| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|---|
|
[ Upstream commit a4b6539038c1aa1ae871aacf6e41b566c3613993 ]
When recvmsg with MSG_PEEK flag, the data will be copied to
user's buffer without advancing consume cursor and without
reducing the length of rx available data. Once the expected
peek length is larger than the value of bytes_to_rcv, in the
loop of do while in smc_rx_recvmsg, the first loop will copy
bytes_to_rcv bytes of data from the position local_tx_ctrl.cons,
the second loop will copy the min(bytes_to_rcv, read_remaining)
bytes from the position local_tx_ctrl.cons again because of the
lacking of process with advancing consume cursor and reducing
the length of available data. So do the subsequent loops. The
data copied in the second loop and the subsequent loops will
result in data error, as it should not be copied if no more data
arrives and it should be copied from the position advancing
bytes_to_rcv bytes from the local_tx_ctrl.cons if more data arrives.
This issue can be reproduce by the following python script:
server.py:
import socket
import time
server_ip = '0.0.0.0'
server_port = 12346
server_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
server_socket.bind((server_ip, server_port))
server_socket.listen(1)
print('Server is running and listening for connections...')
conn, addr = server_socket.accept()
print('Connected by', addr)
while True:
data = conn.recv(1024)
if not data:
break
print('Received request:', data.decode())
conn.sendall(b'Hello, client!\n')
time.sleep(5)
conn.sendall(b'Hello, again!\n')
conn.close()
client.py:
import socket
server_ip = '<server ip>'
server_port = 12346
resp=b'Hello, client!\nHello, again!\n'
client_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
client_socket.connect((server_ip, server_port))
request = 'Hello, server!'
client_socket.sendall(request.encode())
peek_data = client_socket.recv(len(resp),
socket.MSG_PEEK | socket.MSG_WAITALL)
print('Peeked data:', peek_data.decode())
client_socket.close()
Fixes: 952310ccf2d8 ("smc: receive data from RMBE")
Reported-by: D. Wythe <alibuda@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Guangguan Wang <guangguan.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250104143201.35529-1-guangguan.wang@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit aa3ce3f8fafa0b8fb062f28024855ea8cb3f3450 ]
If STA state is pre-moved to AUTHORIZED (such as in IBSS
scenarios) and insertion fails, the station is freed.
In this case, the driver never knew about the station,
so trying to flush it is unexpected and may crash.
Check if the sta was uploaded to the driver before and
fix this.
Fixes: d00800a289c9 ("wifi: mac80211: add flush_sta method")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Miri Korenblit <miriam.rachel.korenblit@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250102161730.e3d10970a7c7.I491bbcccc46f835ade07df0640a75f6ed92f20a3@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 3aaa1a5a9a2ceeb32afa6ea4110a92338a863c33 ]
With change (wifi: mac80211: fix receiving A-MSDU
frames on mesh interfaces), a non-zero TID assignment
is lost during slow path mesh forwarding.
Prior to this change, ieee80211_rx_h_mesh_fwding()
left the TID intact in the header.
As a result of this header corruption, packets belonging
to non-zero TIDs will get treating as belonging
TID 0 by functions such as ieee80211_get_tid().
While this miscategorization by itself is an
issue, there are additional ramifications
due to the fact that skb->priority still reflects
the mesh forwarded packet's ingress (correct) TID.
The mt7915 driver inspects the TID recorded within
skb->priority and relays this to the
hardware/radio during TX. The radio firmware appears to
react to this by changing the sequence control
header, but it does not also ensure/correct the TID in
the QoS control header. As a result, the receiver
will see packets with sequence numbers corresponding
to the wrong TID. The receiver of the forwarded
packet will see TID 0 in QoS control but a sequence number
corresponding to the correct (different) TID in sequence
control. This causes data stalls for TID 0 until
the TID 0 sequence number advances past what the receiver
believes it should be due to this bug.
Mesh routing mpath changes cause a brief transition
from fast path forwarding to slow path forwarding.
Since this bug only affects the slow path forwarding,
mpath changes bring opportunity for the bug to be triggered.
In the author's case, he was experiencing TID 0 data stalls
after mpath changes on an intermediate mesh node.
These observed stalls may be specific
to mediatek radios. But the inconsistency between
the packet header and skb->priority may cause problems
for other drivers as well. Regardless if this causes
connectivity issues on other radios, this change is
necessary in order transmit (forward) the packet on the
correct TID and to have a consistent view a packet's TID
within mac80211.
Fixes: 986e43b19ae9 ("wifi: mac80211: fix receiving A-MSDU frames on mesh interfaces")
Signed-off-by: Andy Strohman <andrew@andrewstrohman.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250107104431.446775-1-andrew@andrewstrohman.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 7553477cbfd784b128297f9ed43751688415bbaa ]
In the internal API this calls this is a WARN_ON, but that
should remain since internally we want to know about bugs
that may cause this. Prevent deactivating all links in the
debugfs write directly.
Reported-by: syzbot+0c5d8e65f23569a8ffec@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 3d9011029227 ("wifi: mac80211: implement link switching")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241230091408.505bd125c35a.Ic3c1f9572b980a952a444cad62b09b9c6721732b@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 95fc45d1dea8e1253f8ec58abc5befb71553d666 ]
syzbot found a lockdep issue [1].
We should remove ax25 RTNL dependency in ax25_setsockopt()
This should also fix a variety of possible UAF in ax25.
[1]
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.13.0-rc3-syzkaller-00762-g9268abe611b0 #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz.5.1818/12806 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffffff8fcb3988 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ax25_setsockopt+0xa55/0xe90 net/ax25/af_ax25.c:680
but task is already holding lock:
ffff8880617ac258 (sk_lock-AF_AX25){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1618 [inline]
ffff8880617ac258 (sk_lock-AF_AX25){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: ax25_setsockopt+0x209/0xe90 net/ax25/af_ax25.c:574
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (sk_lock-AF_AX25){+.+.}-{0:0}:
lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849
lock_sock_nested+0x48/0x100 net/core/sock.c:3642
lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1618 [inline]
ax25_kill_by_device net/ax25/af_ax25.c:101 [inline]
ax25_device_event+0x24d/0x580 net/ax25/af_ax25.c:146
notifier_call_chain+0x1a5/0x3f0 kernel/notifier.c:85
__dev_notify_flags+0x207/0x400
dev_change_flags+0xf0/0x1a0 net/core/dev.c:9026
dev_ifsioc+0x7c8/0xe70 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:563
dev_ioctl+0x719/0x1340 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:820
sock_do_ioctl+0x240/0x460 net/socket.c:1234
sock_ioctl+0x626/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1339
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xf5/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:892
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
-> #0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}:
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3161 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3280 [inline]
validate_chain+0x18ef/0x5920 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3904
__lock_acquire+0x1397/0x2100 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5226
lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x1ac/0xee0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:735
ax25_setsockopt+0xa55/0xe90 net/ax25/af_ax25.c:680
do_sock_setsockopt+0x3af/0x720 net/socket.c:2324
__sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2349 [inline]
__do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2355 [inline]
__se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2352 [inline]
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0x1ee/0x280 net/socket.c:2352
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(sk_lock-AF_AX25);
lock(rtnl_mutex);
lock(sk_lock-AF_AX25);
lock(rtnl_mutex);
*** DEADLOCK ***
1 lock held by syz.5.1818/12806:
#0: ffff8880617ac258 (sk_lock-AF_AX25){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1618 [inline]
#0: ffff8880617ac258 (sk_lock-AF_AX25){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: ax25_setsockopt+0x209/0xe90 net/ax25/af_ax25.c:574
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 12806 Comm: syz.5.1818 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc3-syzkaller-00762-g9268abe611b0 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_circular_bug+0x13a/0x1b0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2074
check_noncircular+0x36a/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2206
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3161 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3280 [inline]
validate_chain+0x18ef/0x5920 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3904
__lock_acquire+0x1397/0x2100 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5226
lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x1ac/0xee0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:735
ax25_setsockopt+0xa55/0xe90 net/ax25/af_ax25.c:680
do_sock_setsockopt+0x3af/0x720 net/socket.c:2324
__sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2349 [inline]
__do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2355 [inline]
__se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2352 [inline]
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0x1ee/0x280 net/socket.c:2352
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f7b62385d29
Fixes: c433570458e4 ("ax25: fix a use-after-free in ax25_fillin_cb()")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250103210514.87290-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit a853c609504e2d1d83e71285e3622fda1f1451d8 ]
All inet_getpeer() callers except ip4_frag_init() don't need
to acquire a permanent refcount on the inetpeer.
They can switch to full RCU protection.
Move the refcount_inc_not_zero() into ip4_frag_init(),
so that all the other callers no longer have to
perform a pair of expensive atomic operations on
a possibly contended cache line.
inet_putpeer() no longer needs to be exported.
After this patch, my DUT can receive 8,400,000 UDP packets
per second targeting closed ports, using 50% less cpu cycles
than before.
Also change two calls to l3mdev_master_ifindex() by
l3mdev_master_ifindex_rcu() (Ido ideas)
Fixes: 8c2bd38b95f7 ("icmp: change the order of rate limits")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241215175629.1248773-5-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 50b362f21d6c10b0f7939c1482c6a1b43da82f1a ]
inet_putpeer() will be removed in the following patch,
because we will no longer use refcounts.
Update inetpeer timestamp (p->dtime) at lookup time.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241215175629.1248773-4-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: a853c609504e ("inetpeer: do not get a refcount in inet_getpeer()")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 7a596a50c4a4eab946aec149171c72321b4934aa ]
All callers of inet_getpeer() want to create an inetpeer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241215175629.1248773-3-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: a853c609504e ("inetpeer: do not get a refcount in inet_getpeer()")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 661cd8fc8e9039819ca0c22e0add52b632240a9e ]
All callers of inet_getpeer_v4() and inet_getpeer_v6()
want to create an inetpeer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241215175629.1248773-2-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: a853c609504e ("inetpeer: do not get a refcount in inet_getpeer()")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 0e56ebde245e4799ce74d38419426f2a80d39950 ]
Fix the handling of a connection abort that we've received. Though the
abort is at the connection level, it needs propagating to the calls on that
connection. Whilst the propagation bit is performed, the calls aren't then
woken up to go and process their termination, and as no further input is
forthcoming, they just hang.
Also add some tracing for the logging of connection aborts.
Fixes: 248f219cb8bc ("rxrpc: Rewrite the data and ack handling code")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241204074710.990092-3-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 10685681bafce6febb39770f3387621bf5d67d0b ]
The current implementation does not work correctly with a limit of
1. iproute2 actually checks for this and this patch adds the check in
kernel as well.
This fixes the following syzkaller reported crash:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/sched/sch_sfq.c:210:6
index 65535 is out of range for type 'struct sfq_head[128]'
CPU: 0 PID: 2569 Comm: syz-executor101 Not tainted 5.10.0-smp-DEV #1
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline]
dump_stack+0x125/0x19f lib/dump_stack.c:120
ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:148 [inline]
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0xed/0x120 lib/ubsan.c:347
sfq_link net/sched/sch_sfq.c:210 [inline]
sfq_dec+0x528/0x600 net/sched/sch_sfq.c:238
sfq_dequeue+0x39b/0x9d0 net/sched/sch_sfq.c:500
sfq_reset+0x13/0x50 net/sched/sch_sfq.c:525
qdisc_reset+0xfe/0x510 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1026
tbf_reset+0x3d/0x100 net/sched/sch_tbf.c:319
qdisc_reset+0xfe/0x510 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1026
dev_reset_queue+0x8c/0x140 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1296
netdev_for_each_tx_queue include/linux/netdevice.h:2350 [inline]
dev_deactivate_many+0x6dc/0xc20 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1362
__dev_close_many+0x214/0x350 net/core/dev.c:1468
dev_close_many+0x207/0x510 net/core/dev.c:1506
unregister_netdevice_many+0x40f/0x16b0 net/core/dev.c:10738
unregister_netdevice_queue+0x2be/0x310 net/core/dev.c:10695
unregister_netdevice include/linux/netdevice.h:2893 [inline]
__tun_detach+0x6b6/0x1600 drivers/net/tun.c:689
tun_detach drivers/net/tun.c:705 [inline]
tun_chr_close+0x104/0x1b0 drivers/net/tun.c:3640
__fput+0x203/0x840 fs/file_table.c:280
task_work_run+0x129/0x1b0 kernel/task_work.c:185
exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:33 [inline]
do_exit+0x5ce/0x2200 kernel/exit.c:931
do_group_exit+0x144/0x310 kernel/exit.c:1046
__do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1057 [inline]
__se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1055 [inline]
__x64_sys_exit_group+0x3b/0x40 kernel/exit.c:1055
do_syscall_64+0x6c/0xd0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xcb
RIP: 0033:0x7fe5e7b52479
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0x7fe5e7b5244f.
RSP: 002b:00007ffd3c800398 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fe5e7b52479
RDX: 000000000000003c RSI: 00000000000000e7 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 00007fe5e7bcd2d0 R08: ffffffffffffffb8 R09: 0000000000000014
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fe5e7bcd2d0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fe5e7bcdd20 R15: 00007fe5e7b24270
The crash can be also be reproduced with the following (with a tc
recompiled to allow for sfq limits of 1):
tc qdisc add dev dummy0 handle 1: root tbf rate 1Kbit burst 100b lat 1s
../iproute2-6.9.0/tc/tc qdisc add dev dummy0 handle 2: parent 1:10 sfq limit 1
ifconfig dummy0 up
ping -I dummy0 -f -c2 -W0.1 8.8.8.8
sleep 1
Scenario that triggers the crash:
* the first packet is sent and queued in TBF and SFQ; qdisc qlen is 1
* TBF dequeues: it peeks from SFQ which moves the packet to the
gso_skb list and keeps qdisc qlen set to 1. TBF is out of tokens so
it schedules itself for later.
* the second packet is sent and TBF tries to queues it to SFQ. qdisc
qlen is now 2 and because the SFQ limit is 1 the packet is dropped
by SFQ. At this point qlen is 1, and all of the SFQ slots are empty,
however q->tail is not NULL.
At this point, assuming no more packets are queued, when sch_dequeue
runs again it will decrement the qlen for the current empty slot
causing an underflow and the subsequent out of bounds access.
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Octavian Purdila <tavip@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241204030520.2084663-2-tavip@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit e4650d7ae4252f67e997a632adfae0dd74d3a99a ]
SFQ has an assumption on dealing with packets smaller than 64KB.
Even before BIG TCP, TCA_STAB can provide arbitrary big values
in qdisc_pkt_len(skb)
It is time to switch (struct sfq_slot)->allot to a 32bit field.
sizeof(struct sfq_slot) is now 64 bytes, giving better cache locality.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241008111603.653140-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 10685681bafc ("net_sched: sch_sfq: don't allow 1 packet limit")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit a17ef9e6c2c1cf0fc6cd6ca6a9ce525c67d1da7f ]
sfq_perturbation() reads q->perturb_period locklessly.
Add annotations to fix potential issues.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240430180015.3111398-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 10685681bafc ("net_sched: sch_sfq: don't allow 1 packet limit")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
commit 90e0569dd3d32f4f4d2ca691d3fa5a8a14a13c12 upstream.
The per-netns IP tunnel hash table is protected by the RTNL mutex and
ip_tunnel_find() is only called from the control path where the mutex is
taken.
Add a lockdep expression to hlist_for_each_entry_rcu() in
ip_tunnel_find() in order to validate that the mutex is held and to
silence the suspicious RCU usage warning [1].
[1]
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
6.12.0-rc3-custom-gd95d9a31aceb #139 Not tainted
-----------------------------
net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c:221 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
1 lock held by ip/362:
#0: ffffffff86fc7cb0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x377/0xf60
stack backtrace:
CPU: 12 UID: 0 PID: 362 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.12.0-rc3-custom-gd95d9a31aceb #139
Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xba/0x110
lockdep_rcu_suspicious.cold+0x4f/0xd6
ip_tunnel_find+0x435/0x4d0
ip_tunnel_newlink+0x517/0x7a0
ipgre_newlink+0x14c/0x170
__rtnl_newlink+0x1173/0x19c0
rtnl_newlink+0x6c/0xa0
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x3cc/0xf60
netlink_rcv_skb+0x171/0x450
netlink_unicast+0x539/0x7f0
netlink_sendmsg+0x8c1/0xd80
____sys_sendmsg+0x8f9/0xc20
___sys_sendmsg+0x197/0x1e0
__sys_sendmsg+0x122/0x1f0
do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Fixes: c54419321455 ("GRE: Refactor GRE tunneling code.")
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241023123009.749764-1-idosch@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alva Lan <alvalan9@foxmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit d62b04fca4340a0d468d7853bd66e511935a18cb upstream.
Haowei Yan <g1042620637@gmail.com> found that ets_class_from_arg() can
index an Out-Of-Bound class in ets_class_from_arg() when passed clid of
0. The overflow may cause local privilege escalation.
[ 18.852298] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 18.853271] UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/sched/sch_ets.c:93:20
[ 18.853743] index 18446744073709551615 is out of range for type 'ets_class [16]'
[ 18.854254] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1275 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.12.6-dirty #17
[ 18.854821] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
[ 18.856532] Call Trace:
[ 18.857441] <TASK>
[ 18.858227] dump_stack_lvl+0xc2/0xf0
[ 18.859607] dump_stack+0x10/0x20
[ 18.860908] __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0xa7/0xf0
[ 18.864022] ets_class_change+0x3d6/0x3f0
[ 18.864322] tc_ctl_tclass+0x251/0x910
[ 18.864587] ? lock_acquire+0x5e/0x140
[ 18.865113] ? __mutex_lock+0x9c/0xe70
[ 18.866009] ? __mutex_lock+0xa34/0xe70
[ 18.866401] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x170/0x6f0
[ 18.866806] ? __lock_acquire+0x578/0xc10
[ 18.867184] ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
[ 18.867503] netlink_rcv_skb+0x59/0x110
[ 18.867776] rtnetlink_rcv+0x15/0x30
[ 18.868159] netlink_unicast+0x1c3/0x2b0
[ 18.868440] netlink_sendmsg+0x239/0x4b0
[ 18.868721] ____sys_sendmsg+0x3e2/0x410
[ 18.869012] ___sys_sendmsg+0x88/0xe0
[ 18.869276] ? rseq_ip_fixup+0x198/0x260
[ 18.869563] ? rseq_update_cpu_node_id+0x10a/0x190
[ 18.869900] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0x5a/0xd0
[ 18.870196] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xcc/0x220
[ 18.870547] ? do_syscall_64+0x93/0x150
[ 18.870821] ? __memcg_slab_free_hook+0x69/0x290
[ 18.871157] __sys_sendmsg+0x69/0xd0
[ 18.871416] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x1d/0x30
[ 18.871699] x64_sys_call+0x9e2/0x2670
[ 18.871979] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x150
[ 18.873280] ? do_syscall_64+0x93/0x150
[ 18.874742] ? lock_release+0x7b/0x160
[ 18.876157] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x5ce/0x8f0
[ 18.877833] ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0xc2/0x210
[ 18.879608] ? irqentry_exit+0x77/0xb0
[ 18.879808] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x15/0x70
[ 18.880023] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x15/0x70
[ 18.880223] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x15/0x70
[ 18.880426] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[ 18.880683] RIP: 0033:0x44a957
[ 18.880851] Code: ff ff e8 fc 00 00 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 89 54 24 1c 48 8974 24 10
[ 18.881766] RSP: 002b:00007ffcdd00fad8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
[ 18.882149] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffcdd010db8 RCX: 000000000044a957
[ 18.882507] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffcdd00fb70 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 18.885037] RBP: 00007ffcdd010bc0 R08: 000000000703c770 R09: 000000000703c7c0
[ 18.887203] R10: 0000000000000080 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
[ 18.888026] R13: 00007ffcdd010da8 R14: 00000000004ca7d0 R15: 0000000000000001
[ 18.888395] </TASK>
[ 18.888610] ---[ end trace ]---
Fixes: dcc68b4d8084 ("net: sch_ets: Add a new Qdisc")
Reported-by: Haowei Yan <g1042620637@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Haowei Yan <g1042620637@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250111145740.74755-1-jhs@mojatatu.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit d9ccb18f83ea2bb654289b6ecf014fd267cc988b upstream.
Soft lockups have been observed on a cluster of Linux-based edge routers
located in a highly dynamic environment. Using the `bird` service, these
routers continuously update BGP-advertised routes due to frequently
changing nexthop destinations, while also managing significant IPv6
traffic. The lockups occur during the traversal of the multipath
circular linked-list in the `fib6_select_path` function, particularly
while iterating through the siblings in the list. The issue typically
arises when the nodes of the linked list are unexpectedly deleted
concurrently on a different core—indicated by their 'next' and
'previous' elements pointing back to the node itself and their reference
count dropping to zero. This results in an infinite loop, leading to a
soft lockup that triggers a system panic via the watchdog timer.
Apply RCU primitives in the problematic code sections to resolve the
issue. Where necessary, update the references to fib6_siblings to
annotate or use the RCU APIs.
Include a test script that reproduces the issue. The script
periodically updates the routing table while generating a heavy load
of outgoing IPv6 traffic through multiple iperf3 clients. It
consistently induces infinite soft lockups within a couple of minutes.
Kernel log:
0 [ffffbd13003e8d30] machine_kexec at ffffffff8ceaf3eb
1 [ffffbd13003e8d90] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8d0120e3
2 [ffffbd13003e8e58] panic at ffffffff8cef65d4
3 [ffffbd13003e8ed8] watchdog_timer_fn at ffffffff8d05cb03
4 [ffffbd13003e8f08] __hrtimer_run_queues at ffffffff8cfec62f
5 [ffffbd13003e8f70] hrtimer_interrupt at ffffffff8cfed756
6 [ffffbd13003e8fd0] __sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt at ffffffff8cea01af
7 [ffffbd13003e8ff0] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt at ffffffff8df1b83d
-- <IRQ stack> --
8 [ffffbd13003d3708] asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt at ffffffff8e000ecb
[exception RIP: fib6_select_path+299]
RIP: ffffffff8ddafe7b RSP: ffffbd13003d37b8 RFLAGS: 00000287
RAX: ffff975850b43600 RBX: ffff975850b40200 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 000000003fffffff RSI: 0000000051d383e4 RDI: ffff975850b43618
RBP: ffffbd13003d3800 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: ffff975850b40200
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffbd13003d3830
R13: ffff975850b436a8 R14: ffff975850b43600 R15: 0000000000000007
ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018
9 [ffffbd13003d3808] ip6_pol_route at ffffffff8ddb030c
10 [ffffbd13003d3888] ip6_pol_route_input at ffffffff8ddb068c
11 [ffffbd13003d3898] fib6_rule_lookup at ffffffff8ddf02b5
12 [ffffbd13003d3928] ip6_route_input at ffffffff8ddb0f47
13 [ffffbd13003d3a18] ip6_rcv_finish_core.constprop.0 at ffffffff8dd950d0
14 [ffffbd13003d3a30] ip6_list_rcv_finish.constprop.0 at ffffffff8dd96274
15 [ffffbd13003d3a98] ip6_sublist_rcv at ffffffff8dd96474
16 [ffffbd13003d3af8] ipv6_list_rcv at ffffffff8dd96615
17 [ffffbd13003d3b60] __netif_receive_skb_list_core at ffffffff8dc16fec
18 [ffffbd13003d3be0] netif_receive_skb_list_internal at ffffffff8dc176b3
19 [ffffbd13003d3c50] napi_gro_receive at ffffffff8dc565b9
20 [ffffbd13003d3c80] ice_receive_skb at ffffffffc087e4f5 [ice]
21 [ffffbd13003d3c90] ice_clean_rx_irq at ffffffffc0881b80 [ice]
22 [ffffbd13003d3d20] ice_napi_poll at ffffffffc088232f [ice]
23 [ffffbd13003d3d80] __napi_poll at ffffffff8dc18000
24 [ffffbd13003d3db8] net_rx_action at ffffffff8dc18581
25 [ffffbd13003d3e40] __do_softirq at ffffffff8df352e9
26 [ffffbd13003d3eb0] run_ksoftirqd at ffffffff8ceffe47
27 [ffffbd13003d3ec0] smpboot_thread_fn at ffffffff8cf36a30
28 [ffffbd13003d3ee8] kthread at ffffffff8cf2b39f
29 [ffffbd13003d3f28] ret_from_fork at ffffffff8ce5fa64
30 [ffffbd13003d3f50] ret_from_fork_asm at ffffffff8ce03cbb
Fixes: 66f5d6ce53e6 ("ipv6: replace rwlock with rcu and spinlock in fib6_table")
Reported-by: Adrian Oliver <kernel@aoliver.ca>
Signed-off-by: Omid Ehtemam-Haghighi <omid.ehtemamhaghighi@menlosecurity.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Ido Schimmel <idosch@idosch.org>
Cc: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241106010236.1239299-1-omid.ehtemamhaghighi@menlosecurity.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Rajani Kantha <rajanikantha@engineer.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 073d89808c065ac4c672c0a613a71b27a80691cb upstream.
Syzkaller reported this warning:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 16 at net/ipv4/af_inet.c:156 inet_sock_destruct+0x1c5/0x1e0
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 16 Comm: ksoftirqd/0 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5 #26
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:inet_sock_destruct+0x1c5/0x1e0
Code: 24 12 4c 89 e2 5b 48 c7 c7 98 ec bb 82 41 5c e9 d1 18 17 ff 4c 89 e6 5b 48 c7 c7 d0 ec bb 82 41 5c e9 bf 18 17 ff 0f 0b eb 83 <0f> 0b eb 97 0f 0b eb 87 0f 0b e9 68 ff ff ff 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000008bd90 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 0000000000000300 RBX: ffff88810b172a90 RCX: 0000000000000007
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000000300 RDI: ffff88810b172a00
RBP: ffff88810b172a00 R08: ffff888104273c00 R09: 0000000000100007
R10: 0000000000020000 R11: 0000000000000006 R12: ffff88810b172a00
R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888237c31f78
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888237c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007ffc63fecac8 CR3: 000000000342e000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __warn+0x88/0x130
? inet_sock_destruct+0x1c5/0x1e0
? report_bug+0x18e/0x1a0
? handle_bug+0x53/0x90
? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x70
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
? inet_sock_destruct+0x1c5/0x1e0
__sk_destruct+0x2a/0x200
rcu_do_batch+0x1aa/0x530
? rcu_do_batch+0x13b/0x530
rcu_core+0x159/0x2f0
handle_softirqs+0xd3/0x2b0
? __pfx_smpboot_thread_fn+0x10/0x10
run_ksoftirqd+0x25/0x30
smpboot_thread_fn+0xdd/0x1d0
kthread+0xd3/0x100
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Its possible that two threads call tcp_v6_do_rcv()/sk_forward_alloc_add()
concurrently when sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN with sk->sk_lock unlocked,
which triggers a data-race around sk->sk_forward_alloc:
tcp_v6_rcv
tcp_v6_do_rcv
skb_clone_and_charge_r
sk_rmem_schedule
__sk_mem_schedule
sk_forward_alloc_add()
skb_set_owner_r
sk_mem_charge
sk_forward_alloc_add()
__kfree_skb
skb_release_all
skb_release_head_state
sock_rfree
sk_mem_uncharge
sk_forward_alloc_add()
sk_mem_reclaim
// set local var reclaimable
__sk_mem_reclaim
sk_forward_alloc_add()
In this syzkaller testcase, two threads call
tcp_v6_do_rcv() with skb->truesize=768, the sk_forward_alloc changes like
this:
(cpu 1) | (cpu 2) | sk_forward_alloc
... | ... | 0
__sk_mem_schedule() | | +4096 = 4096
| __sk_mem_schedule() | +4096 = 8192
sk_mem_charge() | | -768 = 7424
| sk_mem_charge() | -768 = 6656
... | ... |
sk_mem_uncharge() | | +768 = 7424
reclaimable=7424 | |
| sk_mem_uncharge() | +768 = 8192
| reclaimable=8192 |
__sk_mem_reclaim() | | -4096 = 4096
| __sk_mem_reclaim() | -8192 = -4096 != 0
The skb_clone_and_charge_r() should not be called in tcp_v6_do_rcv() when
sk->sk_state is TCP_LISTEN, it happens later in tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock().
Fix the same issue in dccp_v6_do_rcv().
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Fixes: e994b2f0fb92 ("tcp: do not lock listener to process SYN packets")
Signed-off-by: Wang Liang <wangliang74@huawei.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241107023405.889239-1-wangliang74@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alva Lan <alvalan9@foxmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 91751e248256efc111e52e15115840c35d85abaf upstream.
Recent reports have shown how we sometimes call vsock_*_has_data()
when a vsock socket has been de-assigned from a transport (see attached
links), but we shouldn't.
Previous commits should have solved the real problems, but we may have
more in the future, so to avoid null-ptr-deref, we can return 0
(no space, no data available) but with a warning.
This way the code should continue to run in a nearly consistent state
and have a warning that allows us to debug future problems.
Fixes: c0cfa2d8a788 ("vsock: add multi-transports support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/Z2K%2FI4nlHdfMRTZC@v4bel-B760M-AORUS-ELITE-AX/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/5ca20d4c-1017-49c2-9516-f6f75fd331e9@rbox.co/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/677f84a8.050a0220.25a300.01b3.GAE@google.com/
Co-developed-by: Hyunwoo Kim <v4bel@theori.io>
Signed-off-by: Hyunwoo Kim <v4bel@theori.io>
Co-developed-by: Wongi Lee <qwerty@theori.io>
Signed-off-by: Wongi Lee <qwerty@theori.io>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Luigi Leonardi <leonardi@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Hyunwoo Kim <v4bel@theori.io>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit a24009bc9be60242651a21702609381b5092459e upstream.
Transport's release() and destruct() are called when de-assigning the
vsock transport. These callbacks can touch some socket state like
sock flags, sk_state, and peer_shutdown.
Since we are reassigning the socket to a new transport during
vsock_connect(), let's reset these fields to have a clean state with
the new transport.
Fixes: c0cfa2d8a788 ("vsock: add multi-transports support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Luigi Leonardi <leonardi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit df137da9d6d166e87e40980e36eb8e0bc90483ef upstream.
During virtio_transport_release() we can schedule a delayed work to
perform the closing of the socket before destruction.
The destructor is called either when the socket is really destroyed
(reference counter to zero), or it can also be called when we are
de-assigning the transport.
In the former case, we are sure the delayed work has completed, because
it holds a reference until it completes, so the destructor will
definitely be called after the delayed work is finished.
But in the latter case, the destructor is called by AF_VSOCK core, just
after the release(), so there may still be delayed work scheduled.
Refactor the code, moving the code to delete the close work already in
the do_close() to a new function. Invoke it during destruction to make
sure we don't leave any pending work.
Fixes: c0cfa2d8a788 ("vsock: add multi-transports support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Hyunwoo Kim <v4bel@theori.io>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/Z37Sh+utS+iV3+eb@v4bel-B760M-AORUS-ELITE-AX/
Signed-off-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Luigi Leonardi <leonardi@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Hyunwoo Kim <v4bel@theori.io>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 2cb7c756f605ec02ffe562fb26828e4bcc5fdfc1 upstream.
If the socket has been de-assigned or assigned to another transport,
we must discard any packets received because they are not expected
and would cause issues when we access vsk->transport.
A possible scenario is described by Hyunwoo Kim in the attached link,
where after a first connect() interrupted by a signal, and a second
connect() failed, we can find `vsk->transport` at NULL, leading to a
NULL pointer dereference.
Fixes: c0cfa2d8a788 ("vsock: add multi-transports support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Hyunwoo Kim <v4bel@theori.io>
Reported-by: Wongi Lee <qwerty@theori.io>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/Z2LvdTTQR7dBmPb5@v4bel-B760M-AORUS-ELITE-AX/
Signed-off-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Hyunwoo Kim <v4bel@theori.io>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit f6abafcd32f9cfc4b1a2f820ecea70773e26d423 upstream.
Some of the core functions can only be called if the transport
has been assigned.
As Michal reported, a socket might have the transport at NULL,
for example after a failed connect(), causing the following trace:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000a0
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 12faf8067 P4D 12faf8067 PUD 113670067 PMD 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 15 UID: 0 PID: 1198 Comm: a.out Not tainted 6.13.0-rc2+
RIP: 0010:vsock_connectible_has_data+0x1f/0x40
Call Trace:
vsock_bpf_recvmsg+0xca/0x5e0
sock_recvmsg+0xb9/0xc0
__sys_recvfrom+0xb3/0x130
__x64_sys_recvfrom+0x20/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
So we need to check the `vsk->transport` in vsock_bpf_recvmsg(),
especially for connected sockets (stream/seqpacket) as we already
do in __vsock_connectible_recvmsg().
Fixes: 634f1a7110b4 ("vsock: support sockmap")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Michal Luczaj <mhal@rbox.co>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/5ca20d4c-1017-49c2-9516-f6f75fd331e9@rbox.co/
Tested-by: Michal Luczaj <mhal@rbox.co>
Reported-by: syzbot+3affdbfc986ecd9200fd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/677f84a8.050a0220.25a300.01b3.GAE@google.com/
Tested-by: syzbot+3affdbfc986ecd9200fd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reviewed-by: Hyunwoo Kim <v4bel@theori.io>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Luigi Leonardi <leonardi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit e226d9259dc4f5d2c19e6682ad1356fa97cf38f4 upstream.
The wake-up condition currently implemented by mptcp_epollin_ready()
is wrong, as it could mark the MPTCP socket as readable even when
no data are present and the system is under memory pressure.
Explicitly check for some data being available in the receive queue.
Fixes: 5684ab1a0eff ("mptcp: give rcvlowat some love")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250113-net-mptcp-connect-st-flakes-v1-2-0d986ee7b1b6@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 2ca06a2f65310aeef30bb69b7405437a14766e4d upstream.
mptcp_cleanup_rbuf() is responsible to send acks when the user-space
reads enough data to update the receive windows significantly.
It tries hard to avoid acquiring the subflow sockets locks by checking
conditions similar to the ones implemented at the TCP level.
To avoid too much code duplication - the MPTCP protocol can't reuse the
TCP helpers as part of the relevant status is maintained into the msk
socket - and multiple costly window size computation, mptcp_cleanup_rbuf
uses a rough estimate for the most recently advertised window size:
the MPTCP receive free space, as recorded as at last-ack time.
Unfortunately the above does not allow mptcp_cleanup_rbuf() to detect
a zero to non-zero win change in some corner cases, skipping the
tcp_cleanup_rbuf call and leaving the peer stuck.
After commit ea66758c1795 ("tcp: allow MPTCP to update the announced
window"), MPTCP has actually cheap access to the announced window value.
Use it in mptcp_cleanup_rbuf() for a more accurate ack generation.
Fixes: e3859603ba13 ("mptcp: better msk receive window updates")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/20250107131845.5e5de3c5@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250113-net-mptcp-connect-st-flakes-v1-1-0d986ee7b1b6@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit eb09fbeb48709fe66c0d708aed81e910a577a30a ]
syzkaller reported a corrupted list in ieee802154_if_remove. [1]
Remove an IEEE 802.15.4 network interface after unregister an IEEE 802.15.4
hardware device from the system.
CPU0 CPU1
==== ====
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit ieee802154_unregister_hw
ieee802154_del_iface ieee802154_remove_interfaces
rdev_del_virtual_intf_deprecated list_del(&sdata->list)
ieee802154_if_remove
list_del_rcu
The net device has been unregistered, since the rcu grace period,
unregistration must be run before ieee802154_if_remove.
To avoid this issue, add a check for local->interfaces before deleting
sdata list.
[1]
kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:58!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 6277 Comm: syz-executor157 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-syzkaller-00005-g557329bcecc2 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0xf4/0x140 lib/list_debug.c:56
Code: e8 a1 7e 00 07 90 0f 0b 48 c7 c7 e0 37 60 8c 4c 89 fe e8 8f 7e 00 07 90 0f 0b 48 c7 c7 40 38 60 8c 4c 89 fe e8 7d 7e 00 07 90 <0f> 0b 48 c7 c7 a0 38 60 8c 4c 89 fe e8 6b 7e 00 07 90 0f 0b 48 c7
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000490f3d0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 000000000000004e RBX: dead000000000122 RCX: d211eee56bb28d00
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000080000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff88805b278dd8 R08: ffffffff8174a12c R09: 1ffffffff2852f0d
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff2852f0e R12: dffffc0000000000
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: dead000000000100 R15: ffff88805b278cc0
FS: 0000555572f94380(0000) GS:ffff8880b8600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000056262e4a3000 CR3: 0000000078496000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__list_del_entry_valid include/linux/list.h:124 [inline]
__list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:215 [inline]
list_del_rcu include/linux/rculist.h:157 [inline]
ieee802154_if_remove+0x86/0x1e0 net/mac802154/iface.c:687
rdev_del_virtual_intf_deprecated net/ieee802154/rdev-ops.h:24 [inline]
ieee802154_del_iface+0x2c0/0x5c0 net/ieee802154/nl-phy.c:323
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit net/netlink/genetlink.c:1115 [inline]
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:1195 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0xb14/0xec0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1210
netlink_rcv_skb+0x1e3/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2551
genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1219
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1331 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x7f6/0x990 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1357
netlink_sendmsg+0x8e4/0xcb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1901
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:729 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:744
____sys_sendmsg+0x52a/0x7e0 net/socket.c:2607
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2661 [inline]
__sys_sendmsg+0x292/0x380 net/socket.c:2690
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+985f827280dc3a6e7e92@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=985f827280dc3a6e7e92
Signed-off-by: Lizhi Xu <lizhi.xu@windriver.com>
Reviewed-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20241113095129.1457225-1-lizhi.xu@windriver.com
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schmidt <stefan@datenfreihafen.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit fd4f101edbd9f99567ab2adb1f2169579ede7c13 ]
Many (struct pernet_operations)->exit_batch() methods have
to acquire rtnl.
In presence of rtnl mutex pressure, this makes cleanup_net()
very slow.
This patch adds a new exit_batch_rtnl() method to reduce
number of rtnl acquisitions from cleanup_net().
exit_batch_rtnl() handlers are called while rtnl is locked,
and devices to be killed can be queued in a list provided
as their second argument.
A single unregister_netdevice_many() is called right
before rtnl is released.
exit_batch_rtnl() handlers are called before ->exit() and
->exit_batch() handlers.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Tenart <atenart@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240206144313.2050392-2-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 46841c7053e6 ("gtp: Use for_each_netdev_rcu() in gtp_genl_dump_pdp().")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 76201b5979768500bca362871db66d77cb4c225e ]
Passing a sufficient amount of imix entries leads to invalid access to the
pkt_dev->imix_entries array because of the incorrect boundary check.
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/core/pktgen.c:874:24
index 20 is out of range for type 'imix_pkt [20]'
CPU: 2 PID: 1210 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.10.0-rc1 #121
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl lib/dump_stack.c:117
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds lib/ubsan.c:429
get_imix_entries net/core/pktgen.c:874
pktgen_if_write net/core/pktgen.c:1063
pde_write fs/proc/inode.c:334
proc_reg_write fs/proc/inode.c:346
vfs_write fs/read_write.c:593
ksys_write fs/read_write.c:644
do_syscall_64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.
Fixes: 52a62f8603f9 ("pktgen: Parse internet mix (imix) input")
Signed-off-by: Artem Chernyshev <artem.chernyshev@red-soft.ru>
[ fp: allow to fill the array completely; minor changelog cleanup ]
Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 47e55e4b410f7d552e43011baa5be1aab4093990 ]
Commit in a fixes tag attempted to fix the issue in the following
sequence of calls:
do_output
-> ovs_vport_send
-> dev_queue_xmit
-> __dev_queue_xmit
-> netdev_core_pick_tx
-> skb_tx_hash
When device is unregistering, the 'dev->real_num_tx_queues' goes to
zero and the 'while (unlikely(hash >= qcount))' loop inside the
'skb_tx_hash' becomes infinite, locking up the core forever.
But unfortunately, checking just the carrier status is not enough to
fix the issue, because some devices may still be in unregistering
state while reporting carrier status OK.
One example of such device is a net/dummy. It sets carrier ON
on start, but it doesn't implement .ndo_stop to set the carrier off.
And it makes sense, because dummy doesn't really have a carrier.
Therefore, while this device is unregistering, it's still easy to hit
the infinite loop in the skb_tx_hash() from the OVS datapath. There
might be other drivers that do the same, but dummy by itself is
important for the OVS ecosystem, because it is frequently used as a
packet sink for tcpdump while debugging OVS deployments. And when the
issue is hit, the only way to recover is to reboot.
Fix that by also checking if the device is running. The running
state is handled by the net core during unregistering, so it covers
unregistering case better, and we don't really need to send packets
to devices that are not running anyway.
While only checking the running state might be enough, the carrier
check is preserved. The running and the carrier states seem disjoined
throughout the code and different drivers. And other core functions
like __dev_direct_xmit() check both before attempting to transmit
a packet. So, it seems safer to check both flags in OVS as well.
Fixes: 066b86787fa3 ("net: openvswitch: fix race on port output")
Reported-by: Friedrich Weber <f.weber@proxmox.com>
Closes: https://mail.openvswitch.org/pipermail/ovs-discuss/2025-January/053423.html
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets@ovn.org>
Tested-by: Friedrich Weber <f.weber@proxmox.com>
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole <aconole@redhat.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250109122225.4034688-1-i.maximets@ovn.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit b3af60928ab9129befa65e6df0310d27300942bf ]
As pointed out in the original comment, lookup in sockmap can return a TCP
ESTABLISHED socket. Such TCP socket may have had SO_ATTACH_REUSEPORT_EBPF
set before it was ESTABLISHED. In other words, a non-NULL sk_reuseport_cb
does not imply a non-refcounted socket.
Drop sk's reference in both error paths.
unreferenced object 0xffff888101911800 (size 2048):
comm "test_progs", pid 44109, jiffies 4297131437
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
80 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace (crc 9336483b):
__kmalloc_noprof+0x3bf/0x560
__reuseport_alloc+0x1d/0x40
reuseport_alloc+0xca/0x150
reuseport_attach_prog+0x87/0x140
sk_reuseport_attach_bpf+0xc8/0x100
sk_setsockopt+0x1181/0x1990
do_sock_setsockopt+0x12b/0x160
__sys_setsockopt+0x7b/0xc0
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0x1b/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Fixes: 64d85290d79c ("bpf: Allow bpf_map_lookup_elem for SOCKMAP and SOCKHASH")
Signed-off-by: Michal Luczaj <mhal@rbox.co>
Reviewed-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250110-reuseport-memleak-v1-1-fa1ddab0adfe@rbox.co
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
commit 6259d2484d0ceff42245d1f09cc8cb6ee72d847a upstream.
As mentioned in a previous commit of this series, using the 'net'
structure via 'current' is not recommended for different reasons:
- Inconsistency: getting info from the reader's/writer's netns vs only
from the opener's netns.
- current->nsproxy can be NULL in some cases, resulting in an 'Oops'
(null-ptr-deref), e.g. when the current task is exiting, as spotted by
syzbot [1] using acct(2).
The 'net' structure can be obtained from the table->data using
container_of().
Note that table->data could also be used directly, as this is the only
member needed from the 'net' structure, but that would increase the size
of this fix, to use '*data' everywhere 'net->sctp.probe_interval' is
used.
Fixes: d1e462a7a5f3 ("sctp: add probe_interval in sysctl and sock/asoc/transport")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/67769ecb.050a0220.3a8527.003f.GAE@google.com [1]
Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250108-net-sysctl-current-nsproxy-v1-8-5df34b2083e8@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit c10377bbc1972d858eaf0ab366a311b39f8ef1b6 upstream.
As mentioned in a previous commit of this series, using the 'net'
structure via 'current' is not recommended for different reasons:
- Inconsistency: getting info from the reader's/writer's netns vs only
from the opener's netns.
- current->nsproxy can be NULL in some cases, resulting in an 'Oops'
(null-ptr-deref), e.g. when the current task is exiting, as spotted by
syzbot [1] using acct(2).
The 'net' structure can be obtained from the table->data using
container_of().
Note that table->data could also be used directly, but that would
increase the size of this fix, while 'sctp.ctl_sock' still needs to be
retrieved from 'net' structure.
Fixes: 046c052b475e ("sctp: enable udp tunneling socks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/67769ecb.050a0220.3a8527.003f.GAE@google.com [1]
Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250108-net-sysctl-current-nsproxy-v1-7-5df34b2083e8@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 15649fd5415eda664ef35780c2013adeb5d9c695 upstream.
As mentioned in a previous commit of this series, using the 'net'
structure via 'current' is not recommended for different reasons:
- Inconsistency: getting info from the reader's/writer's netns vs only
from the opener's netns.
- current->nsproxy can be NULL in some cases, resulting in an 'Oops'
(null-ptr-deref), e.g. when the current task is exiting, as spotted by
syzbot [1] using acct(2).
The 'net' structure can be obtained from the table->data using
container_of().
Note that table->data could also be used directly, but that would
increase the size of this fix, while 'sctp.ctl_sock' still needs to be
retrieved from 'net' structure.
Fixes: b14878ccb7fa ("net: sctp: cache auth_enable per endpoint")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/67769ecb.050a0220.3a8527.003f.GAE@google.com [1]
Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250108-net-sysctl-current-nsproxy-v1-6-5df34b2083e8@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 9fc17b76fc70763780aa78b38fcf4742384044a5 upstream.
As mentioned in a previous commit of this series, using the 'net'
structure via 'current' is not recommended for different reasons:
- Inconsistency: getting info from the reader's/writer's netns vs only
from the opener's netns.
- current->nsproxy can be NULL in some cases, resulting in an 'Oops'
(null-ptr-deref), e.g. when the current task is exiting, as spotted by
syzbot [1] using acct(2).
The 'net' structure can be obtained from the table->data using
container_of().
Note that table->data could also be used directly, as this is the only
member needed from the 'net' structure, but that would increase the size
of this fix, to use '*data' everywhere 'net->sctp.rto_min/max' is used.
Fixes: 4f3fdf3bc59c ("sctp: add check rto_min and rto_max in sysctl")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/67769ecb.050a0220.3a8527.003f.GAE@google.com [1]
Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250108-net-sysctl-current-nsproxy-v1-5-5df34b2083e8@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit ea62dd1383913b5999f3d16ae99d411f41b528d4 upstream.
As mentioned in a previous commit of this series, using the 'net'
structure via 'current' is not recommended for different reasons:
- Inconsistency: getting info from the reader's/writer's netns vs only
from the opener's netns.
- current->nsproxy can be NULL in some cases, resulting in an 'Oops'
(null-ptr-deref), e.g. when the current task is exiting, as spotted by
syzbot [1] using acct(2).
The 'net' structure can be obtained from the table->data using
container_of().
Note that table->data could also be used directly, as this is the only
member needed from the 'net' structure, but that would increase the size
of this fix, to use '*data' everywhere 'net->sctp.sctp_hmac_alg' is
used.
Fixes: 3c68198e7511 ("sctp: Make hmac algorithm selection for cookie generation dynamic")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/67769ecb.050a0220.3a8527.003f.GAE@google.com [1]
Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250108-net-sysctl-current-nsproxy-v1-4-5df34b2083e8@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit d38e26e36206ae3d544d496513212ae931d1da0a upstream.
Using the 'net' structure via 'current' is not recommended for different
reasons.
First, if the goal is to use it to read or write per-netns data, this is
inconsistent with how the "generic" sysctl entries are doing: directly
by only using pointers set to the table entry, e.g. table->data. Linked
to that, the per-netns data should always be obtained from the table
linked to the netns it had been created for, which may not coincide with
the reader's or writer's netns.
Another reason is that access to current->nsproxy->netns can oops if
attempted when current->nsproxy had been dropped when the current task
is exiting. This is what syzbot found, when using acct(2):
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000005: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000028-0x000000000000002f]
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5924 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 6.13.0-rc5-syzkaller-00004-gccb98ccef0e5 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
RIP: 0010:proc_scheduler+0xc6/0x3c0 net/mptcp/ctrl.c:125
Code: 03 42 80 3c 38 00 0f 85 fe 02 00 00 4d 8b a4 24 08 09 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 49 8d 7c 24 28 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 cc 02 00 00 4d 8b 7c 24 28 48 8d 84 24 c8 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc900034774e8 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 1ffff9200068ee9e RCX: ffffc90003477620
RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: ffffffff8b08f91e RDI: 0000000000000028
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffffc90003477710 R09: 0000000000000040
R10: 0000000000000040 R11: 00000000726f7475 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffc90003477620 R14: ffffc90003477710 R15: dffffc0000000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b8700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fee3cd452d8 CR3: 000000007d116000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
proc_sys_call_handler+0x403/0x5d0 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:601
__kernel_write_iter+0x318/0xa80 fs/read_write.c:612
__kernel_write+0xf6/0x140 fs/read_write.c:632
do_acct_process+0xcb0/0x14a0 kernel/acct.c:539
acct_pin_kill+0x2d/0x100 kernel/acct.c:192
pin_kill+0x194/0x7c0 fs/fs_pin.c:44
mnt_pin_kill+0x61/0x1e0 fs/fs_pin.c:81
cleanup_mnt+0x3ac/0x450 fs/namespace.c:1366
task_work_run+0x14e/0x250 kernel/task_work.c:239
exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:43 [inline]
do_exit+0xad8/0x2d70 kernel/exit.c:938
do_group_exit+0xd3/0x2a0 kernel/exit.c:1087
get_signal+0x2576/0x2610 kernel/signal.c:3017
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x90/0x7e0 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:337
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:111 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:329 [inline]
__syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:207 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x150/0x2a0 kernel/entry/common.c:218
do_syscall_64+0xda/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:89
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fee3cb87a6a
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7fee3cb87a40.
RSP: 002b:00007fffcccac688 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000037
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007fffcccac710 RCX: 00007fee3cb87a6a
RDX: 0000000000000041 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 00007fffcccac6ac R09: 00007fffcccacac7
R10: 00007fffcccac710 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007fee3cd49500
R13: 00007fffcccac6ac R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007fee3cd4b000
</TASK>
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:proc_scheduler+0xc6/0x3c0 net/mptcp/ctrl.c:125
Code: 03 42 80 3c 38 00 0f 85 fe 02 00 00 4d 8b a4 24 08 09 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 49 8d 7c 24 28 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 cc 02 00 00 4d 8b 7c 24 28 48 8d 84 24 c8 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc900034774e8 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 1ffff9200068ee9e RCX: ffffc90003477620
RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: ffffffff8b08f91e RDI: 0000000000000028
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffffc90003477710 R09: 0000000000000040
R10: 0000000000000040 R11: 00000000726f7475 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffc90003477620 R14: ffffc90003477710 R15: dffffc0000000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b8700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fee3cd452d8 CR3: 000000007d116000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
----------------
Code disassembly (best guess), 1 bytes skipped:
0: 42 80 3c 38 00 cmpb $0x0,(%rax,%r15,1)
5: 0f 85 fe 02 00 00 jne 0x309
b: 4d 8b a4 24 08 09 00 mov 0x908(%r12),%r12
12: 00
13: 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 movabs $0xdffffc0000000000,%rax
1a: fc ff df
1d: 49 8d 7c 24 28 lea 0x28(%r12),%rdi
22: 48 89 fa mov %rdi,%rdx
25: 48 c1 ea 03 shr $0x3,%rdx
* 29: 80 3c 02 00 cmpb $0x0,(%rdx,%rax,1) <-- trapping instruction
2d: 0f 85 cc 02 00 00 jne 0x2ff
33: 4d 8b 7c 24 28 mov 0x28(%r12),%r15
38: 48 rex.W
39: 8d .byte 0x8d
3a: 84 24 c8 test %ah,(%rax,%rcx,8)
Here with 'net.mptcp.scheduler', the 'net' structure is not really
needed, because the table->data already has a pointer to the current
scheduler, the only thing needed from the per-netns data.
Simply use 'data', instead of getting (most of the time) the same thing,
but from a longer and indirect way.
Fixes: 6963c508fd7a ("mptcp: only allow set existing scheduler for net.mptcp.scheduler")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+e364f774c6f57f2c86d1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/67769ecb.050a0220.3a8527.003f.GAE@google.com
Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau <martineau@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250108-net-sysctl-current-nsproxy-v1-2-5df34b2083e8@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 737d4d91d35b5f7fa5bb442651472277318b0bfd ]
Even though we fixed a logic error in the commit cited below, syzbot
still managed to trigger an underflow of the per-host bulk flow
counters, leading to an out of bounds memory access.
To avoid any such logic errors causing out of bounds memory accesses,
this commit factors out all accesses to the per-host bulk flow counters
to a series of helpers that perform bounds-checking before any
increments and decrements. This also has the benefit of improving
readability by moving the conditional checks for the flow mode into
these helpers, instead of having them spread out throughout the
code (which was the cause of the original logic error).
As part of this change, the flow quantum calculation is consolidated
into a helper function, which means that the dithering applied to the
ost load scaling is now applied both in the DRR rotation and when a
sparse flow's quantum is first initiated. The only user-visible effect
of this is that the maximum packet size that can be sent while a flow
stays sparse will now vary with +/- one byte in some cases. This should
not make a noticeable difference in practice, and thus it's not worth
complicating the code to preserve the old behaviour.
Fixes: 546ea84d07e3 ("sched: sch_cake: fix bulk flow accounting logic for host fairness")
Reported-by: syzbot+f63600d288bfb7057424@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dave Taht <dave.taht@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250107120105.70685-1-toke@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit b541ba7d1f5a5b7b3e2e22dc9e40e18a7d6dbc13 ]
Use INT_MAX as maximum size for the conntrack hashtable. Otherwise, it
is possible to hit WARN_ON_ONCE in __kvmalloc_node_noprof() when
resizing hashtable because __GFP_NOWARN is unset. See:
0708a0afe291 ("mm: Consider __GFP_NOWARN flag for oversized kvmalloc() calls")
Note: hashtable resize is only possible from init_netns.
Fixes: 9cc1c73ad666 ("netfilter: conntrack: avoid integer overflow when resizing")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 13210fc63f353fe78584048079343413a3cdf819 ]
All these cases cause imbalance between BIND and UNBIND calls:
- Delete an interface from a flowtable with multiple interfaces
- Add a (device to a) flowtable with --check flag
- Delete a netns containing a flowtable
- In an interactive nft session, create a table with owner flag and
flowtable inside, then quit.
Fix it by calling FLOW_BLOCK_UNBIND when unregistering hooks, then
remove late FLOW_BLOCK_UNBIND call when destroying flowtable.
Fixes: ff4bf2f42a40 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add nft_unregister_flowtable_hook()")
Reported-by: Phil Sutter <phil@nwl.cc>
Tested-by: Phil Sutter <phil@nwl.cc>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 80fb40baba19e25a1b6f3ecff6fc5c0171806bde ]
This is a follow-up to 3c5b4d69c358 ("net: annotate data-races around
sk->sk_mark"). sk->sk_mark can be read and written without holding
the socket lock. IPv6 equivalent is already covered with READ_ONCE()
annotation in tcp_v6_send_response().
Fixes: 3c5b4d69c358 ("net: annotate data-races around sk->sk_mark")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/f459d1fc44f205e13f6d8bdca2c8bfb9902ffac9.1736244569.git.daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit a182d9c84f9c52fb5db895ecceeee8b3a1bf661e ]
Add Device with LE type requires updating resolving/accept list which
requires quite a number of commands to complete and each of them may
fail, so instead of pretending it would always work this checks the
return of hci_update_passive_scan_sync which indicates if everything
worked as intended.
Fixes: e8907f76544f ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Make use of hci_cmd_sync_queue set 3")
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit c2994b008492db033d40bd767be1620229a3035e ]
This fixes errors such as the following when Own address type is set to
Random Address but it has not been programmed yet due to either be
advertising or connecting:
< HCI Command: LE Set Exte.. (0x08|0x0041) plen 13
Own address type: Random (0x03)
Filter policy: Ignore not in accept list (0x01)
PHYs: 0x05
Entry 0: LE 1M
Type: Passive (0x00)
Interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060)
Window: 30.000 msec (0x0030)
Entry 1: LE Coded
Type: Passive (0x00)
Interval: 180.000 msec (0x0120)
Window: 90.000 msec (0x0090)
> HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4
LE Set Extended Scan Parameters (0x08|0x0041) ncmd 1
Status: Success (0x00)
< HCI Command: LE Set Exten.. (0x08|0x0042) plen 6
Extended scan: Enabled (0x01)
Filter duplicates: Enabled (0x01)
Duration: 0 msec (0x0000)
Period: 0.00 sec (0x0000)
> HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4
LE Set Extended Scan Enable (0x08|0x0042) ncmd 1
Status: Invalid HCI Command Parameters (0x12)
Fixes: c45074d68a9b ("Bluetooth: Fix not generating RPA when required")
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit cb358ff94154774d031159b018adf45e17673941 ]
syzbot presented an use-after-free report [0] regarding ipvlan and
linkwatch.
ipvlan does not hold a refcnt of the lower device unlike vlan and
macvlan.
If the linkwatch work is triggered for the ipvlan dev, the lower dev
might have already been freed, resulting in UAF of ipvlan->phy_dev in
ipvlan_get_iflink().
We can delay the lower dev unregistration like vlan and macvlan by
holding the lower dev's refcnt in dev->netdev_ops->ndo_init() and
releasing it in dev->priv_destructor().
Jakub pointed out calling .ndo_XXX after unregister_netdevice() has
returned is error prone and suggested [1] addressing this UAF in the
core by taking commit 750e51603395 ("net: avoid potential UAF in
default_operstate()") further.
Let's assume unregistering devices DOWN and use RCU protection in
default_operstate() not to race with the device unregistration.
[0]:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ipvlan_get_iflink+0x84/0x88 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_main.c:353
Read of size 4 at addr ffff0000d768c0e0 by task kworker/u8:35/6944
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 6944 Comm: kworker/u8:35 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc2-g9bc5c9515b48 #12 4c3cb9e8b4565456f6a355f312ff91f4f29b3c47
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Workqueue: events_unbound linkwatch_event
Call trace:
show_stack+0x38/0x50 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:484 (C)
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xbc/0x108 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0x16c/0x6f0 mm/kasan/report.c:489
kasan_report+0xc0/0x120 mm/kasan/report.c:602
__asan_report_load4_noabort+0x20/0x30 mm/kasan/report_generic.c:380
ipvlan_get_iflink+0x84/0x88 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_main.c:353
dev_get_iflink+0x7c/0xd8 net/core/dev.c:674
default_operstate net/core/link_watch.c:45 [inline]
rfc2863_policy+0x144/0x360 net/core/link_watch.c:72
linkwatch_do_dev+0x60/0x228 net/core/link_watch.c:175
__linkwatch_run_queue+0x2f4/0x5b8 net/core/link_watch.c:239
linkwatch_event+0x64/0xa8 net/core/link_watch.c:282
process_one_work+0x700/0x1398 kernel/workqueue.c:3229
process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3310 [inline]
worker_thread+0x8c4/0xe10 kernel/workqueue.c:3391
kthread+0x2b0/0x360 kernel/kthread.c:389
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:862
Allocated by task 9303:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x30/0x68 mm/kasan/common.c:68
kasan_save_alloc_info+0x44/0x58 mm/kasan/generic.c:568
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0x84/0xa0 mm/kasan/common.c:394
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline]
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4283 [inline]
__kmalloc_node_noprof+0x2a0/0x560 mm/slub.c:4289
__kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x9c/0x230 mm/util.c:650
alloc_netdev_mqs+0xb4/0x1118 net/core/dev.c:11209
rtnl_create_link+0x2b8/0xb60 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3595
rtnl_newlink_create+0x19c/0x868 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3771
__rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3896 [inline]
rtnl_newlink+0x122c/0x15c0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4011
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x61c/0x918 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6901
netlink_rcv_skb+0x1dc/0x398 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2542
rtnetlink_rcv+0x34/0x50 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6928
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1321 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x618/0x838 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1347
netlink_sendmsg+0x5fc/0x8b0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1891
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:711 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:726 [inline]
__sys_sendto+0x2ec/0x438 net/socket.c:2197
__do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2204 [inline]
__se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2200 [inline]
__arm64_sys_sendto+0xe4/0x110 net/socket.c:2200
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline]
invoke_syscall+0x90/0x278 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49
el0_svc_common+0x13c/0x250 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:132
do_el0_svc+0x54/0x70 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:151
el0_svc+0x4c/0xa8 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:744
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x78/0x108 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:762
el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x1a0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:600
Freed by task 10200:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x30/0x68 mm/kasan/common.c:68
kasan_save_free_info+0x58/0x70 mm/kasan/generic.c:582
poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:247 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x48/0x68 mm/kasan/common.c:264
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:233 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2338 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:4598 [inline]
kfree+0x140/0x420 mm/slub.c:4746
kvfree+0x4c/0x68 mm/util.c:693
netdev_release+0x94/0xc8 net/core/net-sysfs.c:2034
device_release+0x98/0x1c0
kobject_cleanup lib/kobject.c:689 [inline]
kobject_release lib/kobject.c:720 [inline]
kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline]
kobject_put+0x2b0/0x438 lib/kobject.c:737
netdev_run_todo+0xdd8/0xf48 net/core/dev.c:10924
rtnl_unlock net/core/rtnetlink.c:152 [inline]
rtnl_net_unlock net/core/rtnetlink.c:209 [inline]
rtnl_dellink+0x484/0x680 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3526
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x61c/0x918 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6901
netlink_rcv_skb+0x1dc/0x398 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2542
rtnetlink_rcv+0x34/0x50 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6928
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1321 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x618/0x838 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1347
netlink_sendmsg+0x5fc/0x8b0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1891
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:711 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:726 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x410/0x708 net/socket.c:2583
___sys_sendmsg+0x178/0x1d8 net/socket.c:2637
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2669 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2672 [inline]
__arm64_sys_sendmsg+0x12c/0x1c8 net/socket.c:2672
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline]
invoke_syscall+0x90/0x278 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49
el0_svc_common+0x13c/0x250 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:132
do_el0_svc+0x54/0x70 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:151
el0_svc+0x4c/0xa8 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:744
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x78/0x108 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:762
el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x1a0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:600
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff0000d768c000
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-cg-4k of size 4096
The buggy address is located 224 bytes inside of
freed 4096-byte region [ffff0000d768c000, ffff0000d768d000)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x117688
head: order:3 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
memcg:ffff0000c77ef981
flags: 0xbfffe0000000040(head|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1ffff)
page_type: f5(slab)
raw: 0bfffe0000000040 ffff0000c000f500 dead000000000100 dead000000000122
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000040004 00000001f5000000 ffff0000c77ef981
head: 0bfffe0000000040 ffff0000c000f500 dead000000000100 dead000000000122
head: 0000000000000000 0000000000040004 00000001f5000000 ffff0000c77ef981
head: 0bfffe0000000003 fffffdffc35da201 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000
head: 0000000000000008 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff0000d768bf80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff0000d768c000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff0000d768c080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff0000d768c100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff0000d768c180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
Fixes: 8c55facecd7a ("net: linkwatch: only report IF_OPER_LOWERLAYERDOWN if iflink is actually down")
Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Suggested-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20250102174400.085fd8ac@kernel.org/ [1]
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250106071911.64355-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit b341ca51d2679829d26a3f6a4aa9aee9abd94f92 ]
We've noticed that NFS can hang when using RPC over TLS on an unstable
connection, and investigation shows that the RPC layer is stuck in a tight
loop attempting to transmit, but forever getting -EBADMSG back from the
underlying network. The loop begins when tcp_sendmsg_locked() returns
-EPIPE to tls_tx_records(), but that error is converted to -EBADMSG when
calling the socket's error reporting handler.
Instead of converting errors from tcp_sendmsg_locked(), let's pass them
along in this path. The RPC layer handles -EPIPE by reconnecting the
transport, which prevents the endless attempts to transmit on a broken
connection.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com>
Fixes: a42055e8d2c3 ("net/tls: Add support for async encryption of records for performance")
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/9594185559881679d81f071b181a10eb07cd079f.1736004079.git.bcodding@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit a039e54397c6a75b713b9ce7894a62e06956aa92 ]
syzbot found that TCA_FLOW_RSHIFT attribute was not validated.
Right shitfing a 32bit integer is undefined for large shift values.
UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in net/sched/cls_flow.c:329:23
shift exponent 9445 is too large for 32-bit type 'u32' (aka 'unsigned int')
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 54 Comm: kworker/u8:3 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc3-syzkaller-00180-g4f619d518db9 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
Workqueue: ipv6_addrconf addrconf_dad_work
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120
ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:231 [inline]
__ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x3c8/0x420 lib/ubsan.c:468
flow_classify+0x24d5/0x25b0 net/sched/cls_flow.c:329
tc_classify include/net/tc_wrapper.h:197 [inline]
__tcf_classify net/sched/cls_api.c:1771 [inline]
tcf_classify+0x420/0x1160 net/sched/cls_api.c:1867
sfb_classify net/sched/sch_sfb.c:260 [inline]
sfb_enqueue+0x3ad/0x18b0 net/sched/sch_sfb.c:318
dev_qdisc_enqueue+0x4b/0x290 net/core/dev.c:3793
__dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3889 [inline]
__dev_queue_xmit+0xf0e/0x3f50 net/core/dev.c:4400
dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3168 [inline]
neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:523 [inline]
neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:537 [inline]
ip_finish_output2+0xd41/0x1390 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:236
iptunnel_xmit+0x55d/0x9b0 net/ipv4/ip_tunnel_core.c:82
udp_tunnel_xmit_skb+0x262/0x3b0 net/ipv4/udp_tunnel_core.c:173
geneve_xmit_skb drivers/net/geneve.c:916 [inline]
geneve_xmit+0x21dc/0x2d00 drivers/net/geneve.c:1039
__netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:5002 [inline]
netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:5011 [inline]
xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3590 [inline]
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x27a/0x7d0 net/core/dev.c:3606
__dev_queue_xmit+0x1b73/0x3f50 net/core/dev.c:4434
Fixes: e5dfb815181f ("[NET_SCHED]: Add flow classifier")
Reported-by: syzbot+1dbb57d994e54aaa04d2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/6777bf49.050a0220.178762.0040.GAE@google.com/T/#u
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250103104546.3714168-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 1e9b0e1c550c42c13c111d1a31e822057232abc4 ]
802.2+LLC+SNAP frames received by napi_complete_done() with GRO and DSA
have skb->transport_header set two bytes short, or pointing 2 bytes
before network_header & skb->data. This was an issue as snap_rcv()
expected offset to point to SNAP header (OID:PID), causing packet to
be dropped.
A fix at llc_fixup_skb() (a024e377efed) resets transport_header for any
LLC consumers that may care about it, and stops SNAP packets from being
dropped, but doesn't fix the problem which is that LLC and SNAP should
not use transport_header offset.
Ths patch eliminates the use of transport_header offset for SNAP lookup
of OID:PID so that SNAP does not rely on the offset at all.
The offset is reset after pull for any SNAP packet consumers that may
(but shouldn't) use it.
Fixes: fda55eca5a33 ("net: introduce skb_transport_header_was_set()")
Signed-off-by: Antonio Pastor <antonio.pastor@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250103012303.746521-1-antonio.pastor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
commit 551844f26da2a9f76c0a698baaffa631d1178645 upstream.
Under some corner cases the MPTCP protocol can end-up invoking
mptcp_cleanup_rbuf() when no data has been copied, but such helper
assumes the opposite condition.
Explicitly drop such assumption and performs the costly call only
when strictly needed - before releasing the msk socket lock.
Fixes: fd8976790a6c ("mptcp: be careful on MPTCP-level ack.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau <martineau@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241230-net-mptcp-rbuf-fixes-v1-2-8608af434ceb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 449e6912a2522af672e99992e1201a454910864e upstream.
If the recvmsg() blocks after receiving some data - i.e. due to
SO_RCVLOWAT - the MPTCP code will attempt multiple times to
adjust the receive buffer size, wrongly accounting every time the
cumulative of received data - instead of accounting only for the
delta.
Address the issue moving mptcp_rcv_space_adjust just after the
data reception and passing it only the just received bytes.
This also removes an unneeded difference between the TCP and MPTCP
RX code path implementation.
Fixes: 581302298524 ("mptcp: error out earlier on disconnect")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau <martineau@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241230-net-mptcp-rbuf-fixes-v1-1-8608af434ceb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit cbb26f7d8451fe56ccac802c6db48d16240feebd upstream.
Syzbot reported the following splat:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f]
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5836 Comm: sshd Not tainted 6.13.0-rc3-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/25/2024
RIP: 0010:_compound_head include/linux/page-flags.h:242 [inline]
RIP: 0010:put_page+0x23/0x260 include/linux/mm.h:1552
Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 55 41 57 41 56 53 49 89 fe 48 bd 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df e8 f8 5e 12 f8 49 8d 5e 08 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 28 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 8f c7 78 f8 48 8b 1b 48 89 de 48 83
RSP: 0000:ffffc90003916c90 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000008 RCX: ffff888030458000
RDX: 0000000000000100 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffffffff898ca81d R09: 1ffff110054414ac
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed10054414ad R12: 0000000000000007
R13: ffff88802a20a542 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f34f496e800(0000) GS:ffff8880b8700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f9d6ec9ec28 CR3: 000000004d260000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
skb_page_unref include/linux/skbuff_ref.h:43 [inline]
__skb_frag_unref include/linux/skbuff_ref.h:56 [inline]
skb_release_data+0x483/0x8a0 net/core/skbuff.c:1119
skb_release_all net/core/skbuff.c:1190 [inline]
__kfree_skb+0x55/0x70 net/core/skbuff.c:1204
tcp_clean_rtx_queue net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:3436 [inline]
tcp_ack+0x2442/0x6bc0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:4032
tcp_rcv_state_process+0x8eb/0x44e0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6805
tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x77d/0xc70 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1939
tcp_v4_rcv+0x2dc0/0x37f0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2351
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x22e/0x440 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205
ip_local_deliver_finish+0x341/0x5f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233
NF_HOOK+0x3a4/0x450 include/linux/netfilter.h:314
NF_HOOK+0x3a4/0x450 include/linux/netfilter.h:314
__netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5672 [inline]
__netif_receive_skb+0x2bf/0x650 net/core/dev.c:5785
process_backlog+0x662/0x15b0 net/core/dev.c:6117
__napi_poll+0xcb/0x490 net/core/dev.c:6883
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6952 [inline]
net_rx_action+0x89b/0x1240 net/core/dev.c:7074
handle_softirqs+0x2d4/0x9b0 kernel/softirq.c:561
__do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:595 [inline]
invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:435 [inline]
__irq_exit_rcu+0xf7/0x220 kernel/softirq.c:662
irq_exit_rcu+0x9/0x30 kernel/softirq.c:678
instr_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1049 [inline]
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x57/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1049
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:702
RIP: 0033:0x7f34f4519ad5
Code: 85 d2 74 0d 0f 10 02 48 8d 54 24 20 0f 11 44 24 20 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 27 41 b8 08 00 00 00 b8 0f 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 76 75 48 8b 15 24 73 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 83
RSP: 002b:00007ffec5b32ce0 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 00000000000668a0 RCX: 00007f34f4519ad5
RDX: 00007ffec5b32d00 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000564f4bc6cae0
RBP: 0000564f4bc6b5a0 R08: 0000000000000008 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00007ffec5b32de8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000564f48ea8aa4
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000564f48ea93e8 R15: 00007ffec5b32d68
</TASK>
Eric noted a probable shinfo->nr_frags corruption, which indeed
occurs.
The root cause is a buggy MPTCP option len computation in some
circumstances: the ADD_ADDR option should be mutually exclusive
with DSS since the blamed commit.
Still, mptcp_established_options_add_addr() tries to set the
relevant info in mptcp_out_options, if the remaining space is
large enough even when DSS is present.
Since the ADD_ADDR infos and the DSS share the same union
fields, adding first corrupts the latter. In the worst-case
scenario, such corruption increases the DSS binary layout,
exceeding the computed length and possibly overwriting the
skb shared info.
Address the issue by enforcing mutual exclusion in
mptcp_established_options_add_addr(), too.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+38a095a81f30d82884c1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://github.com/multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next/issues/538
Fixes: 1bff1e43a30e ("mptcp: optimize out option generation")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/025d9df8cde3c9a557befc47e9bc08fbbe3476e5.1734771049.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 4e86729d1ff329815a6e8a920cb554a1d4cb5b8d upstream.
While by default max_autoclose equals to INT_MAX / HZ, one may set
net.sctp.max_autoclose to UINT_MAX. There is code in
sctp_association_init() that can consequently trigger overflow.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 9f70f46bd4c7 ("sctp: properly latch and use autoclose value from sock to association")
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Kuratov <kniv@yandex-team.ru>
Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241219162114.2863827-1-kniv@yandex-team.ru
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 4d94f05558271654670d18c26c912da0c1c15549 ]
This reworks hci_cb_list to not use mutex hci_cb_list_lock to avoid bugs
like the bellow:
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:585
in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 5070, name: kworker/u9:2
preempt_count: 0, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 1, expected: 0
4 locks held by kworker/u9:2/5070:
#0: ffff888015be3948 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline]
#0: ffff888015be3948 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x8e0/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
#1: ffffc90003b6fd00 ((work_completion)(&hdev->rx_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3230 [inline]
#1: ffffc90003b6fd00 ((work_completion)(&hdev->rx_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x91b/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
#2: ffff8880665d0078 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: hci_le_create_big_complete_evt+0xcf/0xae0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6914
#3: ffffffff8e132020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:298 [inline]
#3: ffffffff8e132020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:750 [inline]
#3: ffffffff8e132020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: hci_le_create_big_complete_evt+0xdb/0xae0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6915
CPU: 0 PID: 5070 Comm: kworker/u9:2 Not tainted 6.8.0-syzkaller-08073-g480e035fc4c7 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024
Workqueue: hci0 hci_rx_work
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114
__might_resched+0x5d4/0x780 kernel/sched/core.c:10187
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0xc1/0xd70 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752
hci_connect_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2004 [inline]
hci_le_create_big_complete_evt+0x3d9/0xae0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6939
hci_event_func net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7514 [inline]
hci_event_packet+0xa53/0x1540 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7569
hci_rx_work+0x3e8/0xca0 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4171
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa00/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416
kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:243
</TASK>
Reported-by: syzbot+2fb0835e0c9cefc34614@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Tested-by: syzbot+2fb0835e0c9cefc34614@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=2fb0835e0c9cefc34614
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
