Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm

Pull x86 kvm updates from Paolo Bonzini:
 "Generic:

   - Rework almost all of KVM's exports to expose symbols only to KVM's
     x86 vendor modules (kvm-{amd,intel}.ko and PPC's kvm-{pr,hv}.ko

  x86:

   - Rework almost all of KVM x86's exports to expose symbols only to
     KVM's vendor modules, i.e. to kvm-{amd,intel}.ko

   - Add support for virtualizing Control-flow Enforcement Technology
     (CET) on Intel (Shadow Stacks and Indirect Branch Tracking) and AMD
     (Shadow Stacks).

     It is worth noting that while SHSTK and IBT can be enabled
     separately in CPUID, it is not really possible to virtualize them
     separately. Therefore, Intel processors will really allow both
     SHSTK and IBT under the hood if either is made visible in the
     guest's CPUID. The alternative would be to intercept
     XSAVES/XRSTORS, which is not feasible for performance reasons

   - Fix a variety of fuzzing WARNs all caused by checking L1 intercepts
     when completing userspace I/O. KVM has already committed to
     allowing L2 to to perform I/O at that point

   - Emulate PERF_CNTR_GLOBAL_STATUS_SET for PerfMonV2 guests, as the
     MSR is supposed to exist for v2 PMUs

   - Allow Centaur CPU leaves (base 0xC000_0000) for Zhaoxin CPUs

   - Add support for the immediate forms of RDMSR and WRMSRNS, sans full
     emulator support (KVM should never need to emulate the MSRs outside
     of forced emulation and other contrived testing scenarios)

   - Clean up the MSR APIs in preparation for CET and FRED
     virtualization, as well as mediated vPMU support

   - Clean up a pile of PMU code in anticipation of adding support for
     mediated vPMUs

   - Reject in-kernel IOAPIC/PIT for TDX VMs, as KVM can't obtain EOI
     vmexits needed to faithfully emulate an I/O APIC for such guests

   - Many cleanups and minor fixes

   - Recover possible NX huge pages within the TDP MMU under read lock
     to reduce guest jitter when restoring NX huge pages

   - Return -EAGAIN during prefault if userspace concurrently
     deletes/moves the relevant memslot, to fix an issue where
     prefaulting could deadlock with the memslot update

  x86 (AMD):

   - Enable AVIC by default for Zen4+ if x2AVIC (and other prereqs) is
     supported

   - Require a minimum GHCB version of 2 when starting SEV-SNP guests
     via KVM_SEV_INIT2 so that invalid GHCB versions result in immediate
     errors instead of latent guest failures

   - Add support for SEV-SNP's CipherText Hiding, an opt-in feature that
     prevents unauthorized CPU accesses from reading the ciphertext of
     SNP guest private memory, e.g. to attempt an offline attack. This
     feature splits the shared SEV-ES/SEV-SNP ASID space into separate
     ranges for SEV-ES and SEV-SNP guests, therefore a new module
     parameter is needed to control the number of ASIDs that can be used
     for VMs with CipherText Hiding vs. how many can be used to run
     SEV-ES guests

   - Add support for Secure TSC for SEV-SNP guests, which prevents the
     untrusted host from tampering with the guest's TSC frequency, while
     still allowing the the VMM to configure the guest's TSC frequency
     prior to launch

   - Validate the XCR0 provided by the guest (via the GHCB) to avoid
     bugs resulting from bogus XCR0 values

   - Save an SEV guest's policy if and only if LAUNCH_START fully
     succeeds to avoid leaving behind stale state (thankfully not
     consumed in KVM)

   - Explicitly reject non-positive effective lengths during SNP's
     LAUNCH_UPDATE instead of subtly relying on guest_memfd to deal with
     them

   - Reload the pre-VMRUN TSC_AUX on #VMEXIT for SEV-ES guests, not the
     host's desired TSC_AUX, to fix a bug where KVM was keeping a
     different vCPU's TSC_AUX in the host MSR until return to userspace

  KVM (Intel):

   - Preparation for FRED support

   - Don't retry in TDX's anti-zero-step mitigation if the target
     memslot is invalid, i.e. is being deleted or moved, to fix a
     deadlock scenario similar to the aforementioned prefaulting case

   - Misc bugfixes and minor cleanups"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (142 commits)
  KVM: x86: Export KVM-internal symbols for sub-modules only
  KVM: x86: Drop pointless exports of kvm_arch_xxx() hooks
  KVM: x86: Move kvm_intr_is_single_vcpu() to lapic.c
  KVM: Export KVM-internal symbols for sub-modules only
  KVM: s390/vfio-ap: Use kvm_is_gpa_in_memslot() instead of open coded equivalent
  KVM: VMX: Make CR4.CET a guest owned bit
  KVM: selftests: Verify MSRs are (not) in save/restore list when (un)supported
  KVM: selftests: Add coverage for KVM-defined registers in MSRs test
  KVM: selftests: Add KVM_{G,S}ET_ONE_REG coverage to MSRs test
  KVM: selftests: Extend MSRs test to validate vCPUs without supported features
  KVM: selftests: Add support for MSR_IA32_{S,U}_CET to MSRs test
  KVM: selftests: Add an MSR test to exercise guest/host and read/write
  KVM: x86: Define AMD's #HV, #VC, and #SX exception vectors
  KVM: x86: Define Control Protection Exception (#CP) vector
  KVM: x86: Add human friendly formatting for #XM, and #VE
  KVM: SVM: Enable shadow stack virtualization for SVM
  KVM: SEV: Synchronize MSR_IA32_XSS from the GHCB when it's valid
  KVM: SVM: Pass through shadow stack MSRs as appropriate
  KVM: SVM: Update dump_vmcb with shadow stack save area additions
  KVM: nSVM: Save/load CET Shadow Stack state to/from vmcb12/vmcb02
  ...

1 files changed, 101 insertions, 135 deletions

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 3a9fe0a8b78c..153c12dbf3eb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -158,14 +158,6 @@ module_param(lbrv, int, 0444);
 static int tsc_scaling = true;
 module_param(tsc_scaling, int, 0444);
 
-/*
- * enable / disable AVIC.  Because the defaults differ for APICv
- * support between VMX and SVM we cannot use module_param_named.
- */
-static bool avic;
-module_param(avic, bool, 0444);
-module_param(enable_ipiv, bool, 0444);
-
 module_param(enable_device_posted_irqs, bool, 0444);
 
 bool __read_mostly dump_invalid_vmcb;
@@ -195,7 +187,7 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(vmcb_dump_mutex);
  * RDTSCP and RDPID are not used in the kernel, specifically to allow KVM to
  * defer the restoration of TSC_AUX until the CPU returns to userspace.
  */
-static int tsc_aux_uret_slot __read_mostly = -1;
+int tsc_aux_uret_slot __ro_after_init = -1;
 
 static int get_npt_level(void)
 {
@@ -577,18 +569,6 @@ static int svm_enable_virtualization_cpu(void)
 
 	amd_pmu_enable_virt();
 
-	/*
-	 * If TSC_AUX virtualization is supported, TSC_AUX becomes a swap type
-	 * "B" field (see sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest()) for SEV-ES guests.
-	 * Since Linux does not change the value of TSC_AUX once set, prime the
-	 * TSC_AUX field now to avoid a RDMSR on every vCPU run.
-	 */
-	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_TSC_AUX)) {
-		u32 __maybe_unused msr_hi;
-
-		rdmsr(MSR_TSC_AUX, sev_es_host_save_area(sd)->tsc_aux, msr_hi);
-	}
-
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -736,55 +716,6 @@ static void svm_recalc_lbr_msr_intercepts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		svm_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR, MSR_TYPE_RW, intercept);
 }
 
-void svm_set_x2apic_msr_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm, bool intercept)
-{
-	static const u32 x2avic_passthrough_msrs[] = {
-		X2APIC_MSR(APIC_ID),
-		X2APIC_MSR(APIC_LVR),
-		X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TASKPRI),
-		X2APIC_MSR(APIC_ARBPRI),
-		X2APIC_MSR(APIC_PROCPRI),
-		X2APIC_MSR(APIC_EOI),
-		X2APIC_MSR(APIC_RRR),
-		X2APIC_MSR(APIC_LDR),
-		X2APIC_MSR(APIC_DFR),
-		X2APIC_MSR(APIC_SPIV),
-		X2APIC_MSR(APIC_ISR),
-		X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMR),
-		X2APIC_MSR(APIC_IRR),
-		X2APIC_MSR(APIC_ESR),
-		X2APIC_MSR(APIC_ICR),
-		X2APIC_MSR(APIC_ICR2),
-
-		/*
-		 * Note!  Always intercept LVTT, as TSC-deadline timer mode
-		 * isn't virtualized by hardware, and the CPU will generate a
-		 * #GP instead of a #VMEXIT.
-		 */
-		X2APIC_MSR(APIC_LVTTHMR),
-		X2APIC_MSR(APIC_LVTPC),
-		X2APIC_MSR(APIC_LVT0),
-		X2APIC_MSR(APIC_LVT1),
-		X2APIC_MSR(APIC_LVTERR),
-		X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMICT),
-		X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMCCT),
-		X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TDCR),
-	};
-	int i;
-
-	if (intercept == svm->x2avic_msrs_intercepted)
-		return;
-
-	if (!x2avic_enabled)
-		return;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(x2avic_passthrough_msrs); i++)
-		svm_set_intercept_for_msr(&svm->vcpu, x2avic_passthrough_msrs[i],
-					  MSR_TYPE_RW, intercept);
-
-	svm->x2avic_msrs_intercepted = intercept;
-}
-
 void svm_vcpu_free_msrpm(void *msrpm)
 {
 	__free_pages(virt_to_page(msrpm), get_order(MSRPM_SIZE));
@@ -844,6 +775,17 @@ static void svm_recalc_msr_intercepts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		svm_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_MPERF, MSR_TYPE_R);
 	}
 
+	if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
+		bool shstk_enabled = guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK);
+
+		svm_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_U_CET, MSR_TYPE_RW, !shstk_enabled);
+		svm_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_S_CET, MSR_TYPE_RW, !shstk_enabled);
+		svm_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW, !shstk_enabled);
+		svm_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW, !shstk_enabled);
+		svm_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW, !shstk_enabled);
+		svm_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW, !shstk_enabled);
+	}
+
 	if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
 		sev_es_recalc_msr_intercepts(vcpu);
 
@@ -1077,13 +1019,13 @@ static void svm_recalc_instruction_intercepts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	}
 }
 
-static void svm_recalc_intercepts_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+static void svm_recalc_intercepts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	svm_recalc_instruction_intercepts(vcpu);
 	svm_recalc_msr_intercepts(vcpu);
 }
 
-static void init_vmcb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+static void init_vmcb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
 {
 	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
 	struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
@@ -1221,11 +1163,11 @@ static void init_vmcb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_BUSLOCK);
 
 	if (sev_guest(vcpu->kvm))
-		sev_init_vmcb(svm);
+		sev_init_vmcb(svm, init_event);
 
 	svm_hv_init_vmcb(vmcb);
 
-	svm_recalc_intercepts_after_set_cpuid(vcpu);
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_RECALC_INTERCEPTS, vcpu);
 
 	vmcb_mark_all_dirty(vmcb);
 
@@ -1244,9 +1186,6 @@ static void __svm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 	svm->nmi_masked = false;
 	svm->awaiting_iret_completion = false;
-
-	if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
-		sev_es_vcpu_reset(svm);
 }
 
 static void svm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
@@ -1256,10 +1195,7 @@ static void svm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
 	svm->spec_ctrl = 0;
 	svm->virt_spec_ctrl = 0;
 
-	if (init_event)
-		sev_snp_init_protected_guest_state(vcpu);
-
-	init_vmcb(vcpu);
+	init_vmcb(vcpu, init_event);
 
 	if (!init_event)
 		__svm_vcpu_reset(vcpu);
@@ -1275,7 +1211,6 @@ static int svm_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	struct vcpu_svm *svm;
 	struct page *vmcb01_page;
-	struct page *vmsa_page = NULL;
 	int err;
 
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct vcpu_svm, vcpu) != 0);
@@ -1286,24 +1221,18 @@ static int svm_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	if (!vmcb01_page)
 		goto out;
 
-	if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
-		/*
-		 * SEV-ES guests require a separate VMSA page used to contain
-		 * the encrypted register state of the guest.
-		 */
-		vmsa_page = snp_safe_alloc_page();
-		if (!vmsa_page)
-			goto error_free_vmcb_page;
-	}
+	err = sev_vcpu_create(vcpu);
+	if (err)
+		goto error_free_vmcb_page;
 
 	err = avic_init_vcpu(svm);
 	if (err)
-		goto error_free_vmsa_page;
+		goto error_free_sev;
 
 	svm->msrpm = svm_vcpu_alloc_msrpm();
 	if (!svm->msrpm) {
 		err = -ENOMEM;
-		goto error_free_vmsa_page;
+		goto error_free_sev;
 	}
 
 	svm->x2avic_msrs_intercepted = true;
@@ -1312,16 +1241,12 @@ static int svm_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	svm->vmcb01.pa = __sme_set(page_to_pfn(vmcb01_page) << PAGE_SHIFT);
 	svm_switch_vmcb(svm, &svm->vmcb01);
 
-	if (vmsa_page)
-		svm->sev_es.vmsa = page_address(vmsa_page);
-
 	svm->guest_state_loaded = false;
 
 	return 0;
 
-error_free_vmsa_page:
-	if (vmsa_page)
-		__free_page(vmsa_page);
+error_free_sev:
+	sev_free_vcpu(vcpu);
 error_free_vmcb_page:
 	__free_page(vmcb01_page);
 out:
@@ -1423,10 +1348,10 @@ static void svm_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		__svm_write_tsc_multiplier(vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio);
 
 	/*
-	 * TSC_AUX is always virtualized for SEV-ES guests when the feature is
-	 * available. The user return MSR support is not required in this case
-	 * because TSC_AUX is restored on #VMEXIT from the host save area
-	 * (which has been initialized in svm_enable_virtualization_cpu()).
+	 * TSC_AUX is always virtualized (context switched by hardware) for
+	 * SEV-ES guests when the feature is available.  For non-SEV-ES guests,
+	 * context switch TSC_AUX via the user_return MSR infrastructure (not
+	 * all CPUs support TSC_AUX virtualization).
 	 */
 	if (likely(tsc_aux_uret_slot >= 0) &&
 	    (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_TSC_AUX) || !sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)))
@@ -2727,8 +2652,8 @@ static int svm_get_feature_msr(u32 msr, u64 *data)
 static bool sev_es_prevent_msr_access(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 				      struct msr_data *msr_info)
 {
-	return sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm) &&
-	       vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected &&
+	return sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm) && vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected &&
+	       msr_info->index != MSR_IA32_XSS &&
 	       !msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, msr_info->index);
 }
 
@@ -2784,6 +2709,15 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
 		if (guest_cpuid_is_intel_compatible(vcpu))
 			msr_info->data |= (u64)svm->sysenter_esp_hi << 32;
 		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_S_CET:
+		msr_info->data = svm->vmcb->save.s_cet;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB:
+		msr_info->data = svm->vmcb->save.isst_addr;
+		break;
+	case MSR_KVM_INTERNAL_GUEST_SSP:
+		msr_info->data = svm->vmcb->save.ssp;
+		break;
 	case MSR_TSC_AUX:
 		msr_info->data = svm->tsc_aux;
 		break;
@@ -3016,13 +2950,24 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
 		svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.sysenter_esp = (u32)data;
 		svm->sysenter_esp_hi = guest_cpuid_is_intel_compatible(vcpu) ? (data >> 32) : 0;
 		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_S_CET:
+		svm->vmcb->save.s_cet = data;
+		vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb01.ptr, VMCB_CET);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB:
+		svm->vmcb->save.isst_addr = data;
+		vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb01.ptr, VMCB_CET);
+		break;
+	case MSR_KVM_INTERNAL_GUEST_SSP:
+		svm->vmcb->save.ssp = data;
+		vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb01.ptr, VMCB_CET);
+		break;
 	case MSR_TSC_AUX:
 		/*
 		 * TSC_AUX is always virtualized for SEV-ES guests when the
 		 * feature is available. The user return MSR support is not
 		 * required in this case because TSC_AUX is restored on #VMEXIT
-		 * from the host save area (which has been initialized in
-		 * svm_enable_virtualization_cpu()).
+		 * from the host save area.
 		 */
 		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_TSC_AUX) && sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
 			break;
@@ -3407,6 +3352,10 @@ static void dump_vmcb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
 	       "rsp:", save->rsp, "rax:", save->rax);
 	pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
+	       "s_cet:", save->s_cet, "ssp:", save->ssp);
+	pr_err("%-15s %016llx\n",
+	       "isst_addr:", save->isst_addr);
+	pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
 	       "star:", save01->star, "lstar:", save01->lstar);
 	pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
 	       "cstar:", save01->cstar, "sfmask:", save01->sfmask);
@@ -3431,6 +3380,13 @@ static void dump_vmcb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		       "sev_features", vmsa->sev_features);
 
 		pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
+		       "pl0_ssp:", vmsa->pl0_ssp, "pl1_ssp:", vmsa->pl1_ssp);
+		pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
+		       "pl2_ssp:", vmsa->pl2_ssp, "pl3_ssp:", vmsa->pl3_ssp);
+		pr_err("%-15s %016llx\n",
+		       "u_cet:", vmsa->u_cet);
+
+		pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
 		       "rax:", vmsa->rax, "rbx:", vmsa->rbx);
 		pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
 		       "rcx:", vmsa->rcx, "rdx:", vmsa->rdx);
@@ -4180,17 +4136,27 @@ static int svm_vcpu_pre_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 static fastpath_t svm_exit_handlers_fastpath(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
+
+	/*
+	 * Next RIP must be provided as IRQs are disabled, and accessing guest
+	 * memory to decode the instruction might fault, i.e. might sleep.
+	 */
+	if (!nrips || !control->next_rip)
+		return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
 
 	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
 		return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
 
-	switch (svm->vmcb->control.exit_code) {
+	switch (control->exit_code) {
 	case SVM_EXIT_MSR:
-		if (!svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1)
+		if (!control->exit_info_1)
 			break;
-		return handle_fastpath_set_msr_irqoff(vcpu);
+		return handle_fastpath_wrmsr(vcpu);
 	case SVM_EXIT_HLT:
 		return handle_fastpath_hlt(vcpu);
+	case SVM_EXIT_INVD:
+		return handle_fastpath_invd(vcpu);
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
@@ -4467,8 +4433,6 @@ static void svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 	if (sev_guest(vcpu->kvm))
 		sev_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(svm);
-
-	svm_recalc_intercepts_after_set_cpuid(vcpu);
 }
 
 static bool svm_has_wbinvd_exit(void)
@@ -5041,7 +5005,7 @@ static void *svm_alloc_apic_backing_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return page_address(page);
 }
 
-static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = {
+struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = {
 	.name = KBUILD_MODNAME,
 
 	.check_processor_compatibility = svm_check_processor_compat,
@@ -5170,7 +5134,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = {
 
 	.apic_init_signal_blocked = svm_apic_init_signal_blocked,
 
-	.recalc_msr_intercepts = svm_recalc_msr_intercepts,
+	.recalc_intercepts = svm_recalc_intercepts,
 	.complete_emulated_msr = svm_complete_emulated_msr,
 
 	.vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = svm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector,
@@ -5228,7 +5192,8 @@ static __init void svm_set_cpu_caps(void)
 	kvm_set_cpu_caps();
 
 	kvm_caps.supported_perf_cap = 0;
-	kvm_caps.supported_xss = 0;
+
+	kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_IBT);
 
 	/* CPUID 0x80000001 and 0x8000000A (SVM features) */
 	if (nested) {
@@ -5300,8 +5265,12 @@ static __init void svm_set_cpu_caps(void)
 	/* CPUID 0x8000001F (SME/SEV features) */
 	sev_set_cpu_caps();
 
-	/* Don't advertise Bus Lock Detect to guest if SVM support is absent */
+	/*
+	 * Clear capabilities that are automatically configured by common code,
+	 * but that require explicit SVM support (that isn't yet implemented).
+	 */
 	kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_BUS_LOCK_DETECT);
+	kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_MSR_IMM);
 }
 
 static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
@@ -5374,6 +5343,21 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
 			  get_npt_level(), PG_LEVEL_1G);
 	pr_info("Nested Paging %s\n", str_enabled_disabled(npt_enabled));
 
+	/*
+	 * It seems that on AMD processors PTE's accessed bit is
+	 * being set by the CPU hardware before the NPF vmexit.
+	 * This is not expected behaviour and our tests fail because
+	 * of it.
+	 * A workaround here is to disable support for
+	 * GUEST_MAXPHYADDR < HOST_MAXPHYADDR if NPT is enabled.
+	 * In this case userspace can know if there is support using
+	 * KVM_CAP_SMALLER_MAXPHYADDR extension and decide how to handle
+	 * it
+	 * If future AMD CPU models change the behaviour described above,
+	 * this variable can be changed accordingly
+	 */
+	allow_smaller_maxphyaddr = !npt_enabled;
+
 	/* Setup shadow_me_value and shadow_me_mask */
 	kvm_mmu_set_me_spte_mask(sme_me_mask, sme_me_mask);
 
@@ -5408,15 +5392,12 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
 			goto err;
 	}
 
-	enable_apicv = avic = avic && avic_hardware_setup();
-
+	enable_apicv = avic_hardware_setup();
 	if (!enable_apicv) {
 		enable_ipiv = false;
 		svm_x86_ops.vcpu_blocking = NULL;
 		svm_x86_ops.vcpu_unblocking = NULL;
 		svm_x86_ops.vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons = NULL;
-	} else if (!x2avic_enabled) {
-		svm_x86_ops.allow_apicv_in_x2apic_without_x2apic_virtualization = true;
 	}
 
 	if (vls) {
@@ -5453,21 +5434,6 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
 
 	svm_set_cpu_caps();
 
-	/*
-	 * It seems that on AMD processors PTE's accessed bit is
-	 * being set by the CPU hardware before the NPF vmexit.
-	 * This is not expected behaviour and our tests fail because
-	 * of it.
-	 * A workaround here is to disable support for
-	 * GUEST_MAXPHYADDR < HOST_MAXPHYADDR if NPT is enabled.
-	 * In this case userspace can know if there is support using
-	 * KVM_CAP_SMALLER_MAXPHYADDR extension and decide how to handle
-	 * it
-	 * If future AMD CPU models change the behaviour described above,
-	 * this variable can be changed accordingly
-	 */
-	allow_smaller_maxphyaddr = !npt_enabled;
-
 	kvm_caps.inapplicable_quirks &= ~KVM_X86_QUIRK_CD_NW_CLEARED;
 	return 0;