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[ Upstream commit 65a3c497c0e965a552008db8bc2653f62bc925a1 ]
Before taking a refcount, make sure the object is not already
scheduled for deletion.
Same fix is needed in ipv6_flowlabel_opt()
Fixes: 18367681a10b ("ipv6 flowlabel: Convert np->ipv6_fl_list to RCU.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d4d5d8e83c9616aeef28a2869cea49cc3fb35526 ]
Before thread in process context uses bh_lock_sock()
we must disable bh.
sysbot reported :
WARNING: inconsistent lock state
5.2.0-rc3+ #32 Not tainted
inconsistent {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} -> {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} usage.
blkid/26581 [HC0[0]:SC1[1]:HE1:SE0] takes:
00000000e0da85ee (slock-AF_AX25){+.?.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline]
00000000e0da85ee (slock-AF_AX25){+.?.}, at: ax25_destroy_timer+0x53/0xc0 net/ax25/af_ax25.c:275
{SOFTIRQ-ON-W} state was registered at:
lock_acquire+0x16f/0x3f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4303
__raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:142 [inline]
_raw_spin_lock+0x2f/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:151
spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline]
ax25_rt_autobind+0x3ca/0x720 net/ax25/ax25_route.c:429
ax25_connect.cold+0x30/0xa4 net/ax25/af_ax25.c:1221
__sys_connect+0x264/0x330 net/socket.c:1834
__do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1845 [inline]
__se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1842 [inline]
__x64_sys_connect+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1842
do_syscall_64+0xfd/0x680 arch/x86/entry/common.c:301
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
irq event stamp: 2272
hardirqs last enabled at (2272): [<ffffffff810065f3>] trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
hardirqs last disabled at (2271): [<ffffffff8100660f>] trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
softirqs last enabled at (1522): [<ffffffff87400654>] __do_softirq+0x654/0x94c kernel/softirq.c:320
softirqs last disabled at (2267): [<ffffffff81449010>] invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:374 [inline]
softirqs last disabled at (2267): [<ffffffff81449010>] irq_exit+0x180/0x1d0 kernel/softirq.c:414
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0
----
lock(slock-AF_AX25);
<Interrupt>
lock(slock-AF_AX25);
*** DEADLOCK ***
1 lock held by blkid/26581:
#0: 0000000010fd154d ((&ax25->dtimer)){+.-.}, at: lockdep_copy_map include/linux/lockdep.h:175 [inline]
#0: 0000000010fd154d ((&ax25->dtimer)){+.-.}, at: call_timer_fn+0xe0/0x720 kernel/time/timer.c:1312
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 26581 Comm: blkid Not tainted 5.2.0-rc3+ #32
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_usage_bug.cold+0x393/0x4a2 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2935
valid_state kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2948 [inline]
mark_lock_irq kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3138 [inline]
mark_lock+0xd46/0x1370 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3513
mark_irqflags kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3391 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x159f/0x5490 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3745
lock_acquire+0x16f/0x3f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4303
__raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:142 [inline]
_raw_spin_lock+0x2f/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:151
spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline]
ax25_destroy_timer+0x53/0xc0 net/ax25/af_ax25.c:275
call_timer_fn+0x193/0x720 kernel/time/timer.c:1322
expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1366 [inline]
__run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1685 [inline]
__run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1653 [inline]
run_timer_softirq+0x66f/0x1740 kernel/time/timer.c:1698
__do_softirq+0x25c/0x94c kernel/softirq.c:293
invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:374 [inline]
irq_exit+0x180/0x1d0 kernel/softirq.c:414
exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:536 [inline]
smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x13b/0x550 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1068
apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:806
</IRQ>
RIP: 0033:0x7f858d5c3232
Code: 8b 61 08 48 8b 84 24 d8 00 00 00 4c 89 44 24 28 48 8b ac 24 d0 00 00 00 4c 8b b4 24 e8 00 00 00 48 89 7c 24 68 48 89 4c 24 78 <48> 89 44 24 58 8b 84 24 e0 00 00 00 89 84 24 84 00 00 00 8b 84 24
RSP: 002b:00007ffcaf0cf5c0 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff13
RAX: 00007f858d7d27a8 RBX: 00007f858d7d8820 RCX: 00007f858d3940d8
RDX: 00007ffcaf0cf798 RSI: 00000000f5e616f3 RDI: 00007f858d394fee
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00007ffcaf0cf780 R09: 00007f858d7db480
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000009691a75 R12: 0000000000000005
R13: 00000000f5e616f3 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffcaf0cf798
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 967c05aee439e6e5d7d805e195b3a20ef5c433d6 upstream.
If mtu probing is enabled tcp_mtu_probing() could very well end up
with a too small MSS.
Use the new sysctl tcp_min_snd_mss to make sure MSS search
is performed in an acceptable range.
CVE-2019-11479 -- tcp mss hardcoded to 48
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com>
Cc: Jonathan Looney <jtl@netflix.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Bruce Curtis <brucec@netflix.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5f3e2bf008c2221478101ee72f5cb4654b9fc363 upstream.
Some TCP peers announce a very small MSS option in their SYN and/or
SYN/ACK messages.
This forces the stack to send packets with a very high network/cpu
overhead.
Linux has enforced a minimal value of 48. Since this value includes
the size of TCP options, and that the options can consume up to 40
bytes, this means that each segment can include only 8 bytes of payload.
In some cases, it can be useful to increase the minimal value
to a saner value.
We still let the default to 48 (TCP_MIN_SND_MSS), for compatibility
reasons.
Note that TCP_MAXSEG socket option enforces a minimal value
of (TCP_MIN_MSS). David Miller increased this minimal value
in commit c39508d6f118 ("tcp: Make TCP_MAXSEG minimum more correct.")
from 64 to 88.
We might in the future merge TCP_MIN_SND_MSS and TCP_MIN_MSS.
CVE-2019-11479 -- tcp mss hardcoded to 48
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Suggested-by: Jonathan Looney <jtl@netflix.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Bruce Curtis <brucec@netflix.com>
Cc: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f070ef2ac66716357066b683fb0baf55f8191a2e upstream.
Jonathan Looney reported that a malicious peer can force a sender
to fragment its retransmit queue into tiny skbs, inflating memory
usage and/or overflow 32bit counters.
TCP allows an application to queue up to sk_sndbuf bytes,
so we need to give some allowance for non malicious splitting
of retransmit queue.
A new SNMP counter is added to monitor how many times TCP
did not allow to split an skb if the allowance was exceeded.
Note that this counter might increase in the case applications
use SO_SNDBUF socket option to lower sk_sndbuf.
CVE-2019-11478 : tcp_fragment, prevent fragmenting a packet when the
socket is already using more than half the allowed space
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Jonathan Looney <jtl@netflix.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Bruce Curtis <brucec@netflix.com>
Cc: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3b4929f65b0d8249f19a50245cd88ed1a2f78cff upstream.
Jonathan Looney reported that TCP can trigger the following crash
in tcp_shifted_skb() :
BUG_ON(tcp_skb_pcount(skb) < pcount);
This can happen if the remote peer has advertized the smallest
MSS that linux TCP accepts : 48
An skb can hold 17 fragments, and each fragment can hold 32KB
on x86, or 64KB on PowerPC.
This means that the 16bit witdh of TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_gso_segs
can overflow.
Note that tcp_sendmsg() builds skbs with less than 64KB
of payload, so this problem needs SACK to be enabled.
SACK blocks allow TCP to coalesce multiple skbs in the retransmit
queue, thus filling the 17 fragments to maximal capacity.
CVE-2019-11477 -- u16 overflow of TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_gso_segs
Fixes: 832d11c5cd07 ("tcp: Try to restore large SKBs while SACK processing")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Jonathan Looney <jtl@netflix.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Bruce Curtis <brucec@netflix.com>
Cc: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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connections"
This reverts commit 38f092c41cebaff589e88cc22686b289a6840559 which is
commit d5bb334a8e171b262e48f378bd2096c0ea458265 upstream.
Lots of people have reported issues with this patch, and as there does
not seem to be a fix going into Linus's kernel tree any time soon,
revert the commit in the stable trees so as to get people's machines
working properly again.
Reported-by: Vasily Khoruzhick <anarsoul@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Cc: Jeremy Cline <jeremy@jcline.org>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 26a302afbe328ecb7507cae2035d938e6635131b ]
flow_offload_alloc() calls nf_route() to get a dst_entry. Internally,
nf_route() calls ip_route_output_key() that allocates a dst_entry and
holds it. So, a dst_entry should be released by dst_release() if
nf_route() is successful.
Otherwise, netns exit routine cannot be finished and the following
message is printed:
[ 257.490952] unregister_netdevice: waiting for lo to become free. Usage count = 1
Fixes: ac2a66665e23 ("netfilter: add generic flow table infrastructure")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 33cc3c0cfa64c86b6c4bbee86997aea638534931 ]
nf_flow_offload_ip_hook() and nf_flow_offload_ipv6_hook() do not check
ttl value. So, ttl value overflow may occur.
Fixes: 97add9f0d66d ("netfilter: flow table support for IPv4")
Fixes: 0995210753a2 ("netfilter: flow table support for IPv6")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit edbd82c5fba009f68d20b5db585be1e667c605f6 ]
Following splat gets triggered when nfnetlink monitor is running while
xtables-nft selftests are running:
net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1272 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
other info that might help us debug this:
1 lock held by xtables-nft-mul/27006:
#0: 00000000e0f85be9 (&net->nft.commit_mutex){+.+.}, at: nf_tables_valid_genid+0x1a/0x50
Call Trace:
nf_tables_fill_chain_info.isra.45+0x6cc/0x6e0
nf_tables_chain_notify+0xf8/0x1a0
nf_tables_commit+0x165c/0x1740
nf_tables_fill_chain_info() can be called both from dumps (rcu read locked)
or from the transaction path if a userspace process subscribed to nftables
notifications.
In the 'table dump' case, rcu_access_pointer() cannot be used: We do not
hold transaction mutex so the pointer can be NULLed right after the check.
Just unconditionally fetch the value, then have the helper return
immediately if its NULL.
In the notification case we don't hold the rcu read lock, but updates are
prevented due to transaction mutex. Use rcu_dereference_check() to make lockdep
aware of this.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit f5e85ce8e733c2547827f6268136b70b802eabdb ]
Since commit bc7d811ace4a ("netfilter: nf_ct_h323: Convert
CHECK_BOUND macro to function"), NAT traversal for H.323
doesn't work, failing to parse H323-UserInformation.
nf_h323_error_boundary() compares contents of the bitstring,
not the addresses, preventing valid H.323 packets from being
conntrack'd.
This looks like an oversight from when CHECK_BOUND macro was
converted to a function.
To fix it, stop dereferencing bs->cur and bs->end.
Fixes: bc7d811ace4a ("netfilter: nf_ct_h323: Convert CHECK_BOUND macro to function")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jankowski <shasta@toxcorp.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 43c8f131184faf20c07221f3e09724611c6525d8 ]
rhashtable_insert_fast() may return an error value when memory
allocation fails, but flow_offload_add() does not check for errors.
This patch just adds missing error checking.
Fixes: ac2a66665e23 ("netfilter: add generic flow table infrastructure")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit f9fc54d313fab2834f44f516459cdc8ac91d797f upstream.
The return type for get_regs_len in struct ethtool_ops is int,
the hns3 driver may return error when failing to get the regs
len by sending cmd to firmware.
Signed-off-by: Yunsheng Lin <linyunsheng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit b9aa52c4cb457e7416cc0c95f475e72ef4a61336 ]
The following code returns EFAULT (Bad address):
s = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_ICMPV6);
setsockopt(s, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_HDRINCL, 1);
sendto(ipv6_icmp6_packet, addr); /* returns -1, errno = EFAULT */
The IPv4 equivalent code works. A workaround is to use IPPROTO_RAW
instead of IPPROTO_ICMPV6.
The failure happens because 2 bytes are eaten from the msghdr by
rawv6_probe_proto_opt() starting from commit 19e3c66b52ca ("ipv6
equivalent of "ipv4: Avoid reading user iov twice after
raw_probe_proto_opt""), but at that time it was not a problem because
IPV6_HDRINCL was not yet introduced.
Only eat these 2 bytes if hdrincl == 0.
Fixes: 715f504b1189 ("ipv6: add IPV6_HDRINCL option for raw sockets")
Signed-off-by: Olivier Matz <olivier.matz@6wind.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 59e3e4b52663a9d97efbce7307f62e4bc5c9ce91 ]
As it was done in commit 8f659a03a0ba ("net: ipv4: fix for a race
condition in raw_sendmsg") and commit 20b50d79974e ("net: ipv4: emulate
READ_ONCE() on ->hdrincl bit-field in raw_sendmsg()") for ipv4, copy the
value of inet->hdrincl in a local variable, to avoid introducing a race
condition in the next commit.
Signed-off-by: Olivier Matz <olivier.matz@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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NLM_F_EXCL not supplied"
[ Upstream commit 4970b42d5c362bf873982db7d93245c5281e58f4 ]
This reverts commit e9919a24d3022f72bcadc407e73a6ef17093a849.
Nathan reported the new behaviour breaks Android, as Android just add
new rules and delete old ones.
If we return 0 without adding dup rules, Android will remove the new
added rules and causing system to soft-reboot.
Fixes: e9919a24d302 ("fib_rules: return 0 directly if an exactly same rule exists when NLM_F_EXCL not supplied")
Reported-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Yaro Slav <yaro330@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <zenczykowski@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 720f1de4021f09898b8c8443f3b3e995991b6e3a ]
Currently, the process issuing a "start" command on the pktgen procfs
interface, acquires the pktgen thread lock and never release it, until
all pktgen threads are completed. The above can blocks indefinitely any
other pktgen command and any (even unrelated) netdevice removal - as
the pktgen netdev notifier acquires the same lock.
The issue is demonstrated by the following script, reported by Matteo:
ip -b - <<'EOF'
link add type dummy
link add type veth
link set dummy0 up
EOF
modprobe pktgen
echo reset >/proc/net/pktgen/pgctrl
{
echo rem_device_all
echo add_device dummy0
} >/proc/net/pktgen/kpktgend_0
echo count 0 >/proc/net/pktgen/dummy0
echo start >/proc/net/pktgen/pgctrl &
sleep 1
rmmod veth
Fix the above releasing the thread lock around the sleep call.
Additionally we must prevent racing with forcefull rmmod - as the
thread lock no more protects from them. Instead, acquire a self-reference
before waiting for any thread. As a side effect, running
rmmod pktgen
while some thread is running now fails with "module in use" error,
before this patch such command hanged indefinitely.
Note: the issue predates the commit reported in the fixes tag, but
this fix can't be applied before the mentioned commit.
v1 -> v2:
- no need to check for thread existence after flipping the lock,
pktgen threads are freed only at net exit time
-
Fixes: 6146e6a43b35 ("[PKTGEN]: Removes thread_{un,}lock() macros.")
Reported-and-tested-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit afa0925c6fcc6a8f610e996ca09bc3215048033c ]
Rollover used to use a complex RCU mechanism for assignment, which had
a race condition. The below patch fixed the bug and greatly simplified
the logic.
The feature depends on fanout, but the state is private to the socket.
Fanout_release returns f only when the last member leaves and the
fanout struct is to be freed.
Destroy rollover unconditionally, regardless of fanout state.
Fixes: 57f015f5eccf2 ("packet: fix crash in fanout_demux_rollover()")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Diagnosed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit e52972c11d6b1262964db96d65934196db621685 ]
Commit 38030d7cb779 ("net/tls: avoid NULL-deref on resync during device removal")
tried to fix a potential NULL-dereference by taking the
context rwsem. Unfortunately the RX resync may get called
from soft IRQ, so we can't use the rwsem to protect from
the device disappearing. Because we are guaranteed there
can be only one resync at a time (it's called from strparser)
use a bit to indicate resync is busy and make device
removal wait for the bit to get cleared.
Note that there is a leftover "flags" field in struct
tls_context already.
Fixes: 4799ac81e52a ("tls: Add rx inline crypto offload")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 85cb928787eab6a2f4ca9d2a798b6f3bed53ced1 ]
When the following tests last for several hours, the problem will occur.
Server:
rds-stress -r 1.1.1.16 -D 1M
Client:
rds-stress -r 1.1.1.14 -s 1.1.1.16 -D 1M -T 30
The following will occur.
"
Starting up....
tsks tx/s rx/s tx+rx K/s mbi K/s mbo K/s tx us/c rtt us cpu
%
1 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.00
1 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.00
1 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.00
1 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.00
"
>From vmcore, we can find that clean_list is NULL.
>From the source code, rds_mr_flushd calls rds_ib_mr_pool_flush_worker.
Then rds_ib_mr_pool_flush_worker calls
"
rds_ib_flush_mr_pool(pool, 0, NULL);
"
Then in function
"
int rds_ib_flush_mr_pool(struct rds_ib_mr_pool *pool,
int free_all, struct rds_ib_mr **ibmr_ret)
"
ibmr_ret is NULL.
In the source code,
"
...
list_to_llist_nodes(pool, &unmap_list, &clean_nodes, &clean_tail);
if (ibmr_ret)
*ibmr_ret = llist_entry(clean_nodes, struct rds_ib_mr, llnode);
/* more than one entry in llist nodes */
if (clean_nodes->next)
llist_add_batch(clean_nodes->next, clean_tail, &pool->clean_list);
...
"
When ibmr_ret is NULL, llist_entry is not executed. clean_nodes->next
instead of clean_nodes is added in clean_list.
So clean_nodes is discarded. It can not be used again.
The workqueue is executed periodically. So more and more clean_nodes are
discarded. Finally the clean_list is NULL.
Then this problem will occur.
Fixes: 1bc144b62524 ("net, rds, Replace xlist in net/rds/xlist.h with llist")
Signed-off-by: Zhu Yanjun <yanjun.zhu@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 4b2a2bfeb3f056461a90bd621e8bd7d03fa47f60 ]
Commit cd9ff4de0107 changed the key for IFF_POINTOPOINT devices to
INADDR_ANY but neigh_xmit which is used for MPLS encapsulations was not
updated to use the altered key. The result is that every packet Tx does
a lookup on the gateway address which does not find an entry, a new one
is created only to find the existing one in the table right before the
insert since arp_constructor was updated to reset the primary key. This
is seen in the allocs and destroys counters:
ip -s -4 ntable show | head -10 | grep alloc
which increase for each packet showing the unnecessary overhread.
Fix by having neigh_xmit use __ipv4_neigh_lookup_noref for NEIGH_ARP_TABLE.
Fixes: cd9ff4de0107 ("ipv4: Make neigh lookup keys for loopback/point-to-point devices be INADDR_ANY")
Reported-by: Alan Maguire <alan.maguire@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Alan Maguire <alan.maguire@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 0a90478b93a46bdcd56ba33c37566a993e455d54 ]
With the topo:
h1 ---| rp1 |
| route rp3 |--- h3 (192.168.200.1)
h2 ---| rp2 |
If rp1 bc_forwarding is set while rp2 bc_forwarding is not, after
doing "ping 192.168.200.255" on h1, then ping 192.168.200.255 on
h2, and the packets can still be forwared.
This issue was caused by the input route cache. It should only do
the cache for either bc forwarding or local delivery. Otherwise,
local delivery can use the route cache for bc forwarding of other
interfaces.
This patch is to fix it by not doing cache for local delivery if
all.bc_forwarding is enabled.
Note that we don't fix it by checking route cache local flag after
rt_cache_valid() in "local_input:" and "ip_mkroute_input", as the
common route code shouldn't be touched for bc_forwarding.
Fixes: 5cbf777cfdf6 ("route: add support for directed broadcast forwarding")
Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 0a8dd9f67cd0da7dc284f48b032ce00db1a68791 ]
syzbot found the following leak in sctp_process_init
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff88810ef68400 (size 1024):
comm "syz-executor273", pid 7046, jiffies 4294945598 (age 28.770s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
1d de 28 8d de 0b 1b e3 b5 c2 f9 68 fd 1a 97 25 ..(........h...%
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<00000000a02cebbd>] kmemleak_alloc_recursive include/linux/kmemleak.h:55
[inline]
[<00000000a02cebbd>] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:439 [inline]
[<00000000a02cebbd>] slab_alloc mm/slab.c:3326 [inline]
[<00000000a02cebbd>] __do_kmalloc mm/slab.c:3658 [inline]
[<00000000a02cebbd>] __kmalloc_track_caller+0x15d/0x2c0 mm/slab.c:3675
[<000000009e6245e6>] kmemdup+0x27/0x60 mm/util.c:119
[<00000000dfdc5d2d>] kmemdup include/linux/string.h:432 [inline]
[<00000000dfdc5d2d>] sctp_process_init+0xa7e/0xc20
net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c:2437
[<00000000b58b62f8>] sctp_cmd_process_init net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:682
[inline]
[<00000000b58b62f8>] sctp_cmd_interpreter net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1384
[inline]
[<00000000b58b62f8>] sctp_side_effects net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1194
[inline]
[<00000000b58b62f8>] sctp_do_sm+0xbdc/0x1d60 net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1165
[<0000000044e11f96>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x13c/0x200
net/sctp/associola.c:1074
[<00000000ec43804d>] sctp_inq_push+0x7f/0xb0 net/sctp/inqueue.c:95
[<00000000726aa954>] sctp_backlog_rcv+0x5e/0x2a0 net/sctp/input.c:354
[<00000000d9e249a8>] sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:950 [inline]
[<00000000d9e249a8>] __release_sock+0xab/0x110 net/core/sock.c:2418
[<00000000acae44fa>] release_sock+0x37/0xd0 net/core/sock.c:2934
[<00000000963cc9ae>] sctp_sendmsg+0x2c0/0x990 net/sctp/socket.c:2122
[<00000000a7fc7565>] inet_sendmsg+0x64/0x120 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:802
[<00000000b732cbd3>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline]
[<00000000b732cbd3>] sock_sendmsg+0x54/0x70 net/socket.c:671
[<00000000274c57ab>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x393/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2292
[<000000008252aedb>] __sys_sendmsg+0x80/0xf0 net/socket.c:2330
[<00000000f7bf23d1>] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2339 [inline]
[<00000000f7bf23d1>] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2337 [inline]
[<00000000f7bf23d1>] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x23/0x30 net/socket.c:2337
[<00000000a8b4131f>] do_syscall_64+0x76/0x1a0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:3
The problem was that the peer.cookie value points to an skb allocated
area on the first pass through this function, at which point it is
overwritten with a heap allocated value, but in certain cases, where a
COOKIE_ECHO chunk is included in the packet, a second pass through
sctp_process_init is made, where the cookie value is re-allocated,
leaking the first allocation.
Fix is to always allocate the cookie value, and free it when we are done
using it.
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+f7e9153b037eac9b1df8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
CC: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 0ee4e76937d69128a6a66861ba393ebdc2ffc8a2 ]
ethtool_get_regs() allocates a buffer of size ops->get_regs_len(),
and pass it to the kernel driver via ops->get_regs() for filling.
There is no restriction about what the kernel drivers can or cannot do
with the open ethtool_regs structure. They usually set regs->version
and ignore regs->len or set it to the same size as ops->get_regs_len().
But if userspace allocates a smaller buffer for the registers dump,
we would cause a userspace buffer overflow in the final copy_to_user()
call, which uses the regs.len value potentially reset by the driver.
To fix this, make this case obvious and store regs.len before calling
ops->get_regs(), to only copy as much data as requested by userspace,
up to the value returned by ops->get_regs_len().
While at it, remove the redundant check for non-null regbuf.
Signed-off-by: Vivien Didelot <vivien.didelot@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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commit 526f5b851a96566803ee4bee60d0a34df56c77f8 upstream.
Error message printed:
modprobe: ERROR: could not insert 'tipc': Address family not
supported by protocol.
when modprobe tipc after the following patch: switch order of
device registration, commit 7e27e8d6130c
("tipc: switch order of device registration to fix a crash")
Because sock_create_kern(net, AF_TIPC, ...) called by
tipc_topsrv_create_listener() in the initialization process
of tipc_init_net(), so tipc_socket_init() must be execute before that.
Meanwhile, tipc_net_id need to be initialized when sock_create()
called, and tipc_socket_init() is no need to be called for each namespace.
I add a variable tipc_topsrv_net_ops, and split the
register_pernet_subsys() of tipc into two parts, and split
tipc_socket_init() with initialization of pernet params.
By the way, I fixed resources rollback error when tipc_bcast_init()
failed in tipc_init_net().
Fixes: 7e27e8d6130c ("tipc: switch order of device registration to fix a crash")
Signed-off-by: Junwei Hu <hujunwei4@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Wang Wang <wangwang2@huawei.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+1e8114b61079bfe9cbc5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reviewed-by: Kang Zhou <zhoukang7@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Suanming Mou <mousuanming@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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registration"
commit 5593530e56943182ebb6d81eca8a3be6db6dbba4 upstream.
This reverts commit 532b0f7ece4cb2ffd24dc723ddf55242d1188e5e.
More revisions coming up.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e9666d10a5677a494260d60d1fa0b73cc7646eb3 upstream.
Currently, CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL just means "I _want_ to use jump label".
The jump label is controlled by HAVE_JUMP_LABEL, which is defined
like this:
#if defined(CC_HAVE_ASM_GOTO) && defined(CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL)
# define HAVE_JUMP_LABEL
#endif
We can improve this by testing 'asm goto' support in Kconfig, then
make JUMP_LABEL depend on CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO.
Ugly #ifdef HAVE_JUMP_LABEL will go away, and CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL will
match to the real kernel capability.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> (powerpc)
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
[nc: Fix trivial conflicts in 4.19
arch/xtensa/kernel/jump_label.c doesn't exist yet
Ensured CC_HAVE_ASM_GOTO and HAVE_JUMP_LABEL were sufficiently
eliminated]
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit c3f4a6c39cf269a40d45f813c05fa830318ad875 ]
On device surprise removal path (the notifier) we can't
bail just because the features are disabled. They may
have been enabled during the lifetime of the device.
This bug leads to leaking netdev references and
use-after-frees if there are active connections while
device features are cleared.
Fixes: e8f69799810c ("net/tls: Add generic NIC offload infrastructure")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Reviewed-by: Dirk van der Merwe <dirk.vandermerwe@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 3686637e507b48525fcea6fb91e1988bdbc14530 ]
TLS offload drivers shouldn't (and currently don't) block
the TLS offload feature changes based on whether there are
active offloaded connections or not.
This seems to be a good idea, because we want the admin to
be able to disable the TLS offload at any time, and there
is no clean way of disabling it for active connections
(TX side is quite problematic). So if features are cleared
existing connections will stay offloaded until they close,
and new connections will not attempt offload to a given
device.
However, the offload state removal handling is currently
broken if feature flags get cleared while there are
active TLS offloads.
RX side will completely bail from cleanup, even on normal
remove path, leaving device state dangling, potentially
causing issues when the 5-tuple is reused. It will also
fail to release the netdev reference.
Remove the RX-side warning message, in next release cycle
it should be printed when features are disabled, rather
than when connection dies, but for that we need a more
efficient method of finding connection of a given netdev
(a'la BPF offload code).
Fixes: 4799ac81e52a ("tls: Add rx inline crypto offload")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Reviewed-by: Dirk van der Merwe <dirk.vandermerwe@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 4097e9d250fb17958c1d9b94538386edd3f20144 ]
Function tcf_action_dump() relies on tc_action->order field when starting
nested nla to send action data to userspace. This approach breaks in
several cases:
- When multiple filters point to same shared action, tc_action->order field
is overwritten each time it is attached to filter. This causes filter
dump to output action with incorrect attribute for all filters that have
the action in different position (different order) from the last set
tc_action->order value.
- When action data is displayed using tc action API (RTM_GETACTION), action
order is overwritten by tca_action_gd() according to its position in
resulting array of nl attributes, which will break filter dump for all
filters attached to that shared action that expect it to have different
order value.
Don't rely on tc_action->order when dumping actions. Set nla according to
action position in resulting array of actions instead.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit a4270d6795b0580287453ea55974d948393e66ef ]
If a network driver provides to napi_gro_frags() an
skb with a page fragment of exactly 14 bytes, the call
to gro_pull_from_frag0() will 'consume' the fragment
by calling skb_frag_unref(skb, 0), and the page might
be freed and reused.
Reading eth->h_proto at the end of napi_frags_skb() might
read mangled data, or crash under specific debugging features.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in napi_frags_skb net/core/dev.c:5833 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in napi_gro_frags+0xc6f/0xd10 net/core/dev.c:5841
Read of size 2 at addr ffff88809366840c by task syz-executor599/8957
CPU: 1 PID: 8957 Comm: syz-executor599 Not tainted 5.2.0-rc1+ #32
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description.cold+0x7c/0x20d mm/kasan/report.c:188
__kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:317
kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:614
__asan_report_load_n_noabort+0xf/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:142
napi_frags_skb net/core/dev.c:5833 [inline]
napi_gro_frags+0xc6f/0xd10 net/core/dev.c:5841
tun_get_user+0x2f3c/0x3ff0 drivers/net/tun.c:1991
tun_chr_write_iter+0xbd/0x156 drivers/net/tun.c:2037
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1872 [inline]
do_iter_readv_writev+0x5f8/0x8f0 fs/read_write.c:693
do_iter_write fs/read_write.c:970 [inline]
do_iter_write+0x184/0x610 fs/read_write.c:951
vfs_writev+0x1b3/0x2f0 fs/read_write.c:1015
do_writev+0x15b/0x330 fs/read_write.c:1058
Fixes: a50e233c50db ("net-gro: restore frag0 optimization")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8fb44d60d4142cd2a440620cd291d346e23c131e ]
If llc_mac_hdr_init() returns an error, we must drop the skb
since no llc_build_and_send_ui_pkt() caller will take care of this.
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff8881202b6800 (size 2048):
comm "syz-executor907", pid 7074, jiffies 4294943781 (age 8.590s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
1a 00 07 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ...@............
backtrace:
[<00000000e25b5abe>] kmemleak_alloc_recursive include/linux/kmemleak.h:55 [inline]
[<00000000e25b5abe>] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:439 [inline]
[<00000000e25b5abe>] slab_alloc mm/slab.c:3326 [inline]
[<00000000e25b5abe>] __do_kmalloc mm/slab.c:3658 [inline]
[<00000000e25b5abe>] __kmalloc+0x161/0x2c0 mm/slab.c:3669
[<00000000a1ae188a>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:552 [inline]
[<00000000a1ae188a>] sk_prot_alloc+0xd6/0x170 net/core/sock.c:1608
[<00000000ded25bbe>] sk_alloc+0x35/0x2f0 net/core/sock.c:1662
[<000000002ecae075>] llc_sk_alloc+0x35/0x170 net/llc/llc_conn.c:950
[<00000000551f7c47>] llc_ui_create+0x7b/0x140 net/llc/af_llc.c:173
[<0000000029027f0e>] __sock_create+0x164/0x250 net/socket.c:1430
[<000000008bdec225>] sock_create net/socket.c:1481 [inline]
[<000000008bdec225>] __sys_socket+0x69/0x110 net/socket.c:1523
[<00000000b6439228>] __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1532 [inline]
[<00000000b6439228>] __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1530 [inline]
[<00000000b6439228>] __x64_sys_socket+0x1e/0x30 net/socket.c:1530
[<00000000cec820c1>] do_syscall_64+0x76/0x1a0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:301
[<000000000c32554f>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff88811d750d00 (size 224):
comm "syz-executor907", pid 7074, jiffies 4294943781 (age 8.600s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 f0 0c 24 81 88 ff ff 00 68 2b 20 81 88 ff ff ...$.....h+ ....
backtrace:
[<0000000053026172>] kmemleak_alloc_recursive include/linux/kmemleak.h:55 [inline]
[<0000000053026172>] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:439 [inline]
[<0000000053026172>] slab_alloc_node mm/slab.c:3269 [inline]
[<0000000053026172>] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x153/0x2a0 mm/slab.c:3579
[<00000000fa8f3c30>] __alloc_skb+0x6e/0x210 net/core/skbuff.c:198
[<00000000d96fdafb>] alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1058 [inline]
[<00000000d96fdafb>] alloc_skb_with_frags+0x5f/0x250 net/core/skbuff.c:5327
[<000000000a34a2e7>] sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x269/0x2a0 net/core/sock.c:2225
[<00000000ee39999b>] sock_alloc_send_skb+0x32/0x40 net/core/sock.c:2242
[<00000000e034d810>] llc_ui_sendmsg+0x10a/0x540 net/llc/af_llc.c:933
[<00000000c0bc8445>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline]
[<00000000c0bc8445>] sock_sendmsg+0x54/0x70 net/socket.c:671
[<000000003b687167>] __sys_sendto+0x148/0x1f0 net/socket.c:1964
[<00000000922d78d9>] __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1976 [inline]
[<00000000922d78d9>] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1972 [inline]
[<00000000922d78d9>] __x64_sys_sendto+0x2a/0x30 net/socket.c:1972
[<00000000cec820c1>] do_syscall_64+0x76/0x1a0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:301
[<000000000c32554f>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 31680ac265802397937d75461a2809a067b9fb93 ]
IPv6 redirect is broken for VRF. __ip6_route_redirect walks the FIB
entries looking for an exact match on ifindex. With VRF the flowi6_oif
is updated by l3mdev_update_flow to the l3mdev index and the
FLOWI_FLAG_SKIP_NH_OIF set in the flags to tell the lookup to skip the
device match. For redirects the device match is requires so use that
flag to know when the oif needs to be reset to the skb device index.
Fixes: ca254490c8df ("net: Add VRF support to IPv6 stack")
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 72f7cfab6f93a8ea825fab8ccfb016d064269f7f ]
IPv6 does not consider if the socket is bound to a device when binding
to an address. The result is that a socket can be bound to eth0 and
then bound to the address of eth1. If the device is a VRF, the result
is that a socket can only be bound to an address in the default VRF.
Resolve by considering the device if sk_bound_dev_if is set.
Signed-off-by: Mike Manning <mmanning@vyatta.att-mail.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Tested-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 903869bd10e6719b9df6718e785be7ec725df59f ]
ip_sf_list_clear_all() needs to be defined even if !CONFIG_IP_MULTICAST
Fixes: 3580d04aa674 ("ipv4/igmp: fix another memory leak in igmpv3_del_delrec()")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 3580d04aa674383c42de7b635d28e52a1e5bc72c ]
syzbot reported memory leaks [1] that I have back tracked to
a missing cleanup from igmpv3_del_delrec() when
(im->sfmode != MCAST_INCLUDE)
Add ip_sf_list_clear_all() and kfree_pmc() helpers to explicitely
handle the cleanups before freeing.
[1]
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff888123e32b00 (size 64):
comm "softirq", pid 0, jiffies 4294942968 (age 8.010s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 e0 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<000000006105011b>] kmemleak_alloc_recursive include/linux/kmemleak.h:55 [inline]
[<000000006105011b>] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:439 [inline]
[<000000006105011b>] slab_alloc mm/slab.c:3326 [inline]
[<000000006105011b>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x13d/0x280 mm/slab.c:3553
[<000000004bba8073>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:547 [inline]
[<000000004bba8073>] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:742 [inline]
[<000000004bba8073>] ip_mc_add1_src net/ipv4/igmp.c:1961 [inline]
[<000000004bba8073>] ip_mc_add_src+0x36b/0x400 net/ipv4/igmp.c:2085
[<00000000a46a65a0>] ip_mc_msfilter+0x22d/0x310 net/ipv4/igmp.c:2475
[<000000005956ca89>] do_ip_setsockopt.isra.0+0x1795/0x1930 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:957
[<00000000848e2d2f>] ip_setsockopt+0x3b/0xb0 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1246
[<00000000b9db185c>] udp_setsockopt+0x4e/0x90 net/ipv4/udp.c:2616
[<000000003028e438>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x38/0x50 net/core/sock.c:3130
[<0000000015b65589>] __sys_setsockopt+0x98/0x120 net/socket.c:2078
[<00000000ac198ef0>] __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2089 [inline]
[<00000000ac198ef0>] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2086 [inline]
[<00000000ac198ef0>] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x26/0x30 net/socket.c:2086
[<000000000a770437>] do_syscall_64+0x76/0x1a0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:301
[<00000000d3adb93b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Fixes: 9c8bb163ae78 ("igmp, mld: Fix memory leak in igmpv3/mld_del_delrec()")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit df453700e8d81b1bdafdf684365ee2b9431fb702 ]
According to Amit Klein and Benny Pinkas, IP ID generation is too weak
and might be used by attackers.
Even with recent net_hash_mix() fix (netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix())
having 64bit key and Jenkins hash is risky.
It is time to switch to siphash and its 128bit keys.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <benny@pinkas.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 099e6cc1582dc2903fecb898bbeae8f7cf4262c7 ]
Currently incoming ARP Replies, for example via a DHT-PUT message, do
not update the timeout for an already existing DAT entry. These ARP
Replies are dropped instead.
This however defeats the purpose of the DHCPACK snooping, for instance.
Right now, a DAT entry in the DHT will be purged every five minutes,
likely leading to a mesh-wide ARP Request broadcast after this timeout.
Which then recreates the entry. The idea of the DHCPACK snooping is to
be able to update an entry before a timeout happens, to avoid ARP Request
flooding.
This patch fixes this issue by updating a DAT entry on incoming
ARP Replies even if a matching DAT entry already exists. While still
filtering the ARP Reply towards the soft-interface, to avoid duplicate
messages on the client device side.
Signed-off-by: Linus Lüssing <linus.luessing@c0d3.blue>
Acked-by: Antonio Quartulli <a@unstable.cc>
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich <sw@simonwunderlich.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5dc8cdce1d722c733f8c7af14c5fb595cfedbfa8 ]
FullMAC STAs have no way to update bss channel after CSA channel switch
completion. As a result, user-space tools may provide inconsistent
channel info. For instance, consider the following two commands:
$ sudo iw dev wlan0 link
$ sudo iw dev wlan0 info
The latter command gets channel info from the hardware, so most probably
its output will be correct. However the former command gets channel info
from scan cache, so its output will contain outdated channel info.
In fact, current bss channel info will not be updated until the
next [re-]connect.
Note that mac80211 STAs have a workaround for this, but it requires
access to internal cfg80211 data, see ieee80211_chswitch_work:
/* XXX: shouldn't really modify cfg80211-owned data! */
ifmgd->associated->channel = sdata->csa_chandef.chan;
This patch suggests to convert mac80211 workaround into cfg80211 behavior
and to update current bss channel in cfg80211_ch_switch_notify.
Signed-off-by: Sergey Matyukevich <sergey.matyukevich.os@quantenna.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit f80c5dad7b6467b884c445ffea45985793b4b2d0 ]
This commit makes the kernel not send the next queued HCI command until
a command complete arrives for the last HCI command sent to the
controller. This change avoids a problem with some buggy controllers
(seen on two SKUs of QCA9377) that send an extra command complete event
for the previous command after the kernel had already sent a new HCI
command to the controller.
The problem was reproduced when starting an active scanning procedure,
where an extra command complete event arrives for the LE_SET_RANDOM_ADDR
command. When this happends the kernel ends up not processing the
command complete for the following commmand, LE_SET_SCAN_PARAM, and
ultimately behaving as if a passive scanning procedure was being
performed, when in fact controller is performing an active scanning
procedure. This makes it impossible to discover BLE devices as no device
found events are sent to userspace.
This problem is reproducible on 100% of the attempts on the affected
controllers. The extra command complete event can be seen at timestamp
27.420131 on the btmon logs bellow.
Bluetooth monitor ver 5.50
= Note: Linux version 5.0.0+ (x86_64) 0.352340
= Note: Bluetooth subsystem version 2.22 0.352343
= New Index: 80:C5:F2:8F:87:84 (Primary,USB,hci0) [hci0] 0.352344
= Open Index: 80:C5:F2:8F:87:84 [hci0] 0.352345
= Index Info: 80:C5:F2:8F:87:84 (Qualcomm) [hci0] 0.352346
@ MGMT Open: bluetoothd (privileged) version 1.14 {0x0001} 0.352347
@ MGMT Open: btmon (privileged) version 1.14 {0x0002} 0.352366
@ MGMT Open: btmgmt (privileged) version 1.14 {0x0003} 27.302164
@ MGMT Command: Start Discovery (0x0023) plen 1 {0x0003} [hci0] 27.302310
Address type: 0x06
LE Public
LE Random
< HCI Command: LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) plen 6 #1 [hci0] 27.302496
Address: 15:60:F2:91:B2:24 (Non-Resolvable)
> HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #2 [hci0] 27.419117
LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) ncmd 1
Status: Success (0x00)
< HCI Command: LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) plen 7 #3 [hci0] 27.419244
Type: Active (0x01)
Interval: 11.250 msec (0x0012)
Window: 11.250 msec (0x0012)
Own address type: Random (0x01)
Filter policy: Accept all advertisement (0x00)
> HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #4 [hci0] 27.420131
LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) ncmd 1
Status: Success (0x00)
< HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #5 [hci0] 27.420259
Scanning: Enabled (0x01)
Filter duplicates: Enabled (0x01)
> HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #6 [hci0] 27.420969
LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) ncmd 1
Status: Success (0x00)
> HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #7 [hci0] 27.421983
LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1
Status: Success (0x00)
@ MGMT Event: Command Complete (0x0001) plen 4 {0x0003} [hci0] 27.422059
Start Discovery (0x0023) plen 1
Status: Success (0x00)
Address type: 0x06
LE Public
LE Random
@ MGMT Event: Discovering (0x0013) plen 2 {0x0003} [hci0] 27.422067
Address type: 0x06
LE Public
LE Random
Discovery: Enabled (0x01)
@ MGMT Event: Discovering (0x0013) plen 2 {0x0002} [hci0] 27.422067
Address type: 0x06
LE Public
LE Random
Discovery: Enabled (0x01)
@ MGMT Event: Discovering (0x0013) plen 2 {0x0001} [hci0] 27.422067
Address type: 0x06
LE Public
LE Random
Discovery: Enabled (0x01)
Signed-off-by: João Paulo Rechi Vita <jprvita@endlessm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit a3c7cd0cdf1107f891aff847ad481e34df727055 upstream.
Syzbot has reported some issues with the locking assumptions made for
the multicast tt/tvlv worker: It was able to trigger the WARN_ON() in
batadv_mcast_mla_tt_retract() and batadv_mcast_mla_tt_add().
While hard/not reproduceable for us so far it seems that the
delayed_work_pending() we use might not be quite safe from reordering.
Therefore this patch adds an explicit, new spinlock to protect the
update of the mla_list and flags in bat_priv and then removes the
WARN_ON(delayed_work_pending()).
Reported-by: syzbot+83f2d54ec6b7e417e13f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+050927a651272b145a5d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+979ffc89b87309b1b94b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+f9f3f388440283da2965@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: cbebd363b2e9 ("batman-adv: Use own timer for multicast TT and TVLV updates")
Signed-off-by: Linus Lüssing <linus.luessing@c0d3.blue>
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich <sw@simonwunderlich.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ede95a63b5e84ddeea6b0c473b36ab8bfd8c6ce3 upstream.
Rick reported that the BPF JIT could potentially fill the entire module
space with BPF programs from unprivileged users which would prevent later
attempts to load normal kernel modules or privileged BPF programs, for
example. If JIT was enabled but unsuccessful to generate the image, then
before commit 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config")
we would always fall back to the BPF interpreter. Nowadays in the case
where the CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON could be set, then the load will abort
with a failure since the BPF interpreter was compiled out.
Add a global limit and enforce it for unprivileged users such that in case
of BPF interpreter compiled out we fail once the limit has been reached
or we fall back to BPF interpreter earlier w/o using module mem if latter
was compiled in. In a next step, fair share among unprivileged users can
be resolved in particular for the case where we would fail hard once limit
is reached.
Fixes: 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config")
Fixes: 0a14842f5a3c ("net: filter: Just In Time compiler for x86-64")
Co-Developed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit f1267cf3c01b12e0f843fb6a7450a7f0b2efab8a ]
The txq of vif is added to active_txqs list for ATF TXQ scheduling
in the function ieee80211_queue_skb(), but it was not properly removed
before freeing the txq object. It was causing use after free of the txq
objects from the active_txqs list, result was kernel panic
due to invalid memory access.
Fix kernel invalid memory access by properly removing txq object
from active_txqs list before free the object.
Signed-off-by: Bhagavathi Perumal S <bperumal@codeaurora.org>
Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8742dc86d0c7a9628117a989c11f04a9b6b898f3 ]
We currently don't reload pointers pointing into skb header
after doing pskb_may_pull() in _decode_session4(). So in case
pskb_may_pull() changed the pointers, we read from random
memory. Fix this by putting all the needed infos on the
stack, so that we don't need to access the header pointers
after doing pskb_may_pull().
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 025c65e119bf58b610549ca359c9ecc5dee6a8d2 ]
If an xfrmi is associated to a vrf layer 3 master device,
xfrm_policy_check() fails after traffic decapsulation. The input
interface is replaced by the layer 3 master device, and hence
xfrmi_decode_session() can't match the xfrmi anymore to satisfy
policy checking.
Extend ingress xfrmi lookup to honor the original layer 3 slave
device, allowing xfrm interfaces to operate within a vrf domain.
Fixes: f203b76d7809 ("xfrm: Add virtual xfrm interfaces")
Signed-off-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8dfb4eba4100e7cdd161a8baef2d8d61b7a7e62e ]
esp_output_udp_encap can produce a length that doesn't fit in the 16
bits of a UDP header's length field. In that case, we'll send a
fragmented packet whose length is larger than IP_MAX_MTU (resulting in
"Oversized IP packet" warnings on receive) and with a bogus UDP
length.
To prevent this, add a length check to esp_output_udp_encap and return
-EMSGSIZE on failure.
This seems to be older than git history.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit dbb2483b2a46fbaf833cfb5deb5ed9cace9c7399 ]
In commit 6a53b7593233 ("xfrm: check id proto in validate_tmpl()")
I introduced a check for xfrm protocol, but according to Herbert
IPSEC_PROTO_ANY should only be used as a wildcard for lookup, so
it should be removed from validate_tmpl().
And, IPSEC_PROTO_ANY is expected to only match 3 IPSec-specific
protocols, this is why xfrm_state_flush() could still miss
IPPROTO_ROUTING, which leads that those entries are left in
net->xfrm.state_all before exit net. Fix this by replacing
IPSEC_PROTO_ANY with zero.
This patch also extracts the check from validate_tmpl() to
xfrm_id_proto_valid() and uses it in parse_ipsecrequest().
With this, no other protocols should be added into xfrm.
Fixes: 6a53b7593233 ("xfrm: check id proto in validate_tmpl()")
Reported-by: syzbot+0bf0519d6e0de15914fe@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5483844c3fc18474de29f5d6733003526e0a9f78 ]
If tunnel registration failed during module initialization, the module
would fail to deregister the IPPROTO_COMP protocol and would attempt to
deregister the tunnel.
The tunnel was not deregistered during module-exit.
Fixes: dd9ee3444014e ("vti4: Fix a ipip packet processing bug in 'IPCOMP' virtual tunnel")
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Sowden <jeremy@azazel.net>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6ee02a54ef990a71bf542b6f0a4e3321de9d9c66 ]
When unloading xfrm6_tunnel module, xfrm6_tunnel_fini directly
frees the xfrm6_tunnel_spi_kmem. Maybe someone has gotten the
xfrm6_tunnel_spi, so need to wait it.
Fixes: 91cc3bb0b04ff("xfrm6_tunnel: RCU conversion")
Signed-off-by: Su Yanjun <suyj.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit b805d78d300bcf2c83d6df7da0c818b0fee41427 ]
UBSAN report this:
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:1289:24
index 6 is out of range for type 'unsigned int [6]'
CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 4.4.162-514.55.6.9.x86_64+ #13
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
0000000000000000 1466cf39b41b23c9 ffff8801f6b07a58 ffffffff81cb35f4
0000000041b58ab3 ffffffff83230f9c ffffffff81cb34e0 ffff8801f6b07a80
ffff8801f6b07a20 1466cf39b41b23c9 ffffffff851706e0 ffff8801f6b07ae8
Call Trace:
<IRQ> [<ffffffff81cb35f4>] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [inline]
<IRQ> [<ffffffff81cb35f4>] dump_stack+0x114/0x1a0 lib/dump_stack.c:51
[<ffffffff81d94225>] ubsan_epilogue+0x12/0x8f lib/ubsan.c:164
[<ffffffff81d954db>] __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0x16e/0x1b2 lib/ubsan.c:382
[<ffffffff82a25acd>] __xfrm_policy_unlink+0x3dd/0x5b0 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:1289
[<ffffffff82a2e572>] xfrm_policy_delete+0x52/0xb0 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:1309
[<ffffffff82a3319b>] xfrm_policy_timer+0x30b/0x590 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:243
[<ffffffff813d3927>] call_timer_fn+0x237/0x990 kernel/time/timer.c:1144
[<ffffffff813d8e7e>] __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1218 [inline]
[<ffffffff813d8e7e>] run_timer_softirq+0x6ce/0xb80 kernel/time/timer.c:1401
[<ffffffff8120d6f9>] __do_softirq+0x299/0xe10 kernel/softirq.c:273
[<ffffffff8120e676>] invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:350 [inline]
[<ffffffff8120e676>] irq_exit+0x216/0x2c0 kernel/softirq.c:391
[<ffffffff82c5edab>] exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:652 [inline]
[<ffffffff82c5edab>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x8b/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:926
[<ffffffff82c5c985>] apic_timer_interrupt+0xa5/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:735
<EOI> [<ffffffff81188096>] ? native_safe_halt+0x6/0x10 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:52
[<ffffffff810834d7>] arch_safe_halt arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:111 [inline]
[<ffffffff810834d7>] default_idle+0x27/0x430 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:446
[<ffffffff81085f05>] arch_cpu_idle+0x15/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:437
[<ffffffff8132abc3>] default_idle_call+0x53/0x90 kernel/sched/idle.c:92
[<ffffffff8132b32d>] cpuidle_idle_call kernel/sched/idle.c:156 [inline]
[<ffffffff8132b32d>] cpu_idle_loop kernel/sched/idle.c:251 [inline]
[<ffffffff8132b32d>] cpu_startup_entry+0x60d/0x9a0 kernel/sched/idle.c:299
[<ffffffff8113e119>] start_secondary+0x3c9/0x560 arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:245
The issue is triggered as this:
xfrm_add_policy
-->verify_newpolicy_info //check the index provided by user with XFRM_POLICY_MAX
//In my case, the index is 0x6E6BB6, so it pass the check.
-->xfrm_policy_construct //copy the user's policy and set xfrm_policy_timer
-->xfrm_policy_insert
--> __xfrm_policy_link //use the orgin dir, in my case is 2
--> xfrm_gen_index //generate policy index, there is 0x6E6BB6
then xfrm_policy_timer be fired
xfrm_policy_timer
--> xfrm_policy_id2dir //get dir from (policy index & 7), in my case is 6
--> xfrm_policy_delete
--> __xfrm_policy_unlink //access policy_count[dir], trigger out of range access
Add xfrm_policy_id2dir check in verify_newpolicy_info, make sure the computed dir is
valid, to fix the issue.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: e682adf021be ("xfrm: Try to honor policy index if it's supplied by user")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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