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Let userspace "disable" IPI virtualization for AVIC via the enable_ipiv
module param, by never setting IsRunning. SVM doesn't provide a way to
disable IPI virtualization in hardware, but by ensuring CPUs never see
IsRunning=1, every IPI in the guest (except for self-IPIs) will generate a
VM-Exit.
To avoid setting the real IsRunning bit, while still allowing KVM to use
each vCPU's entry to update GA log entries, simply maintain a shadow of
the entry, without propagating IsRunning updates to the real table when
IPI virtualization is disabled.
Providing a way to effectively disable IPI virtualization will allow KVM
to safely enable AVIC on hardware that is susceptible to erratum #1235,
which causes hardware to sometimes fail to detect that the IsRunning bit
has been cleared by software.
Note, the table _must_ be fully populated, as broadcast IPIs skip invalid
entries, i.e. won't generate VM-Exit if every entry is invalid, and so
simply pointing the VMCB at a common dummy table won't work.
Alternatively, KVM could allocate a shadow of the entire table, but that'd
be a waste of 4KiB since the per-vCPU entry doesn't actually consume an
additional 8 bytes of memory (vCPU structures are large enough that they
are backed by order-N pages).
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
[sean: keep "entry" variables, reuse enable_ipiv, split from erratum]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611224604.313496-19-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Move enable_ipiv to common x86 so that it can be reused by SVM to control
IPI virtualization when AVIC is enabled. SVM doesn't actually provide a
way to truly disable IPI virtualization, but KVM can get close enough by
skipping the necessary table programming.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611224604.313496-18-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Drop the vCPU's pointer to its AVIC Physical ID entry, and simply index
the table directly. Caching a pointer address is completely unnecessary
for performance, and while the field technically caches the result of the
pointer calculation, it's all too easy to misinterpret the name and think
that the field somehow caches the _data_ in the table.
No functional change intended.
Suggested-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Sairaj Kodilkar <sarunkod@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Naveen N Rao (AMD) <naveen@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611224604.313496-17-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Allocate and track AVIC's logical and physical tables as u32 and u64
pointers respectively, as managing the pages as "struct page" pointers
adds an almost absurd amount of boilerplate and complexity. E.g. with
page_address() out of the way, svm->avic_physical_id_cache becomes
completely superfluous, and will be removed in a future cleanup.
No functional change intended.
Tested-by: Sairaj Kodilkar <sarunkod@amd.com>
Acked-by: Naveen N Rao (AMD) <naveen@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611224604.313496-16-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Drop avic_get_physical_id_entry()'s compatibility check on the incoming
ID, as its sole caller, avic_init_backing_page(), performs the exact same
check. Drop avic_get_physical_id_entry() entirely as the only remaining
functionality is getting the address of the Physical ID table, and
accessing the array without an immediate bounds check is kludgy.
Opportunistically add a compile-time assertion to ensure the vcpu_id can't
result in a bounds overflow, e.g. if KVM (really) messed up a maximum
physical ID #define, as well as run-time assertions so that a NULL pointer
dereference is morphed into a safer WARN().
No functional change intended.
Tested-by: Sairaj Kodilkar <sarunkod@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Naveen N Rao (AMD) <naveen@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611224604.313496-15-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Inhibit AVIC with a new "ID too big" flag if userspace creates a vCPU with
an ID that is too big, but otherwise allow vCPU creation to succeed.
Rejecting KVM_CREATE_VCPU with EINVAL violates KVM's ABI as KVM advertises
that the max vCPU ID is 4095, but disallows creating vCPUs with IDs bigger
than 254 (AVIC) or 511 (x2AVIC).
Alternatively, KVM could advertise an accurate value depending on which
AVIC mode is in use, but that wouldn't really solve the underlying problem,
e.g. would be a breaking change if KVM were to ever try and enable AVIC or
x2AVIC by default.
Cc: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Sairaj Kodilkar <sarunkod@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611224604.313496-14-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Drop vcpu_svm's avic_backing_page pointer and instead grab the physical
address of KVM's vAPIC page directly from the source. Getting a physical
address from a kernel virtual address is not an expensive operation, and
getting the physical address from a struct page is *more* expensive for
CONFIG_SPARSEMEM=y kernels. Regardless, none of the paths that consume
the address are hot paths, i.e. shaving cycles is not a priority.
Eliminating the "cache" means KVM doesn't have to worry about the cache
being invalid, which will simplify a future fix when dealing with vCPU IDs
that are too big.
WARN if KVM attempts to allocate a vCPU's AVIC backing page without an
in-kernel local APIC. avic_init_vcpu() bails early if the APIC is not
in-kernel, and KVM disallows enabling an in-kernel APIC after vCPUs have
been created, i.e. it should be impossible to reach
avic_init_backing_page() without the vAPIC being allocated.
Tested-by: Sairaj Kodilkar <sarunkod@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Naveen N Rao (AMD) <naveen@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611224604.313496-13-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Add a helper to get the physical address of the AVIC backing page, both
to deduplicate code and to prepare for getting the address directly from
apic->regs, at which point it won't be all that obvious that the address
in question is what SVM calls the AVIC backing page.
No functional change intended.
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Sairaj Kodilkar <sarunkod@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Naveen N Rao (AMD) <naveen@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611224604.313496-12-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Drop AVIC_HPA_MASK and all its users, the mask is just the 4KiB-aligned
maximum theoretical physical address for x86-64 CPUs, as x86-64 is
currently defined (going beyond PA52 would require an entirely new paging
mode, which would arguably create a new, different architecture).
All usage in KVM masks the result of page_to_phys(), which on x86-64 is
guaranteed to be 4KiB aligned and a legal physical address; if either of
those requirements doesn't hold true, KVM has far bigger problems.
Drop masking the avic_backing_page with
AVIC_PHYSICAL_ID_ENTRY_BACKING_PAGE_MASK for all the same reasons, but
keep the macro even though it's unused in functional code. It's a
distinct architectural define, and having the definition in software
helps visualize the layout of an entry. And to be hyper-paranoid about
MAXPA going beyond 52, add a compile-time assert to ensure the kernel's
maximum supported physical address stays in bounds.
The unnecessary masking in avic_init_vmcb() also incorrectly assumes that
SME's C-bit resides between bits 51:11; that holds true for current CPUs,
but isn't required by AMD's architecture:
In some implementations, the bit used may be a physical address bit
Key word being "may".
Opportunistically use the GENMASK_ULL() version for
AVIC_PHYSICAL_ID_ENTRY_BACKING_PAGE_MASK, which is far more readable
than a set of repeating Fs.
Tested-by: Sairaj Kodilkar <sarunkod@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Naveen N Rao (AMD) <naveen@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611224604.313496-11-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Drop VMCB_AVIC_APIC_BAR_MASK, it's just a regurgitation of the maximum
theoretical 4KiB-aligned physical address, i.e. is not novel in any way,
and its only usage is to mask the default APIC base, which is 4KiB aligned
and (obviously) a legal physical address.
No functional change intended.
Tested-by: Sairaj Kodilkar <sarunkod@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Naveen N Rao (AMD) <naveen@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611224604.313496-10-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Delete the IRTE link from the previous vCPU irrespective of the new
routing state, i.e. even if the IRTE won't be configured to post IRQs to a
vCPU. Whether or not the new route is postable as no bearing on the *old*
route. Failure to delete the link can result in KVM incorrectly updating
the IRTE, e.g. if the "old" vCPU is scheduled in/out.
Fixes: 411b44ba80ab ("svm: Implements update_pi_irte hook to setup posted interrupt")
Tested-by: Sairaj Kodilkar <sarunkod@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611224604.313496-9-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Delete the amd_ir_data.prev_ga_tag field now that all usage is
superfluous.
Reviewed-by: Vasant Hegde <vasant.hegde@amd.com>
Tested-by: Sairaj Kodilkar <sarunkod@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611224604.313496-8-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Delete the previous per-vCPU IRTE link prior to modifying the IRTE. If
forcing the IRTE back to remapped mode fails, the IRQ is already broken;
keeping stale metadata won't change that, and the IOMMU should be
sufficiently paranoid to sanitize the IRTE when the IRQ is freed and
reallocated.
This will allow hoisting the vCPU tracking to common x86, which in turn
will allow most of the IRTE update code to be deduplicated.
Tested-by: Sairaj Kodilkar <sarunkod@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611224604.313496-7-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Track the IRTEs that are posting to an SVM vCPU via the associated irqfd
structure and GSI routing instead of dynamically allocating a separate
data structure. In addition to eliminating an atomic allocation, this
will allow hoisting much of the IRTE update logic to common x86.
Cc: Sairaj Kodilkar <sarunkod@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611224604.313496-6-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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When updating IRTEs in response to a GSI routing or IRQ bypass change,
pass the new/current routing information along with the associated irqfd.
This will allow KVM x86 to harden, simplify, and deduplicate its code.
Since adding/removing a bypass producer is now conveniently protected with
irqfds.lock, i.e. can't run concurrently with kvm_irq_routing_update(),
use the routing information cached in the irqfd instead of looking up
the information in the current GSI routing tables.
Opportunistically convert an existing printk() to pr_info() and put its
string onto a single line (old code that strictly adhered to 80 chars).
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611224604.313496-5-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Drop irq_comm.c, a.k.a. common IRQ APIs, as there has been no non-x86 user
since commit 003f7de62589 ("KVM: ia64: remove") (at the time, irq_comm.c
lived in virt/kvm, not arch/x86/kvm).
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611213557.294358-19-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Move the IRQ mask logic to ioapic.c as KVM's only user is its in-kernel
I/O APIC emulation. In addition to encapsulating more I/O APIC specific
code, trimming down irq_comm.c helps pave the way for removing it entirely.
Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611213557.294358-18-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Add a Kconfig to allow building KVM without support for emulating a I/O
APIC, PIC, and PIT, which is desirable for deployments that effectively
don't support a fully in-kernel IRQ chip, i.e. never expect any VMM to
create an in-kernel I/O APIC. E.g. compiling out support eliminates a few
thousand lines of guest-facing code and gives security folks warm fuzzies.
As a bonus, wrapping relevant paths with CONFIG_KVM_IOAPIC #ifdefs makes
it much easier for readers to understand which bits and pieces exist
specifically for fully in-kernel IRQ chips.
Opportunistically convert all two in-kernel uses of __KVM_HAVE_IOAPIC to
CONFIG_KVM_IOAPIC, e.g. rather than add a second #ifdef to generate a stub
for kvm_arch_post_irq_routing_update().
Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611213557.294358-15-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Move the I/O APIC tracepoints and trace_kvm_msi_set_irq() to x86, as
__KVM_HAVE_IOAPIC is just code for "x86", and trace_kvm_msi_set_irq()
isn't unique to I/O APIC emulation.
Opportunistically clean up the absurdly messy #includes in ioapic.c.
No functional change intended.
Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611213557.294358-14-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Explicitly check for an in-kernel PIC when checking for a pending ExtINT
in the PIC. Effectively swapping the split vs. full irqchip logic will
allow guarding the in-kernel I/O APIC (and PIC) emulation with a Kconfig,
and also makes it more obvious that kvm_pic_read_irq() won't result in a
NULL pointer dereference.
Opportunistically add WARNs in the fallthrough path, mostly to document
that the userspace ExtINT logic is only relevant to split IRQ chips.
Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611213557.294358-13-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Don't bother clearing the PIT's IRQ line status when destroying the PIT,
as userspace can't possibly rely on KVM to lower the IRQ line in any sane
use case, and it's not at all obvious that clearing the PIT's IRQ line is
correct/desirable in kvm_create_pit()'s error path.
When called from kvm_arch_pre_destroy_vm(), the entire VM is being torn
down and thus {kvm_pic,kvm_ioapic}.irq_states are unreachable.
As for the error path in kvm_create_pit(), the only way the PIT's bit in
irq_states can be set is if userspace raises the associated IRQ before
KVM_CREATE_PIT{2} completes. Forcefully clearing the bit would clobber
userspace's input, nonsensical though that input may be. Not to mention
that no known VMM will continue on if PIT creation fails.
Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611213557.294358-12-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Hardcode the PIT's source IRQ ID to '2' instead of "finding" that bit 2
is always the first available bit in irq_sources_bitmap. Bits 0 and 1 are
set/reserved by kvm_arch_init_vm(), i.e. long before kvm_create_pit() can
be invoked, and KVM allows at most one in-kernel PIT instance, i.e. it's
impossible for the PIT to find a different free bit (there are no other
users of kvm_request_irq_source_id().
Delete the now-defunct irq_sources_bitmap and all its associated code.
Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611213557.294358-11-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Move kvm_{request,free}_irq_source_id() to i8254.c, i.e. the dedicated PIT
emulation file, in anticipation of removing them entirely in favor of
hardcoding the PIT's "requested" source ID (the source ID can only ever be
'2', and the request can never fail).
No functional change intended.
Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611213557.294358-10-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Move the default IRQ routing table used for in-kernel I/O APIC and PIC
routing to irq.c, and tweak the name to make it explicitly clear what
routing is being initialized.
In addition to making it more obvious that the so called "default" routing
only applies to an in-kernel I/O APIC, getting it out of irq_comm.c will
allow removing irq_comm.c entirely. And placing the function alongside
other I/O APIC and PIC code will allow for guarding KVM's in-kernel I/O
APIC and PIC emulation with a Kconfig with minimal #ifdefs.
No functional change intended.
Cc: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611213557.294358-9-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Rename irqchip_kernel() to irqchip_full(), as "kernel" is very ambiguous
due to the existence of split IRQ chip support, where only some of the
"irqchip" is in emulated by the kernel/KVM. E.g. irqchip_kernel() often
gets confused with irqchip_in_kernel().
Opportunistically hoist the definition up in irq.h so that it's
co-located with other "full" irqchip code in anticipation of wrapping it
all with a Kconfig/#ifdef.
No functional change intended.
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611213557.294358-8-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Move the ioctl helpers for getting/setting fully in-kernel IRQ chip state
to irq.c, partly to trim down x86.c, but mostly in preparation for adding
a Kconfig to control support for in-kernel I/O APIC, PIC, and PIT
emulation.
No functional change intended.
Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611213557.294358-7-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Move the PIT ioctl helpers to i8254.c, i.e. to the file that implements
PIT emulation. Eliminating PIT code in x86.c will allow adding a Kconfig
to control support for in-kernel I/O APIC, PIC, and PIT emulation with
minimal #ifdefs.
Opportunistically make kvm_pit_set_reinject() and kvm_pit_load_count()
local to i8254.c as they were only publicly visible to make them available
to the ioctl helpers.
No functional change intended.
Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611213557.294358-6-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Drop the superfluous kvm_hv_set_sint() and instead wire up ->set() directly
to its final destination, kvm_hv_synic_set_irq(). Keep hv_synic_set_irq()
instead of kvm_hv_set_sint() to provide some amount of consistency in the
->set() helpers, e.g. to match kvm_pic_set_irq() and kvm_ioapic_set_irq().
kvm_set_msi() is arguably the oddball, e.g. kvm_set_msi_irq() should be
something like kvm_msi_to_lapic_irq() so that kvm_set_msi() can instead be
kvm_set_msi_irq(), but that's a future problem to solve.
No functional change intended.
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611213557.294358-5-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Drop the superfluous and confusing kvm_set_ioapic_irq() and instead wire
up ->set() directly to its final destination.
No functional change intended.
Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611213557.294358-4-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Drop the superfluous and confusing kvm_set_pic_irq() => kvm_pic_set_irq()
wrapper, and instead wire up ->set() directly to its final destination.
Opportunistically move the declaration kvm_pic_set_irq() to irq.h to
start gathering more of the in-kernel APIC/IO-APIC logic in irq.{c,h}.
No functional change intended.
Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611213557.294358-3-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Trigger the I/O APIC route rescan that's performed for a split IRQ chip
after userspace updates IRQ routes in kvm_arch_irq_routing_update(), i.e.
before dropping kvm->irq_lock. Calling kvm_make_all_cpus_request() under
a mutex is perfectly safe, and the smp_wmb()+smp_mb__after_atomic() pair
in __kvm_make_request()+kvm_check_request() ensures the new routing is
visible to vCPUs prior to the request being visible to vCPUs.
In all likelihood, commit b053b2aef25d ("KVM: x86: Add EOI exit bitmap
inference") somewhat arbitrarily made the request outside of irq_lock to
avoid holding irq_lock any longer than is strictly necessary. And then
commit abdb080f7ac8 ("kvm/irqchip: kvm_arch_irq_routing_update renaming
split") took the easy route of adding another arch hook instead of risking
a functional change.
Note, the call to synchronize_srcu_expedited() does NOT provide ordering
guarantees with respect to vCPUs scanning the new routing; as above, the
request infrastructure provides the necessary ordering. I.e. there's no
need to wait for kvm_scan_ioapic_routes() to complete if it's actively
running, because regardless of whether it grabs the old or new table, the
vCPU will have another KVM_REQ_SCAN_IOAPIC pending, i.e. will rescan again
and see the new mappings.
Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611213557.294358-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Move ownership of IRQ bypass token tracking into irqbypass.ko, and
explicitly require callers to pass an eventfd_ctx structure instead of a
completely opaque token. Relying on producers and consumers to set the
token appropriately is error prone, and hiding the fact that the token must
be an eventfd_ctx pointer (for all intents and purposes) unnecessarily
obfuscates the code and makes it more brittle.
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250516230734.2564775-4-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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KVM currently returns -EINVAL when it attempts to create an SNP guest if
the SINGLE_SOCKET guest policy bit is set. The reason for this action is
that KVM would need specific support (SNP_ACTIVATE_EX command support) to
achieve this when running on a system with more than one socket. However,
the SEV firmware will make the proper check and return POLICY_FAILURE
during SNP_ACTIVATE if the single socket guest policy bit is set and the
system has more than one socket:
- System with one socket
- Guest policy SINGLE_SOCKET == 0 ==> SNP_ACTIVATE succeeds
- Guest policy SINGLE_SOCKET == 1 ==> SNP_ACTIVATE succeeds
- System with more than one socket
- Guest policy SINGLE_SOCKET == 0 ==> SNP_ACTIVATE succeeds
- Guest policy SINGLE_SOCKET == 1 ==> SNP_ACTIVATE fails with
POLICY_FAILURE
Remove the check for the SINGLE_SOCKET policy bit from snp_launch_start()
and allow the firmware to perform the proper checking.
This does have the effect of allowing an SNP guest with the SINGLE_SOCKET
policy bit set to run on a single socket system, but fail when run on a
system with more than one socket. However, this should not affect existing
SNP guests as setting the SINGLE_SOCKET policy bit is not allowed today.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4c51018dd3e4f2c543935134d2c4f47076f109f6.1748553480.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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KVM currently returns -EINVAL when it attempts to create an SNP guest if
the SMT guest policy bit is not set. However, there is no reason to check
this, as there is no specific support in KVM that is required to support
this. The SEV firmware will determine if SMT has been enabled or disabled
in the BIOS and process the policy in the proper way:
- SMT enabled in BIOS
- Guest policy SMT == 0 ==> SNP_LAUNCH_START fails with POLICY_FAILURE
- Guest policy SMT == 1 ==> SNP_LAUNCH_START succeeds
- SMT disabled in BIOS
- Guest policy SMT == 0 ==> SNP_LAUNCH_START succeeds
- Guest policy SMT == 1 ==> SNP_LAUNCH_START succeeds
Remove the check for the SMT policy bit from snp_launch_start() and allow
the firmware to perform the proper checking.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/71043abdd9ef23b6f98fffa9c5c6045ac3a50187.1748553480.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Move TDX hardware setup to tdx.c, as the code is obviously TDX specific,
co-locating the setup with tdx_bringup() makes it easier to see and
document the success_disable_tdx "error" path, and configuring the TDX
specific hooks in tdx.c reduces the number of globally visible TDX symbols.
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250523001138.3182794-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Exempt nested EPT shadow pages tables from the CR0.WP=0 handling of
supervisor writes, as EPT doesn't have a U/S bit and isn't affected by
CR0.WP (or CR4.SMEP in the exception to the exception).
Opportunistically refresh the comment to explain what KVM is doing, as
the only record of why KVM shoves in WRITE and drops USER is buried in
years-old changelogs.
Cc: Jon Kohler <jon@nutanix.com>
Cc: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dyasli@nutanix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jon Kohler <jon@nutanix.com>
Reviewed-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dyasli@nutanix.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250602234851.54573-1-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Convert the incoming mp_state to INIT_RECIEVED instead of manually calling
kvm_set_mp_state() to make it more obvious that the SIPI_RECEIVED logic is
translating the incoming state to KVM's internal tracking, as opposed to
being some entirely unique flow.
Opportunistically add a comment to explain what the code is doing.
No functional change intended.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250605195018.539901-5-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Check for the should-be-impossible scenario of a vCPU being in
Wait-For-SIPI with INIT/SIPI blocked during KVM_RUN instead of trying to
detect and prevent illegal combinations in every ioctl that sets relevant
state. Attempting to handle every possible "set" path is a losing game of
whack-a-mole, and risks breaking userspace. E.g. INIT/SIPI are blocked on
Intel if the vCPU is in VMX Root mode (post-VMXON), and on AMD if GIF=0.
Handling those scenarios would require potentially breaking changes to
{vmx,svm}_set_nested_state().
Moving the check to KVM_RUN fixes a syzkaller-induced splat due to the
aforementioned VMXON case, and in theory should close the hole once and for
all.
Note, kvm_x86_vcpu_pre_run() already handles SIPI_RECEIVED, only the WFS
case needs additional attention.
Reported-by: syzbot+c1cbaedc2613058d5194@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=490ae63d8d89cb82c5d462d16962cf371df0e476
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250605195018.539901-4-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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WARN if KVM_RUN is reached with a vCPU's mp_state set to SIPI_RECEIVED, as
KVM no longer uses SIPI_RECEIVED internally, and should morph SIPI_RECEIVED
into INIT_RECEIVED with a pending SIPI if userspace forces SIPI_RECEIVED.
See commit 66450a21f996 ("KVM: x86: Rework INIT and SIPI handling") for
more history and details.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250605195018.539901-3-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Allow userspace to set a vCPU's mp_state to INIT_RECEIVED in conjunction
with a pending SMI, as rejecting that combination could result in KVM
disallowing reflecting the output from KVM_GET_VCPU_EVENTS back into KVM
via KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS.
At the time the check was added, smi_pending could only be set in the
context of KVM_RUN, with the vCPU in the RUNNABLE state. I.e. it was
impossible for KVM to save vCPU state such that userspace could see a
pending SMI for a vCPU in WFS.
That no longer holds true now that KVM processes requested SMIs during
KVM_GET_VCPU_EVENTS, e.g. if a vCPU receives an SMI while in WFS, and
then userspace saves vCPU state.
Note, this may partially re-open the user-triggerable WARN that was mostly
closed by commit 28bf28887976 ("KVM: x86: fix user triggerable warning in
kvm_apic_accept_events()"), but that WARN can already be triggered in
several other ways, e.g. if userspace stuffs VMXON=1 after putting the
vCPU into WFS. That issue will be addressed in an upcoming commit, in a
more robust fashion (hopefully).
Fixes: 1f7becf1b7e2 ("KVM: x86: get smi pending status correctly")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250605195018.539901-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Refactor {svm,vmx}_disable_intercept_for_msr() to simplify the handling of
userspace filters that disallow access to an MSR. The more complicated
logic is no longer needed or justified now that KVM recalculates all MSR
intercepts on a userspace MSR filter change, i.e. now that KVM doesn't
need to also update shadow bitmaps.
No functional change intended.
Suggested-by: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250610225737.156318-32-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Add a helper to allocate and initialize an MSR or I/O permissions map, as
the logic is identical between the two map types, the only difference is
the size of the bitmap. Opportunistically add a comment to explain why
the bitmaps are initialized with 0xff, e.g. instead of the more common
zero-initialized behavior, which is the main motivation for deduplicating
the code.
No functional change intended.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250610225737.156318-31-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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When merging L0 and L1 MSRPMs as part of nested VMRUN emulation, access
the bitmaps using "unsigned long" chunks, i.e. use 8-byte access for
64-bit kernels instead of arbitrarily working on 4-byte chunks.
Opportunistically rename local variables in nested_svm_merge_msrpm() to
more precisely/accurately reflect their purpose ("offset" in particular is
extremely ambiguous).
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250610225737.156318-30-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Return -EINVAL instead of MSR_INVALID from svm_msrpm_bit_nr() to indicate
that the MSR isn't covered by one of the (currently) three MSRPM ranges,
and delete the MSR_INVALID macro now that all users are gone.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250610225737.156318-29-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Access the MSRPM using u32/4-byte chunks (and appropriately adjusted
offsets) only when merging L0 and L1 bitmaps as part of emulating VMRUN.
The only reason to batch accesses to MSRPMs is to avoid the overhead of
uaccess operations (e.g. STAC/CLAC and bounds checks) when reading L1's
bitmap pointed at by vmcb12. For all other uses, either per-bit accesses
are more than fast enough (no uaccess), or KVM is only accessing a single
bit (nested_svm_exit_handled_msr()) and so there's nothing to batch.
In addition to (hopefully) documenting the uniqueness of the merging code,
restricting chunked access to _just_ the merging code will allow for
increasing the chunk size (to unsigned long) with minimal risk.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250610225737.156318-28-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Store KVM's MSRPM pointers as "void *" instead of "u32 *" to guard against
directly accessing the bitmaps outside of code that is explicitly written
to access the bitmaps with a specific type.
Opportunistically use svm_vcpu_free_msrpm() in svm_vcpu_free() instead of
open coding an equivalent.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250610225737.156318-27-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Move svm_msrpm_offset() from svm.c to nested.c now that all usage of the
u32-index offsets is nested virtualization specific.
No functional change intended.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250610225737.156318-26-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Now that msr_write_intercepted() defaults to true, i.e. accurately reflects
hardware behavior for out-of-range MSRs, and doesn't WARN (or BUG) on an
out-of-range MSR, drop sev_es_prevent_msr_access()'s svm_msrpm_offset()
check that guarded against calling msr_write_intercepted() with a "bad"
index.
Opportunistically clean up the helper's formatting.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250610225737.156318-25-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Merge svm_recalc_intercepts_after_set_cpuid() and
svm_recalc_instruction_intercepts() such that the "after set CPUID" helper
simply invokes the type-specific helpers (MSRs vs. instructions), i.e.
make svm_recalc_intercepts_after_set_cpuid() a single entry point for all
intercept updates that need to be performed after a CPUID change.
No functional change intended.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250610225737.156318-24-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Fold svm_vcpu_init_msrpm() into svm_recalc_msr_intercepts() now that there
is only the one caller (and because the "init" misnomer is even more
misleading than it was in the past).
No functional change intended.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250610225737.156318-23-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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