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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2025-09-10 20:52:16 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2025-09-10 20:52:16 -0700 |
commit | 223ba8ee0a3986718c874b66ed24e7f87f6b8124 (patch) | |
tree | 7597b02a3a145b618b19a3e7e4f65875ee3cd68a /scripts/rustdoc_test_builder.rs | |
parent | 7aac71907bdea16e2754a782b9d9155449a9d49d (diff) | |
parent | 8a68d64bb10334426834e8c273319601878e961e (diff) |
Merge tag 'vmscape-for-linus-20250904' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull vmescape mitigation fixes from Dave Hansen:
"Mitigate vmscape issue with indirect branch predictor flushes.
vmscape is a vulnerability that essentially takes Spectre-v2 and
attacks host userspace from a guest. It particularly affects
hypervisors like QEMU.
Even if a hypervisor may not have any sensitive data like disk
encryption keys, guest-userspace may be able to attack the
guest-kernel using the hypervisor as a confused deputy.
There are many ways to mitigate vmscape using the existing Spectre-v2
defenses like IBRS variants or the IBPB flushes. This series focuses
solely on IBPB because it works universally across vendors and all
vulnerable processors. Further work doing vendor and model-specific
optimizations can build on top of this if needed / wanted.
Do the normal issue mitigation dance:
- Add the CPU bug boilerplate
- Add a list of vulnerable CPUs
- Use IBPB to flush the branch predictors after running guests"
* tag 'vmscape-for-linus-20250904' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/vmscape: Add old Intel CPUs to affected list
x86/vmscape: Warn when STIBP is disabled with SMT
x86/bugs: Move cpu_bugs_smt_update() down
x86/vmscape: Enable the mitigation
x86/vmscape: Add conditional IBPB mitigation
x86/vmscape: Enumerate VMSCAPE bug
Documentation/hw-vuln: Add VMSCAPE documentation
Diffstat (limited to 'scripts/rustdoc_test_builder.rs')
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