diff options
author | Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com> | 2024-05-01 16:20:36 -0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2024-07-18 11:39:33 +0200 |
commit | b90176a9553775e23966650e445b1866e62e4924 (patch) | |
tree | 4fe07f437050a0352d4741a3b3fff9065fba0c7c | |
parent | 85cc3ecb0b1256d539bb6a58a5f995c802a331c4 (diff) |
orangefs: fix out-of-bounds fsid access
[ Upstream commit 53e4efa470d5fc6a96662d2d3322cfc925818517 ]
Arnd Bergmann sent a patch to fsdevel, he says:
"orangefs_statfs() copies two consecutive fields of the superblock into
the statfs structure, which triggers a warning from the string fortification
helpers"
Jan Kara suggested an alternate way to do the patch to make it more readable.
I ran both ideas through xfstests and both seem fine. This patch
is based on Jan Kara's suggestion.
Signed-off-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
-rw-r--r-- | fs/orangefs/super.c | 3 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/fs/orangefs/super.c b/fs/orangefs/super.c index 524fd95173b3..571eebf1a263 100644 --- a/fs/orangefs/super.c +++ b/fs/orangefs/super.c @@ -186,7 +186,8 @@ static int orangefs_statfs(struct dentry *dentry, struct kstatfs *buf) (long)new_op->downcall.resp.statfs.files_avail); buf->f_type = sb->s_magic; - memcpy(&buf->f_fsid, &ORANGEFS_SB(sb)->fs_id, sizeof(buf->f_fsid)); + buf->f_fsid.val[0] = ORANGEFS_SB(sb)->fs_id; + buf->f_fsid.val[1] = ORANGEFS_SB(sb)->id; buf->f_bsize = new_op->downcall.resp.statfs.block_size; buf->f_namelen = ORANGEFS_NAME_MAX; |