x86/srso: Add a Speculative RAS Overflow mitigation

Add a mitigation for the speculative return address stack overflow
vulnerability found on AMD processors.

The mitigation works by ensuring all RET instructions speculate to
a controlled location, similar to how speculation is controlled in the
retpoline sequence.  To accomplish this, the __x86_return_thunk forces
the CPU to mispredict every function return using a 'safe return'
sequence.

To ensure the safety of this mitigation, the kernel must ensure that the
safe return sequence is itself free from attacker interference.  In Zen3
and Zen4, this is accomplished by creating a BTB alias between the
untraining function srso_untrain_ret_alias() and the safe return
function srso_safe_ret_alias() which results in evicting a potentially
poisoned BTB entry and using that safe one for all function returns.

In older Zen1 and Zen2, this is accomplished using a reinterpretation
technique similar to Retbleed one: srso_untrain_ret() and
srso_safe_ret().

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>

1 files changed, 2 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index d46300e94f85..7c67db7c9f53 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -682,9 +682,11 @@ extern u16 get_llc_id(unsigned int cpu);
 #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SUP_AMD
 extern u32 amd_get_nodes_per_socket(void);
 extern u32 amd_get_highest_perf(void);
+extern bool cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode(void);
 #else
 static inline u32 amd_get_nodes_per_socket(void)	{ return 0; }
 static inline u32 amd_get_highest_perf(void)		{ return 0; }
+static inline bool cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode(void)	{ return false; }
 #endif
 
 extern unsigned long arch_align_stack(unsigned long sp);