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commit e3ff9c3678b4d80e22d2557b68726174578eaf52 upstream.
Jason reported that the coarse ktime based time getters advance only once
per second and not once per tick as advertised.
The code reads only the monotonic base time, which advances once per
second. The nanoseconds are accumulated on every tick in xtime_nsec up to
a second and the regular time getters take this nanoseconds offset into
account, but the ktime_get_coarse*() implementation fails to do so.
Add the accumulated xtime_nsec value to the monotonic base time to get the
proper per tick advancing coarse tinme.
Fixes: b9ff604cff11 ("timekeeping: Add ktime_get_coarse_with_offset")
Reported-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
Cc: Sultan Alsawaf <sultan@kerneltoast.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1906132136280.1791@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f01098c74b5219f3969d4750eeed1a36bfc038e3 upstream.
Just like the case of commit 8b05a3a7503c ("tracing/kprobes: Fix NULL
pointer dereference in trace_kprobe_create()"), writing an incorrectly
formatted string to uprobe_events can trigger NULL pointer dereference.
Reporeducer:
# echo r > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/uprobe_events
dmesg:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 8000000079d12067 P4D 8000000079d12067 PUD 7b7ab067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 1903 Comm: bash Not tainted 5.2.0-rc3+ #15
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-2.fc30 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:strchr+0x0/0x30
Code: c0 eb 0d 84 c9 74 18 48 83 c0 01 48 39 d0 74 0f 0f b6 0c 07 3a 0c 06 74 ea 19 c0 83 c8 01 c3 31 c0 c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 <0f> b6 07 89 f2 40 38 f0 75 0e eb 13 0f b6 47 01 48 83 c
RSP: 0018:ffffb55fc0403d10 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: ffff993ffb793400 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffffa4852625
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000002f RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffb55fc0403dd0 R08: ffff993ffb793400 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff993ff9cc1668 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f30c5147700(0000) GS:ffff993ffda00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000007b628000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
trace_uprobe_create+0xe6/0xb10
? __kmalloc_track_caller+0xe6/0x1c0
? __kmalloc+0xf0/0x1d0
? trace_uprobe_create+0xb10/0xb10
create_or_delete_trace_uprobe+0x35/0x90
? trace_uprobe_create+0xb10/0xb10
trace_run_command+0x9c/0xb0
trace_parse_run_command+0xf9/0x1eb
? probes_open+0x80/0x80
__vfs_write+0x43/0x90
vfs_write+0x14a/0x2a0
ksys_write+0xa2/0x170
do_syscall_64+0x7f/0x200
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190614074026.8045-1-devel@etsukata.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 0597c49c69d5 ("tracing/uprobes: Use dyn_event framework for uprobe events")
Reviewed-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eiichi Tsukata <devel@etsukata.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 55267c88c003a3648567beae7c90512d3e2ab15e ]
hist_field_var_ref() is an implementation of hist_field_fn_t(), which
can be called with a null tracing_map_elt elt param when assembling a
key in event_hist_trigger().
In the case of hist_field_var_ref() this doesn't make sense, because a
variable can only be resolved by looking it up using an already
assembled key i.e. a variable can't be used to assemble a key since
the key is required in order to access the variable.
Upper layers should prevent the user from constructing a key using a
variable in the first place, but in case one slips through, it
shouldn't cause a NULL pointer dereference. Also if one does slip
through, we want to know about it, so emit a one-time warning in that
case.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/64ec8dc15c14d305295b64cdfcc6b2b9dd14753f.1555597045.git.tom.zanussi@linux.intel.com
Reported-by: Vincent Bernat <vincent@bernat.ch>
Signed-off-by: Tom Zanussi <tom.zanussi@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 40ea97290b08be2e038b31cbb33097d1145e8169 ]
New tooling noticed this mishap:
kernel/kcov.o: warning: objtool: write_comp_data()+0x138: call to __stack_chk_fail() with UACCESS enabled
kernel/kcov.o: warning: objtool: __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc()+0xd9: call to __stack_chk_fail() with UACCESS enabled
All the other instrumentation (KASAN,UBSAN) also have stack protector
disabled.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit f6581f5b55141a95657ef5742cf6a6bfa20a109f upstream.
Restore the read memory barrier in __ptrace_may_access() that was deleted
a couple years ago. Also add comments on this barrier and the one it pairs
with to explain why they're there (as far as I understand).
Fixes: bfedb589252c ("mm: Add a user_ns owner to mm_struct and fix ptrace permission checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f6e2aa91a46d2bc79fce9b93a988dbe7655c90c0 upstream.
Recently syzbot in conjunction with KMSAN reported that
ptrace_peek_siginfo can copy an uninitialized siginfo to userspace.
Inspecting ptrace_peek_siginfo confirms this.
The problem is that off when initialized from args.off can be
initialized to a negaive value. At which point the "if (off >= 0)"
test to see if off became negative fails because off started off
negative.
Prevent the core problem by adding a variable found that is only true
if a siginfo is found and copied to a temporary in preparation for
being copied to userspace.
Prevent args.off from being truncated when being assigned to off by
testing that off is <= the maximum possible value of off. Convert off
to an unsigned long so that we should not have to truncate args.off,
we have well defined overflow behavior so if we add another check we
won't risk fighting undefined compiler behavior, and so that we have a
type whose maximum value is easy to test for.
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+0d602a1b0d8c95bdf299@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 84c751bd4aeb ("ptrace: add ability to retrieve signals without removing from a queue (v4)")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit fdc6bae940ee9eb869e493990540098b8c0fd6ab ]
The ADJ_TAI adjtimex mode sets the TAI-UTC offset of the system clock.
It is typically set by NTP/PTP implementations and it is automatically
updated by the kernel on leap seconds. The initial value is zero (which
applications may interpret as unknown), but this value cannot be set by
adjtimex. This limitation seems to go back to the original "nanokernel"
implementation by David Mills.
Change the ADJ_TAI check to accept zero as a valid TAI-UTC offset in
order to allow setting it back to the initial value.
Fixes: 153b5d054ac2 ("ntp: support for TAI")
Suggested-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Miroslav Lichvar <mlichvar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190417084833.7401-1-mlichvar@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit e2f7fc0ac6957cabff4cecf6c721979b571af208 ]
Commit 31fd85816dbe ("bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program
context fields") made the verifier add AND instructions to clear the
unwanted bits with a mask when doing a narrow load. The mask is
computed with
(1 << size * 8) - 1
where "size" is the size of the narrow load. When doing a 4 byte load
of a an 8 byte field the verifier shifts the literal 1 by 32 places to
the left. This results in an overflow of a signed integer, which is an
undefined behavior. Typically, the computed mask was zero, so the
result of the narrow load ended up being zero too.
Cast the literal to long long to avoid overflows. Note that narrow
load of the 4 byte fields does not have the undefined behavior,
because the load size can only be either 1 or 2 bytes, so shifting 1
by 8 or 16 places will not overflow it. And reading 4 bytes would not
be a narrow load of a 4 bytes field.
Fixes: 31fd85816dbe ("bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields")
Reviewed-by: Alban Crequy <alban@kinvolk.io>
Reviewed-by: Iago López Galeiras <iago@kinvolk.io>
Signed-off-by: Krzesimir Nowak <krzesimir@kinvolk.io>
Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit a9e73998f9d705c94a8dca9687633adc0f24a19a ]
While validating new map we require the @start_data to be strictly less
than @end_data, which is fine for regular applications (this is why this
nit didn't trigger for that long). These members are set from executable
loaders such as elf handers, still it is pretty valid to have a loadable
data section with zero size in file, in such case the start_data is equal
to end_data once kernel loader finishes.
As a result when we're trying to restore such programs the procedure fails
and the kernel returns -EINVAL. From the image dump of a program:
| "mm_start_code": "0x400000",
| "mm_end_code": "0x8f5fb4",
| "mm_start_data": "0xf1bfb0",
| "mm_end_data": "0xf1bfb0",
Thus we need to change validate_prctl_map from strictly less to less or
equal operator use.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190408143554.GY1421@uranus.lan
Fixes: f606b77f1a9e3 ("prctl: PR_SET_MM -- introduce PR_SET_MM_MAP operation")
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrey Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit e260ad01f0aa9e96b5386d5cd7184afd949dc457 ]
Currently when userspace gives us a values that overflow e.g. file-max
and other callers of __do_proc_doulongvec_minmax() we simply ignore the
new value and leave the current value untouched.
This can be problematic as it gives the illusion that the limit has
indeed be bumped when in fact it failed. This commit makes sure to
return EINVAL when an overflow is detected. Please note that this is a
userspace facing change.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190210203943.8227-4-christian@brauner.io
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Acked-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Joe Lawrence <joe.lawrence@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit ec527c318036a65a083ef68d8ba95789d2212246 upstream.
As explained in
0cc3cd21657b ("cpu/hotplug: Boot HT siblings at least once")
we always, no matter what, have to bring up x86 HT siblings during boot at
least once in order to avoid first MCE bringing the system to its knees.
That means that whenever 'nosmt' is supplied on the kernel command-line,
all the HT siblings are as a result sitting in mwait or cpudile after
going through the online-offline cycle at least once.
This causes a serious issue though when a kernel, which saw 'nosmt' on its
commandline, is going to perform resume from hibernation: if the resume
from the hibernated image is successful, cr3 is flipped in order to point
to the address space of the kernel that is being resumed, which in turn
means that all the HT siblings are all of a sudden mwaiting on address
which is no longer valid.
That results in triple fault shortly after cr3 is switched, and machine
reboots.
Fix this by always waking up all the SMT siblings before initiating the
'restore from hibernation' process; this guarantees that all the HT
siblings will be properly carried over to the resumed kernel waiting in
resume_play_dead(), and acted upon accordingly afterwards, based on the
target kernel configuration.
Symmetricaly, the resumed kernel has to push the SMT siblings to mwait
again in case it has SMT disabled; this means it has to online all
the siblings when resuming (so that they come out of hlt) and offline
them again to let them reach mwait.
Cc: 4.19+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.19+
Debugged-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: 0cc3cd21657b ("cpu/hotplug: Boot HT siblings at least once")
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 98af37d624ed8c83f1953b1b6b2f6866011fc064 upstream.
In the fixes commit, removing SIGKILL from each thread signal mask and
executing "goto fatal" directly will skip the call to
"trace_signal_deliver". At this point, the delivery tracking of the
SIGKILL signal will be inaccurate.
Therefore, we need to add trace_signal_deliver before "goto fatal" after
executing sigdelset.
Note: SEND_SIG_NOINFO matches the fact that SIGKILL doesn't have any info.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190425025812.91424-1-weizhenliang@huawei.com
Fixes: cf43a757fd4944 ("signal: Restore the stop PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT")
Signed-off-by: Zhenliang Wei <weizhenliang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Ivan Delalande <colona@arista.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9852ae3fe5293264f01c49f2571ef7688f7823ce upstream.
memory.stat and other files already consider subtrees in their output, and
we should too in order to not present an inconsistent interface.
The current situation is fairly confusing, because people interacting with
cgroups expect hierarchical behaviour in the vein of memory.stat,
cgroup.events, and other files. For example, this causes confusion when
debugging reclaim events under low, as currently these always read "0" at
non-leaf memcg nodes, which frequently causes people to misdiagnose breach
behaviour. The same confusion applies to other counters in this file when
debugging issues.
Aggregation is done at write time instead of at read-time since these
counters aren't hot (unlike memory.stat which is per-page, so it does it
at read time), and it makes sense to bundle this with the file
notifications.
After this patch, events are propagated up the hierarchy:
[root@ktst ~]# cat /sys/fs/cgroup/system.slice/memory.events
low 0
high 0
max 0
oom 0
oom_kill 0
[root@ktst ~]# systemd-run -p MemoryMax=1 true
Running as unit: run-r251162a189fb4562b9dabfdc9b0422f5.service
[root@ktst ~]# cat /sys/fs/cgroup/system.slice/memory.events
low 0
high 0
max 7
oom 1
oom_kill 1
As this is a change in behaviour, this can be reverted to the old
behaviour by mounting with the `memory_localevents' flag set. However, we
use the new behaviour by default as there's a lack of evidence that there
are any current users of memory.events that would find this change
undesirable.
akpm: this is a behaviour change, so Cc:stable. THis is so that
forthcoming distros which use cgroup v2 are more likely to pick up the
revised behaviour.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190208224419.GA24772@chrisdown.name
Signed-off-by: Chris Down <chris@chrisdown.name>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Dennis Zhou <dennis@kernel.org>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit dfb4a6f2191a80c8b790117d0ff592fd712d3296 upstream.
In case of errors, predicate_parse() goes to the out_free label
to free memory and to return an error code.
However, predicate_parse() does not free the predicates of the
temporary prog_stack array, thence leaking them.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190528154338.29976-1-tomasbortoli@gmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 80765597bc587 ("tracing: Rewrite filter logic to be simpler and faster")
Reported-by: syzbot+6b8e0fb820e570c59e19@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Tomas Bortoli <tomasbortoli@gmail.com>
[ Added protection around freeing prog_stack[i].pred ]
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 95e0b46fcebd7dbf6850dee96046e4c4ddc7f69c ]
module.name will be allocated unconditionally when auditing load
module, and audit_log_start() can fail with other reasons, or
audit_log_exit maybe not called, caused module.name is not freed
so free module.name in audit_free_context and __audit_syscall_exit
unreferenced object 0xffff88af90837d20 (size 8):
comm "modprobe", pid 1036, jiffies 4294704867 (age 3069.138s)
hex dump (first 8 bytes):
69 78 67 62 65 00 ff ff ixgbe...
backtrace:
[<0000000008da28fe>] __audit_log_kern_module+0x33/0x80
[<00000000c1491e61>] load_module+0x64f/0x3850
[<000000007fc9ae3f>] __do_sys_init_module+0x218/0x250
[<0000000000d4a478>] do_syscall_64+0x117/0x400
[<000000004924ded8>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[<000000007dc331dd>] 0xffffffffffffffff
Fixes: ca86cad7380e3 ("audit: log module name on init_module")
Signed-off-by: Zhang Yu <zhangyu31@baidu.com>
Signed-off-by: Li RongQing <lirongqing@baidu.com>
[PM: manual merge fixup in __audit_syscall_exit()]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit ad092c027713a68a34168942a5ef422e42e039f4 ]
If the specified rcuperf.perf_type is not in the rcu_perf_init()
function's perf_ops[] array, rcuperf prints some console messages and
then invokes rcu_perf_cleanup() to set state so that a future torture
test can run. However, rcu_perf_cleanup() also attempts to end the
test that didn't actually start, and in doing so relies on the value
of cur_ops, a value that is not particularly relevant in this case.
This can result in confusing output or even follow-on failures due to
attempts to use facilities that have not been properly initialized.
This commit therefore sets the value of cur_ops to NULL in this case and
inserts a check near the beginning of rcu_perf_cleanup(), thus avoiding
relying on an irrelevant cur_ops value.
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit b813afae7ab6a5e91b4e16cc567331d9c2ae1f04 ]
If the specified rcutorture.torture_type is not in the rcu_torture_init()
function's torture_ops[] array, rcutorture prints some console messages
and then invokes rcu_torture_cleanup() to set state so that a future
torture test can run. However, rcu_torture_cleanup() also attempts to
end the test that didn't actually start, and in doing so relies on the
value of cur_ops, a value that is not particularly relevant in this case.
This can result in confusing output or even follow-on failures due to
attempts to use facilities that have not been properly initialized.
This commit therefore sets the value of cur_ops to NULL in this case
and inserts a check near the beginning of rcu_torture_cleanup(),
thus avoiding relying on an irrelevant cur_ops value.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <rong.a.chen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7a8e61f8478639072d402a26789055a4a4de8f77 ]
Several people reported testing failures after setting CLOCK_REALTIME close
to the limits of the kernel internal representation in nanoseconds,
i.e. year 2262.
The failures are exposed in subsequent operations, i.e. when arming timers
or when the advancing CLOCK_MONOTONIC makes the calculation of
CLOCK_REALTIME overflow into negative space.
Now people start to paper over the underlying problem by clamping
calculations to the valid range, but that's just wrong because such
workarounds will prevent detection of real issues as well.
It is reasonable to force an upper bound for the various methods of setting
CLOCK_REALTIME. Year 2262 is the absolute upper bound. Assume a maximum
uptime of 30 years which is plenty enough even for esoteric embedded
systems. That results in an upper bound of year 2232 for setting the time.
Once that limit is reached in reality this limit is only a small part of
the problem space. But until then this stops people from trying to paper
over the problem at the wrong places.
Reported-by: Xiongfeng Wang <wangxiongfeng2@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Hongbo Yao <yaohongbo@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org>
Cc: Miroslav Lichvar <mlichvar@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1903231125480.2157@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4a6c91fbdef846ec7250b82f2eeeb87ac5f18cf9 ]
For CONFIG_TRACE_BRANCH_PROFILING=y the likely/unlikely things get
overloaded and generate callouts to this code, and thus also when
AC=1.
Make it safe.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit a1247d06d01045d7ab2882a9c074fbf21137c690 ]
Even though the atomic_dec_and_mutex_lock() in
__static_key_slow_dec_cpuslocked() can never see a negative value in
key->enabled the subsequent sanity check is re-reading key->enabled, which may
have been set to -1 in the meantime by static_key_slow_inc_cpuslocked().
CPU A CPU B
__static_key_slow_dec_cpuslocked(): static_key_slow_inc_cpuslocked():
# enabled = 1
atomic_dec_and_mutex_lock()
# enabled = 0
atomic_read() == 0
atomic_set(-1)
# enabled = -1
val = atomic_read()
# Oops - val == -1!
The test case is TCP's clean_acked_data_enable() / clean_acked_data_disable()
as tickled by KTLS (net/ktls).
Suggested-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Reported-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Tested-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org
Cc: oss-drivers@netronome.com
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 471ba0e686cb13752bc1ff3216c54b69a2d250ea ]
The QEMU PowerPC/PSeries machine model was not expecting a self-IPI,
and it may be a bit surprising thing to do, so have irq_work_queue_on
do local queueing when target is the current CPU.
Suggested-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Reported-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: =?UTF-8?q?C=C3=A9dric=20Le=20Goater?= <clg@kaod.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Suraj Jitindar Singh <sjitindarsingh@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190409093403.20994-1-npiggin@gmail.com
[ Simplified the preprocessor comments.
Fixed unbalanced curly brackets pointed out by Thomas. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5b61d50ab4ef590f5e1d4df15cd2cea5f5715308 ]
Bit shift in scale_load() could overflow shares. This patch saturates
it to MAX_SHARES like following sched_group_set_shares().
Example:
# echo 9223372036854776832 > cpu.shares
# cat cpu.shares
Before patch: 1024
After pattch: 262144
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/155125501891.293431.3345233332801109696.stgit@buzz
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1a010e29cfa00fee2888fd2fd4983f848cbafb58 ]
Example of unhandled overflows:
# echo 18446744073709651 > cpu.rt_runtime_us
# cat cpu.rt_runtime_us
99
# echo 18446744073709900 > cpu.rt_period_us
# cat cpu.rt_period_us
348
After this patch they will fail with -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/155125501739.293431.5252197504404771496.stgit@buzz
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1a8b4540db732ca16c9e43ac7c08b1b8f0b252d8 ]
Large values could overflow u64 and pass following sanity checks.
# echo 18446744073750000 > cpu.cfs_period_us
# cat cpu.cfs_period_us
40448
# echo 18446744073750000 > cpu.cfs_quota_us
# cat cpu.cfs_quota_us
40448
After this patch they will fail with -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/155125502079.293431.3947497929372138600.stgit@buzz
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4dcabece4c3a9f9522127be12cc12cc120399b2f ]
The number of descendant cgroups and the number of dying
descendant cgroups are currently synchronized using the cgroup_mutex.
The number of descendant cgroups will be required by the cgroup v2
freezer, which will use it to determine if a cgroup is frozen
(depending on total number of descendants and number of frozen
descendants). It's not always acceptable to grab the cgroup_mutex,
especially from quite hot paths (e.g. exit()).
To avoid this, let's additionally synchronize these counters using
the css_set_lock.
So, it's safe to read these counters with either cgroup_mutex or
css_set_lock locked, and for changing both locks should be acquired.
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: kernel-team@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 70c4cf17e445264453bc5323db3e50aa0ac9e81f ]
In audit_rule_change(), audit_data_to_entry() is firstly invoked to
translate the payload data to the kernel's rule representation. In
audit_data_to_entry(), depending on the audit field type, an audit tree may
be created in audit_make_tree(), which eventually invokes kmalloc() to
allocate the tree. Since this tree is a temporary tree, it will be then
freed in the following execution, e.g., audit_add_rule() if the message
type is AUDIT_ADD_RULE or audit_del_rule() if the message type is
AUDIT_DEL_RULE. However, if the message type is neither AUDIT_ADD_RULE nor
AUDIT_DEL_RULE, i.e., the default case of the switch statement, this
temporary tree is not freed.
To fix this issue, only allocate the tree when the type is AUDIT_ADD_RULE
or AUDIT_DEL_RULE.
Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang <wang6495@umn.edu>
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9b019acb72e4b5741d88e8936d6f200ed44b66b2 ]
The NOHZ idle balancer runs on the lowest idle CPU. This can
interfere with isolated CPUs, so confine it to HK_FLAG_MISC
housekeeping CPUs.
HK_FLAG_SCHED is not used for this because it is not set anywhere
at the moment. This could be folded into HK_FLAG_SCHED once that
option is fixed.
The problem was observed with increased jitter on an application
running on CPU0, caused by NOHZ idle load balancing being run on
CPU1 (an SMT sibling).
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190412042613.28930-1-npiggin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit f2c65fb3221adc6b73b0549fc7ba892022db9797 ]
When modules and BPF filters are loaded, there is a time window in
which some memory is both writable and executable. An attacker that has
already found another vulnerability (e.g., a dangling pointer) might be
able to exploit this behavior to overwrite kernel code. Prevent having
writable executable PTEs in this stage.
In addition, avoiding having W+X mappings can also slightly simplify the
patching of modules code on initialization (e.g., by alternatives and
static-key), as would be done in the next patch. This was actually the
main motivation for this patch.
To avoid having W+X mappings, set them initially as RW (NX) and after
they are set as RO set them as X as well. Setting them as executable is
done as a separate step to avoid one core in which the old PTE is cached
(hence writable), and another which sees the updated PTE (executable),
which would break the W^X protection.
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: <deneen.t.dock@intel.com>
Cc: <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Cc: <kristen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <linux_dti@icloud.com>
Cc: <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190426001143.4983-12-namit@vmware.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 9419a3191dcb27f24478d288abaab697228d28e6 upstream.
What happens there is that we are replacing file->path.mnt of
a file we'd just opened with a clone and we need the write
count contribution to be transferred from original mount to
new one. That's it. We do *NOT* want any kind of freeze
protection for the duration of switchover.
IOW, we should just use __mnt_{want,drop}_write() for that
switchover; no need to bother with mnt_{want,drop}_write()
there.
Tested-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+2a73a6ea9507b7112141@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2baae3545327632167c0180e9ca1d467416f1919 upstream.
synchronize_rcu() is fine when the rcu callbacks only need
to free memory (kfree_rcu() or direct kfree() call rcu call backs)
__dev_map_entry_free() is a bit more complex, so we need to make
sure that call queued __dev_map_entry_free() callbacks have completed.
sysbot report:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in dev_map_flush_old kernel/bpf/devmap.c:365
[inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __dev_map_entry_free+0x2a8/0x300
kernel/bpf/devmap.c:379
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8801b8da38c8 by task ksoftirqd/1/18
CPU: 1 PID: 18 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 4.17.0+ #39
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description+0x6c/0x20b mm/kasan/report.c:256
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline]
kasan_report.cold.7+0x242/0x2fe mm/kasan/report.c:412
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:433
dev_map_flush_old kernel/bpf/devmap.c:365 [inline]
__dev_map_entry_free+0x2a8/0x300 kernel/bpf/devmap.c:379
__rcu_reclaim kernel/rcu/rcu.h:178 [inline]
rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2558 [inline]
invoke_rcu_callbacks kernel/rcu/tree.c:2818 [inline]
__rcu_process_callbacks kernel/rcu/tree.c:2785 [inline]
rcu_process_callbacks+0xe9d/0x1760 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2802
__do_softirq+0x2e0/0xaf5 kernel/softirq.c:284
run_ksoftirqd+0x86/0x100 kernel/softirq.c:645
smpboot_thread_fn+0x417/0x870 kernel/smpboot.c:164
kthread+0x345/0x410 kernel/kthread.c:240
ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:412
Allocated by task 6675:
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
kasan_kmalloc+0xc4/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:553
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x152/0x780 mm/slab.c:3620
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:513 [inline]
kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:706 [inline]
dev_map_alloc+0x208/0x7f0 kernel/bpf/devmap.c:102
find_and_alloc_map kernel/bpf/syscall.c:129 [inline]
map_create+0x393/0x1010 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:453
__do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:2351 [inline]
__se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:2328 [inline]
__x64_sys_bpf+0x303/0x510 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:2328
do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Freed by task 26:
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x11a/0x170 mm/kasan/kasan.c:521
kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/kasan.c:528
__cache_free mm/slab.c:3498 [inline]
kfree+0xd9/0x260 mm/slab.c:3813
dev_map_free+0x4fa/0x670 kernel/bpf/devmap.c:191
bpf_map_free_deferred+0xba/0xf0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:262
process_one_work+0xc64/0x1b70 kernel/workqueue.c:2153
worker_thread+0x181/0x13a0 kernel/workqueue.c:2296
kthread+0x345/0x410 kernel/kthread.c:240
ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:412
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8801b8da37c0
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
The buggy address is located 264 bytes inside of
512-byte region [ffff8801b8da37c0, ffff8801b8da39c0)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0006e368c0 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8801da800940
index:0xffff8801b8da3540
flags: 0x2fffc0000000100(slab)
raw: 02fffc0000000100 ffffea0007217b88 ffffea0006e30cc8 ffff8801da800940
raw: ffff8801b8da3540 ffff8801b8da3040 0000000100000004 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8801b8da3780: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8801b8da3800: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> ffff8801b8da3880: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8801b8da3900: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8801b8da3980: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
Fixes: 546ac1ffb70d ("bpf: add devmap, a map for storing net device references")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+457d3e2ffbcf31aee5c0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9b2ca371b1505a547217b244f903ad3fb86fa5b4 upstream.
Without this check a snapshot is taken whenever a bucket's max is hit,
rather than only when the global max is hit, as it should be.
Before:
In this example, we do a first run of the workload (cyclictest),
examine the output, note the max ('triggering value') (347), then do
a second run and note the max again.
In this case, the max in the second run (39) is below the max in the
first run, but since we haven't cleared the histogram, the first max
is still in the histogram and is higher than any other max, so it
should still be the max for the snapshot. It isn't however - the
value should still be 347 after the second run.
# echo 'hist:keys=pid:ts0=common_timestamp.usecs if comm=="cyclictest"' >> /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/sched/sched_waking/trigger
# echo 'hist:keys=next_pid:wakeup_lat=common_timestamp.usecs-$ts0:onmax($wakeup_lat).save(next_prio,next_comm,prev_pid,prev_prio,prev_comm):onmax($wakeup_lat).snapshot() if next_comm=="cyclictest"' >> /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/sched/sched_switch/trigger
# cyclictest -p 80 -n -s -t 2 -D 2
# cat /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/sched/sched_switch/hist
{ next_pid: 2143 } hitcount: 199
max: 44 next_prio: 120 next_comm: cyclictest
prev_pid: 0 prev_prio: 120 prev_comm: swapper/4
{ next_pid: 2145 } hitcount: 1325
max: 38 next_prio: 19 next_comm: cyclictest
prev_pid: 0 prev_prio: 120 prev_comm: swapper/2
{ next_pid: 2144 } hitcount: 1982
max: 347 next_prio: 19 next_comm: cyclictest
prev_pid: 0 prev_prio: 120 prev_comm: swapper/6
Snapshot taken (see tracing/snapshot). Details:
triggering value { onmax($wakeup_lat) }: 347
triggered by event with key: { next_pid: 2144 }
# cyclictest -p 80 -n -s -t 2 -D 2
# cat /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/sched/sched_switch/hist
{ next_pid: 2143 } hitcount: 199
max: 44 next_prio: 120 next_comm: cyclictest
prev_pid: 0 prev_prio: 120 prev_comm: swapper/4
{ next_pid: 2148 } hitcount: 199
max: 16 next_prio: 120 next_comm: cyclictest
prev_pid: 0 prev_prio: 120 prev_comm: swapper/1
{ next_pid: 2145 } hitcount: 1325
max: 38 next_prio: 19 next_comm: cyclictest
prev_pid: 0 prev_prio: 120 prev_comm: swapper/2
{ next_pid: 2150 } hitcount: 1326
max: 39 next_prio: 19 next_comm: cyclictest
prev_pid: 0 prev_prio: 120 prev_comm: swapper/4
{ next_pid: 2144 } hitcount: 1982
max: 347 next_prio: 19 next_comm: cyclictest
prev_pid: 0 prev_prio: 120 prev_comm: swapper/6
{ next_pid: 2149 } hitcount: 1983
max: 130 next_prio: 19 next_comm: cyclictest
prev_pid: 0 prev_prio: 120 prev_comm: swapper/0
Snapshot taken (see tracing/snapshot). Details:
triggering value { onmax($wakeup_lat) }: 39
triggered by event with key: { next_pid: 2150 }
After:
In this example, we do a first run of the workload (cyclictest),
examine the output, note the max ('triggering value') (375), then do
a second run and note the max again.
In this case, the max in the second run is still 375, the highest in
any bucket, as it should be.
# cyclictest -p 80 -n -s -t 2 -D 2
# cat /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/sched/sched_switch/hist
{ next_pid: 2072 } hitcount: 200
max: 28 next_prio: 120 next_comm: cyclictest
prev_pid: 0 prev_prio: 120 prev_comm: swapper/5
{ next_pid: 2074 } hitcount: 1323
max: 375 next_prio: 19 next_comm: cyclictest
prev_pid: 0 prev_prio: 120 prev_comm: swapper/2
{ next_pid: 2073 } hitcount: 1980
max: 153 next_prio: 19 next_comm: cyclictest
prev_pid: 0 prev_prio: 120 prev_comm: swapper/6
Snapshot taken (see tracing/snapshot). Details:
triggering value { onmax($wakeup_lat) }: 375
triggered by event with key: { next_pid: 2074 }
# cyclictest -p 80 -n -s -t 2 -D 2
# cat /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/sched/sched_switch/hist
{ next_pid: 2101 } hitcount: 199
max: 49 next_prio: 120 next_comm: cyclictest
prev_pid: 0 prev_prio: 120 prev_comm: swapper/6
{ next_pid: 2072 } hitcount: 200
max: 28 next_prio: 120 next_comm: cyclictest
prev_pid: 0 prev_prio: 120 prev_comm: swapper/5
{ next_pid: 2074 } hitcount: 1323
max: 375 next_prio: 19 next_comm: cyclictest
prev_pid: 0 prev_prio: 120 prev_comm: swapper/2
{ next_pid: 2103 } hitcount: 1325
max: 74 next_prio: 19 next_comm: cyclictest
prev_pid: 0 prev_prio: 120 prev_comm: swapper/4
{ next_pid: 2073 } hitcount: 1980
max: 153 next_prio: 19 next_comm: cyclictest
prev_pid: 0 prev_prio: 120 prev_comm: swapper/6
{ next_pid: 2102 } hitcount: 1981
max: 84 next_prio: 19 next_comm: cyclictest
prev_pid: 12 prev_prio: 120 prev_comm: kworker/0:1
Snapshot taken (see tracing/snapshot). Details:
triggering value { onmax($wakeup_lat) }: 375
triggered by event with key: { next_pid: 2074 }
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/95958351329f129c07504b4d1769c47a97b70d65.1555597045.git.tom.zanussi@linux.intel.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a3785b7eca8fd ("tracing: Add hist trigger snapshot() action")
Signed-off-by: Tom Zanussi <tom.zanussi@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 50b045a8c0ccf44f76640ac3eea8d80ca53979a3 upstream.
One of the biggest issues we face right now with picking LRU map over
regular hash table is that a map walk out of user space, for example,
to just dump the existing entries or to remove certain ones, will
completely mess up LRU eviction heuristics and wrong entries such
as just created ones will get evicted instead. The reason for this
is that we mark an entry as "in use" via bpf_lru_node_set_ref() from
system call lookup side as well. Thus upon walk, all entries are
being marked, so information of actual least recently used ones
are "lost".
In case of Cilium where it can be used (besides others) as a BPF
based connection tracker, this current behavior causes disruption
upon control plane changes that need to walk the map from user space
to evict certain entries. Discussion result from bpfconf [0] was that
we should simply just remove marking from system call side as no
good use case could be found where it's actually needed there.
Therefore this patch removes marking for regular LRU and per-CPU
flavor. If there ever should be a need in future, the behavior could
be selected via map creation flag, but due to mentioned reason we
avoid this here.
[0] http://vger.kernel.org/bpfconf.html
Fixes: 29ba732acbee ("bpf: Add BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_HASH")
Fixes: 8f8449384ec3 ("bpf: Add BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_PERCPU_HASH")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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|
commit c6110222c6f49ea68169f353565eb865488a8619 upstream.
Add a callback map_lookup_elem_sys_only() that map implementations
could use over map_lookup_elem() from system call side in case the
map implementation needs to handle the latter differently than from
the BPF data path. If map_lookup_elem_sys_only() is set, this will
be preferred pick for map lookups out of user space. This hook is
used in a follow-up fix for LRU map, but once development window
opens, we can convert other map types from map_lookup_elem() (here,
the one called upon BPF_MAP_LOOKUP_ELEM cmd is meant) over to use
the callback to simplify and clean up the latter.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit e547ff3f803e779a3898f1f48447b29f43c54085 upstream.
For iptable module to load a bpf program from a pinned location, it
only retrieve a loaded program and cannot change the program content so
requiring a write permission for it might not be necessary.
Also when adding or removing an unrelated iptable rule, it might need to
flush and reload the xt_bpf related rules as well and triggers the inode
permission check. It might be better to remove the write premission
check for the inode so we won't need to grant write access to all the
processes that flush and restore iptables rules.
Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3dd1f7f24f8ceec00bbbc364c2ac3c893f0fdc4c upstream.
Fix to make the type of $comm "string". If we set the other type to $comm
argument, it shows meaningless value or wrong data. Currently probe events
allow us to set string array type (e.g. ":string[2]"), or other digit types
like x8 on $comm. But since clearly $comm is just a string data, it should
not be fetched by other types including array.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/155723736241.9149.14582064184468574539.stgit@devnote2
Cc: Andreas Ziegler <andreas.ziegler@fau.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 533059281ee5 ("tracing: probeevent: Introduce new argument fetching code")
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit cbe08bcbbe787315c425dde284dcb715cfbf3f39 upstream.
When reading only part of the id file, the ppos isn't tracked correctly.
This is taken care by simple_read_from_buffer.
Reading a single byte, and then the next byte would result EOF.
While this seems like not a big deal, this breaks abstractions that
reads information from files unbuffered. See for example
https://github.com/golang/go/issues/29399
This code was mentioned as problematic in
commit cd458ba9d5a5
("tracing: Do not (ab)use trace_seq in event_id_read()")
An example C code that show this bug is:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
if (argc < 2)
return 1;
int fd = open(argv[1], O_RDONLY);
char c;
read(fd, &c, 1);
printf("First %c\n", c);
read(fd, &c, 1);
printf("Second %c\n", c);
}
Then run with, e.g.
sudo ./a.out /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/tcp/tcp_set_state/id
You'll notice you're getting the first character twice, instead of the
first two characters in the id file.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181231115837.4932-1-elazar@lightbitslabs.com
Cc: Orit Wasserman <orit.was@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 23725aeeab10b ("ftrace: provide an id file for each event")
Signed-off-by: Elazar Leibovich <elazar@lightbitslabs.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c3f3ce049f7d97cc7ec9c01cb51d9ec74e0f37c2 upstream.
The task structure is freed while get_mem_cgroup_from_mm() holds
rcu_read_lock() and dereferences mm->owner.
get_mem_cgroup_from_mm() failing fork()
---- ---
task = mm->owner
mm->owner = NULL;
free(task)
if (task) *task; /* use after free */
The fix consists in freeing the task with RCU also in the fork failure
case, exactly like it always happens for the regular exit(2) path. That
is enough to make the rcu_read_lock hold in get_mem_cgroup_from_mm()
(left side above) effective to avoid a use after free when dereferencing
the task structure.
An alternate possible fix would be to defer the delivery of the
userfaultfd contexts to the monitor until after fork() is guaranteed to
succeed. Such a change would require more changes because it would
create a strict ordering dependency where the uffd methods would need to
be called beyond the last potentially failing branch in order to be
safe. This solution as opposed only adds the dependency to common code
to set mm->owner to NULL and to free the task struct that was pointed by
mm->owner with RCU, if fork ends up failing. The userfaultfd methods
can still be called anywhere during the fork runtime and the monitor
will keep discarding orphaned "mm" coming from failed forks in userland.
This race condition couldn't trigger if CONFIG_MEMCG was set =n at build
time.
[aarcange@redhat.com: improve changelog, reduce #ifdefs per Michal]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190429035752.4508-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325225636.11635-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 893e26e61d04 ("userfaultfd: non-cooperative: Add fork() event")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Tested-by: zhong jiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+cbb52e396df3e565ab02@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: zhong jiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com>
Cc: syzbot+cbb52e396df3e565ab02@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit af959b18fd447170a10865283ba691af4353cc7f upstream.
systemtap folks reported the following splat recently:
[ 7790.862212] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 26759 at arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c:1022 kprobe_fault_handler+0xec/0xf0
[...]
[ 7790.864113] CPU: 3 PID: 26759 Comm: sshd Not tainted 5.1.0-0.rc7.git1.1.fc31.x86_64 #1
[ 7790.864198] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS[...]
[ 7790.864314] RIP: 0010:kprobe_fault_handler+0xec/0xf0
[ 7790.864375] Code: 48 8b 50 [...]
[ 7790.864714] RSP: 0018:ffffc06800bdbb48 EFLAGS: 00010082
[ 7790.864812] RAX: ffff9e2b75a16320 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 7790.865306] RDX: ffffffffffffffff RSI: 000000000000000e RDI: ffffc06800bdbbf8
[ 7790.865514] RBP: ffffc06800bdbbf8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 7790.865960] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffc06800bdbbf8
[ 7790.866037] R13: ffff9e2ab56a0418 R14: ffff9e2b6d0bb400 R15: ffff9e2b6d268000
[ 7790.866114] FS: 00007fde49937d80(0000) GS:ffff9e2b75a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 7790.866193] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 7790.866318] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000012f312000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 7790.866419] Call Trace:
[ 7790.866677] do_user_addr_fault+0x64/0x480
[ 7790.867513] do_page_fault+0x33/0x210
[ 7790.868002] async_page_fault+0x1e/0x30
[ 7790.868071] RIP: 0010: (null)
[ 7790.868144] Code: Bad RIP value.
[ 7790.868229] RSP: 0018:ffffc06800bdbca8 EFLAGS: 00010282
[ 7790.868362] RAX: ffff9e2b598b60f8 RBX: ffffc06800bdbe48 RCX: 0000000000000004
[ 7790.868629] RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: ffffc06800bdbc6c RDI: ffff9e2b598b60f0
[ 7790.868834] RBP: ffffc06800bdbcf8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000004
[ 7790.870432] R10: 00000000ff6f7a03 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001
[ 7790.871859] R13: ffffc06800bdbcb8 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff9e2acd0a5310
[ 7790.873455] ? vfs_read+0x5/0x170
[ 7790.874639] ? vfs_read+0x1/0x170
[ 7790.875834] ? trace_call_bpf+0xf6/0x260
[ 7790.877044] ? vfs_read+0x1/0x170
[ 7790.878208] ? vfs_read+0x5/0x170
[ 7790.879345] ? kprobe_perf_func+0x233/0x260
[ 7790.880503] ? vfs_read+0x1/0x170
[ 7790.881632] ? vfs_read+0x5/0x170
[ 7790.882751] ? kprobe_ftrace_handler+0x92/0xf0
[ 7790.883926] ? __vfs_read+0x30/0x30
[ 7790.885050] ? ftrace_ops_assist_func+0x94/0x100
[ 7790.886183] ? vfs_read+0x1/0x170
[ 7790.887283] ? vfs_read+0x5/0x170
[ 7790.888348] ? ksys_read+0x5a/0xe0
[ 7790.889389] ? do_syscall_64+0x5c/0xa0
[ 7790.890401] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
After some debugging, turns out that the logic in 2cbd95a5c4fb
("bpf: change parameters of call/branch offset adjustment") has
a bug that is exposed after 52875a04f4b2 ("bpf: verifier: remove
dead code") in that we miss some of the jump offset adjustments
after code patching when we remove dead code, more concretely,
upon backward jump spanning over the area that is being removed.
BPF insns of a case that was hit pre 52875a04f4b2:
[...]
676: (85) call bpf_perf_event_output#-47616
677: (05) goto pc-636
678: (62) *(u32 *)(r10 -64) = 0
679: (bf) r7 = r10
680: (07) r7 += -64
681: (05) goto pc-44
682: (05) goto pc-1
683: (05) goto pc-1
BPF insns afterwards:
[...]
618: (85) call bpf_perf_event_output#-47616
619: (05) goto pc-638
620: (62) *(u32 *)(r10 -64) = 0
621: (bf) r7 = r10
622: (07) r7 += -64
623: (05) goto pc-44
To illustrate the bug, situation looks as follows:
____
0 | | <-- foo: [...]
1 |____|
2 |____| <-- pos / end_new ^
3 | | |
4 | | | len
5 |____| | (remove region)
6 | | <-- end_old v
7 | |
8 | | <-- curr (jmp foo)
9 |____|
The condition curr >= end_new && curr + off + 1 < end_new in the
branch delta adjustments is never hit because curr + off + 1 <
end_new is compared as unsigned and therefore curr + off + 1 >
end_new in unsigned realm as curr + off + 1 becomes negative
since the insns are memmove()'d before the offset adjustments.
Correct BPF insns after this fix:
[...]
618: (85) call bpf_perf_event_output#-47216
619: (05) goto pc-578
620: (62) *(u32 *)(r10 -64) = 0
621: (bf) r7 = r10
622: (07) r7 += -64
623: (05) goto pc-44
Note that unprivileged case is not affected from this.
Fixes: 52875a04f4b2 ("bpf: verifier: remove dead code")
Fixes: 2cbd95a5c4fb ("bpf: change parameters of call/branch offset adjustment")
Reported-by: Frank Ch. Eigler <fche@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit a9e9bcb45b1525ba7aea26ed9441e8632aeeda58 ]
During my rwsem testing, it was found that after a down_read(), the
reader count may occasionally become 0 or even negative. Consequently,
a writer may steal the lock at that time and execute with the reader
in parallel thus breaking the mutual exclusion guarantee of the write
lock. In other words, both readers and writer can become rwsem owners
simultaneously.
The current reader wakeup code does it in one pass to clear waiter->task
and put them into wake_q before fully incrementing the reader count.
Once waiter->task is cleared, the corresponding reader may see it,
finish the critical section and do unlock to decrement the count before
the count is incremented. This is not a problem if there is only one
reader to wake up as the count has been pre-incremented by 1. It is
a problem if there are more than one readers to be woken up and writer
can steal the lock.
The wakeup was actually done in 2 passes before the following v4.9 commit:
70800c3c0cc5 ("locking/rwsem: Scan the wait_list for readers only once")
To fix this problem, the wakeup is now done in two passes
again. In the first pass, we collect the readers and count them.
The reader count is then fully incremented. In the second pass, the
waiter->task is then cleared and they are put into wake_q to be woken
up later.
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: huang ying <huang.ying.caritas@gmail.com>
Fixes: 70800c3c0cc5 ("locking/rwsem: Scan the wait_list for readers only once")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190428212557.13482-2-longman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 98af8452945c55652de68536afdde3b520fec429 upstream
Keeping track of the number of mitigations for all the CPU speculation
bugs has become overwhelming for many users. It's getting more and more
complicated to decide which mitigations are needed for a given
architecture. Complicating matters is the fact that each arch tends to
have its own custom way to mitigate the same vulnerability.
Most users fall into a few basic categories:
a) they want all mitigations off;
b) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT enabled even if
it's vulnerable; or
c) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT disabled if
vulnerable.
Define a set of curated, arch-independent options, each of which is an
aggregation of existing options:
- mitigations=off: Disable all mitigations.
- mitigations=auto: [default] Enable all the default mitigations, but
leave SMT enabled, even if it's vulnerable.
- mitigations=auto,nosmt: Enable all the default mitigations, disabling
SMT if needed by a mitigation.
Currently, these options are placeholders which don't actually do
anything. They will be fleshed out in upcoming patches.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> (on x86)
Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Cc: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b07a8ef9b7c5055c3a4637c87d07c296d5016fe0.1555085500.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6b4f4bc9cb22875f97023984a625386f0c7cc1c0 upstream.
Some futex() operations, including FUTEX_WAKE_OP, require the kernel to
perform an atomic read-modify-write of the futex word via the userspace
mapping. These operations are implemented by each architecture in
arch_futex_atomic_op_inuser() and futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic(), which
are called in atomic context with the relevant hash bucket locks held.
Although these routines may return -EFAULT in response to a page fault
generated when accessing userspace, they are expected to succeed (i.e.
return 0) in all other cases. This poses a problem for architectures
that do not provide bounded forward progress guarantees or fairness of
contended atomic operations and can lead to starvation in some cases.
In these problematic scenarios, we must return back to the core futex
code so that we can drop the hash bucket locks and reschedule if
necessary, much like we do in the case of a page fault.
Allow architectures to return -EAGAIN from their implementations of
arch_futex_atomic_op_inuser() and futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic(), which
will cause the core futex code to reschedule if necessary and return
back to the architecture code later on.
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 59c39840f5abf4a71e1810a8da71aaccd6c17d26 upstream.
When irq_set_affinity_notifier() replaces the notifier, then the
reference count on the old notifier is dropped which causes it to be
freed. But nothing ensures that the old notifier is not longer queued
in the work list. If it is queued this results in a use after free and
possibly in work list corruption.
Ensure that the work is canceled before the reference is dropped.
Signed-off-by: Prasad Sodagudi <psodagud@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: marc.zyngier@arm.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1553439424-6529-1-git-send-email-psodagud@codeaurora.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull perf fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"I'd like to apologize for this very late pull request: I was dithering
through the week whether to send the fixes, and then yesterday Jiri's
crash fix for a regression introduced in this cycle clearly marked
perf/urgent as 'must merge now'.
Most of the commits are tooling fixes, plus there's three kernel fixes
via four commits:
- race fix in the Intel PEBS code
- fix an AUX bug and roll back a previous attempt
- fix AMD family 17h generic HW cache-event perf counters
The largest diffstat contribution comes from the AMD fix - a new event
table is introduced, which is a fairly low risk change but has a large
linecount"
* 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
perf/x86/intel: Fix race in intel_pmu_disable_event()
perf/x86/intel/pt: Remove software double buffering PMU capability
perf/ring_buffer: Fix AUX software double buffering
perf tools: Remove needless asm/unistd.h include fixing build in some places
tools arch uapi: Copy missing unistd.h headers for arc, hexagon and riscv
tools build: Add -ldl to the disassembler-four-args feature test
perf cs-etm: Always allocate memory for cs_etm_queue::prev_packet
perf cs-etm: Don't check cs_etm_queue::prev_packet validity
perf report: Report OOM in status line in the GTK UI
perf bench numa: Add define for RUSAGE_THREAD if not present
tools lib traceevent: Change tag string for error
perf annotate: Fix build on 32 bit for BPF annotation
tools uapi x86: Sync vmx.h with the kernel
perf bpf: Return value with unlocking in perf_env__find_btf()
MAINTAINERS: Include vendor specific files under arch/*/events/*
perf/x86/amd: Update generic hardware cache events for Family 17h
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull scheduler fix from Ingo Molnar:
"Fix a kobject memory leak in the cpufreq code"
* 'sched-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
sched/cpufreq: Fix kobject memleak
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This recent commit:
5768402fd9c6e87 ("perf/ring_buffer: Use high order allocations for AUX buffers optimistically")
overlooked the fact that the previous one page granularity of the AUX buffer
provided an implicit double buffering capability to the PMU driver, which
went away when the entire buffer became one high-order page.
Always make the full-trace mode AUX allocation at least two-part to preserve
the previous behavior and allow the implicit double buffering to continue.
Reported-by: Ammy Yi <ammy.yi@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Cc: adrian.hunter@intel.com
Fixes: 5768402fd9c6e87 ("perf/ring_buffer: Use high order allocations for AUX buffers optimistically")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190503085536.24119-2-alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Pull networking fixes from David Miller:
1) Out of bounds access in xfrm IPSEC policy unlink, from Yue Haibing.
2) Missing length check for esp4 UDP encap, from Sabrina Dubroca.
3) Fix byte order of RX STBC access in mac80211, from Johannes Berg.
4) Inifnite loop in bpftool map create, from Alban Crequy.
5) Register mark fix in ebpf verifier after pkt/null checks, from Paul
Chaignon.
6) Properly use rcu_dereference_sk_user_data in L2TP code, from Eric
Dumazet.
7) Buffer overrun in marvell phy driver, from Andrew Lunn.
8) Several crash and statistics handling fixes to bnxt_en driver, from
Michael Chan and Vasundhara Volam.
9) Several fixes to the TLS layer from Jakub Kicinski (copying negative
amounts of data in reencrypt, reencrypt frag copying, blind nskb->sk
NULL deref, etc).
10) Several UDP GRO fixes, from Paolo Abeni and Eric Dumazet.
11) PID/UID checks on ipv6 flow labels are inverted, from Willem de
Bruijn.
12) Use after free in l2tp, from Eric Dumazet.
13) IPV6 route destroy races, also from Eric Dumazet.
14) SCTP state machine can erroneously run recursively, fix from Xin
Long.
15) Adjust AF_PACKET msg_name length checks, add padding bytes if
necessary. From Willem de Bruijn.
16) Preserve skb_iif, so that forwarded packets have consistent values
even if fragmentation is involved. From Shmulik Ladkani.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net: (69 commits)
udp: fix GRO packet of death
ipv6: A few fixes on dereferencing rt->from
rds: ib: force endiannes annotation
selftests: fib_rule_tests: print the result and return 1 if any tests failed
ipv4: ip_do_fragment: Preserve skb_iif during fragmentation
net/tls: avoid NULL pointer deref on nskb->sk in fallback
selftests: fib_rule_tests: Fix icmp proto with ipv6
packet: validate msg_namelen in send directly
packet: in recvmsg msg_name return at least sizeof sockaddr_ll
sctp: avoid running the sctp state machine recursively
stmmac: pci: Fix typo in IOT2000 comment
Documentation: fix netdev-FAQ.rst markup warning
ipv6: fix races in ip6_dst_destroy()
l2ip: fix possible use-after-free
appletalk: Set error code if register_snap_client failed
net: dsa: bcm_sf2: fix buffer overflow doing set_rxnfc
rxrpc: Fix net namespace cleanup
ipv6/flowlabel: wait rcu grace period before put_pid()
vrf: Use orig netdev to count Ip6InNoRoutes and a fresh route lookup when sending dest unreach
tcp: add sanity tests in tcp_add_backlog()
...
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Currently the error return path from kobject_init_and_add() is not
followed by a call to kobject_put() - which means we are leaking
the kobject.
Fix it by adding a call to kobject_put() in the error path of
kobject_init_and_add().
Signed-off-by: Tobin C. Harding <tobin@kernel.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tobin C. Harding <tobin@kernel.org>
Cc: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430001144.24890-1-tobin@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull seccomp fixes from Kees Cook:
"Syzbot found a use-after-free bug in seccomp due to flags that should
not be allowed to be used together.
Tycho fixed this, I updated the self-tests, and the syzkaller PoC has
been running for several days without triggering KASan (before this
fix, it would reproduce). These patches have also been in -next for
almost a week, just to be sure.
- Add logic for making some seccomp flags exclusive (Tycho)
- Update selftests for exclusivity testing (Kees)"
* tag 'seccomp-v5.1-rc8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
seccomp: Make NEW_LISTENER and TSYNC flags exclusive
selftests/seccomp: Prepare for exclusive seccomp flags
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull scheduler fix from Ingo Molnar:
"Fix a division by zero bug that can trigger in the NUMA placement
code"
* 'sched-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
sched/numa: Fix a possible divide-by-zero
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"Three tracing fixes:
- Use "nosteal" for ring buffer splice pages
- Memory leak fix in error path of trace_pid_write()
- Fix preempt_enable_no_resched() (use preempt_enable()) in ring
buffer code"
* tag 'trace-v5.1-rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
trace: Fix preempt_enable_no_resched() abuse
tracing: Fix a memory leak by early error exit in trace_pid_write()
tracing: Fix buffer_ref pipe ops
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