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authorPawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>2025-08-14 10:20:43 -0700
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2025-09-11 17:17:17 +0200
commit79ec330d124e12671aa15a0fe9eb5b93a5db07a6 (patch)
tree88a0448645e26a5ed9d068e86c49d24a32f72a6c
parent1cd71b057f0528bcaececa93611e3f6165fb0685 (diff)
x86/vmscape: Warn when STIBP is disabled with SMT
commit b7cc9887231526ca4fa89f3fa4119e47c2dc7b1e upstream. Cross-thread attacks are generally harder as they require the victim to be co-located on a core. However, with VMSCAPE the adversary targets belong to the same guest execution, that are more likely to get co-located. In particular, a thread that is currently executing userspace hypervisor (after the IBPB) may still be targeted by a guest execution from a sibling thread. Issue a warning about the potential risk, except when: - SMT is disabled - STIBP is enabled system-wide - Intel eIBRS is enabled (which implies STIBP protection) Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c23
1 files changed, 23 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 1355fa6d6ea9..1628c0014589 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -2890,6 +2890,7 @@ static void __init vmscape_select_mitigation(void)
#define MDS_MSG_SMT "MDS CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html for more details.\n"
#define TAA_MSG_SMT "TAA CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.html for more details.\n"
#define MMIO_MSG_SMT "MMIO Stale Data CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.html for more details.\n"
+#define VMSCAPE_MSG_SMT "VMSCAPE: SMT on, STIBP is required for full protection. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/vmscape.html for more details.\n"
void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void)
{
@@ -2962,6 +2963,28 @@ void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void)
break;
}
+ switch (vmscape_mitigation) {
+ case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE:
+ case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_AUTO:
+ break;
+ case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT:
+ case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER:
+ /*
+ * Hypervisors can be attacked across-threads, warn for SMT when
+ * STIBP is not already enabled system-wide.
+ *
+ * Intel eIBRS (!AUTOIBRS) implies STIBP on.
+ */
+ if (!sched_smt_active() ||
+ spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
+ spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED ||
+ (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS)))
+ break;
+ pr_warn_once(VMSCAPE_MSG_SMT);
+ break;
+ }
+
mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
}