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* kvm-arm64/nv-nv:
: .
: Flick the switch on the NV support by adding the missing piece
: in the form of the VNCR page management. From the cover letter:
:
: "This is probably the most interesting bit of the whole NV adventure.
: So far, everything else has been a walk in the park, but this one is
: where the real fun takes place.
:
: With FEAT_NV2, most of the NV support revolves around tricking a guest
: into accessing memory while it tries to access system registers. The
: hypervisor's job is to handle the context switch of the actual
: registers with the state in memory as needed."
: .
KVM: arm64: nv: Release faulted-in VNCR page from mmu_lock critical section
KVM: arm64: nv: Handle TLBI S1E2 for VNCR invalidation with mmu_lock held
KVM: arm64: nv: Hold mmu_lock when invalidating VNCR SW-TLB before translating
KVM: arm64: Document NV caps and vcpu flags
KVM: arm64: Allow userspace to request KVM_ARM_VCPU_EL2*
KVM: arm64: nv: Remove dead code from ERET handling
KVM: arm64: nv: Plumb TLBI S1E2 into system instruction dispatch
KVM: arm64: nv: Add S1 TLB invalidation primitive for VNCR_EL2
KVM: arm64: nv: Program host's VNCR_EL2 to the fixmap address
KVM: arm64: nv: Handle VNCR_EL2 invalidation from MMU notifiers
KVM: arm64: nv: Handle mapping of VNCR_EL2 at EL2
KVM: arm64: nv: Handle VNCR_EL2-triggered faults
KVM: arm64: nv: Add userspace and guest handling of VNCR_EL2
KVM: arm64: nv: Add pseudo-TLB backing VNCR_EL2
KVM: arm64: nv: Don't adjust PSTATE.M when L2 is nesting
KVM: arm64: nv: Move TLBI range decoding to a helper
KVM: arm64: nv: Snapshot S1 ASID tagging information during walk
KVM: arm64: nv: Extract translation helper from the AT code
KVM: arm64: nv: Allocate VNCR page when required
arm64: sysreg: Add layout for VNCR_EL2
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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* kvm-arm64/fgt-masks: (43 commits)
: .
: Large rework of the way KVM deals with trap bits in conjunction with
: the CPU feature registers. It now draws a direct link between which
: the feature set, the system registers that need to UNDEF to match
: the configuration and bits that need to behave as RES0 or RES1 in
: the trap registers that are visible to the guest.
:
: Best of all, these definitions are mostly automatically generated
: from the JSON description published by ARM under a permissive
: license.
: .
KVM: arm64: Handle TSB CSYNC traps
KVM: arm64: Add FGT descriptors for FEAT_FGT2
KVM: arm64: Allow sysreg ranges for FGT descriptors
KVM: arm64: Add context-switch for FEAT_FGT2 registers
KVM: arm64: Add trap routing for FEAT_FGT2 registers
KVM: arm64: Add sanitisation for FEAT_FGT2 registers
KVM: arm64: Add FEAT_FGT2 registers to the VNCR page
KVM: arm64: Use HCR_EL2 feature map to drive fixed-value bits
KVM: arm64: Use HCRX_EL2 feature map to drive fixed-value bits
KVM: arm64: Allow kvm_has_feat() to take variable arguments
KVM: arm64: Use FGT feature maps to drive RES0 bits
KVM: arm64: Validate FGT register descriptions against RES0 masks
KVM: arm64: Switch to table-driven FGU configuration
KVM: arm64: Handle PSB CSYNC traps
KVM: arm64: Use KVM-specific HCRX_EL2 RES0 mask
KVM: arm64: Remove hand-crafted masks for FGT registers
KVM: arm64: Use computed FGT masks to setup FGT registers
KVM: arm64: Propagate FGT masks to the nVHE hypervisor
KVM: arm64: Unconditionally configure fine-grain traps
KVM: arm64: Use computed masks as sanitisers for FGT registers
...
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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The architecture introduces a trap for TSB CSYNC that fits in
the same EC as LS64 and PSB CSYNC. Let's deal with it in a similar
way.
It's not that we expect this to be useful any time soon anyway.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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As VNCR_EL2.BADDR contains a VA, it is bound to trigger faults.
These faults can have multiple source:
- We haven't mapped anything on the host: we need to compute the
resulting translation, populate a TLB, and eventually map
the corresponding page
- The permissions are out of whack: we need to tell the guest about
this state of affairs
Note that the kernel doesn't support S1POE for itself yet, so
the particular case of a VNCR page mapped with no permissions
or with write-only permissions is not correctly handled yet.
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250514103501.2225951-10-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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The architecture introduces a trap for PSB CSYNC that fits in
the same EC as LS64. Let's deal with it in a similar way as
LS64.
It's not that we expect this to be useful any time soon anyway.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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As now UBSAN can be enabled, handle brk64 exits from UBSAN.
Re-use the decoding code from the kernel, and panic with
UBSAN message.
Signed-off-by: Mostafa Saleh <smostafa@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250430162713.1997569-5-smostafa@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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We don't seem to be handling the GCS-specific exception class.
Handle it by delivering an UNDEF to the guest, and populate the
relevant trap bits.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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We generally don't expect FEAT_LS64* instructions to trap, unless
they are trapped by a guest hypervisor.
Otherwise, this is just the guest playing tricks on us by using
an instruction that isn't advertised, which we handle with a well
deserved UNDEF.
Reviewed-by: Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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Forward exceptions due to WFI or WFE instructions to the virtual EL2 if
they are not coming from the virtual EL2 and virtual HCR_EL2.TWx is set.
Signed-off-by: Jintack Lim <jintack.lim@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250225172930.1850838-12-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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Inject debug exceptions into vEL2 if MDCR_EL2.TDE is set.
Tested-by: James Clark <james.clark@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241219224116.3941496-17-oliver.upton@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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KVM takes over the guest's software step state machine if the VMM is
debugging the guest, but it does the save/restore fiddling for every
guest entry.
Note that the only constraint on host usage of software step is that the
guest's configuration remains visible to userspace via the ONE_REG
ioctls. So, we can cut down on the amount of fiddling by doing this at
load/put instead.
Tested-by: James Clark <james.clark@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241219224116.3941496-16-oliver.upton@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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* kvm-arm64/nv-sve:
: CPTR_EL2, FPSIMD/SVE support for nested
:
: This series brings support for honoring the guest hypervisor's CPTR_EL2
: trap configuration when running a nested guest, along with support for
: FPSIMD/SVE usage at L1 and L2.
KVM: arm64: Allow the use of SVE+NV
KVM: arm64: nv: Add additional trap setup for CPTR_EL2
KVM: arm64: nv: Add trap description for CPTR_EL2
KVM: arm64: nv: Add TCPAC/TTA to CPTR->CPACR conversion helper
KVM: arm64: nv: Honor guest hypervisor's FP/SVE traps in CPTR_EL2
KVM: arm64: nv: Load guest FP state for ZCR_EL2 trap
KVM: arm64: nv: Handle CPACR_EL1 traps
KVM: arm64: Spin off helper for programming CPTR traps
KVM: arm64: nv: Ensure correct VL is loaded before saving SVE state
KVM: arm64: nv: Use guest hypervisor's max VL when running nested guest
KVM: arm64: nv: Save guest's ZCR_EL2 when in hyp context
KVM: arm64: nv: Load guest hyp's ZCR into EL1 state
KVM: arm64: nv: Handle ZCR_EL2 traps
KVM: arm64: nv: Forward SVE traps to guest hypervisor
KVM: arm64: nv: Forward FP/ASIMD traps to guest hypervisor
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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Similar to FPSIMD traps, don't load SVE state if the guest hypervisor
has SVE traps enabled and forward the trap instead. Note that ZCR_EL2
will require some special handling, as it takes a sysreg trap to EL2
when HCR_EL2.NV = 1.
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240620164653.1130714-3-oliver.upton@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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Give precedence to the guest hypervisor's trap configuration when
routing an FP/ASIMD trap taken to EL2. Take advantage of the
infrastructure for translating CPTR_EL2 into the VHE (i.e. EL1) format
and base the trap decision solely on the VHE view of the register. The
in-memory value of CPTR_EL2 will always be up to date for the guest
hypervisor (more on that later), so just read it directly from memory.
Bury all of this behind a macro keyed off of the CPTR bitfield in
anticipation of supporting other traps (e.g. SVE).
[maz: account for HCR_EL2.E2H when testing for TFP/FPEN, with
all the hard work actually being done by Chase Conklin]
[ oliver: translate nVHE->VHE format for testing traps; macro for reuse
in other CPTR_EL2.xEN fields ]
Signed-off-by: Jintack Lim <jintack.lim@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240620164653.1130714-2-oliver.upton@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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The compiler implements kCFI by adding type information (u32) above
every function that might be indirectly called and, whenever a function
pointer is called, injects a read-and-compare of that u32 against the
value corresponding to the expected type. In case of a mismatch, a BRK
instruction gets executed. When the hypervisor triggers such an
exception in nVHE, it panics and triggers and exception return to EL1.
Therefore, teach nvhe_hyp_panic_handler() to detect kCFI errors from the
ESR and report them. If necessary, remind the user that EL2 kCFI is not
affected by CONFIG_CFI_PERMISSIVE.
Pass $(CC_FLAGS_CFI) to the compiler when building the nVHE hyp code.
Use SYM_TYPED_FUNC_START() for __pkvm_init_switch_pgd, as nVHE can't
call it directly and must use a PA function pointer from C (because it
is part of the idmap page), which would trigger a kCFI failure if the
type ID wasn't present.
Signed-off-by: Pierre-Clément Tosi <ptosi@google.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240610063244.2828978-9-ptosi@google.com
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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Add a helper to display a panic banner soon to also be used for kCFI
failures, to ensure that we remain consistent.
Signed-off-by: Pierre-Clément Tosi <ptosi@google.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240610063244.2828978-8-ptosi@google.com
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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As it is already used in two places, move esr_comment() to a header for
re-use, with a clearer name.
Introduce esr_is_cfi_brk() to detect kCFI BRK syndromes, currently used
by early_brk64() but soon to also be used by hypervisor code.
Signed-off-by: Pierre-Clément Tosi <ptosi@google.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240610063244.2828978-7-ptosi@google.com
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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We currently insist on disabling PAuth on vcpu_load(), and get to
enable it on first guest use of an instruction or a key (ignoring
the NV case for now).
It isn't clear at all what this is trying to achieve: guests tend
to use PAuth when available, and nothing forces you to expose it
to the guest if you don't want to. This also isn't totally free:
we take a full GPR save/restore between host and guest, only to
write ten 64bit registers. The "value proposition" escapes me.
So let's forget this stuff and enable PAuth eagerly if exposed to
the guest. This results in much simpler code. Performance wise,
that's not bad either (tested on M2 Pro running a fully automated
Debian installer as the workload):
- On a non-NV guest, I can see reduction of 0.24% in the number
of cycles (measured with perf over 10 consecutive runs)
- On a NV guest (L2), I see a 2% reduction in wall-clock time
(measured with 'time', as M2 doesn't have a PMUv3 and NV
doesn't support it either)
So overall, a much reduced complexity and a (small) performance
improvement.
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240419102935.1935571-16-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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Now that we have some emulation in place for ERETA[AB], we can
plug it into the exception handling machinery.
As for a bare ERET, an "easy" ERETAx instruction is processed as
a fixup, while something that requires a translation regime
transition or an exception delivery is left to the slow path.
Reviewed-by: Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240419102935.1935571-14-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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In order for a L1 hypervisor to correctly handle PAuth instructions,
it must observe traps caused by a L1 PAuth instruction when
HCR_EL2.API==0. Since we already handle the case for API==1 as
a fixup, only the exception injection case needs to be handled.
Rework the kvm_handle_ptrauth() callback to reinject the trap
in this case. Note that APK==0 is already handled by the exising
triage_sysreg_trap() helper.
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240419102935.1935571-11-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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Honor the trap forwarding bits for both ERET and SMC, using a new
helper that checks for common conditions.
Reviewed-by: Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>
Co-developed-by: Jintack Lim <jintack.lim@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Jintack Lim <jintack.lim@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240419102935.1935571-7-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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The ESR_ELx_ERET_ISS_ERET* macros are a bit confusing:
- ESR_ELx_ERET_ISS_ERET really indicates that we have trapped an
ERETA* instruction, as opposed to an ERET
- ESR_ELx_ERET_ISS_ERETA really indicates that we have trapped
an ERETAB instruction, as opposed to an ERETAA.
We could repaint those to make more sense, but these are the
names that are present in the ARM ARM, and we are sentimentally
attached to those.
Instead, add two new helpers:
- esr_iss_is_eretax() being true tells you that you need to
authenticate the ERET
- esr_iss_is_eretab() tells you that you need to use the B key
instead of the A key
Following patches will make use of these primitives.
Suggested-by: Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240419102935.1935571-3-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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We already handle ERET being trapped from a L1 guest in hyp context.
However, with FGT, we can also have ERET being trapped from L2, and
this needs to be reinjected into L1.
Add the required exception routing.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jing Zhang <jingzhangos@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230815183903.2735724-25-maz@kernel.org
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HFGITR_EL2 allows the trap of SVC instructions to EL2. Allow these
traps to be forwarded. Take this opportunity to deny any 32bit activity
when NV is enabled.
Reviewed-by: Eric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jing Zhang <jingzhangos@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230815183903.2735724-24-maz@kernel.org
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Typically a negative return from an exit handler is used to request a
return to userspace with the specified error. KVM's handling of SMCCC
emulation (i.e. both HVCs and SMCs) deviates from the trend and resumes
the guest instead.
Stop handling negative returns this way and instead let the error
percolate to userspace.
Suggested-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230404154050.2270077-12-oliver.upton@linux.dev
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In anticipation of user hypercall filters, add the necessary plumbing to
get SMCCC calls out to userspace. Even though the exit structure has
space for KVM to pass register arguments, let's just avoid it altogether
and let userspace poke at the registers via KVM_GET_ONE_REG.
This deliberately stretches the definition of a 'hypercall' to cover
SMCs from EL1 in addition to the HVCs we know and love. KVM doesn't
support EL1 calls into secure services, but now we can paint that as a
userspace problem and be done with it.
Finally, we need a flag to let userspace know what conduit instruction
was used (i.e. SMC vs. HVC).
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230404154050.2270077-9-oliver.upton@linux.dev
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Whelp, the architecture gods have spoken and confirmed that the function
ID space is common between SMCs and HVCs. Not only that, the expectation
is that hypervisors handle calls to both SMC and HVC conduits. KVM
recently picked up support for SMCCCs in commit bd36b1a9eb5a ("KVM:
arm64: nv: Handle SMCs taken from virtual EL2") but scoped it only to a
nested hypervisor.
Let's just open the floodgates and let EL1 access our SMCCC
implementation with the SMC instruction as well.
Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230404154050.2270077-6-oliver.upton@linux.dev
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KVM handles SMCCC calls from virtual EL2 that use the SMC instruction
since commit bd36b1a9eb5a ("KVM: arm64: nv: Handle SMCs taken from
virtual EL2"). Thus, the function name of the handler no longer reflects
reality.
Normalize the name on SMCCC, since that's the only hypercall interface
KVM supports in the first place. No fuctional change intended.
Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230404154050.2270077-5-oliver.upton@linux.dev
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Non-nested guests have used the hvc instruction to initiate SMCCC
calls into KVM. This is quite a poor fit for NV as hvc exceptions are
always taken to EL2. In other words, KVM needs to unconditionally
forward the hvc exception back into vEL2 to uphold the architecture.
Instead, treat the smc instruction from vEL2 as we would a guest
hypercall, thereby allowing the vEL2 to interact with KVM's hypercall
surface. Note that on NV-capable hardware HCR_EL2.TSC causes smc
instructions executed in non-secure EL1 to trap to EL2, even if EL3 is
not implemented.
Reviewed-by: Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jintack Lim <jintack.lim@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230209175820.1939006-13-maz@kernel.org
[Oliver: redo commit message, only handle smc from vEL2]
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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When a guest hypervisor running virtual EL2 in EL1 executes an ERET
instruction, we will have set HCR_EL2.NV which traps ERET to EL2, so
that we can emulate the exception return in software.
Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230209175820.1939006-12-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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As we expect all PSCI calls from the L1 hypervisor to be performed
using SMC when nested virtualization is enabled, it is clear that
all HVC instruction from the VM (including from the virtual EL2)
are supposed to handled in the virtual EL2.
Forward these to EL2 as required.
Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jintack Lim <jintack.lim@linaro.org>
[maz: add handling of HCR_EL2.HCD]
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230209175820.1939006-11-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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While userspace enables single-step, if the Software Step state at the
last guest exit was "Active-pending", clear PSTATE.SS on guest entry
to restore the state.
Currently, KVM sets PSTATE.SS to 1 on every guest entry while userspace
enables single-step for the vCPU (with KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP).
It means KVM always makes the vCPU's Software Step state
"Active-not-pending" on the guest entry, which lets the VCPU perform
single-step (then Software Step exception is taken). This could cause
extra single-step (without returning to userspace) if the Software Step
state at the last guest exit was "Active-pending" (i.e. the last
exit was triggered by an asynchronous exception after the single-step
is performed, but before the Software Step exception is taken.
See "Figure D2-3 Software step state machine" and "D2.12.7 Behavior
in the active-pending state" in ARM DDI 0487I.a for more info about
this behavior).
Fix this by clearing PSTATE.SS on guest entry if the Software Step state
at the last exit was "Active-pending" so that KVM restore the state (and
the exception is taken before further single-step is performed).
Fixes: 337b99bf7edf ("KVM: arm64: guest debug, add support for single-step")
Signed-off-by: Reiji Watanabe <reijiw@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220917010600.532642-3-reijiw@google.com
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* kvm-arm64/nvhe-stacktrace: (27 commits)
: .
: Add an overflow stack to the nVHE EL2 code, allowing
: the implementation of an unwinder, courtesy of
: Kalesh Singh. From the cover letter (slightly edited):
:
: "nVHE has two modes of operation: protected (pKVM) and unprotected
: (conventional nVHE). Depending on the mode, a slightly different approach
: is used to dump the hypervisor stacktrace but the core unwinding logic
: remains the same.
:
: * Protected nVHE (pKVM) stacktraces:
:
: In protected nVHE mode, the host cannot directly access hypervisor memory.
:
: The hypervisor stack unwinding happens in EL2 and is made accessible to
: the host via a shared buffer. Symbolizing and printing the stacktrace
: addresses is delegated to the host and happens in EL1.
:
: * Non-protected (Conventional) nVHE stacktraces:
:
: In non-protected mode, the host is able to directly access the hypervisor
: stack pages.
:
: The hypervisor stack unwinding and dumping of the stacktrace is performed
: by the host in EL1, as this avoids the memory overhead of setting up
: shared buffers between the host and hypervisor."
:
: Additional patches from Oliver Upton and Marc Zyngier, tidying up
: the initial series.
: .
arm64: Update 'unwinder howto'
KVM: arm64: Don't open code ARRAY_SIZE()
KVM: arm64: Move nVHE-only helpers into kvm/stacktrace.c
KVM: arm64: Make unwind()/on_accessible_stack() per-unwinder functions
KVM: arm64: Move nVHE stacktrace unwinding into its own compilation unit
KVM: arm64: Move PROTECTED_NVHE_STACKTRACE around
KVM: arm64: Introduce pkvm_dump_backtrace()
KVM: arm64: Implement protected nVHE hyp stack unwinder
KVM: arm64: Save protected-nVHE (pKVM) hyp stacktrace
KVM: arm64: Stub implementation of pKVM HYP stack unwinder
KVM: arm64: Allocate shared pKVM hyp stacktrace buffers
KVM: arm64: Add PROTECTED_NVHE_STACKTRACE Kconfig
KVM: arm64: Introduce hyp_dump_backtrace()
KVM: arm64: Implement non-protected nVHE hyp stack unwinder
KVM: arm64: Prepare non-protected nVHE hypervisor stacktrace
KVM: arm64: Stub implementation of non-protected nVHE HYP stack unwinder
KVM: arm64: On stack overflow switch to hyp overflow_stack
arm64: stacktrace: Add description of stacktrace/common.h
arm64: stacktrace: Factor out common unwind()
arm64: stacktrace: Handle frame pointer from different address spaces
...
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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The unwinding code doesn't really belong to the exit handling
code. Instead, move it to a file (conveniently named stacktrace.c
to confuse the reviewer), and move all the stacktrace-related
stuff there.
It will be joined by more code very soon.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com>
Tested-by: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220727142906.1856759-3-maz@kernel.org
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Dumps the pKVM hypervisor backtrace from EL1 by reading the unwinded
addresses from the shared stacktrace buffer.
The nVHE hyp backtrace is dumped on hyp_panic(), before panicking the
host.
[ 111.623091] kvm [367]: nVHE call trace:
[ 111.623215] kvm [367]: [<ffff8000090a6570>] __kvm_nvhe_hyp_panic+0xac/0xf8
[ 111.623448] kvm [367]: [<ffff8000090a65cc>] __kvm_nvhe_hyp_panic_bad_stack+0x10/0x10
[ 111.623642] kvm [367]: [<ffff8000090a61e4>] __kvm_nvhe_recursive_death+0x24/0x34
. . .
[ 111.640366] kvm [367]: [<ffff8000090a61e4>] __kvm_nvhe_recursive_death+0x24/0x34
[ 111.640467] kvm [367]: [<ffff8000090a61e4>] __kvm_nvhe_recursive_death+0x24/0x34
[ 111.640574] kvm [367]: [<ffff8000090a5de4>] __kvm_nvhe___kvm_vcpu_run+0x30/0x40c
[ 111.640676] kvm [367]: [<ffff8000090a8b64>] __kvm_nvhe_handle___kvm_vcpu_run+0x30/0x48
[ 111.640778] kvm [367]: [<ffff8000090a88b8>] __kvm_nvhe_handle_trap+0xc4/0x128
[ 111.640880] kvm [367]: [<ffff8000090a7864>] __kvm_nvhe___host_exit+0x64/0x64
[ 111.640996] kvm [367]: ---[ end nVHE call trace ]---
Signed-off-by: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220726073750.3219117-18-kaleshsingh@google.com
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In non-protected nVHE mode, unwinds and dumps the hypervisor backtrace
from EL1. This is possible beacause the host can directly access the
hypervisor stack pages in non-protected mode.
The nVHE backtrace is dumped on hyp_panic(), before panicking the host.
[ 101.498183] kvm [377]: nVHE call trace:
[ 101.498363] kvm [377]: [<ffff8000090a6570>] __kvm_nvhe_hyp_panic+0xac/0xf8
[ 101.499045] kvm [377]: [<ffff8000090a65cc>] __kvm_nvhe_hyp_panic_bad_stack+0x10/0x10
[ 101.499498] kvm [377]: [<ffff8000090a61e4>] __kvm_nvhe_recursive_death+0x24/0x34
. . .
[ 101.524929] kvm [377]: [<ffff8000090a61e4>] __kvm_nvhe_recursive_death+0x24/0x34
[ 101.525062] kvm [377]: [<ffff8000090a61e4>] __kvm_nvhe_recursive_death+0x24/0x34
[ 101.525195] kvm [377]: [<ffff8000090a5de4>] __kvm_nvhe___kvm_vcpu_run+0x30/0x40c
[ 101.525333] kvm [377]: [<ffff8000090a8b64>] __kvm_nvhe_handle___kvm_vcpu_run+0x30/0x48
[ 101.525468] kvm [377]: [<ffff8000090a88b8>] __kvm_nvhe_handle_trap+0xc4/0x128
[ 101.525602] kvm [377]: [<ffff8000090a7864>] __kvm_nvhe___host_exit+0x64/0x64
[ 101.525745] kvm [377]: ---[ end nVHE call trace ]---
Signed-off-by: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220726073750.3219117-12-kaleshsingh@google.com
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* kvm-arm64/misc-5.20:
: .
: Misc fixes for 5.20:
:
: - Tidy up the hyp/nvhe Makefile
:
: - Fix functions pointlessly returning a void value
:
: - Fix vgic_init selftest to handle the GICv3-on-v3 case
:
: - Fix hypervisor symbolisation when CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE=y
: .
KVM: arm64: Fix hypervisor address symbolization
KVM: arm64: selftests: Add support for GICv2 on v3
KVM: arm64: Don't return from void function
KVM: arm64: nvhe: Add intermediates to 'targets' instead of extra-y
KVM: arm64: nvhe: Rename confusing obj-y
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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With CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE=y vmlinux addresses will resolve incorrectly
from kallsyms. Fix this by adding the KASLR offset before printing the
symbols.
Fixes: 6ccf9cb557bd ("KVM: arm64: Symbolize the nVHE HYP addresses")
Reported-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220715235824.2549012-1-kaleshsingh@google.com
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The host kernel uses the WFIT flag to remember that a vcpu has used
this instruction and wake it up as required. Move it to the state
set, as nothing in the hypervisor uses this information.
Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Reiji Watanabe <reijiw@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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Pull kvm updates from Paolo Bonzini:
"S390:
- ultravisor communication device driver
- fix TEID on terminating storage key ops
RISC-V:
- Added Sv57x4 support for G-stage page table
- Added range based local HFENCE functions
- Added remote HFENCE functions based on VCPU requests
- Added ISA extension registers in ONE_REG interface
- Updated KVM RISC-V maintainers entry to cover selftests support
ARM:
- Add support for the ARMv8.6 WFxT extension
- Guard pages for the EL2 stacks
- Trap and emulate AArch32 ID registers to hide unsupported features
- Ability to select and save/restore the set of hypercalls exposed to
the guest
- Support for PSCI-initiated suspend in collaboration with userspace
- GICv3 register-based LPI invalidation support
- Move host PMU event merging into the vcpu data structure
- GICv3 ITS save/restore fixes
- The usual set of small-scale cleanups and fixes
x86:
- New ioctls to get/set TSC frequency for a whole VM
- Allow userspace to opt out of hypercall patching
- Only do MSR filtering for MSRs accessed by rdmsr/wrmsr
AMD SEV improvements:
- Add KVM_EXIT_SHUTDOWN metadata for SEV-ES
- V_TSC_AUX support
Nested virtualization improvements for AMD:
- Support for "nested nested" optimizations (nested vVMLOAD/VMSAVE,
nested vGIF)
- Allow AVIC to co-exist with a nested guest running
- Fixes for LBR virtualizations when a nested guest is running, and
nested LBR virtualization support
- PAUSE filtering for nested hypervisors
Guest support:
- Decoupling of vcpu_is_preempted from PV spinlocks"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (199 commits)
KVM: x86: Fix the intel_pt PMI handling wrongly considered from guest
KVM: selftests: x86: Sync the new name of the test case to .gitignore
Documentation: kvm: reorder ARM-specific section about KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_SUSPEND
x86, kvm: use correct GFP flags for preemption disabled
KVM: LAPIC: Drop pending LAPIC timer injection when canceling the timer
x86/kvm: Alloc dummy async #PF token outside of raw spinlock
KVM: x86: avoid calling x86 emulator without a decoded instruction
KVM: SVM: Use kzalloc for sev ioctl interfaces to prevent kernel data leak
x86/fpu: KVM: Set the base guest FPU uABI size to sizeof(struct kvm_xsave)
s390/uv_uapi: depend on CONFIG_S390
KVM: selftests: x86: Fix test failure on arch lbr capable platforms
KVM: LAPIC: Trace LAPIC timer expiration on every vmentry
KVM: s390: selftest: Test suppression indication on key prot exception
KVM: s390: Don't indicate suppression on dirtying, failing memop
selftests: drivers/s390x: Add uvdevice tests
drivers/s390/char: Add Ultravisor io device
MAINTAINERS: Update KVM RISC-V entry to cover selftests support
RISC-V: KVM: Introduce ISA extension register
RISC-V: KVM: Cleanup stale TLB entries when host CPU changes
RISC-V: KVM: Add remote HFENCE functions based on VCPU requests
...
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* kvm-arm64/aarch32-idreg-trap:
: .
: Add trapping/sanitising infrastructure for AArch32 systen registers,
: allowing more control over what we actually expose (such as the PMU).
:
: Patches courtesy of Oliver and Alexandru.
: .
KVM: arm64: Fix new instances of 32bit ESRs
KVM: arm64: Hide AArch32 PMU registers when not available
KVM: arm64: Start trapping ID registers for 32 bit guests
KVM: arm64: Plumb cp10 ID traps through the AArch64 sysreg handler
KVM: arm64: Wire up CP15 feature registers to their AArch64 equivalents
KVM: arm64: Don't write to Rt unless sys_reg emulation succeeds
KVM: arm64: Return a bool from emulate_cp()
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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* kvm-arm64/hyp-stack-guard:
: .
: Harden the EL2 stack by providing stack guards, courtesy of
: Kalesh Singh.
: .
KVM: arm64: Symbolize the nVHE HYP addresses
KVM: arm64: Detect and handle hypervisor stack overflows
KVM: arm64: Add guard pages for pKVM (protected nVHE) hypervisor stack
KVM: arm64: Add guard pages for KVM nVHE hypervisor stack
KVM: arm64: Introduce pkvm_alloc_private_va_range()
KVM: arm64: Introduce hyp_alloc_private_va_range()
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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In order to enable HCR_EL2.TID3 for AArch32 guests KVM needs to handle
traps where ESR_EL2.EC=0x8, which corresponds to an attempted VMRS
access from an ID group register. Specifically, the MVFR{0-2} registers
are accessed this way from AArch32. Conveniently, these registers are
architecturally mapped to MVFR{0-2}_EL1 in AArch64. Furthermore, KVM
already handles reads to these aliases in AArch64.
Plumb VMRS read traps through to the general AArch64 system register
handler.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Reiji Watanabe <reijiw@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220503060205.2823727-5-oupton@google.com
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When userspace is debugging a VM, the kvm_debug_exit_arch part of the
kvm_run struct contains arm64 specific debug information: the ESR_EL2
value, encoded in the field "hsr", and the address of the instruction
that caused the exception, encoded in the field "far".
Linux has moved to treating ESR_EL2 as a 64-bit register, but unfortunately
kvm_debug_exit_arch.hsr cannot be changed because that would change the
memory layout of the struct on big endian machines:
Current layout: | Layout with "hsr" extended to 64 bits:
|
offset 0: ESR_EL2[31:0] (hsr) | offset 0: ESR_EL2[61:32] (hsr[61:32])
offset 4: padding | offset 4: ESR_EL2[31:0] (hsr[31:0])
offset 8: FAR_EL2[61:0] (far) | offset 8: FAR_EL2[61:0] (far)
which breaks existing code.
The padding is inserted by the compiler because the "far" field must be
aligned to 8 bytes (each field must be naturally aligned - aapcs64 [1],
page 18), and the struct itself must be aligned to 8 bytes (the struct must
be aligned to the maximum alignment of its fields - aapcs64, page 18),
which means that "hsr" must be aligned to 8 bytes as it is the first field
in the struct.
To avoid changing the struct size and layout for the existing fields, add a
new field, "hsr_high", which replaces the existing padding. "hsr_high" will
be used to hold the ESR_EL2[61:32] bits of the register. The memory layout,
both on big and little endian machine, becomes:
offset 0: ESR_EL2[31:0] (hsr)
offset 4: ESR_EL2[61:32] (hsr_high)
offset 8: FAR_EL2[61:0] (far)
The padding that the compiler inserts for the current struct layout is
unitialized. To prevent an updated userspace running on an old kernel
mistaking the padding for a valid "hsr_high" value, add a new flag,
KVM_DEBUG_ARCH_HSR_HIGH_VALID, to kvm_run->flags to let userspace know that
"hsr_high" holds a valid ESR_EL2[61:32] value.
[1] https://github.com/ARM-software/abi-aa/releases/download/2021Q3/aapcs64.pdf
Signed-off-by: Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220425114444.368693-6-alexandru.elisei@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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ESR_EL2 was defined as a 32-bit register in the initial release of the
ARM Architecture Manual for Armv8-A, and was later extended to 64 bits,
with bits [63:32] RES0. ARMv8.7 introduced FEAT_LS64, which makes use of
bits [36:32].
KVM treats ESR_EL1 as a 64-bit register when saving and restoring the
guest context, but ESR_EL2 is handled as a 32-bit register. Start
treating ESR_EL2 as a 64-bit register to allow KVM to make use of the
most significant 32 bits in the future.
The type chosen to represent ESR_EL2 is u64, as that is consistent with the
notation KVM overwhelmingly uses today (u32), and how the rest of the
registers are declared.
Signed-off-by: Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220425114444.368693-5-alexandru.elisei@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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Reintroduce the __kvm_nvhe_ symbols in kallsyms, ignoring the local
symbols in this namespace. The local symbols are not informative and
can cause aliasing issues when symbolizing the addresses.
With the necessary symbols now in kallsyms we can symbolize nVHE
addresses using the %p print format specifier:
[ 98.916444][ T426] kvm [426]: nVHE hyp panic at: [<ffffffc0096156fc>] __kvm_nvhe_overflow_stack+0x8/0x34!
Signed-off-by: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com>
Tested-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220420214317.3303360-7-kaleshsingh@google.com
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For WFxT instructions used with very small delays, it is not
unlikely that the deadline is already expired by the time we
reach the WFx handling code.
Check for this condition as soon as possible, and return to the
guest immediately if we can.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220419182755.601427-7-maz@kernel.org
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When trapping a blocking WFIT instruction, take it into account when
computing the deadline of the background timer.
The state is tracked with a new vcpu flag, and is gated by a new
CPU capability, which isn't currently enabled.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220419182755.601427-6-maz@kernel.org
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Various spelling mistakes in comments.
Detected with the help of Coccinelle.
Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall <Julia.Lawall@inria.fr>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220318103729.157574-24-Julia.Lawall@inria.fr
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Prior to commit defe21f49bc9 ("KVM: arm64: Move PC rollback on SError to
HYP"), when an SError is synchronised due to another exception, KVM
handles the SError first. If the guest survives, the instruction that
triggered the original exception is re-exectued to handle the first
exception. HVC is treated as a special case as the instruction wouldn't
normally be re-exectued, as its not a trap.
Commit defe21f49bc9 didn't preserve the behaviour of the 'return 1'
that skips the rest of handle_exit().
Since commit defe21f49bc9, KVM will try to handle the SError and the
original exception at the same time. When the exception was an HVC,
fixup_guest_exit() has already rolled back ELR_EL2, meaning if the
guest has virtual SError masked, it will execute and handle the HVC
twice.
Restore the original behaviour.
Fixes: defe21f49bc9 ("KVM: arm64: Move PC rollback on SError to HYP")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220127122052.1584324-4-james.morse@arm.com
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