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Test verifier/helper_value_access.c automatically converted to use inline assembly.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230325025524.144043-24-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Test verifier/helper_restricted.c automatically converted to use inline assembly.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230325025524.144043-23-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Test verifier/helper_packet_access.c automatically converted to use inline assembly.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230325025524.144043-22-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Test verifier/helper_access_var_len.c automatically converted to use inline assembly.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230325025524.144043-21-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Test verifier/div_overflow.c automatically converted to use inline assembly.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230325025524.144043-20-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Test verifier/div0.c automatically converted to use inline assembly.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230325025524.144043-19-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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assembly
Test verifier/direct_stack_access_wraparound.c automatically converted to use inline assembly.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230325025524.144043-18-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Test verifier/ctx_sk_msg.c automatically converted to use inline assembly.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230325025524.144043-17-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Test verifier/const_or.c automatically converted to use inline assembly.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230325025524.144043-16-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Test verifier/cgroup_storage.c automatically converted to use inline assembly.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230325025524.144043-15-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Test verifier/cgroup_skb.c automatically converted to use inline assembly.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230325025524.144043-14-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Test verifier/cgroup_inv_retcode.c automatically converted to use inline assembly.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230325025524.144043-13-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Test verifier/cfg.c automatically converted to use inline assembly.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230325025524.144043-12-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Test verifier/bounds_mix_sign_unsign.c automatically converted to use inline assembly.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230325025524.144043-11-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Test verifier/bounds_deduction.c automatically converted to use inline assembly.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230325025524.144043-10-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Test verifier/basic_stack.c automatically converted to use inline assembly.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230325025524.144043-9-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Test verifier/array_access.c automatically converted to use inline assembly.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230325025524.144043-8-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Test verifier/and.c automatically converted to use inline assembly.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230325025524.144043-7-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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KF_RELEASE kfuncs are not currently treated as having KF_TRUSTED_ARGS,
even though they have a superset of the requirements of KF_TRUSTED_ARGS.
Like KF_TRUSTED_ARGS, KF_RELEASE kfuncs require a 0-offset argument, and
don't allow NULL-able arguments. Unlike KF_TRUSTED_ARGS which require
_either_ an argument with ref_obj_id > 0, _or_ (ref->type &
BPF_REG_TRUSTED_MODIFIERS) (and no unsafe modifiers allowed), KF_RELEASE
only allows for ref_obj_id > 0. Because KF_RELEASE today doesn't
automatically imply KF_TRUSTED_ARGS, some of these requirements are
enforced in different ways that can make the behavior of the verifier
feel unpredictable. For example, a KF_RELEASE kfunc with a NULL-able
argument will currently fail in the verifier with a message like, "arg#0
is ptr_or_null_ expected ptr_ or socket" rather than "Possibly NULL
pointer passed to trusted arg0". Our intention is the same, but the
semantics are different due to implemenetation details that kfunc authors
and BPF program writers should not need to care about.
Let's make the behavior of the verifier more consistent and intuitive by
having KF_RELEASE kfuncs imply the presence of KF_TRUSTED_ARGS. Our
eventual goal is to have all kfuncs assume KF_TRUSTED_ARGS by default
anyways, so this takes us a step in that direction.
Note that it does not make sense to assume KF_TRUSTED_ARGS for all
KF_ACQUIRE kfuncs. KF_ACQUIRE kfuncs can have looser semantics than
KF_RELEASE, with e.g. KF_RCU | KF_RET_NULL. We may want to have
KF_ACQUIRE imply KF_TRUSTED_ARGS _unless_ KF_RCU is specified, but that
can be left to another patch set, and there are no such subtleties to
address for KF_RELEASE.
Signed-off-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230325213144.486885-4-void@manifault.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Add cases to check if bound is updated correctly when 64-bit value is
not in the 32-bit range.
Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230322213056.2470-2-daniel@iogearbox.net
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Check that verifier tracks pointer types for BPF_ST_MEM instructions
and reports error if pointer types do not match for different
execution branches.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230304011247.566040-3-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Lift verifier restriction to use BPF_ST_MEM instructions to write to
context data structures. This requires the following changes:
- verifier.c:do_check() for BPF_ST updated to:
- no longer forbid writes to registers of type PTR_TO_CTX;
- track dst_reg type in the env->insn_aux_data[...].ptr_type field
(same way it is done for BPF_STX and BPF_LDX instructions).
- verifier.c:convert_ctx_access() and various callbacks invoked by
it are updated to handled BPF_ST instruction alongside BPF_STX.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230304011247.566040-2-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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bpf_rcu_read_lock/unlock() are only available in clang compiled kernels. Lack
of such key mechanism makes it impossible for sleepable bpf programs to use RCU
pointers.
Allow bpf_rcu_read_lock/unlock() in GCC compiled kernels (though GCC doesn't
support btf_type_tag yet) and allowlist certain field dereferences in important
data structures like tast_struct, cgroup, socket that are used by sleepable
programs either as RCU pointer or full trusted pointer (which is valid outside
of RCU CS). Use BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU and BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED macros for such
tagging. They will be removed once GCC supports btf_type_tag.
With that refactor check_ptr_to_btf_access(). Make it strict in enforcing
PTR_TRUSTED and PTR_UNTRUSTED while deprecating old PTR_TO_BTF_ID without
modifier flags. There is a chance that this strict enforcement might break
existing programs (especially on GCC compiled kernels), but this cleanup has to
start sooner than later. Note PTR_TO_CTX access still yields old deprecated
PTR_TO_BTF_ID. Once it's converted to strict PTR_TRUSTED or PTR_UNTRUSTED the
kfuncs and helpers will be able to default to KF_TRUSTED_ARGS. KF_RCU will
remain as a weaker version of KF_TRUSTED_ARGS where obj refcnt could be 0.
Adjust rcu_read_lock selftest to run on gcc and clang compiled kernels.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230303041446.3630-7-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
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The life time of certain kernel structures like 'struct cgroup' is protected by RCU.
Hence it's safe to dereference them directly from __kptr tagged pointers in bpf maps.
The resulting pointer is MEM_RCU and can be passed to kfuncs that expect KF_RCU.
Derefrence of other kptr-s returns PTR_UNTRUSTED.
For example:
struct map_value {
struct cgroup __kptr *cgrp;
};
SEC("tp_btf/cgroup_mkdir")
int BPF_PROG(test_cgrp_get_ancestors, struct cgroup *cgrp_arg, const char *path)
{
struct cgroup *cg, *cg2;
cg = bpf_cgroup_acquire(cgrp_arg); // cg is PTR_TRUSTED and ref_obj_id > 0
bpf_kptr_xchg(&v->cgrp, cg);
cg2 = v->cgrp; // This is new feature introduced by this patch.
// cg2 is PTR_MAYBE_NULL | MEM_RCU.
// When cg2 != NULL, it's a valid cgroup, but its percpu_ref could be zero
if (cg2)
bpf_cgroup_ancestor(cg2, level); // safe to do.
}
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230303041446.3630-4-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
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This commits updates the following functions to allow reads from
uninitialized stack locations when env->allow_uninit_stack option is
enabled:
- check_stack_read_fixed_off()
- check_stack_range_initialized(), called from:
- check_stack_read_var_off()
- check_helper_mem_access()
Such change allows to relax logic in stacksafe() to treat STACK_MISC
and STACK_INVALID in a same way and make the following stack slot
configurations equivalent:
| Cached state | Current state |
| stack slot | stack slot |
|------------------+------------------|
| STACK_INVALID or | STACK_INVALID or |
| STACK_MISC | STACK_SPILL or |
| | STACK_MISC or |
| | STACK_ZERO or |
| | STACK_DYNPTR |
This leads to significant verification speed gains (see below).
The idea was suggested by Andrii Nakryiko [1] and initial patch was
created by Alexei Starovoitov [2].
Currently the env->allow_uninit_stack is allowed for programs loaded
by users with CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN capabilities.
A number of test cases from verifier/*.c were expecting uninitialized
stack access to be an error. These test cases were updated to execute
in unprivileged mode (thus preserving the tests).
The test progs/test_global_func10.c expected "invalid indirect read
from stack" error message because of the access to uninitialized
memory region. This error is no longer possible in privileged mode.
The test is updated to provoke an error "invalid indirect access to
stack" because of access to invalid stack address (such error is not
verified by progs/test_global_func*.c series of tests).
The following tests had to be removed because these can't be made
unprivileged:
- verifier/sock.c:
- "sk_storage_get(map, skb->sk, &stack_value, 1): partially init
stack_value"
BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS programs are not executed in unprivileged mode.
- verifier/var_off.c:
- "indirect variable-offset stack access, max_off+size > max_initialized"
- "indirect variable-offset stack access, uninitialized"
These tests verify that access to uninitialized stack values is
detected when stack offset is not a constant. However, variable
stack access is prohibited in unprivileged mode, thus these tests
are no longer valid.
* * *
Here is veristat log comparing this patch with current master on a
set of selftest binaries listed in tools/testing/selftests/bpf/veristat.cfg
and cilium BPF binaries (see [3]):
$ ./veristat -e file,prog,states -C -f 'states_pct<-30' master.log current.log
File Program States (A) States (B) States (DIFF)
-------------------------- -------------------------- ---------- ---------- ----------------
bpf_host.o tail_handle_ipv6_from_host 349 244 -105 (-30.09%)
bpf_host.o tail_handle_nat_fwd_ipv4 1320 895 -425 (-32.20%)
bpf_lxc.o tail_handle_nat_fwd_ipv4 1320 895 -425 (-32.20%)
bpf_sock.o cil_sock4_connect 70 48 -22 (-31.43%)
bpf_sock.o cil_sock4_sendmsg 68 46 -22 (-32.35%)
bpf_xdp.o tail_handle_nat_fwd_ipv4 1554 803 -751 (-48.33%)
bpf_xdp.o tail_lb_ipv4 6457 2473 -3984 (-61.70%)
bpf_xdp.o tail_lb_ipv6 7249 3908 -3341 (-46.09%)
pyperf600_bpf_loop.bpf.o on_event 287 145 -142 (-49.48%)
strobemeta.bpf.o on_event 15915 4772 -11143 (-70.02%)
strobemeta_nounroll2.bpf.o on_event 17087 3820 -13267 (-77.64%)
xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.o syncookie_tc 21271 6635 -14636 (-68.81%)
xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.o syncookie_xdp 23122 6024 -17098 (-73.95%)
-------------------------- -------------------------- ---------- ---------- ----------------
Note: I limited selection by states_pct<-30%.
Inspection of differences in pyperf600_bpf_loop behavior shows that
the following patch for the test removes almost all differences:
- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/pyperf.h
+ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/pyperf.h
@ -266,8 +266,8 @ int __on_event(struct bpf_raw_tracepoint_args *ctx)
}
if (event->pthread_match || !pidData->use_tls) {
- void* frame_ptr;
- FrameData frame;
+ void* frame_ptr = 0;
+ FrameData frame = {};
Symbol sym = {};
int cur_cpu = bpf_get_smp_processor_id();
W/o this patch the difference comes from the following pattern
(for different variables):
static bool get_frame_data(... FrameData *frame ...)
{
...
bpf_probe_read_user(&frame->f_code, ...);
if (!frame->f_code)
return false;
...
bpf_probe_read_user(&frame->co_name, ...);
if (frame->co_name)
...;
}
int __on_event(struct bpf_raw_tracepoint_args *ctx)
{
FrameData frame;
...
get_frame_data(... &frame ...) // indirectly via a bpf_loop & callback
...
}
SEC("raw_tracepoint/kfree_skb")
int on_event(struct bpf_raw_tracepoint_args* ctx)
{
...
ret |= __on_event(ctx);
ret |= __on_event(ctx);
...
}
With regards to value `frame->co_name` the following is important:
- Because of the conditional `if (!frame->f_code)` each call to
__on_event() produces two states, one with `frame->co_name` marked
as STACK_MISC, another with it as is (and marked STACK_INVALID on a
first call).
- The call to bpf_probe_read_user() does not mark stack slots
corresponding to `&frame->co_name` as REG_LIVE_WRITTEN but it marks
these slots as BPF_MISC, this happens because of the following loop
in the check_helper_call():
for (i = 0; i < meta.access_size; i++) {
err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, meta.regno, i, BPF_B,
BPF_WRITE, -1, false);
if (err)
return err;
}
Note the size of the write, it is a one byte write for each byte
touched by a helper. The BPF_B write does not lead to write marks
for the target stack slot.
- Which means that w/o this patch when second __on_event() call is
verified `if (frame->co_name)` will propagate read marks first to a
stack slot with STACK_MISC marks and second to a stack slot with
STACK_INVALID marks and these states would be considered different.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAEf4BzY3e+ZuC6HUa8dCiUovQRg2SzEk7M-dSkqNZyn=xEmnPA@mail.gmail.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAADnVQKs2i1iuZ5SUGuJtxWVfGYR9kDgYKhq3rNV+kBLQCu7rA@mail.gmail.com/
[3] git@github.com:anakryiko/cilium.git
Suggested-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Co-developed-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230219200427.606541-2-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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A test case to verify that variable offset BPF_ST instruction
preserves STACK_ZERO marks when writes zeros, e.g. in the following
situation:
*(u64*)(r10 - 8) = 0 ; STACK_ZERO marks for fp[-8]
r0 = random(-7, -1) ; some random number in range of [-7, -1]
r0 += r10 ; r0 is now variable offset pointer to stack
*(u8*)(r0) = 0 ; BPF_ST writing zero, STACK_ZERO mark for
; fp[-8] should be preserved.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230214232030.1502829-5-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Check that verifier tracks the value of 'imm' spilled to stack by
BPF_ST_MEM instruction. Cover the following cases:
- write of non-zero constant to stack;
- write of a zero constant to stack.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230214232030.1502829-3-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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For aligned stack writes using BPF_ST instruction track stored values
in a same way BPF_STX is handled, e.g. make sure that the following
commands produce similar verifier knowledge:
fp[-8] = 42; r1 = 42;
fp[-8] = r1;
This covers two cases:
- non-null values written to stack are stored as spill of fake
registers;
- null values written to stack are stored as STACK_ZERO marks.
Previously both cases above used STACK_MISC marks instead.
Some verifier test cases relied on the old logic to obtain STACK_MISC
marks for some stack values. These test cases are updated in the same
commit to avoid failures during bisect.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230214232030.1502829-2-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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net/core/gro.c
7d2c89b32587 ("skb: Do mix page pool and page referenced frags in GRO")
b1a78b9b9886 ("net: add support for ipv4 big tcp")
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230203094454.5766f160@canb.auug.org.au/
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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BPF struct_ops programs currently cannot be marked as sleepable. This
need not be the case -- struct_ops programs can be sleepable, and e.g.
invoke kfuncs that export the KF_SLEEPABLE flag. So as to allow future
struct_ops programs to invoke such kfuncs, this patch updates the
verifier to allow struct_ops programs to be sleepable. A follow-on patch
will add support to libbpf for specifying struct_ops.s as a sleepable
struct_ops program, and then another patch will add testcases to the
dummy_st_ops selftest suite which test sleepable struct_ops behavior.
Signed-off-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125164735.785732-2-void@manifault.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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A testcase to check that verifier.c:copy_register_state() preserves
register parentage chain and livness information.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230106142214.1040390-3-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Adding verifier tests for loading all types od allowed
sleepable programs plus reject for tp_btf type.
Acked-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230117223705.440975-2-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Check that verifier.c:states_equal() uses check_ids() to match
consistent active_lock/map_value configurations. This allows to prune
states with active spin locks even if numerical values of
active_lock ids do not match across compared states.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221209135733.28851-8-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Test that when reg->id is not same for the same register of type
PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE between current and old explored state, we currently
return false from regsafe and continue exploring.
Without the fix in prior commit, the test case fails.
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221209135733.28851-7-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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A test case that would erroneously pass verification if
verifier.c:states_equal() maintains separate register ID mappings for
call frames.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221209135733.28851-5-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Under certain conditions it was possible for verifier.c:regsafe() to
skip check_id() call. This commit adds negative test cases previously
errorneously accepted as safe.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221209135733.28851-3-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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While check_func_arg_reg_off is the place which performs generic checks
needed by various candidates of reg->type, there is some handling for
special cases, like ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, OBJ_RELEASE, and
ARG_PTR_TO_RINGBUF_MEM.
This commit aims to streamline these special cases and instead leave
other things up to argument type specific code to handle. The function
will be restrictive by default, and cover all possible cases when
OBJ_RELEASE is set, without having to update the function again (and
missing to do that being a bug).
This is done primarily for two reasons: associating back reg->type to
its argument leaves room for the list getting out of sync when a new
reg->type is supported by an arg_type.
The other case is ARG_PTR_TO_RINGBUF_MEM. The problem there is something
we already handle, whenever a release argument is expected, it should
be passed as the pointer that was received from the acquire function.
Hence zero fixed and variable offset.
There is nothing special about ARG_PTR_TO_RINGBUF_MEM, where technically
its target register type PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RINGBUF can already be passed
with non-zero offset to other helper functions, which makes sense.
Hence, lift the arg_type_is_release check for reg->off and cover all
possible register types, instead of duplicating the same kind of check
twice for current OBJ_RELEASE arg_types (alloc_mem and ptr_to_btf_id).
For the release argument, arg_type_is_dynptr is the special case, where
we go to actual object being freed through the dynptr, so the offset of
the pointer still needs to allow fixed and variable offset and
process_dynptr_func will verify them later for the release argument case
as well.
This is not specific to ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR though, we will need to make
this exception for any future object on the stack that needs to be
released. In this sense, PTR_TO_STACK as a candidate for object on stack
argument is a special case for release offset checks, and they need to
be done by the helper releasing the object on stack.
Since the check has been lifted above all register type checks, remove
the duplicated check that is being done for PTR_TO_BTF_ID.
Acked-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com>
Acked-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com>
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221207204141.308952-5-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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The networking programs typically don't require CAP_PERFMON, but through kfuncs
like bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx() they can access memory through PTR_TO_BTF_ID. In
such case enforce CAP_PERFMON.
Also make sure that only GPL programs can access kernel data structures.
All kfuncs require GPL already.
Also remove allow_ptr_to_map_access. It's the same as allow_ptr_leaks and
different name for the same check only causes confusion.
Fixes: fd264ca02094 ("bpf: Add a kfunc to type cast from bpf uapi ctx to kernel ctx")
Fixes: 50c6b8a9aea2 ("selftests/bpf: Add a test for btf_type_tag "percpu"")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20221125220617.26846-1-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
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Kfuncs currently support specifying the KF_TRUSTED_ARGS flag to signal
to the verifier that it should enforce that a BPF program passes it a
"safe", trusted pointer. Currently, "safe" means that the pointer is
either PTR_TO_CTX, or is refcounted. There may be cases, however, where
the kernel passes a BPF program a safe / trusted pointer to an object
that the BPF program wishes to use as a kptr, but because the object
does not yet have a ref_obj_id from the perspective of the verifier, the
program would be unable to pass it to a KF_ACQUIRE | KF_TRUSTED_ARGS
kfunc.
The solution is to expand the set of pointers that are considered
trusted according to KF_TRUSTED_ARGS, so that programs can invoke kfuncs
with these pointers without getting rejected by the verifier.
There is already a PTR_UNTRUSTED flag that is set in some scenarios,
such as when a BPF program reads a kptr directly from a map
without performing a bpf_kptr_xchg() call. These pointers of course can
and should be rejected by the verifier. Unfortunately, however,
PTR_UNTRUSTED does not cover all the cases for safety that need to
be addressed to adequately protect kfuncs. Specifically, pointers
obtained by a BPF program "walking" a struct are _not_ considered
PTR_UNTRUSTED according to BPF. For example, say that we were to add a
kfunc called bpf_task_acquire(), with KF_ACQUIRE | KF_TRUSTED_ARGS, to
acquire a struct task_struct *. If we only used PTR_UNTRUSTED to signal
that a task was unsafe to pass to a kfunc, the verifier would mistakenly
allow the following unsafe BPF program to be loaded:
SEC("tp_btf/task_newtask")
int BPF_PROG(unsafe_acquire_task,
struct task_struct *task,
u64 clone_flags)
{
struct task_struct *acquired, *nested;
nested = task->last_wakee;
/* Would not be rejected by the verifier. */
acquired = bpf_task_acquire(nested);
if (!acquired)
return 0;
bpf_task_release(acquired);
return 0;
}
To address this, this patch defines a new type flag called PTR_TRUSTED
which tracks whether a PTR_TO_BTF_ID pointer is safe to pass to a
KF_TRUSTED_ARGS kfunc or a BPF helper function. PTR_TRUSTED pointers are
passed directly from the kernel as a tracepoint or struct_ops callback
argument. Any nested pointer that is obtained from walking a PTR_TRUSTED
pointer is no longer PTR_TRUSTED. From the example above, the struct
task_struct *task argument is PTR_TRUSTED, but the 'nested' pointer
obtained from 'task->last_wakee' is not PTR_TRUSTED.
A subsequent patch will add kfuncs for storing a task kfunc as a kptr,
and then another patch will add selftests to validate.
Signed-off-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221120051004.3605026-3-void@manifault.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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As we continue to add more features, argument types, kfunc flags, and
different extensions to kfuncs, the code to verify the correctness of
the kfunc prototype wrt the passed in registers has become ad-hoc and
ugly to read. To make life easier, and make a very clear split between
different stages of argument processing, move all the code into
verifier.c and refactor into easier to read helpers and functions.
This also makes sharing code within the verifier easier with kfunc
argument processing. This will be more and more useful in later patches
as we are now moving to implement very core BPF helpers as kfuncs, to
keep them experimental before baking into UAPI.
Remove all kfunc related bits now from btf_check_func_arg_match, as
users have been converted away to refactored kfunc argument handling.
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221118015614.2013203-12-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Verify that nullness information is porpagated in the branches of
register to register JEQ and JNE operations.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221115224859.2452988-3-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Currently, verifier uses MEM_ALLOC type tag to specially tag memory
returned from bpf_ringbuf_reserve helper. However, this is currently
only used for this purpose and there is an implicit assumption that it
only refers to ringbuf memory (e.g. the check for ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM
in check_func_arg_reg_off).
Hence, rename MEM_ALLOC to MEM_RINGBUF to indicate this special
relationship and instead open the use of MEM_ALLOC for more generic
allocations made for user types.
Also, since ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM_OR_NULL is unused, simply drop it.
Finally, update selftests using 'alloc_' verifier string to 'ringbuf_'.
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221114191547.1694267-7-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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drivers/net/can/pch_can.c
ae64438be192 ("can: dev: fix skb drop check")
1dd1b521be85 ("can: remove obsolete PCH CAN driver")
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221110102509.1f7d63cc@canb.auug.org.au/
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Add a test case to ensure that released pointer registers will not be
leaked into the map.
Before fix:
./test_verifier 984
984/u reference tracking: try to leak released ptr reg FAIL
Unexpected success to load!
verification time 67 usec
stack depth 4
processed 23 insns (limit 1000000) max_states_per_insn 0 total_states 2
peak_states 2 mark_read 1
984/p reference tracking: try to leak released ptr reg OK
Summary: 1 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 1 FAILED
After fix:
./test_verifier 984
984/u reference tracking: try to leak released ptr reg OK
984/p reference tracking: try to leak released ptr reg OK
Summary: 2 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED
Signed-off-by: Youlin Li <liulin063@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20221103093440.3161-2-liulin063@gmail.com
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Current tests cover only shifts with an immediate as the source
operand/shift counts; add a new test case to cover register operand.
Signed-off-by: Jie Meng <jmeng@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221007202348.1118830-4-jmeng@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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There are a couple of spelling mistakes, one in a literal string and one
in a comment. Fix them.
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.i.king@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220928221555.67873-1-colin.i.king@gmail.com
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Add verifier tests for bpf_lookup_*_key() and bpf_key_put(), to ensure that
acquired key references stored in the bpf_key structure are released, that
a non-NULL bpf_key pointer is passed to bpf_key_put(), and that key
references are not leaked.
Also, slightly modify test_verifier.c, to find the BTF ID of the attach
point for the LSM program type (currently, it is done only for TRACING).
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220920075951.929132-11-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Add a test to ensure we do mark_chain_precision for the argument type
ARG_CONST_ALLOC_SIZE_OR_ZERO. For other argument types, this was already
done, but propagation for missing for this case. Without the fix, this
test case loads successfully.
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220823185500.467-1-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Loading the BTF won't be permitted without privileges, hence only test
for privileged mode by setting the prog type. This makes the
test_verifier show 0 failures when unprivileged BPF is enabled.
Fixes: 41188e9e9def ("selftest/bpf: Test for use-after-free bug fix in inline_bpf_loop")
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220721134245.2450-14-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Make sure verifier rejects the bad cases and ensure the good case keeps
working. The selftests make use of the bpf_kfunc_call_test_ref kfunc
added in the previous patch only for verification.
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220721134245.2450-11-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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