diff options
author | Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> | 2025-08-14 10:20:43 -0700 |
---|---|---|
committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2025-09-11 17:17:17 +0200 |
commit | 79ec330d124e12671aa15a0fe9eb5b93a5db07a6 (patch) | |
tree | 88a0448645e26a5ed9d068e86c49d24a32f72a6c | |
parent | 1cd71b057f0528bcaececa93611e3f6165fb0685 (diff) |
x86/vmscape: Warn when STIBP is disabled with SMT
commit b7cc9887231526ca4fa89f3fa4119e47c2dc7b1e upstream.
Cross-thread attacks are generally harder as they require the victim to be
co-located on a core. However, with VMSCAPE the adversary targets belong to
the same guest execution, that are more likely to get co-located. In
particular, a thread that is currently executing userspace hypervisor
(after the IBPB) may still be targeted by a guest execution from a sibling
thread.
Issue a warning about the potential risk, except when:
- SMT is disabled
- STIBP is enabled system-wide
- Intel eIBRS is enabled (which implies STIBP protection)
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 23 |
1 files changed, 23 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 1355fa6d6ea9..1628c0014589 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -2890,6 +2890,7 @@ static void __init vmscape_select_mitigation(void) #define MDS_MSG_SMT "MDS CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html for more details.\n" #define TAA_MSG_SMT "TAA CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.html for more details.\n" #define MMIO_MSG_SMT "MMIO Stale Data CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.html for more details.\n" +#define VMSCAPE_MSG_SMT "VMSCAPE: SMT on, STIBP is required for full protection. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/vmscape.html for more details.\n" void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void) { @@ -2962,6 +2963,28 @@ void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void) break; } + switch (vmscape_mitigation) { + case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE: + case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_AUTO: + break; + case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT: + case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER: + /* + * Hypervisors can be attacked across-threads, warn for SMT when + * STIBP is not already enabled system-wide. + * + * Intel eIBRS (!AUTOIBRS) implies STIBP on. + */ + if (!sched_smt_active() || + spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || + spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED || + (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled) && + !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS))) + break; + pr_warn_once(VMSCAPE_MSG_SMT); + break; + } + mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex); } |