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authorPawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>2022-05-19 20:33:13 -0700
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2022-06-16 13:32:04 +0200
commitbafc2b2727b4ebd219b112e87143cf0cf136d3fa (patch)
tree2c22ca52ebcd1b31cf77acc8548d9aef609c4981
parent1baf738f30ee91be35003b0d106190ba8bfa8f1c (diff)
x86/speculation/srbds: Update SRBDS mitigation selection
commit 22cac9c677c95f3ac5c9244f8ca0afdc7c8afb19 upstream Currently, Linux disables SRBDS mitigation on CPUs not affected by MDS and have the TSX feature disabled. On such CPUs, secrets cannot be extracted from CPU fill buffers using MDS or TAA. Without SRBDS mitigation, Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities can be used to extract RDRAND, RDSEED, and EGETKEY data. Do not disable SRBDS mitigation by default when CPU is also affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c8
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 38853077ca58..ef4749097f42 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -595,11 +595,13 @@ static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void)
return;
/*
- * Check to see if this is one of the MDS_NO systems supporting
- * TSX that are only exposed to SRBDS when TSX is enabled.
+ * Check to see if this is one of the MDS_NO systems supporting TSX that
+ * are only exposed to SRBDS when TSX is enabled or when CPU is affected
+ * by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerability.
*/
ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
- if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM))
+ if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA))
srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF;
else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR;