
10b752: 48 85 c9 test %rcx,%rcx
10b755: 74 1a je 10b771 <set_syscall_user_dispatch+0x41>
10b757: 48 89 cf mov %rcx,%rdi
10b75a: 49 b8 ef cd ab 89 67 movabs $0x123456789abcdef,%r8
10b761: 45 23 01
10b764: 90 nop
10b765: 90 nop
10b766: 90 nop
10b767: 90 nop
10b768: 90 nop
10b769: 90 nop
10b76a: 90 nop
10b76b: 90 nop
10b76c: 49 39 f8 cmp %rdi,%r8
10b76f: 72 6e jb 10b7df <set_syscall_user_dispatch+0xaf>
10b771: 48 89 88 48 08 00 00 mov %rcx,0x848(%rax)
10b778: 48 89 b0 50 08 00 00 mov %rsi,0x850(%rax)
10b77f: 48 89 90 58 08 00 00 mov %rdx,0x858(%rax)
10b786: c6 80 60 08 00 00 00 movb $0x0,0x860(%rax)
10b78d: f0 80 48 08 20 lock orb $0x20,0x8(%rax)
10b792: 31 c0 xor %eax,%eax
10b794: c3 ret
10b795: 48 09 d1 or %rdx,%rcx
10b798: 48 09 f1 or %rsi,%rcx
10b79b: 75 aa jne 10b747 <set_syscall_user_dispatch+0x17>
10b79d: 48 c7 80 48 08 00 00 movq $0x0,0x848(%rax)
10b7a4: 00 00 00 00
10b7a8: 48 c7 80 50 08 00 00 movq $0x0,0x850(%rax)
10b7af: 00 00 00 00
10b7b3: 48 c7 80 58 08 00 00 movq $0x0,0x858(%rax)
10b7ba: 00 00 00 00
10b7be: c6 80 60 08 00 00 00 movb $0x0,0x860(%rax)
10b7c5: f0 80 60 08 df lock andb $0xdf,0x8(%rax)
10b7ca: 31 c0 xor %eax,%eax
10b7cc: c3 ret
10b7cd: 48 8d 3c 16 lea (%rsi,%rdx,1),%rdi
10b7d1: 48 39 fe cmp %rdi,%rsi
10b7d4: 0f 82 78 ff ff ff jb 10b752 <set_syscall_user_dispatch+0x22>
10b7da: e9 68 ff ff ff jmp 10b747 <set_syscall_user_dispatch+0x17>
10b7df: b8 f2 ff ff ff mov $0xfffffff2,%eax
10b7e4: c3 ret
Please note a series of NOPs that get replaced with an alternative:
11f0: 65 48 23 05 00 00 00 and %gs:0x0(%rip),%rax
11f7: 00
Signed-off-by: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250407072129.33440-1-ubizjak@gmail.com
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This works around what seems to be an optimization bug in GCC (at least
13.3.0), where it predicts access_ok() to fail despite the hint to the
contrary.
_copy_to_user() contains:
if (access_ok(to, n)) {
instrument_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
n = raw_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
}
Where access_ok() is likely(__access_ok(addr, size)), yet the compiler
emits conditional jumps forward for the case where it succeeds:
<+0>: endbr64
<+4>: mov %rdx,%rcx
<+7>: mov %rdx,%rax
<+10>: xor %edx,%edx
<+12>: add %rdi,%rcx
<+15>: setb %dl
<+18>: movabs $0x123456789abcdef,%r8
<+28>: test %rdx,%rdx
<+31>: jne 0xffffffff81b3b7c6 <_copy_to_user+38>
<+33>: cmp %rcx,%r8
<+36>: jae 0xffffffff81b3b7cb <_copy_to_user+43>
<+38>: jmp 0xffffffff822673e0 <__x86_return_thunk>
<+43>: nop
<+44>: nop
<+45>: nop
<+46>: mov %rax,%rcx
<+49>: rep movsb %ds:(%rsi),%es:(%rdi)
<+51>: nop
<+52>: nop
<+53>: nop
<+54>: mov %rcx,%rax
<+57>: nop
<+58>: nop
<+59>: nop
<+60>: jmp 0xffffffff822673e0 <__x86_return_thunk>
Patching _copy_to_user() to likely() around the access_ok() use does
not change the asm.
However, spelling out the prediction *within* valid_user_address() does the
trick:
<+0>: endbr64
<+4>: xor %eax,%eax
<+6>: mov %rdx,%rcx
<+9>: add %rdi,%rdx
<+12>: setb %al
<+15>: movabs $0x123456789abcdef,%r8
<+25>: test %rax,%rax
<+28>: jne 0xffffffff81b315e6 <_copy_to_user+54>
<+30>: cmp %rdx,%r8
<+33>: jb 0xffffffff81b315e6 <_copy_to_user+54>
<+35>: nop
<+36>: nop
<+37>: nop
<+38>: rep movsb %ds:(%rsi),%es:(%rdi)
<+40>: nop
<+41>: nop
<+42>: nop
<+43>: nop
<+44>: nop
<+45>: nop
<+46>: mov %rcx,%rax
<+49>: jmp 0xffffffff82255ba0 <__x86_return_thunk>
<+54>: mov %rcx,%rax
<+57>: jmp 0xffffffff82255ba0 <__x86_return_thunk>
Since we kinda expect valid_user_address() to be likely anyway,
add the likely() annotation that also happens to work around
this compiler bug.
[ mingo: Moved the unlikely() branch into valid_user_address() & updated the changelog ]
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250401203029.1132135-1-mjguzik@gmail.com
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This was a suggestion by David Laight, and while I was slightly worried
that some micro-architecture would predict cmov like a conditional
branch, there is little reason to actually believe any core would be
that broken.
Intel documents that their existing cores treat CMOVcc as a data
dependency that will constrain speculation in their "Speculative
Execution Side Channel Mitigations" whitepaper:
"Other instructions such as CMOVcc, AND, ADC, SBB and SETcc can also
be used to prevent bounds check bypass by constraining speculative
execution on current family 6 processors (Intel® Core™, Intel® Atom™,
Intel® Xeon® and Intel® Xeon Phi™ processors)"
and while that leaves the future uarch issues open, that's certainly
true of our traditional SBB usage too.
Any core that predicts CMOV will be unusable for various crypto
algorithms that need data-independent timing stability, so let's just
treat CMOV as the safe choice that simplifies the address masking by
avoiding an extra instruction and doesn't need a temporary register.
Suggested-by: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Link: https://www.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/336996-speculative-execution-side-channel-mitigations.pdf
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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It turns out that AMD has a "Meltdown Lite(tm)" issue with non-canonical
accesses in kernel space. And so using just the high bit to decide
whether an access is in user space or kernel space ends up with the good
old "leak speculative data" if you have the right gadget using the
result:
CVE-2020-12965 “Transient Execution of Non-Canonical Accesses“
Now, the kernel surrounds the access with a STAC/CLAC pair, and those
instructions end up serializing execution on older Zen architectures,
which closes the speculation window.
But that was true only up until Zen 5, which renames the AC bit [1].
That improves performance of STAC/CLAC a lot, but also means that the
speculation window is now open.
Note that this affects not just the new address masking, but also the
regular valid_user_address() check used by access_ok(), and the asm
version of the sign bit check in the get_user() helpers.
It does not affect put_user() or clear_user() variants, since there's no
speculative result to be used in a gadget for those operations.
Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/80d94591-1297-4afb-b510-c665efd37f10@citrix.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241023094448.GAZxjFkEOOF_DM83TQ@fat_crate.local/ [1]
Link: https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-1010.html
Link: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2108.10771
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Tested-by: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman@intel.com> # LAM case
Fixes: 2865baf54077 ("x86: support user address masking instead of non-speculative conditional")
Fixes: 6014bc27561f ("x86-64: make access_ok() independent of LAM")
Fixes: b19b74bc99b1 ("x86/mm: Rework address range check in get_user() and put_user()")
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This doesn't actually matter for any of the current users, but before
merging it mainline, make sure we don't have any surprising semantics.
We don't actually want to use an inline function here, because we want
to allow - but not require - const pointer arguments, and return them as
such. But we already had a local auto-type variable, so let's just use
it to avoid any possible double evaluation.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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In any normal situation this really shouldn't matter, but in case the
address passed in to masked_user_access_begin() were to be some complex
expression, we should evaluate it fully before doing the 'stac'
instruction.
And even without that issue (which objdump would pick up on for any
really bad case), just in general we should strive to minimize the
amount of code we run with user accesses enabled.
For example, even for the trivial pselect6() case, the code generation
(obviously with a non-debug build) just diff with this ends up being
- stac
mov %rax,%rcx
sar $0x3f,%rcx
or %rax,%rcx
+ stac
mov (%rcx),%r13
mov 0x8(%rcx),%r14
clac
so the area delimeted by the 'stac / clac' pair is now literally just
the two user access instructions, and the address generation has been
moved out to before that code.
This will be much more noticeable if we end up deciding that we can go
back to just inlining "get_user()" using the new masked user access
model. The get_user() pointers can often be more complex expressions
involving kernel memory accesses or even function calls.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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The Spectre-v1 mitigations made "access_ok()" much more expensive, since
it has to serialize execution with the test for a valid user address.
All the normal user copy routines avoid this by just masking the user
address with a data-dependent mask instead, but the fast
"unsafe_user_read()" kind of patterms that were supposed to be a fast
case got slowed down.
This introduces a notion of using
src = masked_user_access_begin(src);
to do the user address sanity using a data-dependent mask instead of the
more traditional conditional
if (user_read_access_begin(src, len)) {
model.
This model only works for dense accesses that start at 'src' and on
architectures that have a guard region that is guaranteed to fault in
between the user space and the kernel space area.
With this, the user access doesn't need to be manually checked, because
a bad address is guaranteed to fault (by some architecture masking
trick: on x86-64 this involves just turning an invalid user address into
all ones, since we don't map the top of address space).
This only converts a couple of examples for now. Example x86-64 code
generation for loading two words from user space:
stac
mov %rax,%rcx
sar $0x3f,%rcx
or %rax,%rcx
mov (%rcx),%r13
mov 0x8(%rcx),%r14
clac
where all the error handling and -EFAULT is now purely handled out of
line by the exception path.
Of course, if the micro-architecture does badly at 'clac' and 'stac',
the above is still pitifully slow. But at least we did as well as we
could.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull core x86 updates from Ingo Molnar:
- The biggest change is the rework of the percpu code, to support the
'Named Address Spaces' GCC feature, by Uros Bizjak:
- This allows C code to access GS and FS segment relative memory
via variables declared with such attributes, which allows the
compiler to better optimize those accesses than the previous
inline assembly code.
- The series also includes a number of micro-optimizations for
various percpu access methods, plus a number of cleanups of %gs
accesses in assembly code.
- These changes have been exposed to linux-next testing for the
last ~5 months, with no known regressions in this area.
- Fix/clean up __switch_to()'s broken but accidentally working handling
of FPU switching - which also generates better code
- Propagate more RIP-relative addressing in assembly code, to generate
slightly better code
- Rework the CPU mitigations Kconfig space to be less idiosyncratic, to
make it easier for distros to follow & maintain these options
- Rework the x86 idle code to cure RCU violations and to clean up the
logic
- Clean up the vDSO Makefile logic
- Misc cleanups and fixes
* tag 'x86-core-2024-03-11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (52 commits)
x86/idle: Select idle routine only once
x86/idle: Let prefer_mwait_c1_over_halt() return bool
x86/idle: Cleanup idle_setup()
x86/idle: Clean up idle selection
x86/idle: Sanitize X86_BUG_AMD_E400 handling
sched/idle: Conditionally handle tick broadcast in default_idle_call()
x86: Increase brk randomness entropy for 64-bit systems
x86/vdso: Move vDSO to mmap region
x86/vdso/kbuild: Group non-standard build attributes and primary object file rules together
x86/vdso: Fix rethunk patching for vdso-image-{32,64}.o
x86/retpoline: Ensure default return thunk isn't used at runtime
x86/vdso: Use CONFIG_COMPAT_32 to specify vdso32
x86/vdso: Use $(addprefix ) instead of $(foreach )
x86/vdso: Simplify obj-y addition
x86/vdso: Consolidate targets and clean-files
x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_RETHUNK => CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK
x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_CPU_SRSO => CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO
x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY => CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY
x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY => CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY
x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_SLS => CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS
...
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valid_user_address()
Sparse complains about losing the __user address space due to the cast to
long:
uaccess_64.h:88:24: sparse: warning: cast removes address space '__user' of expression
Annotate it with __force to tell sparse that this is intentional.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240304005104.677606054@linutronix.de
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%RIP-relative addresses are nowadays correctly handled in alternative
instructions, so remove misleading comment and improve assembly to
use %RIP-relative address.
Also, explicitly using %gs: prefix will segfault for non-SMP builds.
Use macros from percpu.h which will DTRT with segment prefix register
as far as SMP/non-SMP builds are concerned.
Signed-off-by: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradaed.org>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231213150357.5942-1-ubizjak%40gmail.com
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Intel CPUs ship with ERMS for over a decade, but this is not true for
AMD. In particular one reasonably recent uarch (EPYC 7R13) does not
have it (or at least the bit is inactive when running on the Amazon EC2
cloud -- I found rather conflicting information about AMD CPUs vs the
extension).
Hand-rolled mov loops executing in this case are quite pessimal compared
to rep movsq for bigger sizes. While the upper limit depends on uarch,
everyone is well south of 1KB AFAICS and sizes bigger than that are
common.
While technically ancient CPUs may be suffering from rep usage, gcc has
been emitting it for years all over kernel code, so I don't think this
is a legitimate concern.
Sample result from read1_processes from will-it-scale (4KB reads/s):
before: 1507021
after: 1721828 (+14%)
Note that the cutoff point for rep usage is set to 64 bytes, which is
way too conservative but I'm sticking to what was done in 47ee3f1dd93b
("x86: re-introduce support for ERMS copies for user space accesses").
That is to say *some* copies will now go slower, which is fixable but
beyond the scope of this patch.
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Dave Hansen found the "(long) addr >= 0" code in the x86-64 access_ok
checks somewhat confusing, and suggested using a helper to clarify what
the code is doing.
So this does exactly that: clarifying what the sign bit check is all
about, by adding a helper macro that makes it clear what it is testing.
This also adds some explicit comments talking about how even with LAM
enabled, any addresses with the sign bit will still GP-fault in the
non-canonical region just above the sign bit.
This is all what allows us to do the user address checks with just the
sign bit, and furthermore be a bit cavalier about accesses that might be
done with an additional offset even past that point.
(And yes, this talks about 'positive' even though zero is also a valid
user address and so technically we should call them 'non-negative'. But
I don't think using 'non-negative' ends up being more understandable).
Suggested-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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The intent of the sign games was to not modify kernel addresses when
untagging them. However, that had two issues:
(a) it didn't actually work as intended, since the mask was calculated
as 'addr >> 63' on an _unsigned_ address. So instead of getting a
mask of all ones for kernel addresses, you just got '1'.
(b) untagging a kernel address isn't actually a valid operation anyway.
Now, (a) had originally been true for both 'untagged_addr()' and the
remote version of it, but had accidentally been fixed for the regular
version of untagged_addr() by commit e0bddc19ba95 ("x86/mm: Reduce
untagged_addr() overhead for systems without LAM"). That one rewrote
the shift to be part of the alternative asm code, and in the process
changed the unsigned shift into a signed 'sar' instruction.
And while it is true that we don't want to turn what looks like a kernel
address into a user address by masking off the high bit, that doesn't
need these sign masking games - all it needs is that the mm context
'untag_mask' value has the high bit set.
Which it always does.
So simplify the code by just removing the superfluous (and in the case
of untagged_addr_remote(), still buggy) sign bit games in the address
masking.
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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The x86 <asm/uaccess.h> file has grown features that are specific to
x86-64 like LAM support and the related access_ok() changes. They
really should be in the <asm/uaccess_64.h> file and not pollute the
generic x86 header.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 cleanups from Borislav Petkov:
- Unify duplicated __pa() and __va() definitions
- Simplify sysctl tables registration
- Remove unused symbols
- Correct function name in comment
* tag 'x86_cleanups_for_v6.4_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/boot: Centralize __pa()/__va() definitions
x86: Simplify one-level sysctl registration for itmt_kern_table
x86: Simplify one-level sysctl registration for abi_table2
x86/platform/intel-mid: Remove unused definitions from intel-mid.h
x86/uaccess: Remove memcpy_page_flushcache()
x86/entry: Change stale function name in comment to error_return()
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Every caller passes in zero, meaning they don't want any partial copy to
zero the remainder of the destination buffer.
Which is just as well, because the implementation of that function
didn't actually even look at that argument, and wasn't even aware it
existed, although some misleading comments did mention it still.
The 'zerorest' thing is a historical artifact of how "copy_from_user()"
worked, in that it would zero the rest of the kernel buffer that it
copied into.
That zeroing still exists, but it's long since been moved to generic
code, and the raw architecture-specific code doesn't do it. See
_copy_from_user() in lib/usercopy.c for this all.
However, while __copy_user_nocache() shares some history and superficial
other similarities with copy_from_user(), it is in many ways also very
different.
In particular, while the code makes it *look* similar to the generic
user copy functions that can copy both to and from user space, and take
faults on both reads and writes as a result, __copy_user_nocache() does
no such thing at all.
__copy_user_nocache() always copies to kernel space, and will never take
a page fault on the destination. What *can* happen, though, is that the
non-temporal stores take a machine check because one of the use cases is
for writing to stable memory, and any memory errors would then take
synchronous faults.
So __copy_user_nocache() does look a lot like copy_from_user(), but has
faulting behavior that is more akin to our old copy_in_user() (which no
longer exists, but copied from user space to user space and could fault
on both source and destination).
And it very much does not have the "zero the end of the destination
buffer", since a problem with the destination buffer is very possibly
the very source of the partial copy.
So this whole thing was just a confusing historical artifact from having
shared some code with a completely different function with completely
different use cases.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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The old 'copy_user_generic_unrolled' function was oddly implemented for
largely historical reasons: it had been largely based on the uncached
copy case, which has some other concerns.
For example, the __copy_user_nocache() function uses 'movnti' for the
destination stores, and those want the destination to be aligned. In
contrast, the regular copy function doesn't really care, and trying to
align things only complicates matters.
Also, like the clear_user function, the copy function had some odd
handling of the repeat counts, complicating the exception handling for
no really good reason. So as with clear_user, just write it to keep all
the byte counts in the %rcx register, exactly like the 'rep movs'
functionality that this replaces.
Unlike a real 'rep movs', we do allow for this to trash a few temporary
registers to not have to unnecessarily save/restore registers on the
stack.
And like the clearing case, rename this to what it now clearly is:
'rep_movs_alternative', and make it one coherent function, so that it
shows up as such in profiles (instead of the odd split between
"copy_user_generic_unrolled" and "copy_user_short_string", the latter of
which was not about strings at all, and which was shared with the
uncached case).
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
The old version was oddly written to have the repeat count in multiple
registers. So instead of taking advantage of %rax being zero, it had
some sub-counts in it. All just for a "single word clearing" loop,
which isn't even efficient to begin with.
So get rid of those games, and just keep all the state in the same
registers we got it in (and that we should return things in). That not
only makes this act much more like 'rep stos' (which this function is
replacing), but makes it much easier to actually do the obvious loop
unrolling.
Also rename the function from the now nonsensical 'clear_user_original'
to what it now clearly is: 'rep_stos_alternative'.
End result: if we don't have a fast 'rep stosb', at least we can have a
fast fallback for it.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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|
This does the same thing for the user copies as commit 0db7058e8e23
("x86/clear_user: Make it faster") did for clear_user(). In other
words, it inlines the "rep movs" case when X86_FEATURE_FSRM is set,
avoiding the function call entirely.
In order to do that, it makes the calling convention for the out-of-line
case ("copy_user_generic_unrolled") match the 'rep movs' calling
convention, although it does also end up clobbering a number of
additional registers.
Also, to simplify code sharing in the low-level assembly with the
__copy_user_nocache() function (that uses the normal C calling
convention), we end up with a kind of mixed return value for the
low-level asm code: it will return the result in both %rcx (to work as
an alternative for the 'rep movs' case), _and_ in %rax (for the nocache
case).
We could avoid this by wrapping __copy_user_nocache() callers in an
inline asm, but since the cost is just an extra register copy, it's
probably not worth it.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
This is preparatory work for inlining the 'rep movs' case, but also a
cleanup. The __copy_user_nocache() function was mis-used by the rdma
code to do uncached kernel copies that don't actually want user copies
at all, and as a result doesn't want the stac/clac either.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
The modern target to use is FSRS (Fast Short REP STOS), and the other
cases should only be used for bigger areas (ie mainly things like page
clearing).
Note! This changes the conditional for the inlining from FSRM ("fast
short rep movs") to FSRS ("fast short rep stos").
We'll have a separate fixup for AMD microarchitectures that have a good
'rep stosb' yet do not set the new Intel-specific FSRS bit (because FSRM
was there first).
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
The modern target to use is FSRM (Fast Short REP MOVS), and the other
cases should only be used for bigger areas (ie mainly things like page
clearing).
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Commit 21b56c847753 ("iov_iter: get rid of separate bvec and xarray
callbacks") removed the calls to memcpy_page_flushcache().
In addition, memcpy_page_flushcache() uses the deprecated
kmap_atomic().
Remove the unused x86 memcpy_page_flushcache() implementation and
also get rid of one more kmap_atomic() user.
[ dhansen: tweak changelog ]
Signed-off-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221230-kmap-x86-v1-1-15f1ecccab50%40intel.com
|
|
Based on a patch by Mark Hemment <markhemm@googlemail.com> and
incorporating very sane suggestions from Linus.
The point here is to have the default case with FSRM - which is supposed
to be the majority of x86 hw out there - if not now then soon - be
directly inlined into the instruction stream so that no function call
overhead is taking place.
Drop the early clobbers from the @size and @addr operands as those are
not needed anymore since we have single instruction alternatives.
The benchmarks I ran would show very small improvements and a PF
benchmark would even show weird things like slowdowns with higher core
counts.
So for a ~6m running the git test suite, the function gets called under
700K times, all from padzero():
<...>-2536 [006] ..... 261.208801: padzero: to: 0x55b0663ed214, size: 3564, cycles: 21900
<...>-2536 [006] ..... 261.208819: padzero: to: 0x7f061adca078, size: 3976, cycles: 17160
<...>-2537 [008] ..... 261.211027: padzero: to: 0x5572d019e240, size: 3520, cycles: 23850
<...>-2537 [008] ..... 261.211049: padzero: to: 0x7f1288dc9078, size: 3976, cycles: 15900
...
which is around 1%-ish of the total time and which is consistent with
the benchmark numbers.
So Mel gave me the idea to simply measure how fast the function becomes.
I.e.:
start = rdtsc_ordered();
ret = __clear_user(to, n);
end = rdtsc_ordered();
Computing the mean average of all the samples collected during the test
suite run then shows some improvement:
clear_user_original:
Amean: 9219.71 (Sum: 6340154910, samples: 687674)
fsrm:
Amean: 8030.63 (Sum: 5522277720, samples: 687652)
That's on Zen3.
The situation looks a lot more confusing on Intel:
Icelake:
clear_user_original:
Amean: 19679.4 (Sum: 13652560764, samples: 693750)
Amean: 19743.7 (Sum: 13693470604, samples: 693562)
(I ran it twice just to be sure.)
ERMS:
Amean: 20374.3 (Sum: 13910601024, samples: 682752)
Amean: 20453.7 (Sum: 14186223606, samples: 693576)
FSRM:
Amean: 20458.2 (Sum: 13918381386, sample s: 680331)
The original microbenchmark which people were complaining about:
for i in $(seq 1 10); do dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/null bs=1M status=progress count=65536; done 2>&1 | grep copied
32207011840 bytes (32 GB, 30 GiB) copied, 1 s, 32.2 GB/s
68719476736 bytes (69 GB, 64 GiB) copied, 1.93069 s, 35.6 GB/s
37597741056 bytes (38 GB, 35 GiB) copied, 1 s, 37.6 GB/s
68719476736 bytes (69 GB, 64 GiB) copied, 1.78017 s, 38.6 GB/s
62020124672 bytes (62 GB, 58 GiB) copied, 2 s, 31.0 GB/s
68719476736 bytes (69 GB, 64 GiB) copied, 2.13716 s, 32.2 GB/s
60010004480 bytes (60 GB, 56 GiB) copied, 1 s, 60.0 GB/s
68719476736 bytes (69 GB, 64 GiB) copied, 1.14129 s, 60.2 GB/s
53212086272 bytes (53 GB, 50 GiB) copied, 1 s, 53.2 GB/s
68719476736 bytes (69 GB, 64 GiB) copied, 1.28398 s, 53.5 GB/s
55698259968 bytes (56 GB, 52 GiB) copied, 1 s, 55.7 GB/s
68719476736 bytes (69 GB, 64 GiB) copied, 1.22507 s, 56.1 GB/s
55306092544 bytes (55 GB, 52 GiB) copied, 1 s, 55.3 GB/s
68719476736 bytes (69 GB, 64 GiB) copied, 1.23647 s, 55.6 GB/s
54387539968 bytes (54 GB, 51 GiB) copied, 1 s, 54.4 GB/s
68719476736 bytes (69 GB, 64 GiB) copied, 1.25693 s, 54.7 GB/s
50566529024 bytes (51 GB, 47 GiB) copied, 1 s, 50.6 GB/s
68719476736 bytes (69 GB, 64 GiB) copied, 1.35096 s, 50.9 GB/s
58308165632 bytes (58 GB, 54 GiB) copied, 1 s, 58.3 GB/s
68719476736 bytes (69 GB, 64 GiB) copied, 1.17394 s, 58.5 GB/s
Now the same thing with smaller buffers:
for i in $(seq 1 10); do dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/null bs=1M status=progress count=8192; done 2>&1 | grep copied
8589934592 bytes (8.6 GB, 8.0 GiB) copied, 0.28485 s, 30.2 GB/s
8589934592 bytes (8.6 GB, 8.0 GiB) copied, 0.276112 s, 31.1 GB/s
8589934592 bytes (8.6 GB, 8.0 GiB) copied, 0.29136 s, 29.5 GB/s
8589934592 bytes (8.6 GB, 8.0 GiB) copied, 0.283803 s, 30.3 GB/s
8589934592 bytes (8.6 GB, 8.0 GiB) copied, 0.306503 s, 28.0 GB/s
8589934592 bytes (8.6 GB, 8.0 GiB) copied, 0.349169 s, 24.6 GB/s
8589934592 bytes (8.6 GB, 8.0 GiB) copied, 0.276912 s, 31.0 GB/s
8589934592 bytes (8.6 GB, 8.0 GiB) copied, 0.265356 s, 32.4 GB/s
8589934592 bytes (8.6 GB, 8.0 GiB) copied, 0.28464 s, 30.2 GB/s
8589934592 bytes (8.6 GB, 8.0 GiB) copied, 0.242998 s, 35.3 GB/s
is also not conclusive because it all depends on the buffer sizes,
their alignments and when the microcode detects that cachelines can be
aggregated properly and copied in bigger sizes.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAHk-=wh=Mu_EYhtOmPn6AxoQZyEh-4fo2Zx3G7rBv1g7vwoKiw@mail.gmail.com
|
|
All users of compat_alloc_user_space() and copy_in_user() have been
removed from the kernel, only a few functions in sparc remain that can be
changed to calling arch_copy_in_user() instead.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210727144859.4150043-7-arnd@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
In reaction to a proposal to introduce a memcpy_mcsafe_fast()
implementation Linus points out that memcpy_mcsafe() is poorly named
relative to communicating the scope of the interface. Specifically what
addresses are valid to pass as source, destination, and what faults /
exceptions are handled.
Of particular concern is that even though x86 might be able to handle
the semantics of copy_mc_to_user() with its common copy_user_generic()
implementation other archs likely need / want an explicit path for this
case:
On Fri, May 1, 2020 at 11:28 AM Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Apr 30, 2020 at 6:21 PM Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> wrote:
> >
> > However now I see that copy_user_generic() works for the wrong reason.
> > It works because the exception on the source address due to poison
> > looks no different than a write fault on the user address to the
> > caller, it's still just a short copy. So it makes copy_to_user() work
> > for the wrong reason relative to the name.
>
> Right.
>
> And it won't work that way on other architectures. On x86, we have a
> generic function that can take faults on either side, and we use it
> for both cases (and for the "in_user" case too), but that's an
> artifact of the architecture oddity.
>
> In fact, it's probably wrong even on x86 - because it can hide bugs -
> but writing those things is painful enough that everybody prefers
> having just one function.
Replace a single top-level memcpy_mcsafe() with either
copy_mc_to_user(), or copy_mc_to_kernel().
Introduce an x86 copy_mc_fragile() name as the rename for the
low-level x86 implementation formerly named memcpy_mcsafe(). It is used
as the slow / careful backend that is supplanted by a fast
copy_mc_generic() in a follow-on patch.
One side-effect of this reorganization is that separating copy_mc_64.S
to its own file means that perf no longer needs to track dependencies
for its memcpy_64.S benchmarks.
[ bp: Massage a bit. ]
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/r/CAHk-=wjSqtXAqfUJxFtWNwmguFASTgB0dz1dT3V-78Quiezqbg@mail.gmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/160195561680.2163339.11574962055305783722.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
|
|
Very few call sites where that would be triggered remain, and none
of those is anywhere near hot enough to bother.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
By writing the function in asm we avoid cross object code flow and
objtool no longer gets confused about a 'stray' CLAC.
Also; the asm version is actually _simpler_.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
|
All copy_to_user() implementations need to be prepared to handle faults
accessing userspace. The __memcpy_mcsafe() implementation handles both
mmu-faults on the user destination and machine-check-exceptions on the
source buffer. However, the memcpy_mcsafe() wrapper may silently
fallback to memcpy() depending on build options and cpu-capabilities.
Force copy_to_user_mcsafe() to always use __memcpy_mcsafe() when
available, and otherwise disable all of the copy_to_user_mcsafe()
infrastructure when __memcpy_mcsafe() is not available, i.e.
CONFIG_X86_MCE=n.
This fixes crashes of the form:
run fstests generic/323 at 2018-07-02 12:46:23
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00007f0d50001000
RIP: 0010:__memcpy+0x12/0x20
[..]
Call Trace:
copyout_mcsafe+0x3a/0x50
_copy_to_iter_mcsafe+0xa1/0x4a0
? dax_alive+0x30/0x50
dax_iomap_actor+0x1f9/0x280
? dax_iomap_rw+0x100/0x100
iomap_apply+0xba/0x130
? dax_iomap_rw+0x100/0x100
dax_iomap_rw+0x95/0x100
? dax_iomap_rw+0x100/0x100
xfs_file_dax_read+0x7b/0x1d0 [xfs]
xfs_file_read_iter+0xa7/0xc0 [xfs]
aio_read+0x11c/0x1a0
Reported-by: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Fixes: 8780356ef630 ("x86/asm/memcpy_mcsafe: Define copy_to_iter_mcsafe()")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/153108277790.37979.1486841789275803399.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
|
Use the updated memcpy_mcsafe() implementation to define
copy_user_mcsafe() and copy_to_iter_mcsafe(). The most significant
difference from typical copy_to_iter() is that the ITER_KVEC and
ITER_BVEC iterator types can fail to complete a full transfer.
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: hch@lst.de
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/152539239150.31796.9189779163576449784.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
|
In preparation for using memcpy_mcsafe() to handle user copies it needs
to be to handle write-protection faults while writing user pages. Add
MMU-fault handlers alongside the machine-check exception handlers.
Note that the machine check fault exception handling makes assumptions
about source buffer alignment and poison alignment. In the write fault
case, given the destination buffer is arbitrarily aligned, it needs a
separate / additional fault handling approach. The mcsafe_handle_tail()
helper is reused. The @limit argument is set to @len since there is no
safety concern about retriggering an MMU fault, and this simplifies the
assembly.
Co-developed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reported-by: Mika Penttilä <mika.penttila@nextfour.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: hch@lst.de
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/152539238635.31796.14056325365122961778.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
|
Quoting Linus:
I do think that it would be a good idea to very expressly document
the fact that it's not that the user access itself is unsafe. I do
agree that things like "get_user()" want to be protected, but not
because of any direct bugs or problems with get_user() and friends,
but simply because get_user() is an excellent source of a pointer
that is obviously controlled from a potentially attacking user
space. So it's a prime candidate for then finding _subsequent_
accesses that can then be used to perturb the cache.
__uaccess_begin_nospec() covers __get_user() and copy_from_iter() where the
limit check is far away from the user pointer de-reference. In those cases
a barrier_nospec() prevents speculation with a potential pointer to
privileged memory. uaccess_try_nospec covers get_user_try.
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727416953.33451.10508284228526170604.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
|
|
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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operations
The pmem driver has a need to transfer data with a persistent memory
destination and be able to rely on the fact that the destination writes are not
cached. It is sufficient for the writes to be flushed to a cpu-store-buffer
(non-temporal / "movnt" in x86 terms), as we expect userspace to call fsync()
to ensure data-writes have reached a power-fail-safe zone in the platform. The
fsync() triggers a REQ_FUA or REQ_FLUSH to the pmem driver which will turn
around and fence previous writes with an "sfence".
Implement a __copy_from_user_inatomic_flushcache, memcpy_page_flushcache, and
memcpy_flushcache, that guarantee that the destination buffer is not dirty in
the cpu cache on completion. The new copy_from_iter_flushcache and sub-routines
will be used to replace the "pmem api" (include/linux/pmem.h +
arch/x86/include/asm/pmem.h). The availability of copy_from_iter_flushcache()
and memcpy_flushcache() are gated by the CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_UACCESS_FLUSHCACHE
config symbol, and fallback to copy_from_iter_nocache() and plain memcpy()
otherwise.
This is meant to satisfy the concern from Linus that if a driver wants to do
something beyond the normal nocache semantics it should be something private to
that driver [1], and Al's concern that anything uaccess related belongs with
the rest of the uaccess code [2].
The first consumer of this interface is a new 'copy_from_iter' dax operation so
that pmem can inject cache maintenance operations without imposing this
overhead on other dax-capable drivers.
[1]: https://lists.01.org/pipermail/linux-nvdimm/2017-January/008364.html
[2]: https://lists.01.org/pipermail/linux-nvdimm/2017-April/009942.html
Cc: <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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... especially since copy_in_user() doesn't
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Enables CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY checks on x86. This is done both in
copy_*_user() and __copy_*_user() because copy_*_user() actually calls
down to _copy_*_user() and not __copy_*_user().
Based on code from PaX and grsecurity.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu>
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Exchange between user and kernel memory is coded in assembly language.
Which means that such accesses won't be spotted by KASAN as a compiler
instruments only C code.
Add explicit KASAN checks to user memory access API to ensure that
userspace writes to (or reads from) a valid kernel memory.
Note: Unlike others strncpy_from_user() is written mostly in C and KASAN
sees memory accesses in it. However, it makes sense to add explicit
check for all @count bytes that *potentially* could be written to the
kernel.
[aryabinin@virtuozzo.com: move kasan check under the condition]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462869209-21096-1-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462538722-1574-4-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Move them to a separate header and have the following
dependency:
x86/cpufeatures.h <- x86/processor.h <- x86/cpufeature.h
This makes it easier to use the header in asm code and not
include the whole cpufeature.h and add guards for asm.
Suggested-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1453842730-28463-5-git-send-email-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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This reorganizes how we do the stac/clac instructions in the user access
code. Instead of adding the instructions directly to the same inline
asm that does the actual user level access and exception handling, add
them at a higher level.
This is mainly preparation for the next step, where we will expose an
interface to allow users to mark several accesses together as being user
space accesses, but it does already clean up some code:
- the inlined trivial cases of copy_in_user() now do stac/clac just
once over the accesses: they used to do one pair around the user
space read, and another pair around the write-back.
- the {get,put}_user_ex() macros that are used with the catch/try
handling don't do any stac/clac at all, because that happens in the
try/catch surrounding them.
Other than those two cleanups that happened naturally from the
re-organization, this should not make any difference. Yet.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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The rule for 'copy_from_user()' is that it zeroes the remaining kernel
buffer even when the copy fails halfway, just to make sure that we don't
leave uninitialized kernel memory around. Because even if we check for
errors, some kernel buffers stay around after thge copy (think page
cache).
However, the x86-64 logic for user copies uses a copy_user_generic()
function for all the cases, that set the "zerorest" flag for any fault
on the source buffer. Which meant that it didn't just try to clear the
kernel buffer after a failure in copy_from_user(), it also tried to
clear the destination user buffer for the "copy_in_user()" case.
Not only is that pointless, it also means that the clearing code has to
worry about the tail clearing taking page faults for the user buffer
case. Which is just stupid, since that case shouldn't happen in the
first place.
Get rid of the whole "zerorest" thing entirely, and instead just check
if the destination is in kernel space or not. And then just use
memset() to clear the tail of the kernel buffer if necessary.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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copy_to/from_user_nocheck()
Commit ff47ab4ff3cdd "x86: Add 1/2/4/8 byte optimization to 64bit
__copy_{from,to}_user_inatomic" added a "_nocheck" call in between
the copy_to/from_user() and copy_user_generic(). As both the
normal and nocheck versions of theses calls use the proper __user
annotation, a typecast to remove it should not be added.
This causes sparse to spin out the following warnings:
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:207:47: warning: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces)
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:207:47: expected void const [noderef] <asn:1>*src
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:207:47: got void const *<noident>
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:207:47: warning: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces)
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:207:47: expected void const [noderef] <asn:1>*src
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:207:47: got void const *<noident>
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:207:47: warning: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces)
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:207:47: expected void const [noderef] <asn:1>*src
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:207:47: got void const *<noident>
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:207:47: warning: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces)
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:207:47: expected void const [noderef] <asn:1>*src
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:207:47: got void const *<noident>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140103164500.5f6478f5@gandalf.local.home
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 uaccess changes from Ingo Molnar:
"A single change that micro-optimizes __copy_*_user_inatomic(), used by
the futex code"
* 'x86-uaccess-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86: Add 1/2/4/8 byte optimization to 64bit __copy_{from,to}_user_inatomic
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Similarly to copy_from_user(), where the range check is to
protect against kernel memory corruption, copy_to_user() can
benefit from such checking too: Here it protects against kernel
information leaks.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5265059502000078000FC4F6@nat28.tlf.novell.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
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Commits 4a3127693001c61a21d1ce680db6340623f52e93 ("x86: Turn the
copy_from_user check into an (optional) compile time warning")
and 63312b6a6faae3f2e5577f2b001e3b504f10a2aa ("x86: Add a
Kconfig option to turn the copy_from_user warnings into errors")
touched only the 32-bit variant of copy_from_user(), whereas the
original commit 9f0cf4adb6aa0bfccf675c938124e68f7f06349d ("x86:
Use __builtin_object_size() to validate the buffer size for
copy_from_user()") also added the same code to the 64-bit one.
Further the earlier conversion from an inline WARN() to the call
to copy_from_user_overflow() went a little too far: When the
number of bytes to be copied is not a constant (e.g. [looking at
3.11] in drivers/net/tun.c:__tun_chr_ioctl() or
drivers/pci/pcie/aer/aer_inject.c:aer_inject_write()), the
compiler will always have to keep the funtion call, and hence
there will always be a warning. By using __builtin_constant_p()
we can avoid this.
And then this slightly extends the effect of
CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS in that apart from
converting warnings to errors in the constant size case, it
retains the (possibly wrong) warnings in the non-constant size
case, such that if someone is prepared to get a few false
positives, (s)he'll be able to recover the current behavior
(except that these diagnostics now will never be converted to
errors).
Since the 32-bit variant (intentionally) didn't call
might_fault(), the unification results in this being called
twice now. Adding a suitable #ifdef would be the alternative if
that's a problem.
I'd like to point out though that with
__compiletime_object_size() being restricted to gcc before 4.6,
the whole construct is going to become more and more pointless
going forward. I would question however that commit
2fb0815c9ee6b9ac50e15dd8360ec76d9fa46a2 ("gcc4: disable
__compiletime_object_size for GCC 4.6+") was really necessary,
and instead this should have been dealt with as is done here
from the beginning.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5265056D02000078000FC4F3@nat28.tlf.novell.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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The 64bit __copy_{from,to}_user_inatomic always called
copy_from_user_generic, but skipped the special optimizations for 1/2/4/8
byte accesses.
This especially hurts the futex call, which accesses the 4 byte futex
user value with a complicated fast string operation in a function call,
instead of a single movl.
Use __copy_{from,to}_user for _inatomic instead to get the same
optimizations. The only problem was the might_fault() in those functions.
So move that to new wrapper and call __copy_{f,t}_user_nocheck()
from *_inatomic directly.
32bit already did this correctly by duplicating the code.
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1376687844-19857-2-git-send-email-andi@firstfloor.org
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
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The only reason uaccess routines might sleep
is if they fault. Make this explicit.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1369577426-26721-9-git-send-email-mst@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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