diff options
| author | Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> | 2021-03-08 10:11:33 -0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> | 2021-03-08 10:11:33 -0300 |
| commit | 009ef05f98129aa91c62c3baab859ba593a15bb2 (patch) | |
| tree | f3414f08d636a597545b1e4f443b373b9d6d8f4b /fs/exec.c | |
| parent | 2777b81b379df772defd654bc4d3fa82dca17a4b (diff) | |
| parent | 144c79ef33536b4ecb4951e07dbc1f2b7fa99d32 (diff) | |
Merge remote-tracking branch 'torvalds/master' into perf/core
To pick up the fixes sent for v5.12 and continue development based on
v5.12-rc2, i.e. without the swap on file bug.
This also gets a slightly newer and better tools/perf/arch/arm/util/cs-etm.c
patch version, using the BIT() macro, that had already been slated to
v5.13 but ended up going to v5.12-rc1 on an older version.
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/exec.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/exec.c | 16 |
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c index 5a853f03c2332..18594f11c31fe 100644 --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -1404,14 +1404,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(begin_new_exec); void would_dump(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); - if (inode_permission(inode, MAY_READ) < 0) { + struct user_namespace *mnt_userns = file_mnt_user_ns(file); + if (inode_permission(mnt_userns, inode, MAY_READ) < 0) { struct user_namespace *old, *user_ns; bprm->interp_flags |= BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP; /* Ensure mm->user_ns contains the executable */ user_ns = old = bprm->mm->user_ns; while ((user_ns != &init_user_ns) && - !privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(user_ns, inode)) + !privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(user_ns, mnt_userns, inode)) user_ns = user_ns->parent; if (old != user_ns) { @@ -1454,7 +1455,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(finalize_exec); /* * Prepare credentials and lock ->cred_guard_mutex. * setup_new_exec() commits the new creds and drops the lock. - * Or, if exec fails before, free_bprm() should release ->cred and + * Or, if exec fails before, free_bprm() should release ->cred * and unlock. */ static int prepare_bprm_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) @@ -1579,6 +1580,7 @@ static void check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) static void bprm_fill_uid(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file) { /* Handle suid and sgid on files */ + struct user_namespace *mnt_userns; struct inode *inode; unsigned int mode; kuid_t uid; @@ -1595,13 +1597,15 @@ static void bprm_fill_uid(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file) if (!(mode & (S_ISUID|S_ISGID))) return; + mnt_userns = file_mnt_user_ns(file); + /* Be careful if suid/sgid is set */ inode_lock(inode); /* reload atomically mode/uid/gid now that lock held */ mode = inode->i_mode; - uid = inode->i_uid; - gid = inode->i_gid; + uid = i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode); + gid = i_gid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode); inode_unlock(inode); /* We ignore suid/sgid if there are no mappings for them in the ns */ @@ -1837,7 +1841,7 @@ static int bprm_execve(struct linux_binprm *bprm, out: /* - * If past the point of no return ensure the the code never + * If past the point of no return ensure the code never * returns to the userspace process. Use an existing fatal * signal if present otherwise terminate the process with * SIGSEGV. |