diff options
author | Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> | 2012-06-25 19:06:12 +0200 |
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committer | Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> | 2012-06-25 19:10:36 +0200 |
commit | 7b0cfee1a24efdfe0235bac62e53f686fe8a8e24 (patch) | |
tree | eeeb8cc3bf7be5ec0e54b7c4f3808ef88ecca012 /security/security.c | |
parent | 9756fe38d10b2bf90c81dc4d2f17d5632e135364 (diff) | |
parent | 6b16351acbd415e66ba16bf7d473ece1574cf0bc (diff) |
Merge tag 'v3.5-rc4' into drm-intel-next-queued
I want to merge the "no more fake agp on gen6+" patches into
drm-intel-next (well, the last pieces). But a patch in 3.5-rc4 also
adds a new use of dev->agp. Hence the backmarge to sort this out, for
otherwise drm-intel-next merged into Linus' tree would conflict in the
relevant code, things would compile but nicely OOPS at driver load :(
Conflicts in this merge are just simple cases of "both branches
changed/added lines at the same place". The only tricky part is to
keep the order correct wrt the unwind code in case of errors in
intel_ringbuffer.c (and the MI_DISPLAY_FLIP #defines in i915_reg.h
together, obviously).
Conflicts:
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_reg.h
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_ringbuffer.c
Signed-Off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/security.c')
-rw-r--r-- | security/security.c | 51 |
1 files changed, 46 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 5497a57fba01..3efc9b12aef4 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -20,6 +20,9 @@ #include <linux/ima.h> #include <linux/evm.h> #include <linux/fsnotify.h> +#include <linux/mman.h> +#include <linux/mount.h> +#include <linux/personality.h> #include <net/flow.h> #define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2 @@ -657,18 +660,56 @@ int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) return security_ops->file_ioctl(file, cmd, arg); } -int security_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, - unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags, - unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only) +static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) { - int ret; + /* + * Does we have PROT_READ and does the application expect + * it to imply PROT_EXEC? If not, nothing to talk about... + */ + if ((prot & (PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC)) != PROT_READ) + return prot; + if (!(current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC)) + return prot; + /* + * if that's an anonymous mapping, let it. + */ + if (!file) + return prot | PROT_EXEC; + /* + * ditto if it's not on noexec mount, except that on !MMU we need + * BDI_CAP_EXEC_MMAP (== VM_MAYEXEC) in this case + */ + if (!(file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)) { +#ifndef CONFIG_MMU + unsigned long caps = 0; + struct address_space *mapping = file->f_mapping; + if (mapping && mapping->backing_dev_info) + caps = mapping->backing_dev_info->capabilities; + if (!(caps & BDI_CAP_EXEC_MAP)) + return prot; +#endif + return prot | PROT_EXEC; + } + /* anything on noexec mount won't get PROT_EXEC */ + return prot; +} - ret = security_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only); +int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, + unsigned long flags) +{ + int ret; + ret = security_ops->mmap_file(file, prot, + mmap_prot(file, prot), flags); if (ret) return ret; return ima_file_mmap(file, prot); } +int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) +{ + return security_ops->mmap_addr(addr); +} + int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot) { |