diff options
author | Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> | 2021-09-16 13:34:24 -0700 |
---|---|---|
committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2021-10-06 15:42:30 +0200 |
commit | 504cf969d5856bd9a084da3bfe636ae4b42a6fe8 (patch) | |
tree | b302cd98e4d4fb795747ffeda457af80d35e13e2 /net/unix/af_unix.c | |
parent | b2fb6ce06c0fa90ce0651fea6b668fb0248dc0ad (diff) |
fs-verity: fix signed integer overflow with i_size near S64_MAX
commit 80f6e3080bfcf865062a926817b3ca6c4a137a57 upstream.
If the file size is almost S64_MAX, the calculated number of Merkle tree
levels exceeds FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS, causing FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY to
fail. This is unintentional, since as the comment above the definition
of FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS states, it is enough for over U64_MAX bytes of
data using SHA-256 and 4K blocks. (Specifically, 4096*128**8 >= 2**64.)
The bug is actually that when the number of blocks in the first level is
calculated from i_size, there is a signed integer overflow due to i_size
being signed. Fix this by treating i_size as unsigned.
This was found by the new test "generic: test fs-verity EFBIG scenarios"
(https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b1d116cd4d0ea74b9cd86f349c672021e005a75c.1631558495.git.boris@bur.io).
This didn't affect ext4 or f2fs since those have a smaller maximum file
size, but it did affect btrfs which allows files up to S64_MAX bytes.
Reported-by: Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io>
Fixes: 3fda4c617e84 ("fs-verity: implement FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY ioctl")
Fixes: fd2d1acfcadf ("fs-verity: add the hook for file ->open()")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.4+
Reviewed-by: Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210916203424.113376-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/unix/af_unix.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions