diff options
author | Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> | 2023-11-18 11:39:59 -0800 |
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committer | Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> | 2023-11-18 11:40:00 -0800 |
commit | 16b3129e14bf2e7505512568b11c437c840a0c19 (patch) | |
tree | c9df3007d849646ad84684b894fa8350a6d8e949 /tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/exceptions_assert.c | |
parent | ff8867af01daa7ea770bebf5f91199b7434b74e5 (diff) | |
parent | 46862ee854b4f5a315d63b677ca3af14a89aefeb (diff) |
Merge branch 'bpf-verifier-log-improvements'
Andrii Nakryiko says:
====================
BPF verifier log improvements
This patch set moves a big chunk of verifier log related code from gigantic
verifier.c file into more focused kernel/bpf/log.c. This is not essential to
the rest of functionality in this patch set, so I can undo it, but it felt
like it's good to start chipping away from 20K+ verifier.c whenever we can.
The main purpose of the patch set, though, is in improving verifier log
further.
Patches #3-#4 start printing out register state even if that register is
spilled into stack slot. Previously we'd get only spilled register type, but
no additional information, like SCALAR_VALUE's ranges. Super limiting during
debugging. For cases of register spills smaller than 8 bytes, we also print
out STACK_MISC/STACK_ZERO/STACK_INVALID markers. This, among other things,
will make it easier to write tests for these mixed spill/misc cases.
Patch #5 prints map name for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE/PTR_TO_MAP_KEY/CONST_PTR_TO_MAP
registers. In big production BPF programs, it's important to map assembly to
actual map, and it's often non-trivial. Having map name helps.
Patch #6 just removes visual noise in form of ubiquitous imm=0 and off=0. They
are default values, omit them.
Patch #7 is probably the most controversial, but it reworks how verifier log
prints numbers. For small valued integers we use decimals, but for large ones
we switch to hexadecimal. From personal experience this is a much more useful
convention. We can tune what consitutes "small value", for now it's 16-bit
range.
Patch #8 prints frame number for PTR_TO_CTX registers, if that frame is
different from the "current" one. This removes ambiguity and confusion,
especially in complicated cases with multiple subprogs passing around
pointers.
v2->v3:
- adjust reg_bounds tester to parse hex form of reg state as well;
- print reg->range as unsigned (Alexei);
v1->v2:
- use verbose_snum() for range and offset in register state (Eduard);
- fixed typos and added acks from Eduard and Stanislav.
====================
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231118034623.3320920-1-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/exceptions_assert.c')
-rw-r--r-- | tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/exceptions_assert.c | 40 |
1 files changed, 20 insertions, 20 deletions
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/exceptions_assert.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/exceptions_assert.c index e1e5c54a6a11..49efaed143fc 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/exceptions_assert.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/exceptions_assert.c @@ -18,48 +18,48 @@ return *(u64 *)num; \ } -__msg(": R0_w=-2147483648 R10=fp0") +__msg(": R0_w=0xffffffff80000000 R10=fp0") check_assert(s64, eq, int_min, INT_MIN); -__msg(": R0_w=2147483647 R10=fp0") +__msg(": R0_w=0x7fffffff R10=fp0") check_assert(s64, eq, int_max, INT_MAX); __msg(": R0_w=0 R10=fp0") check_assert(s64, eq, zero, 0); -__msg(": R0_w=-9223372036854775808 R1_w=-9223372036854775808 R10=fp0") +__msg(": R0_w=0x8000000000000000 R1_w=0x8000000000000000 R10=fp0") check_assert(s64, eq, llong_min, LLONG_MIN); -__msg(": R0_w=9223372036854775807 R1_w=9223372036854775807 R10=fp0") +__msg(": R0_w=0x7fffffffffffffff R1_w=0x7fffffffffffffff R10=fp0") check_assert(s64, eq, llong_max, LLONG_MAX); -__msg(": R0_w=scalar(smax=2147483646) R10=fp0") +__msg(": R0_w=scalar(smax=0x7ffffffe) R10=fp0") check_assert(s64, lt, pos, INT_MAX); -__msg(": R0_w=scalar(smax=-1,umin=9223372036854775808,var_off=(0x8000000000000000; 0x7fffffffffffffff))") +__msg(": R0_w=scalar(smax=-1,umin=0x8000000000000000,var_off=(0x8000000000000000; 0x7fffffffffffffff))") check_assert(s64, lt, zero, 0); -__msg(": R0_w=scalar(smax=-2147483649,umin=9223372036854775808,umax=18446744071562067967,var_off=(0x8000000000000000; 0x7fffffffffffffff))") +__msg(": R0_w=scalar(smax=0xffffffff7fffffff,umin=0x8000000000000000,umax=0xffffffff7fffffff,var_off=(0x8000000000000000; 0x7fffffffffffffff))") check_assert(s64, lt, neg, INT_MIN); -__msg(": R0_w=scalar(smax=2147483647) R10=fp0") +__msg(": R0_w=scalar(smax=0x7fffffff) R10=fp0") check_assert(s64, le, pos, INT_MAX); __msg(": R0_w=scalar(smax=0) R10=fp0") check_assert(s64, le, zero, 0); -__msg(": R0_w=scalar(smax=-2147483648,umin=9223372036854775808,umax=18446744071562067968,var_off=(0x8000000000000000; 0x7fffffffffffffff))") +__msg(": R0_w=scalar(smax=0xffffffff80000000,umin=0x8000000000000000,umax=0xffffffff80000000,var_off=(0x8000000000000000; 0x7fffffffffffffff))") check_assert(s64, le, neg, INT_MIN); -__msg(": R0_w=scalar(smin=umin=2147483648,umax=9223372036854775807,var_off=(0x0; 0x7fffffffffffffff))") +__msg(": R0_w=scalar(smin=umin=0x80000000,umax=0x7fffffffffffffff,var_off=(0x0; 0x7fffffffffffffff))") check_assert(s64, gt, pos, INT_MAX); -__msg(": R0_w=scalar(smin=umin=1,umax=9223372036854775807,var_off=(0x0; 0x7fffffffffffffff))") +__msg(": R0_w=scalar(smin=umin=1,umax=0x7fffffffffffffff,var_off=(0x0; 0x7fffffffffffffff))") check_assert(s64, gt, zero, 0); -__msg(": R0_w=scalar(smin=-2147483647) R10=fp0") +__msg(": R0_w=scalar(smin=0xffffffff80000001) R10=fp0") check_assert(s64, gt, neg, INT_MIN); -__msg(": R0_w=scalar(smin=umin=2147483647,umax=9223372036854775807,var_off=(0x0; 0x7fffffffffffffff))") +__msg(": R0_w=scalar(smin=umin=0x7fffffff,umax=0x7fffffffffffffff,var_off=(0x0; 0x7fffffffffffffff))") check_assert(s64, ge, pos, INT_MAX); -__msg(": R0_w=scalar(smin=0,umax=9223372036854775807,var_off=(0x0; 0x7fffffffffffffff)) R10=fp0") +__msg(": R0_w=scalar(smin=0,umax=0x7fffffffffffffff,var_off=(0x0; 0x7fffffffffffffff)) R10=fp0") check_assert(s64, ge, zero, 0); -__msg(": R0_w=scalar(smin=-2147483648) R10=fp0") +__msg(": R0_w=scalar(smin=0xffffffff80000000) R10=fp0") check_assert(s64, ge, neg, INT_MIN); SEC("?tc") __log_level(2) __failure -__msg(": R0=0 R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0) R2=scalar(smin=smin32=-2147483646,smax=smax32=2147483645) R10=fp0") +__msg(": R0=0 R1=ctx() R2=scalar(smin=0xffffffff80000002,smax=smax32=0x7ffffffd,smin32=0x80000002) R10=fp0") int check_assert_range_s64(struct __sk_buff *ctx) { struct bpf_sock *sk = ctx->sk; @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ int check_assert_range_s64(struct __sk_buff *ctx) SEC("?tc") __log_level(2) __failure -__msg(": R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0) R2=scalar(smin=umin=smin32=umin32=4096,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=8192,var_off=(0x0; 0x3fff))") +__msg(": R1=ctx() R2=scalar(smin=umin=smin32=umin32=4096,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=8192,var_off=(0x0; 0x3fff))") int check_assert_range_u64(struct __sk_buff *ctx) { u64 num = ctx->len; @@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ int check_assert_range_u64(struct __sk_buff *ctx) SEC("?tc") __log_level(2) __failure -__msg(": R0=0 R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0) R2=4096 R10=fp0") +__msg(": R0=0 R1=ctx() R2=4096 R10=fp0") int check_assert_single_range_s64(struct __sk_buff *ctx) { struct bpf_sock *sk = ctx->sk; @@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ int check_assert_single_range_s64(struct __sk_buff *ctx) SEC("?tc") __log_level(2) __failure -__msg(": R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0) R2=4096 R10=fp0") +__msg(": R1=ctx() R2=4096 R10=fp0") int check_assert_single_range_u64(struct __sk_buff *ctx) { u64 num = ctx->len; @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ int check_assert_single_range_u64(struct __sk_buff *ctx) SEC("?tc") __log_level(2) __failure -__msg(": R1=pkt(off=64,r=64,imm=0) R2=pkt_end(off=0,imm=0) R6=pkt(off=0,r=64,imm=0) R10=fp0") +__msg(": R1=pkt(off=64,r=64) R2=pkt_end() R6=pkt(r=64) R10=fp0") int check_assert_generic(struct __sk_buff *ctx) { u8 *data_end = (void *)(long)ctx->data_end; |