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The sha3 partial hash on s390 is in little-endian just like the
final hash. However the generic implementation produces native
or big-endian partial hashes.
Make s390 sha3 conform to that by doing the byte-swap on export
and import.
Reported-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Fixes: 6f90ba706551 ("crypto: s390/sha3 - Use API partial block handling")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Use the Crypto API partial block handling.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Since commit "s390/sha3: Support sha3 performance enhancements"
the selftests of the sha3_256_s390 and sha3_512_s390 kernel digests
sometimes fail with:
alg: shash: sha3-256-s390 test failed (wrong result) on test vector 3,
cfg="import/export"
alg: self-tests for sha3-256 using sha3-256-s390 failed (rc=-22)
or with
alg: ahash: sha3-256-s390 test failed (wrong result) on test vector 3,
cfg="digest misaligned splits crossing pages"
alg: self-tests for sha3-256 using sha3-256-s390 failed (rc=-22)
The first failure is because the newly introduced context field
'first_message_part' is not copied during export and import operations.
Because of that the value of 'first_message_part' is more or less random
after an import into a newly allocated context and may or may not fit to
the state of the imported SHA3 operation, causing an invalid hash when it
does not fit.
Save the 'first_message_part' field in the currently unused field 'partial'
of struct sha3_state, even though the meaning of 'partial' is not exactly
the same as 'first_message_part'. For the caller the returned state blob
is opaque and it must only be ensured that the state can be imported later
on by the module that exported it.
The second failure is when on entry of s390_sha_update() the flag
'first_message_part' is on, and kimd is called in the first 'if (index)'
block as well as in the second 'if (len >= bsize)' block. In this case,
the 'first_message_part' is turned off after the first kimd, but the
function code incorrectly retains the NIP flag. Reset the NIP flag after
the first kimd unconditionally besides turning 'first_message_part' off.
Reported-by: Marc Hartmayer <mhartmay@linux.ibm.com>
Fixes: 88c02b3f79a6 ("s390/sha3: Support sha3 performance enhancements")
Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Holger Dengler <dengler@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Joerg Schmidbauer <jschmidb@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
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On newer machines the SHA3 performance of CPACF instructions KIMD and
KLMD can be enhanced by using additional modifier bits. This allows the
application to omit initializing the ICV, but also affects the internal
processing of the instructions. Performance is mostly gained when
processing short messages.
The new CPACF feature is backwards compatible with older machines, i.e.
the new modifier bits are ignored on older machines. However, to save the
ICV initialization, the application must detect the MSA level and omit
the ICV initialization only if this feature is supported.
Reviewed-by: Holger Dengler <dengler@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Schmidbauer <jschmidb@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
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Rework cpufeature implementation to allow for various cpu feature
indications, which is not only limited to hwcap bits. This is achieved
by adding a sequential list of cpu feature numbers, where each of them
is mapped to an entry which indicates what this number is about.
Each entry contains a type member, which indicates what feature
name space to look into (e.g. hwcap, or cpu facility). If wanted this
allows also to automatically load modules only in e.g. z/VM
configurations.
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220713125644.16121-2-seiden@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
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Currently <crypto/sha.h> contains declarations for both SHA-1 and SHA-2,
and <crypto/sha3.h> contains declarations for SHA-3.
This organization is inconsistent, but more importantly SHA-1 is no
longer considered to be cryptographically secure. So to the extent
possible, SHA-1 shouldn't be grouped together with any of the other SHA
versions, and usage of it should be phased out.
Therefore, split <crypto/sha.h> into two headers <crypto/sha1.h> and
<crypto/sha2.h>, and make everyone explicitly specify whether they want
the declarations for SHA-1, SHA-2, or both.
This avoids making the SHA-1 declarations visible to files that don't
want anything to do with SHA-1. It also prepares for potentially moving
sha1.h into a new insecure/ or dangerous/ directory.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This patch introduces sha3 support for s390.
- Rework the s390-specific SHA1 and SHA2 related code to
provide the basis for SHA3.
- Provide two new kernel modules sha3_256_s390 and
sha3_512_s390 together with new kernel options.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Schmidbauer <jschmidb@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
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