diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux/hooks.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 41 |
1 files changed, 31 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 1bbd53321d13..03bca97c8b29 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ #include <uapi/linux/mount.h> #include <linux/fsnotify.h> #include <linux/fanotify.h> +#include <linux/io_uring.h> #include "avc.h" #include "objsec.h" @@ -640,7 +641,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, * we need to skip the double mount verification. * * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first - * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using + * mount using this sb set explicit options and a second mount using * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options * will be used for both mounts) */ @@ -944,10 +945,12 @@ out: return rc; } +/* + * NOTE: the caller is resposible for freeing the memory even if on error. + */ static int selinux_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts) { struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = *mnt_opts; - bool is_alloc_opts = false; u32 *dst_sid; int rc; @@ -955,7 +958,7 @@ static int selinux_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts) /* eaten and completely ignored */ return 0; if (!s) - return -ENOMEM; + return -EINVAL; if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) { pr_warn("SELinux: Unable to set superblock options before the security server is initialized\n"); @@ -967,7 +970,6 @@ static int selinux_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts) if (!opts) return -ENOMEM; *mnt_opts = opts; - is_alloc_opts = true; } switch (token) { @@ -1002,10 +1004,6 @@ static int selinux_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts) return rc; err: - if (is_alloc_opts) { - kfree(opts); - *mnt_opts = NULL; - } pr_warn(SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); return -EINVAL; } @@ -1019,7 +1017,7 @@ static int show_sid(struct seq_file *m, u32 sid) rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid, &context, &len); if (!rc) { - bool has_comma = context && strchr(context, ','); + bool has_comma = strchr(context, ','); seq_putc(m, '='); if (has_comma) @@ -6792,7 +6790,7 @@ static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode) } /* This function will check the file pass through unix socket or binder to see - * if it is a bpf related object. And apply correspinding checks on the bpf + * if it is a bpf related object. And apply corresponding checks on the bpf * object based on the type. The bpf maps and programs, not like other files and * socket, are using a shared anonymous inode inside the kernel as their inode. * So checking that inode cannot identify if the process have privilege to @@ -6990,6 +6988,28 @@ static int selinux_uring_sqpoll(void) return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__SQPOLL, NULL); } + +/** + * selinux_uring_cmd - check if IORING_OP_URING_CMD is allowed + * @ioucmd: the io_uring command structure + * + * Check to see if the current domain is allowed to execute an + * IORING_OP_URING_CMD against the device/file specified in @ioucmd. + * + */ +static int selinux_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd) +{ + struct file *file = ioucmd->file; + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); + struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode); + struct common_audit_data ad; + + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE; + ad.u.file = file; + + return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), isec->sid, + SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__CMD, &ad); +} #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */ /* @@ -7234,6 +7254,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { #ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, selinux_uring_override_creds), LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, selinux_uring_sqpoll), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_cmd, selinux_uring_cmd), #endif /* |