diff options
author | Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> | 2015-06-29 14:42:03 -0500 |
---|---|---|
committer | Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> | 2017-04-04 22:21:56 +0100 |
commit | 495d1af4041fcb3cb726ca414d3c09cbb251fefa (patch) | |
tree | 6594bb45b92673a868580d7150735b4e6f5a1511 | |
parent | 07a365dd69b520758dd85d215b1a6e2cffb8168f (diff) |
vfs: Commit to never having exectuables on proc and sysfs.
commit 22f6b4d34fcf039c63a94e7670e0da24f8575a5a upstream.
Today proc and sysfs do not contain any executable files. Several
applications today mount proc or sysfs without noexec and nosuid and
then depend on there being no exectuables files on proc or sysfs.
Having any executable files show on proc or sysfs would cause
a user space visible regression, and most likely security problems.
Therefore commit to never allowing executables on proc and sysfs by
adding a new flag to mark them as filesystems without executables and
enforce that flag.
Test the flag where MNT_NOEXEC is tested today, so that the only user
visible effect will be that exectuables will be treated as if the
execute bit is cleared.
The filesystems proc and sysfs do not currently incoporate any
executable files so this does not result in any user visible effects.
This makes it unnecessary to vet changes to proc and sysfs tightly for
adding exectuable files or changes to chattr that would modify
existing files, as no matter what the individual file say they will
not be treated as exectuable files by the vfs.
Not having to vet changes to closely is important as without this we
are only one proc_create call (or another goof up in the
implementation of notify_change) from having problematic executables
on proc. Those mistakes are all too easy to make and would create
a situation where there are security issues or the assumptions of
some program having to be broken (and cause userspace regressions).
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: we don't have super_block::s_iflags; use
file_system_type::fs_flags instead]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
-rw-r--r-- | fs/exec.c | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/open.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/proc/root.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/sysfs/mount.c | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | include/linux/fs.h | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/sys.c | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | mm/mmap.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | mm/nommu.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/security.c | 2 |
9 files changed, 20 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c index 5b653a126b20..8cb7fc4ab789 100644 --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -98,6 +98,12 @@ static inline void put_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt * fmt) module_put(fmt->module); } +bool path_noexec(const struct path *path) +{ + return (path->mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC) || + (path->mnt->mnt_sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_NOEXEC); +} + #ifdef CONFIG_USELIB /* * Note that a shared library must be both readable and executable due to @@ -132,7 +138,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(uselib, const char __user *, library) goto exit; error = -EACCES; - if (file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC) + if (path_noexec(&file->f_path)) goto exit; fsnotify_open(file); @@ -773,7 +779,7 @@ static struct file *do_open_exec(struct filename *name) if (!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode)) goto exit; - if (file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC) + if (path_noexec(&file->f_path)) goto exit; fsnotify_open(file); diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c index 79a52f146182..fc44237e4a2e 100644 --- a/fs/open.c +++ b/fs/open.c @@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ retry: * with the "noexec" flag. */ res = -EACCES; - if (path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC) + if (path_noexec(&path)) goto out_path_release; } diff --git a/fs/proc/root.c b/fs/proc/root.c index 98992cb44c35..d81d0baeb772 100644 --- a/fs/proc/root.c +++ b/fs/proc/root.c @@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ static struct file_system_type proc_fs_type = { .name = "proc", .mount = proc_mount, .kill_sb = proc_kill_sb, - .fs_flags = FS_USERNS_VISIBLE | FS_USERNS_MOUNT, + .fs_flags = FS_USERNS_VISIBLE | FS_USERNS_MOUNT | FS_NOEXEC, }; void __init proc_root_init(void) diff --git a/fs/sysfs/mount.c b/fs/sysfs/mount.c index 1c6ac6fcee9f..0e6c02f27140 100644 --- a/fs/sysfs/mount.c +++ b/fs/sysfs/mount.c @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ static struct dentry *sysfs_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, SYSFS_MAGIC, &new_sb, ns); if (IS_ERR(root) || !new_sb) kobj_ns_drop(KOBJ_NS_TYPE_NET, ns); + return root; } @@ -55,7 +56,7 @@ static struct file_system_type sysfs_fs_type = { .name = "sysfs", .mount = sysfs_mount, .kill_sb = sysfs_kill_sb, - .fs_flags = FS_USERNS_VISIBLE | FS_USERNS_MOUNT, + .fs_flags = FS_USERNS_VISIBLE | FS_USERNS_MOUNT | FS_NOEXEC, }; int __init sysfs_init(void) diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h index 3b69a82bbdd9..da912e6cd2ea 100644 --- a/include/linux/fs.h +++ b/include/linux/fs.h @@ -1767,6 +1767,7 @@ struct file_system_type { #define FS_USERNS_MOUNT 8 /* Can be mounted by userns root */ #define FS_USERNS_DEV_MOUNT 16 /* A userns mount does not imply MNT_NODEV */ #define FS_USERNS_VISIBLE 32 /* FS must already be visible */ +#define FS_NOEXEC 64 /* Ignore executables on this fs */ #define FS_RENAME_DOES_D_MOVE 32768 /* FS will handle d_move() during rename() internally. */ struct dentry *(*mount) (struct file_system_type *, int, const char *, void *); @@ -2782,4 +2783,6 @@ static inline bool dir_relax(struct inode *inode) return !IS_DEADDIR(inode); } +extern bool path_noexec(const struct path *path); + #endif /* _LINUX_FS_H */ diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c index 66a751ebf9d9..6fe6c5986c59 100644 --- a/kernel/sys.c +++ b/kernel/sys.c @@ -1646,8 +1646,7 @@ static int prctl_set_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned int fd) * overall picture. */ err = -EACCES; - if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || - exe.file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC) + if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || path_noexec(&exe.file->f_path)) goto exit; err = inode_permission(inode, MAY_EXEC); diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c index 2859a1cb378a..b49641901093 100644 --- a/mm/mmap.c +++ b/mm/mmap.c @@ -1250,7 +1250,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, * mounted, in which case we dont add PROT_EXEC.) */ if ((prot & PROT_READ) && (current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC)) - if (!(file && (file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC))) + if (!(file && path_noexec(&file->f_path))) prot |= PROT_EXEC; if (!len) @@ -1322,7 +1322,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, case MAP_PRIVATE: if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) return -EACCES; - if (file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC) { + if (path_noexec(&file->f_path)) { if (vm_flags & VM_EXEC) return -EPERM; vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYEXEC; diff --git a/mm/nommu.c b/mm/nommu.c index 2991b074aeae..53a59f41e2e5 100644 --- a/mm/nommu.c +++ b/mm/nommu.c @@ -1043,7 +1043,7 @@ static int validate_mmap_request(struct file *file, /* handle executable mappings and implied executable * mappings */ - if (file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC) { + if (path_noexec(&file->f_path)) { if (prot & PROT_EXEC) return -EPERM; } else if ((prot & PROT_READ) && !(prot & PROT_EXEC)) { diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 31614e9e96e5..7c9f959c298e 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -728,7 +728,7 @@ static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) * ditto if it's not on noexec mount, except that on !MMU we need * BDI_CAP_EXEC_MMAP (== VM_MAYEXEC) in this case */ - if (!(file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)) { + if (!path_noexec(&file->f_path)) { #ifndef CONFIG_MMU unsigned long caps = 0; struct address_space *mapping = file->f_mapping; |