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commit 773110470e2fa3839523384ae014f8a723c4d178 upstream.
find_symbol is only used in module.c.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7ef5264de773279b9f23b6cc8afb5addb30e970b upstream.
ref_module isn't used anywhere outside of module.c.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 785e3c0a3a870e72dc530856136ab4c8dd207128 upstream.
The default max PID is set by PID_MAX_DEFAULT, and the tracing
infrastructure uses this number to map PIDs to the comm names of the
tasks, such output of the trace can show names from the recorded PIDs in
the ring buffer. This mapping is also exported to user space via the
"saved_cmdlines" file in the tracefs directory.
But currently the mapping expects the PIDs to be less than
PID_MAX_DEFAULT, which is the default maximum and not the real maximum.
Recently, systemd will increases the maximum value of a PID on the system,
and when tasks are traced that have a PID higher than PID_MAX_DEFAULT, its
comm is not recorded. This leads to the entire trace to have "<...>" as
the comm name, which is pretty useless.
Instead, keep the array mapping the size of PID_MAX_DEFAULT, but instead
of just mapping the index to the comm, map a mask of the PID
(PID_MAX_DEFAULT - 1) to the comm, and find the full PID from the
map_cmdline_to_pid array (that already exists).
This bug goes back to the beginning of ftrace, but hasn't been an issue
until user space started increasing the maximum value of PIDs.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210427113207.3c601884@gandalf.local.home
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: bc0c38d139ec7 ("ftrace: latency tracer infrastructure")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8c9af478c06bb1ab1422f90d8ecbc53defd44bc3 upstream.
# echo switch_mm:traceoff > /sys/kernel/tracing/set_ftrace_filter
will cause switch_mm to stop tracing by the traceoff command.
# echo -n switch_mm:traceoff > /sys/kernel/tracing/set_ftrace_filter
does nothing.
The reason is that the parsing in the write function only processes
commands if it finished parsing (there is white space written after the
command). That's to handle:
write(fd, "switch_mm:", 10);
write(fd, "traceoff", 8);
cases, where the command is broken over multiple writes.
The problem is if the file descriptor is closed, then the write call is
not processed, and the command needs to be processed in the release code.
The release code can handle matching of functions, but does not handle
commands.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: eda1e32855656 ("tracing: handle broken names in ftrace filter")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2d036dfa5f10df9782f5278fc591d79d283c1fad upstream.
The return value on success (>= 0) is overwritten by the return value of
put_old_timex32(). That works correct in the fault case, but is wrong for
the success case where put_old_timex32() returns 0.
Just check the return value of put_old_timex32() and return -EFAULT in case
it is not zero.
[ tglx: Massage changelog ]
Fixes: 3a4d44b61625 ("ntp: Move adjtimex related compat syscalls to native counterparts")
Signed-off-by: Chen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210414030449.90692-1-chenjun102@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4fbf5d6837bf81fd7a27d771358f4ee6c4f243f8 upstream.
The FUTEX_WAIT operand has historically a relative timeout which means that
the clock id is irrelevant as relative timeouts on CLOCK_REALTIME are not
subject to wall clock changes and therefore are mapped by the kernel to
CLOCK_MONOTONIC for simplicity.
If a caller would set FUTEX_CLOCK_REALTIME for FUTEX_WAIT the timeout is
still treated relative vs. CLOCK_MONOTONIC and then the wait arms that
timeout based on CLOCK_REALTIME which is broken and obviously has never
been used or even tested.
Reject any attempt to use FUTEX_CLOCK_REALTIME with FUTEX_WAIT again.
The desired functionality can be achieved with FUTEX_WAIT_BITSET and a
FUTEX_BITSET_MATCH_ANY argument.
Fixes: 337f13046ff0 ("futex: Allow FUTEX_CLOCK_REALTIME with FUTEX_WAIT op")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422194704.834797921@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b9b34ddbe2076ade359cd5ce7537d5ed019e9807 upstream.
The negation logic for the case where the off_reg is sitting in the
dst register is not correct given then we cannot just invert the add
to a sub or vice versa. As a fix, perform the final bitwise and-op
unconditionally into AX from the off_reg, then move the pointer from
the src to dst and finally use AX as the source for the original
pointer arithmetic operation such that the inversion yields a correct
result. The single non-AX mov in between is possible given constant
blinding is retaining it as it's not an immediate based operation.
Fixes: 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Tested-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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for unprivileged"
The 4.14 backport of 9d7eceede ("bpf: restrict unknown scalars of mixed
signed bounds for unprivileged") adds the PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE check to the
wrong location in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(), most likely because 4.14
doesn't include the commit that updates the if-statement to a
switch-statement (aad2eeaf4 "bpf: Simplify ptr_min_max_vals adjustment").
Move the check to the proper location in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals().
Fixes: 17efa65350c5a ("bpf: restrict unknown scalars of mixed signed bounds for unprivileged")
Signed-off-by: Samuel Mendoza-Jonas <samjonas@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Ethan Chen <yishache@amazon.com>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0687c66b5f666b5ad433f4e94251590d9bc9d10e ]
The debug_work_activate() is called on the premise that
the work can be inserted, because if wq be in WQ_DRAINING
status, insert work may be failed.
Fixes: e41e704bc4f4 ("workqueue: improve destroy_workqueue() debuggability")
Signed-off-by: Zqiang <qiang.zhang@windriver.com>
Reviewed-by: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 9deb193af69d3fd6dd8e47f292b67c805a787010 upstream.
Commit cbc3b92ce037 fixed an issue to modify the macros of the stack trace
event so that user space could parse it properly. Originally the stack
trace format to user space showed that the called stack was a dynamic
array. But it is not actually a dynamic array, in the way that other
dynamic event arrays worked, and this broke user space parsing for it. The
update was to make the array look to have 8 entries in it. Helper
functions were added to make it parse it correctly, as the stack was
dynamic, but was determined by the size of the event stored.
Although this fixed user space on how it read the event, it changed the
internal structure used for the stack trace event. It changed the array
size from [0] to [8] (added 8 entries). This increased the size of the
stack trace event by 8 words. The size reserved on the ring buffer was the
size of the stack trace event plus the number of stack entries found in
the stack trace. That commit caused the amount to be 8 more than what was
needed because it did not expect the caller field to have any size. This
produced 8 entries of garbage (and reading random data) from the stack
trace event:
<idle>-0 [002] d... 1976396.837549: <stack trace>
=> trace_event_raw_event_sched_switch
=> __traceiter_sched_switch
=> __schedule
=> schedule_idle
=> do_idle
=> cpu_startup_entry
=> secondary_startup_64_no_verify
=> 0xc8c5e150ffff93de
=> 0xffff93de
=> 0
=> 0
=> 0xc8c5e17800000000
=> 0x1f30affff93de
=> 0x00000004
=> 0x200000000
Instead, subtract the size of the caller field from the size of the event
to make sure that only the amount needed to store the stack trace is
reserved.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/your-ad-here.call-01617191565-ext-9692@work.hours/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: cbc3b92ce037 ("tracing: Set kernel_stack's caller size properly")
Reported-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 81e2073c175b887398e5bca6c004efa89983f58d upstream.
With interrupt force threading all device interrupt handlers are invoked
from kernel threads. Contrary to hard interrupt context the invocation only
disables bottom halfs, but not interrupts. This was an oversight back then
because any code like this will have an issue:
thread(irq_A)
irq_handler(A)
spin_lock(&foo->lock);
interrupt(irq_B)
irq_handler(B)
spin_lock(&foo->lock);
This has been triggered with networking (NAPI vs. hrtimers) and console
drivers where printk() happens from an interrupt which interrupted the
force threaded handler.
Now people noticed and started to change the spin_lock() in the handler to
spin_lock_irqsave() which affects performance or add IRQF_NOTHREAD to the
interrupt request which in turn breaks RT.
Fix the root cause and not the symptom and disable interrupts before
invoking the force threaded handler which preserves the regular semantics
and the usefulness of the interrupt force threading as a general debugging
tool.
For not RT this is not changing much, except that during the execution of
the threaded handler interrupts are delayed until the handler
returns. Vs. scheduling and softirq processing there is no difference.
For RT kernels there is no issue.
Fixes: 8d32a307e4fa ("genirq: Provide forced interrupt threading")
Reported-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210317143859.513307808@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5abbe51a526253b9f003e9a0a195638dc882d660 upstream.
Preparation for fixing get_nr_restart_syscall() on X86 for COMPAT.
Add a new helper which sets restart_block->fn and calls a dummy
arch_set_restart_data() helper.
Fixes: 609c19a385c8 ("x86/ptrace: Stop setting TS_COMPAT in ptrace code")
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210201174641.GA17871@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f232326f6966cf2a1d1db7bc917a4ce5f9f55f76 upstream.
The purpose of this patch is to streamline error propagation and in particular
to propagate retrieve_ptr_limit() errors for pointer types that are not defining
a ptr_limit such that register-based alu ops against these types can be rejected.
The main rationale is that a gap has been identified by Piotr in the existing
protection against speculatively out-of-bounds loads, for example, in case of
ctx pointers, unprivileged programs can still perform pointer arithmetic. This
can be abused to execute speculatively out-of-bounds loads without restrictions
and thus extract contents of kernel memory.
Fix this by rejecting unprivileged programs that attempt any pointer arithmetic
on unprotected pointer types. The two affected ones are pointer to ctx as well
as pointer to map. Field access to a modified ctx' pointer is rejected at a
later point in time in the verifier, and 7c6967326267 ("bpf: Permit map_ptr
arithmetic with opcode add and offset 0") only relevant for root-only use cases.
Risk of unprivileged program breakage is considered very low.
Fixes: 7c6967326267 ("bpf: Permit map_ptr arithmetic with opcode add and offset 0")
Fixes: b2157399cc98 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation")
Signed-off-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1b1597e64e1a610c7a96710fc4717158e98a08b3 upstream.
Given we know the max possible value of ptr_limit at the time of retrieving
the latter, add basic assertions, so that the verifier can bail out if
anything looks odd and reject the program. Nothing triggered this so far,
but it also does not hurt to have these.
Signed-off-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b5871dca250cd391885218b99cc015aca1a51aea upstream.
Instead of having the mov32 with aux->alu_limit - 1 immediate, move this
operation to retrieve_ptr_limit() instead to simplify the logic and to
allow for subsequent sanity boundary checks inside retrieve_ptr_limit().
This avoids in future that at the time of the verifier masking rewrite
we'd run into an underflow which would not sign extend due to the nature
of mov32 instruction.
Signed-off-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 10d2bb2e6b1d8c4576c56a748f697dbeb8388899 upstream.
retrieve_ptr_limit() computes the ptr_limit for registers with stack and
map_value type. ptr_limit is the size of the memory area that is still
valid / in-bounds from the point of the current position and direction
of the operation (add / sub). This size will later be used for masking
the operation such that attempting out-of-bounds access in the speculative
domain is redirected to remain within the bounds of the current map value.
When masking to the right the size is correct, however, when masking to
the left, the size is off-by-one which would lead to an incorrect mask
and thus incorrect arithmetic operation in the non-speculative domain.
Piotr found that if the resulting alu_limit value is zero, then the
BPF_MOV32_IMM() from the fixup_bpf_calls() rewrite will end up loading
0xffffffff into AX instead of sign-extending to the full 64 bit range,
and as a result, this allows abuse for executing speculatively out-of-
bounds loads against 4GB window of address space and thus extracting the
contents of kernel memory via side-channel.
Fixes: 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic")
Signed-off-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8a8109f303e25a27f92c1d8edd67d7cbbc60a4eb upstream.
printk_safe_flush_on_panic() caused the following deadlock on our
server:
CPU0: CPU1:
panic rcu_dump_cpu_stacks
kdump_nmi_shootdown_cpus nmi_trigger_cpumask_backtrace
register_nmi_handler(crash_nmi_callback) printk_safe_flush
__printk_safe_flush
raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&read_lock)
// send NMI to other processors
apic_send_IPI_allbutself(NMI_VECTOR)
// NMI interrupt, dead loop
crash_nmi_callback
printk_safe_flush_on_panic
printk_safe_flush
__printk_safe_flush
// deadlock
raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&read_lock)
DEADLOCK: read_lock is taken on CPU1 and will never get released.
It happens when panic() stops a CPU by NMI while it has been in
the middle of printk_safe_flush().
Handle the lock the same way as logbuf_lock. The printk_safe buffers
are flushed only when both locks can be safely taken. It can avoid
the deadlock _in this particular case_ at expense of losing contents
of printk_safe buffers.
Note: It would actually be safe to re-init the locks when all CPUs were
stopped by NMI. But it would require passing this information
from arch-specific code. It is not worth the complexity.
Especially because logbuf_lock and printk_safe buffers have been
obsoleted by the lockless ring buffer.
Fixes: cf9b1106c81c ("printk/nmi: flush NMI messages on the system panic")
Signed-off-by: Muchun Song <songmuchun@bytedance.com>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210210034823.64867-1-songmuchun@bytedance.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ebfac7b778fac8b0e8e92ec91d0b055f046b4604 upstream.
clang-12 -fno-pic (since
https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/a084c0388e2a59b9556f2de0083333232da3f1d6)
can emit `call __stack_chk_fail@PLT` instead of `call __stack_chk_fail`
on x86. The two forms should have identical behaviors on x86-64 but the
former causes GNU as<2.37 to produce an unreferenced undefined symbol
_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_.
(On x86-32, there is an R_386_PC32 vs R_386_PLT32 difference but the
linker behavior is identical as far as Linux kernel is concerned.)
Simply ignore _GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_ for now, like what
scripts/mod/modpost.c:ignore_undef_symbol does. This also fixes the
problem for gcc/clang -fpie and -fpic, which may emit `call foo@PLT` for
external function calls on x86.
Note: ld -z defs and dynamic loaders do not error for unreferenced
undefined symbols so the module loader is reading too much. If we ever
need to ignore more symbols, the code should be refactored to ignore
unreferenced symbols.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1250
Link: https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=27178
Reported-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Fangrui Song <maskray@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 04b38d012556199ba4c31195940160e0c44c64f0 upstream.
We don't actually care about the value, since the kernel will panic
before that; but a value should nonetheless be returned, otherwise the
compiler will complain.
Fixes: 8112c4f140fa ("seccomp: remove 2-phase API")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.7+
Signed-off-by: Paul Cercueil <paul@crapouillou.net>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210111172839.640914-1-paul@crapouillou.net
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit befe6d946551d65cddbd32b9cb0170b0249fd5ed ]
The list of tracepoint callbacks is managed by an array that is protected
by RCU. To update this array, a new array is allocated, the updates are
copied over to the new array, and then the list of functions for the
tracepoint is switched over to the new array. After a completion of an RCU
grace period, the old array is freed.
This process happens for both adding a callback as well as removing one.
But on removing a callback, if the new array fails to be allocated, the
callback is not removed, and may be used after it is freed by the clients
of the tracepoint.
There's really no reason to fail if the allocation for a new array fails
when removing a function. Instead, the function can simply be replaced by a
stub function that could be cleaned up on the next modification of the
array. That is, instead of calling the function registered to the
tracepoint, it would call a stub function in its place.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201115055256.65625-1-mmullins@mmlx.us
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201116175107.02db396d@gandalf.local.home
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201117211836.54acaef2@oasis.local.home
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201118093405.7a6d2290@gandalf.local.home
[ Note, this version does use undefined compiler behavior (assuming that
a stub function with no parameters or return, can be called by a location
that thinks it has parameters but still no return value. Static calls
do the same thing, so this trick is not without precedent.
There's another solution that uses RCU tricks and is more complex, but
can be an alternative if this solution becomes an issue.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210127170721.58bce7cc@gandalf.local.home/
]
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Cc: KP Singh <kpsingh@chromium.org>
Cc: netdev <netdev@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de>
Fixes: 97e1c18e8d17b ("tracing: Kernel Tracepoints")
Reported-by: syzbot+83aa762ef23b6f0d1991@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+d29e58bb557324e55e5e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: Matt Mullins <mmullins@mmlx.us>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Tested-by: Matt Mullins <mmullins@mmlx.us>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit f31e3386a4e92ba6eda7328cb508462956c94c64 ]
IMA allocates kernel virtual memory to carry forward the measurement
list, from the current kernel to the next kernel on kexec system call,
in ima_add_kexec_buffer() function. This buffer is not freed before
completing the kexec system call resulting in memory leak.
Add ima_buffer field in "struct kimage" to store the virtual address
of the buffer allocated for the IMA measurement list.
Free the memory allocated for the IMA measurement list in
kimage_file_post_load_cleanup() function.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Suggested-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Fixes: 7b8589cc29e7 ("ima: on soft reboot, save the measurement list")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6df8fb83301d68ea0a0c0e1cbcc790fcc333ed12 ]
For double-checked locking in bpf_common_lru_push_free(), node->type is
read outside the critical section and then re-checked under the lock.
However, concurrent writes to node->type result in data races.
For example, the following concurrent access was observed by KCSAN:
write to 0xffff88801521bc22 of 1 bytes by task 10038 on cpu 1:
__bpf_lru_node_move_in kernel/bpf/bpf_lru_list.c:91
__local_list_flush kernel/bpf/bpf_lru_list.c:298
...
read to 0xffff88801521bc22 of 1 bytes by task 10043 on cpu 0:
bpf_common_lru_push_free kernel/bpf/bpf_lru_list.c:507
bpf_lru_push_free kernel/bpf/bpf_lru_list.c:555
...
Fix the data races where node->type is read outside the critical section
(for double-checked locking) by marking the access with READ_ONCE() as
well as ensuring the variable is only accessed once.
Fixes: 3a08c2fd7634 ("bpf: LRU List")
Reported-by: syzbot+3536db46dfa58c573458@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+516acdb03d3e27d91bcd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210209112701.3341724-1-elver@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 93f7a6d818deef69d0ba652d46bae6fbabbf365c upstream.
Currently kdb uses in_interrupt() to determine whether its library
code has been called from the kgdb trap handler or from a saner calling
context such as driver init. This approach is broken because
in_interrupt() alone isn't able to determine kgdb trap handler entry from
normal task context. This can happen during normal use of basic features
such as breakpoints and can also be trivially reproduced using:
echo g > /proc/sysrq-trigger
We can improve this by adding check for in_dbg_master() instead which
explicitly determines if we are running in debugger context.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1611313556-4004-1-git-send-email-sumit.garg@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6183f4d3a0a2ad230511987c6c362ca43ec0055f ]
On 32-bit architecture, roundup_pow_of_two() can return 0 when the argument
has upper most bit set due to resulting 1UL << 32. Add a check for this case.
Fixes: d5a3b1f69186 ("bpf: introduce BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE")
Signed-off-by: Bui Quang Minh <minhquangbui99@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210127063653.3576-1-minhquangbui99@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit b220c049d5196dd94d992dd2dc8cba1a5e6123bf upstream.
When filters are used by trace events, a page is allocated on each CPU and
used to copy the trace event fields to this page before writing to the ring
buffer. The reason to use the filter and not write directly into the ring
buffer is because a filter may discard the event and there's more overhead
on discarding from the ring buffer than the extra copy.
The problem here is that there is no check against the size being allocated
when using this page. If an event asks for more than a page size while being
filtered, it will get only a page, leading to the caller writing more that
what was allocated.
Check the length of the request, and if it is more than PAGE_SIZE minus the
header default back to allocating from the ring buffer directly. The ring
buffer may reject the event if its too big anyway, but it wont overflow.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/ath10k/1612839593-2308-1-git-send-email-wgong@codeaurora.org/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 0fc1b09ff1ff4 ("tracing: Use temp buffer when filtering events")
Reported-by: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 256cfdd6fdf70c6fcf0f7c8ddb0ebd73ce8f3bc9 upstream.
The file /sys/kernel/tracing/events/enable is used to enable all events by
echoing in "1", or disabling all events when echoing in "0". To know if all
events are enabled, disabled, or some are enabled but not all of them,
cating the file should show either "1" (all enabled), "0" (all disabled), or
"X" (some enabled but not all of them). This works the same as the "enable"
files in the individule system directories (like tracing/events/sched/enable).
But when all events are enabled, the top level "enable" file shows "X". The
reason is that its checking the "ftrace" events, which are special events
that only exist for their format files. These include the format for the
function tracer events, that are enabled when the function tracer is
enabled, but not by the "enable" file. The check includes these events,
which will always be disabled, and even though all true events are enabled,
the top level "enable" file will show "X" instead of "1".
To fix this, have the check test the event's flags to see if it has the
"IGNORE_ENABLE" flag set, and if so, not test it.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 553552ce1796c ("tracing: Combine event filter_active and enable into single flags field")
Reported-by: "Yordan Karadzhov (VMware)" <y.karadz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7e0a9220467dbcfdc5bc62825724f3e52e50ab31 upstream.
On some archs, the idle task can call into cpu_suspend(). The cpu_suspend()
will disable or pause function graph tracing, as there's some paths in
bringing down the CPU that can have issues with its return address being
modified. The task_struct structure has a "tracing_graph_pause" atomic
counter, that when set to something other than zero, the function graph
tracer will not modify the return address.
The problem is that the tracing_graph_pause counter is initialized when the
function graph tracer is enabled. This can corrupt the counter for the idle
task if it is suspended in these architectures.
CPU 1 CPU 2
----- -----
do_idle()
cpu_suspend()
pause_graph_tracing()
task_struct->tracing_graph_pause++ (0 -> 1)
start_graph_tracing()
for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
ftrace_graph_init_idle_task(cpu)
task-struct->tracing_graph_pause = 0 (1 -> 0)
unpause_graph_tracing()
task_struct->tracing_graph_pause-- (0 -> -1)
The above should have gone from 1 to zero, and enabled function graph
tracing again. But instead, it is set to -1, which keeps it disabled.
There's no reason that the field tracing_graph_pause on the task_struct can
not be initialized at boot up.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 380c4b1411ccd ("tracing/function-graph-tracer: append the tracing_graph_flag")
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=211339
Reported-by: pierre.gondois@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0188b87899ffc4a1d36a0badbe77d56c92fd91dc upstream.
Our system encountered a re-init error when re-registering same kretprobe,
where the kretprobe_instance in rp->free_instances is illegally accessed
after re-init.
Implementation to avoid re-registration has been introduced for kprobe
before, but lags for register_kretprobe(). We must check if kprobe has
been re-registered before re-initializing kretprobe, otherwise it will
destroy the data struct of kretprobe registered, which can lead to memory
leak, system crash, also some unexpected behaviors.
We use check_kprobe_rereg() to check if kprobe has been re-registered
before running register_kretprobe()'s body, for giving a warning message
and terminate registration process.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210128124427.2031088-1-bobo.shaobowang@huawei.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 1f0ab40976460 ("kprobes: Prevent re-registration of the same kprobe")
[ The above commit should have been done for kretprobes too ]
Acked-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Wang ShaoBo <bobo.shaobowang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Cheng Jian <cj.chengjian@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6e7b64b9dd6d96537d816ea07ec26b7dedd397b9 upstream.
kernel/elfcore.c only contains weak symbols, which triggers a bug with
clang in combination with recordmcount:
Cannot find symbol for section 2: .text.
kernel/elfcore.o: failed
Move the empty stubs into linux/elfcore.h as inline functions. As only
two architectures use these, just use the architecture specific Kconfig
symbols to key off the declaration.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201204165742.3815221-2-arnd@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Barret Rhoden <brho@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit ac687e6e8c26181a33270efd1a2e2241377924b0 ]
There is a need to distinguish geniune per-cpu kthreads from kthreads
that happen to have a single CPU affinity.
Geniune per-cpu kthreads are kthreads that are CPU affine for
correctness, these will obviously have PF_KTHREAD set, but must also
have PF_NO_SETAFFINITY set, lest userspace modify their affinity and
ruins things.
However, these two things are not sufficient, PF_NO_SETAFFINITY is
also set on other tasks that have their affinities controlled through
other means, like for instance workqueues.
Therefore another bit is needed; it turns out kthread_create_per_cpu()
already has such a bit: KTHREAD_IS_PER_CPU, which is used to make
kthread_park()/kthread_unpark() work correctly.
Expose this flag and remove the implicit setting of it from
kthread_create_on_cpu(); the io_uring usage of it seems dubious at
best.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Valentin Schneider <valentin.schneider@arm.com>
Tested-by: Valentin Schneider <valentin.schneider@arm.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210121103506.557620262@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit bbeb97464eefc65f506084fd9f18f21653e01137 upstream.
Below race can come, if trace_open and resize of
cpu buffer is running parallely on different cpus
CPUX CPUY
ring_buffer_resize
atomic_read(&buffer->resize_disabled)
tracing_open
tracing_reset_online_cpus
ring_buffer_reset_cpu
rb_reset_cpu
rb_update_pages
remove/insert pages
resetting pointer
This race can cause data abort or some times infinte loop in
rb_remove_pages and rb_insert_pages while checking pages
for sanity.
Take buffer lock to fix this.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1601976833-24377-1-git-send-email-gkohli@codeaurora.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Reported-by: Denis Efremov <efremov@linux.com>
Signed-off-by: Gaurav Kohli <gkohli@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 34b1a1ce1458f50ef27c54e28eb9b1947012907a upstream
fixup_pi_state_owner() tries to ensure that the state of the rtmutex,
pi_state and the user space value related to the PI futex are consistent
before returning to user space. In case that the user space value update
faults and the fault cannot be resolved by faulting the page in via
fault_in_user_writeable() the function returns with -EFAULT and leaves
the rtmutex and pi_state owner state inconsistent.
A subsequent futex_unlock_pi() operates on the inconsistent pi_state and
releases the rtmutex despite not owning it which can corrupt the RB tree of
the rtmutex and cause a subsequent kernel stack use after free.
It was suggested to loop forever in fixup_pi_state_owner() if the fault
cannot be resolved, but that results in runaway tasks which is especially
undesired when the problem happens due to a programming error and not due
to malice.
As the user space value cannot be fixed up, the proper solution is to make
the rtmutex and the pi_state consistent so both have the same owner. This
leaves the user space value out of sync. Any subsequent operation on the
futex will fail because the 10th rule of PI futexes (pi_state owner and
user space value are consistent) has been violated.
As a consequence this removes the inept attempts of 'fixing' the situation
in case that the current task owns the rtmutex when returning with an
unresolvable fault by unlocking the rtmutex which left pi_state::owner and
rtmutex::owner out of sync in a different and only slightly less dangerous
way.
Fixes: 1b7558e457ed ("futexes: fix fault handling in futex_lock_pi")
Reported-by: gzobqq@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f2dac39d93987f7de1e20b3988c8685523247ae2 upstream
Too many gotos already and an upcoming fix would make it even more
unreadable.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6ccc84f917d33312eb2846bd7b567639f585ad6d upstream
No point in open coding it. This way it gains the extra sanity checks.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2156ac1934166d6deb6cd0f6ffc4c1076ec63697 upstream
Nothing uses the argument. Remove it as preparation to use
pi_state_update_owner().
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c5cade200ab9a2a3be9e7f32a752c8d86b502ec7 upstream
Updating pi_state::owner is done at several places with the same
code. Provide a function for it and use that at the obvious places.
This is also a preparation for a bug fix to avoid yet another copy of the
same code or alternatively introducing a completely unpenetratable mess of
gotos.
Originally-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 04b79c55201f02ffd675e1231d731365e335c307 upstream
If that unexpected case of inconsistent arguments ever happens then the
futex state is left completely inconsistent and the printk is not really
helpful. Replace it with a warning and make the state consistent.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 12bb3f7f1b03d5913b3f9d4236a488aa7774dfe9 upstream
In case that futex_lock_pi() was aborted by a signal or a timeout and the
task returned without acquiring the rtmutex, but is the designated owner of
the futex due to a concurrent futex_unlock_pi() fixup_owner() is invoked to
establish consistent state. In that case it invokes fixup_pi_state_owner()
which in turn tries to acquire the rtmutex again. If that succeeds then it
does not propagate this success to fixup_owner() and futex_lock_pi()
returns -EINTR or -ETIMEOUT despite having the futex locked.
Return success from fixup_pi_state_owner() in all cases where the current
task owns the rtmutex and therefore the futex and propagate it correctly
through fixup_owner(). Fixup the other callsite which does not expect a
positive return value.
Fixes: c1e2f0eaf015 ("futex: Avoid violating the 10th rule of futex")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d70ef22892ed6c066e51e118b225923c9b74af34 upstream.
sign_extend32 counts the sign bit parameter from 0, not from 1. So we
have to use "11" for 12th bit, not "12".
This mistake means we have not allowed negative op and cmp args since
commit 30d6e0a4190d ("futex: Remove duplicated code and fix undefined
behaviour") till now.
Fixes: 30d6e0a4190d ("futex: Remove duplicated code and fix undefined behaviour")
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 01341fbd0d8d4e717fc1231cdffe00343088ce0b ]
In realtime scenario, We do not want to have interference on the
isolated cpu cores. but when invoking alloc_workqueue() for percpu wq
on the housekeeping cpu, it kick a kworker on the isolated cpu.
alloc_workqueue
pwq_adjust_max_active
wake_up_worker
The comment in pwq_adjust_max_active() said:
"Need to kick a worker after thawed or an unbound wq's
max_active is bumped"
So it is unnecessary to kick a kworker for percpu's wq when invoking
alloc_workqueue(). this patch only kick a worker based on the actual
activation of delayed works.
Signed-off-by: Yunfeng Ye <yeyunfeng@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 38dc717e97153e46375ee21797aa54777e5498f3 ]
Apparently there has been a longstanding race between udev/systemd and
the module loader. Currently, the module loader sends a uevent right
after sysfs initialization, but before the module calls its init
function. However, some udev rules expect that the module has
initialized already upon receiving the uevent.
This race has been triggered recently (see link in references) in some
systemd mount unit files. For instance, the configfs module creates the
/sys/kernel/config mount point in its init function, however the module
loader issues the uevent before this happens. sys-kernel-config.mount
expects to be able to mount /sys/kernel/config upon receipt of the
module loading uevent, but if the configfs module has not called its
init function yet, then this directory will not exist and the mount unit
fails. A similar situation exists for sys-fs-fuse-connections.mount, as
the fuse sysfs mount point is created during the fuse module's init
function. If udev is faster than module initialization then the mount
unit would fail in a similar fashion.
To fix this race, delay the module KOBJ_ADD uevent until after the
module has finished calling its init routine.
References: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/17586
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Tested-By: Nicolas Morey-Chaisemartin <nmoreychaisemartin@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5e8ed280dab9eeabc1ba0b2db5dbe9fe6debb6b5 ]
If a module fails to load due to an error in prepare_coming_module(),
the following error handling in load_module() runs with
MODULE_STATE_COMING in module's state. Fix it by correctly setting
MODULE_STATE_GOING under "bug_cleanup" label.
Signed-off-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4615fbc3788ddc8e7c6d697714ad35a53729aa2c ]
When an interrupt allocation fails for N interrupts, it is pretty
common for the error handling code to free the same number of interrupts,
no matter how many interrupts have actually been allocated.
This may result in the domain freeing code to be unexpectedly called
for interrupts that have no mapping in that domain. Things end pretty
badly.
Instead, add some checks to irq_domain_free_irqs_hierarchy() to make sure
that thiss does not follow the hierarchy if no mapping exists for a given
interrupt.
Fixes: 6a6544e520abe ("genirq/irqdomain: Remove auto-recursive hierarchy support")
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201129135551.396777-1-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 345a957fcc95630bf5535d7668a59ed983eb49a7 ]
do_sched_yield() invokes schedule() with interrupts disabled which is
not allowed. This goes back to the pre git era to commit a6efb709806c
("[PATCH] irqlock patch 2.5.27-H6") in the history tree.
Reenable interrupts and remove the misleading comment which "explains" it.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87r1pt7y5c.fsf@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit a57415f5d1e43c3a5c5d412cd85e2792d7ed9b11 ]
When change sched_rt_{runtime, period}_us, we validate that the new
settings should at least accommodate the currently allocated -dl
bandwidth:
sched_rt_handler()
--> sched_dl_bandwidth_validate()
{
new_bw = global_rt_runtime()/global_rt_period();
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
dl_b = dl_bw_of(cpu);
if (new_bw < dl_b->total_bw) <-------
ret = -EBUSY;
}
}
But under CONFIG_SMP, dl_bw is per root domain , but not per CPU,
dl_b->total_bw is the allocated bandwidth of the whole root domain.
Instead, we should compare dl_b->total_bw against "cpus*new_bw",
where 'cpus' is the number of CPUs of the root domain.
Also, below annotation(in kernel/sched/sched.h) implied implementation
only appeared in SCHED_DEADLINE v2[1], then deadline scheduler kept
evolving till got merged(v9), but the annotation remains unchanged,
meaningless and misleading, update it.
* With respect to SMP, the bandwidth is given on a per-CPU basis,
* meaning that:
* - dl_bw (< 100%) is the bandwidth of the system (group) on each CPU;
* - dl_total_bw array contains, in the i-eth element, the currently
* allocated bandwidth on the i-eth CPU.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1267385230.13676.101.camel@Palantir/
Fixes: 332ac17ef5bf ("sched/deadline: Add bandwidth management for SCHED_DEADLINE tasks")
Signed-off-by: Peng Liu <iwtbavbm@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/db6bbda316048cda7a1bbc9571defde193a8d67e.1602171061.git.iwtbavbm@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8ff00399b153440c1c83e20c43020385b416415b ]
powerpc/64s keeps a counter in the mm which counts bits set in
mm_cpumask as well as other things. This means it can't use generic code
to clear bits out of the mask and doesn't adjust the arch specific
counter.
Add an arch override that allows powerpc/64s to use
clear_tasks_mm_cpumask().
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201126102530.691335-4-npiggin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit bcee5278958802b40ee8b26679155a6d9231783e upstream.
When the instances were able to use their own options, the userstacktrace
option was left hardcoded for the top level. This made the instance
userstacktrace option bascially into a nop, and will confuse users that set
it, but nothing happens (I was confused when it happened to me!)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 16270145ce6b ("tracing: Add trace options for core options to instances")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4c75b0ff4e4bf7a45b5aef9639799719c28d0073 upstream.
On powerpc, kprobe-direct.tc triggered FTRACE_WARN_ON() in
ftrace_get_addr_new() followed by the below message:
Bad trampoline accounting at: 000000004222522f (wake_up_process+0xc/0x20) (f0000001)
The set of steps leading to this involved:
- modprobe ftrace-direct-too
- enable_probe
- modprobe ftrace-direct
- rmmod ftrace-direct <-- trigger
The problem turned out to be that we were not updating flags in the
ftrace record properly. From the above message about the trampoline
accounting being bad, it can be seen that the ftrace record still has
FTRACE_FL_TRAMP set though ftrace-direct module is going away. This
happens because we are checking if any ftrace_ops has the
FTRACE_FL_TRAMP flag set _before_ updating the filter hash.
The fix for this is to look for any _other_ ftrace_ops that also needs
FTRACE_FL_TRAMP.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/56c113aa9c3e10c19144a36d9684c7882bf09af5.1606412433.git.naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a124692b698b0 ("ftrace: Enable trampoline when rec count returns back to one")
Signed-off-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit df5b0ab3e08a156701b537809914b339b0daa526 upstream.
Limit the CPU number to num_possible_cpus(), because setting it to a
value lower than INT_MAX but higher than NR_CPUS produces the following
error on reboot and shutdown:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffff90ab1bb0
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 1c09067 P4D 1c09067 PUD 1c0a063 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: systemd-shutdow Not tainted 5.9.0-rc8-kvm #110
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:migrate_to_reboot_cpu+0xe/0x60
Code: ea ea 00 48 89 fa 48 c7 c7 30 57 f1 81 e9 fa ef ff ff 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 53 8b 1d d5 ea ea 00 e8 14 33 fe ff 89 da <48> 0f a3 15 ea fc bd 00 48 89 d0 73 29 89 c2 c1 e8 06 65 48 8b 3c
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000013e08 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: ffff88801f0a0000 RBX: 0000000077359400 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000077359400 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: ffffffff81c199e0
RBP: ffffffff81c1e3c0 R08: ffff88801f41f000 R09: ffffffff81c1e348
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007f32bedf8830 R14: 00000000fee1dead R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f32bedf8980(0000) GS:ffff88801f480000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffffff90ab1bb0 CR3: 000000001d057000 CR4: 00000000000006a0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
__do_sys_reboot.cold+0x34/0x5b
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x40
Fixes: 1b3a5d02ee07 ("reboot: move arch/x86 reboot= handling to generic kernel")
Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Robin Holt <robinmholt@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201103214025.116799-3-mcroce@linux.microsoft.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[sudip: use reboot_mode instead of mode]
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8b92c4ff4423aa9900cf838d3294fcade4dbda35 upstream.
Patch series "fix parsing of reboot= cmdline", v3.
The parsing of the reboot= cmdline has two major errors:
- a missing bound check can crash the system on reboot
- parsing of the cpu number only works if specified last
Fix both.
This patch (of 2):
This reverts commit 616feab753972b97.
kstrtoint() and simple_strtoul() have a subtle difference which makes
them non interchangeable: if a non digit character is found amid the
parsing, the former will return an error, while the latter will just
stop parsing, e.g. simple_strtoul("123xyx") = 123.
The kernel cmdline reboot= argument allows to specify the CPU used for
rebooting, with the syntax `s####` among the other flags, e.g.
"reboot=warm,s31,force", so if this flag is not the last given, it's
silently ignored as well as the subsequent ones.
Fixes: 616feab75397 ("kernel/reboot.c: convert simple_strtoul to kstrtoint")
Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>
Cc: Robin Holt <robinmholt@gmail.com>
Cc: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201103214025.116799-2-mcroce@linux.microsoft.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[sudip: use reboot_mode instead of mode]
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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