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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2025-09-10 20:52:16 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2025-09-10 20:52:16 -0700
commit223ba8ee0a3986718c874b66ed24e7f87f6b8124 (patch)
tree7597b02a3a145b618b19a3e7e4f65875ee3cd68a /scripts/rustdoc_test_builder.rs
parent7aac71907bdea16e2754a782b9d9155449a9d49d (diff)
parent8a68d64bb10334426834e8c273319601878e961e (diff)
Merge tag 'vmscape-for-linus-20250904' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull vmescape mitigation fixes from Dave Hansen: "Mitigate vmscape issue with indirect branch predictor flushes. vmscape is a vulnerability that essentially takes Spectre-v2 and attacks host userspace from a guest. It particularly affects hypervisors like QEMU. Even if a hypervisor may not have any sensitive data like disk encryption keys, guest-userspace may be able to attack the guest-kernel using the hypervisor as a confused deputy. There are many ways to mitigate vmscape using the existing Spectre-v2 defenses like IBRS variants or the IBPB flushes. This series focuses solely on IBPB because it works universally across vendors and all vulnerable processors. Further work doing vendor and model-specific optimizations can build on top of this if needed / wanted. Do the normal issue mitigation dance: - Add the CPU bug boilerplate - Add a list of vulnerable CPUs - Use IBPB to flush the branch predictors after running guests" * tag 'vmscape-for-linus-20250904' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/vmscape: Add old Intel CPUs to affected list x86/vmscape: Warn when STIBP is disabled with SMT x86/bugs: Move cpu_bugs_smt_update() down x86/vmscape: Enable the mitigation x86/vmscape: Add conditional IBPB mitigation x86/vmscape: Enumerate VMSCAPE bug Documentation/hw-vuln: Add VMSCAPE documentation
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