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The plan is to supposedly tag everything with PTR_TRUSTED eventually,
however those changes should bring in their respective code, instead
of leaving it around right now. It is arguable whether PTR_TRUSTED is
required for all types, when it's only use case is making PTR_TO_BTF_ID
a bit stronger, while all other types are trusted by default.
Hence, just drop the two instances which do not occur in the verifier
for now to avoid reader confusion.
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230221200646.2500777-5-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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This commits updates the following functions to allow reads from
uninitialized stack locations when env->allow_uninit_stack option is
enabled:
- check_stack_read_fixed_off()
- check_stack_range_initialized(), called from:
- check_stack_read_var_off()
- check_helper_mem_access()
Such change allows to relax logic in stacksafe() to treat STACK_MISC
and STACK_INVALID in a same way and make the following stack slot
configurations equivalent:
| Cached state | Current state |
| stack slot | stack slot |
|------------------+------------------|
| STACK_INVALID or | STACK_INVALID or |
| STACK_MISC | STACK_SPILL or |
| | STACK_MISC or |
| | STACK_ZERO or |
| | STACK_DYNPTR |
This leads to significant verification speed gains (see below).
The idea was suggested by Andrii Nakryiko [1] and initial patch was
created by Alexei Starovoitov [2].
Currently the env->allow_uninit_stack is allowed for programs loaded
by users with CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN capabilities.
A number of test cases from verifier/*.c were expecting uninitialized
stack access to be an error. These test cases were updated to execute
in unprivileged mode (thus preserving the tests).
The test progs/test_global_func10.c expected "invalid indirect read
from stack" error message because of the access to uninitialized
memory region. This error is no longer possible in privileged mode.
The test is updated to provoke an error "invalid indirect access to
stack" because of access to invalid stack address (such error is not
verified by progs/test_global_func*.c series of tests).
The following tests had to be removed because these can't be made
unprivileged:
- verifier/sock.c:
- "sk_storage_get(map, skb->sk, &stack_value, 1): partially init
stack_value"
BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS programs are not executed in unprivileged mode.
- verifier/var_off.c:
- "indirect variable-offset stack access, max_off+size > max_initialized"
- "indirect variable-offset stack access, uninitialized"
These tests verify that access to uninitialized stack values is
detected when stack offset is not a constant. However, variable
stack access is prohibited in unprivileged mode, thus these tests
are no longer valid.
* * *
Here is veristat log comparing this patch with current master on a
set of selftest binaries listed in tools/testing/selftests/bpf/veristat.cfg
and cilium BPF binaries (see [3]):
$ ./veristat -e file,prog,states -C -f 'states_pct<-30' master.log current.log
File Program States (A) States (B) States (DIFF)
-------------------------- -------------------------- ---------- ---------- ----------------
bpf_host.o tail_handle_ipv6_from_host 349 244 -105 (-30.09%)
bpf_host.o tail_handle_nat_fwd_ipv4 1320 895 -425 (-32.20%)
bpf_lxc.o tail_handle_nat_fwd_ipv4 1320 895 -425 (-32.20%)
bpf_sock.o cil_sock4_connect 70 48 -22 (-31.43%)
bpf_sock.o cil_sock4_sendmsg 68 46 -22 (-32.35%)
bpf_xdp.o tail_handle_nat_fwd_ipv4 1554 803 -751 (-48.33%)
bpf_xdp.o tail_lb_ipv4 6457 2473 -3984 (-61.70%)
bpf_xdp.o tail_lb_ipv6 7249 3908 -3341 (-46.09%)
pyperf600_bpf_loop.bpf.o on_event 287 145 -142 (-49.48%)
strobemeta.bpf.o on_event 15915 4772 -11143 (-70.02%)
strobemeta_nounroll2.bpf.o on_event 17087 3820 -13267 (-77.64%)
xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.o syncookie_tc 21271 6635 -14636 (-68.81%)
xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.o syncookie_xdp 23122 6024 -17098 (-73.95%)
-------------------------- -------------------------- ---------- ---------- ----------------
Note: I limited selection by states_pct<-30%.
Inspection of differences in pyperf600_bpf_loop behavior shows that
the following patch for the test removes almost all differences:
- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/pyperf.h
+ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/pyperf.h
@ -266,8 +266,8 @ int __on_event(struct bpf_raw_tracepoint_args *ctx)
}
if (event->pthread_match || !pidData->use_tls) {
- void* frame_ptr;
- FrameData frame;
+ void* frame_ptr = 0;
+ FrameData frame = {};
Symbol sym = {};
int cur_cpu = bpf_get_smp_processor_id();
W/o this patch the difference comes from the following pattern
(for different variables):
static bool get_frame_data(... FrameData *frame ...)
{
...
bpf_probe_read_user(&frame->f_code, ...);
if (!frame->f_code)
return false;
...
bpf_probe_read_user(&frame->co_name, ...);
if (frame->co_name)
...;
}
int __on_event(struct bpf_raw_tracepoint_args *ctx)
{
FrameData frame;
...
get_frame_data(... &frame ...) // indirectly via a bpf_loop & callback
...
}
SEC("raw_tracepoint/kfree_skb")
int on_event(struct bpf_raw_tracepoint_args* ctx)
{
...
ret |= __on_event(ctx);
ret |= __on_event(ctx);
...
}
With regards to value `frame->co_name` the following is important:
- Because of the conditional `if (!frame->f_code)` each call to
__on_event() produces two states, one with `frame->co_name` marked
as STACK_MISC, another with it as is (and marked STACK_INVALID on a
first call).
- The call to bpf_probe_read_user() does not mark stack slots
corresponding to `&frame->co_name` as REG_LIVE_WRITTEN but it marks
these slots as BPF_MISC, this happens because of the following loop
in the check_helper_call():
for (i = 0; i < meta.access_size; i++) {
err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, meta.regno, i, BPF_B,
BPF_WRITE, -1, false);
if (err)
return err;
}
Note the size of the write, it is a one byte write for each byte
touched by a helper. The BPF_B write does not lead to write marks
for the target stack slot.
- Which means that w/o this patch when second __on_event() call is
verified `if (frame->co_name)` will propagate read marks first to a
stack slot with STACK_MISC marks and second to a stack slot with
STACK_INVALID marks and these states would be considered different.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAEf4BzY3e+ZuC6HUa8dCiUovQRg2SzEk7M-dSkqNZyn=xEmnPA@mail.gmail.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAADnVQKs2i1iuZ5SUGuJtxWVfGYR9kDgYKhq3rNV+kBLQCu7rA@mail.gmail.com/
[3] git@github.com:anakryiko/cilium.git
Suggested-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Co-developed-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230219200427.606541-2-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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BPF_STX instruction preserves STACK_ZERO marks for variable offset
writes in situations like below:
*(u64*)(r10 - 8) = 0 ; STACK_ZERO marks for fp[-8]
r0 = random(-7, -1) ; some random number in range of [-7, -1]
r0 += r10 ; r0 is now a variable offset pointer to stack
r1 = 0
*(u8*)(r0) = r1 ; BPF_STX writing zero, STACK_ZERO mark for
; fp[-8] is preserved
This commit updates verifier.c:check_stack_write_var_off() to process
BPF_ST in a similar manner, e.g. the following example:
*(u64*)(r10 - 8) = 0 ; STACK_ZERO marks for fp[-8]
r0 = random(-7, -1) ; some random number in range of [-7, -1]
r0 += r10 ; r0 is now variable offset pointer to stack
*(u8*)(r0) = 0 ; BPF_ST writing zero, STACK_ZERO mark for
; fp[-8] is preserved
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230214232030.1502829-4-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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For aligned stack writes using BPF_ST instruction track stored values
in a same way BPF_STX is handled, e.g. make sure that the following
commands produce similar verifier knowledge:
fp[-8] = 42; r1 = 42;
fp[-8] = r1;
This covers two cases:
- non-null values written to stack are stored as spill of fake
registers;
- null values written to stack are stored as STACK_ZERO marks.
Previously both cases above used STACK_MISC marks instead.
Some verifier test cases relied on the old logic to obtain STACK_MISC
marks for some stack values. These test cases are updated in the same
commit to avoid failures during bisect.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230214232030.1502829-2-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Newly-added bpf_rbtree_{remove,first} kfuncs have some special properties
that require handling in the verifier:
* both bpf_rbtree_remove and bpf_rbtree_first return the type containing
the bpf_rb_node field, with the offset set to that field's offset,
instead of a struct bpf_rb_node *
* mark_reg_graph_node helper added in previous patch generalizes
this logic, use it
* bpf_rbtree_remove's node input is a node that's been inserted
in the tree - a non-owning reference.
* bpf_rbtree_remove must invalidate non-owning references in order to
avoid aliasing issue. Use previously-added
invalidate_non_owning_refs helper to mark this function as a
non-owning ref invalidation point.
* Unlike other functions, which convert one of their input arg regs to
non-owning reference, bpf_rbtree_first takes no arguments and just
returns a non-owning reference (possibly null)
* For now verifier logic for this is special-cased instead of
adding new kfunc flag.
This patch, along with the previous one, complete special verifier
handling for all rbtree API functions added in this series.
With functional verifier handling of rbtree_remove, under current
non-owning reference scheme, a node type with both bpf_{list,rb}_node
fields could cause the verifier to accept programs which remove such
nodes from collections they haven't been added to.
In order to prevent this, this patch adds a check to btf_parse_fields
which rejects structs with both bpf_{list,rb}_node fields. This is a
temporary measure that can be removed after "collection identity"
followup. See comment added in btf_parse_fields. A linked_list BTF test
exercising the new check is added in this patch as well.
Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230214004017.2534011-6-davemarchevsky@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Some BPF helpers take a callback function which the helper calls. For
each helper that takes such a callback, there's a special call to
__check_func_call with a callback-state-setting callback that sets up
verifier bpf_func_state for the callback's frame.
kfuncs don't have any of this infrastructure yet, so let's add it in
this patch, following existing helper pattern as much as possible. To
validate functionality of this added plumbing, this patch adds
callback handling for the bpf_rbtree_add kfunc and hopes to lay
groundwork for future graph datastructure callbacks.
In the "general plumbing" category we have:
* check_kfunc_call doing callback verification right before clearing
CALLER_SAVED_REGS, exactly like check_helper_call
* recognition of func_ptr BTF types in kfunc args as
KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CALLBACK + propagation of subprogno for this arg type
In the "rbtree_add / graph datastructure-specific plumbing" category:
* Since bpf_rbtree_add must be called while the spin_lock associated
with the tree is held, don't complain when callback's func_state
doesn't unlock it by frame exit
* Mark rbtree_add callback's args with ref_set_non_owning
to prevent rbtree api functions from being called in the callback.
Semantically this makes sense, as less() takes no ownership of its
args when determining which comes first.
Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230214004017.2534011-5-davemarchevsky@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Now that we find bpf_rb_root and bpf_rb_node in structs, let's give args
that contain those types special classification and properly handle
these types when checking kfunc args.
"Properly handling" these types largely requires generalizing similar
handling for bpf_list_{head,node}, with little new logic added in this
patch.
Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230214004017.2534011-4-davemarchevsky@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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This patch adds implementations of bpf_rbtree_{add,remove,first}
and teaches verifier about their BTF_IDs as well as those of
bpf_rb_{root,node}.
All three kfuncs have some nonstandard component to their verification
that needs to be addressed in future patches before programs can
properly use them:
* bpf_rbtree_add: Takes 'less' callback, need to verify it
* bpf_rbtree_first: Returns ptr_to_node_type(off=rb_node_off) instead
of ptr_to_rb_node(off=0). Return value ref is
non-owning.
* bpf_rbtree_remove: Returns ptr_to_node_type(off=rb_node_off) instead
of ptr_to_rb_node(off=0). 2nd arg (node) is a
non-owning reference.
Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230214004017.2534011-3-davemarchevsky@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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This patch adds special BPF_RB_{ROOT,NODE} btf_field_types similar to
BPF_LIST_{HEAD,NODE}, adds the necessary plumbing to detect the new
types, and adds bpf_rb_root_free function for freeing bpf_rb_root in
map_values.
structs bpf_rb_root and bpf_rb_node are opaque types meant to
obscure structs rb_root_cached rb_node, respectively.
btf_struct_access will prevent BPF programs from touching these special
fields automatically now that they're recognized.
btf_check_and_fixup_fields now groups list_head and rb_root together as
"graph root" fields and {list,rb}_node as "graph node", and does same
ownership cycle checking as before. Note that this function does _not_
prevent ownership type mixups (e.g. rb_root owning list_node) - that's
handled by btf_parse_graph_root.
After this patch, a bpf program can have a struct bpf_rb_root in a
map_value, but not add anything to nor do anything useful with it.
Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230214004017.2534011-2-davemarchevsky@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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This patch introduces non-owning reference semantics to the verifier,
specifically linked_list API kfunc handling. release_on_unlock logic for
refs is refactored - with small functional changes - to implement these
semantics, and bpf_list_push_{front,back} are migrated to use them.
When a list node is pushed to a list, the program still has a pointer to
the node:
n = bpf_obj_new(typeof(*n));
bpf_spin_lock(&l);
bpf_list_push_back(&l, n);
/* n still points to the just-added node */
bpf_spin_unlock(&l);
What the verifier considers n to be after the push, and thus what can be
done with n, are changed by this patch.
Common properties both before/after this patch:
* After push, n is only a valid reference to the node until end of
critical section
* After push, n cannot be pushed to any list
* After push, the program can read the node's fields using n
Before:
* After push, n retains the ref_obj_id which it received on
bpf_obj_new, but the associated bpf_reference_state's
release_on_unlock field is set to true
* release_on_unlock field and associated logic is used to implement
"n is only a valid ref until end of critical section"
* After push, n cannot be written to, the node must be removed from
the list before writing to its fields
* After push, n is marked PTR_UNTRUSTED
After:
* After push, n's ref is released and ref_obj_id set to 0. NON_OWN_REF
type flag is added to reg's type, indicating that it's a non-owning
reference.
* NON_OWN_REF flag and logic is used to implement "n is only a
valid ref until end of critical section"
* n can be written to (except for special fields e.g. bpf_list_node,
timer, ...)
Summary of specific implementation changes to achieve the above:
* release_on_unlock field, ref_set_release_on_unlock helper, and logic
to "release on unlock" based on that field are removed
* The anonymous active_lock struct used by bpf_verifier_state is
pulled out into a named struct bpf_active_lock.
* NON_OWN_REF type flag is introduced along with verifier logic
changes to handle non-owning refs
* Helpers are added to use NON_OWN_REF flag to implement non-owning
ref semantics as described above
* invalidate_non_owning_refs - helper to clobber all non-owning refs
matching a particular bpf_active_lock identity. Replaces
release_on_unlock logic in process_spin_lock.
* ref_set_non_owning - set NON_OWN_REF type flag after doing some
sanity checking
* ref_convert_owning_non_owning - convert owning reference w/
specified ref_obj_id to non-owning references. Set NON_OWN_REF
flag for each reg with that ref_obj_id and 0-out its ref_obj_id
* Update linked_list selftests to account for minor semantic
differences introduced by this patch
* Writes to a release_on_unlock node ref are not allowed, while
writes to non-owning reference pointees are. As a result the
linked_list "write after push" failure tests are no longer scenarios
that should fail.
* The test##missing_lock##op and test##incorrect_lock##op
macro-generated failure tests need to have a valid node argument in
order to have the same error output as before. Otherwise
verification will fail early and the expected error output won't be seen.
Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230212092715.1422619-2-davemarchevsky@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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net/core/gro.c
7d2c89b32587 ("skb: Do mix page pool and page referenced frags in GRO")
b1a78b9b9886 ("net: add support for ipv4 big tcp")
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230203094454.5766f160@canb.auug.org.au/
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next
Daniel Borkmann says:
====================
bpf-next 2023-01-28
We've added 124 non-merge commits during the last 22 day(s) which contain
a total of 124 files changed, 6386 insertions(+), 1827 deletions(-).
The main changes are:
1) Implement XDP hints via kfuncs with initial support for RX hash and
timestamp metadata kfuncs, from Stanislav Fomichev and
Toke Høiland-Jørgensen.
Measurements on overhead: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/875yellcx6.fsf@toke.dk
2) Extend libbpf's bpf_tracing.h support for tracing arguments of
kprobes/uprobes and syscall as a special case, from Andrii Nakryiko.
3) Significantly reduce the search time for module symbols by livepatch
and BPF, from Jiri Olsa and Zhen Lei.
4) Enable cpumasks to be used as kptrs, which is useful for tracing
programs tracking which tasks end up running on which CPUs
in different time intervals, from David Vernet.
5) Fix several issues in the dynptr processing such as stack slot liveness
propagation, missing checks for PTR_TO_STACK variable offset, etc,
from Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi.
6) Various performance improvements, fixes, and introduction of more
than just one XDP program to XSK selftests, from Magnus Karlsson.
7) Big batch to BPF samples to reduce deprecated functionality,
from Daniel T. Lee.
8) Enable struct_ops programs to be sleepable in verifier,
from David Vernet.
9) Reduce pr_warn() noise on BTF mismatches when they are expected under
the CONFIG_MODULE_ALLOW_BTF_MISMATCH config anyway, from Connor O'Brien.
10) Describe modulo and division by zero behavior of the BPF runtime
in BPF's instruction specification document, from Dave Thaler.
11) Several improvements to libbpf API documentation in libbpf.h,
from Grant Seltzer.
12) Improve resolve_btfids header dependencies related to subcmd and add
proper support for HOSTCC, from Ian Rogers.
13) Add ipip6 and ip6ip decapsulation support for bpf_skb_adjust_room()
helper along with BPF selftests, from Ziyang Xuan.
14) Simplify the parsing logic of structure parameters for BPF trampoline
in the x86-64 JIT compiler, from Pu Lehui.
15) Get BTF working for kernels with CONFIG_RUST enabled by excluding
Rust compilation units with pahole, from Martin Rodriguez Reboredo.
16) Get bpf_setsockopt() working for kTLS on top of TCP sockets,
from Kui-Feng Lee.
17) Disable stack protection for BPF objects in bpftool given BPF backends
don't support it, from Holger Hoffstätte.
* tag 'for-netdev' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next: (124 commits)
selftest/bpf: Make crashes more debuggable in test_progs
libbpf: Add documentation to map pinning API functions
libbpf: Fix malformed documentation formatting
selftests/bpf: Properly enable hwtstamp in xdp_hw_metadata
selftests/bpf: Calls bpf_setsockopt() on a ktls enabled socket.
bpf: Check the protocol of a sock to agree the calls to bpf_setsockopt().
bpf/selftests: Verify struct_ops prog sleepable behavior
bpf: Pass const struct bpf_prog * to .check_member
libbpf: Support sleepable struct_ops.s section
bpf: Allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS programs to be sleepable
selftests/bpf: Fix vmtest static compilation error
tools/resolve_btfids: Alter how HOSTCC is forced
tools/resolve_btfids: Install subcmd headers
bpf/docs: Document the nocast aliasing behavior of ___init
bpf/docs: Document how nested trusted fields may be defined
bpf/docs: Document cpumask kfuncs in a new file
selftests/bpf: Add selftest suite for cpumask kfuncs
selftests/bpf: Add nested trust selftests suite
bpf: Enable cpumasks to be queried and used as kptrs
bpf: Disallow NULLable pointers for trusted kfuncs
...
====================
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230128004827.21371-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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The .check_member field of struct bpf_struct_ops is currently passed the
member's btf_type via const struct btf_type *t, and a const struct
btf_member *member. This allows the struct_ops implementation to check
whether e.g. an ops is supported, but it would be useful to also enforce
that the struct_ops prog being loaded for that member has other
qualities, like being sleepable (or not). This patch therefore updates
the .check_member() callback to also take a const struct bpf_prog *prog
argument.
Signed-off-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125164735.785732-4-void@manifault.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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BPF struct_ops programs currently cannot be marked as sleepable. This
need not be the case -- struct_ops programs can be sleepable, and e.g.
invoke kfuncs that export the KF_SLEEPABLE flag. So as to allow future
struct_ops programs to invoke such kfuncs, this patch updates the
verifier to allow struct_ops programs to be sleepable. A follow-on patch
will add support to libbpf for specifying struct_ops.s as a sleepable
struct_ops program, and then another patch will add testcases to the
dummy_st_ops selftest suite which test sleepable struct_ops behavior.
Signed-off-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125164735.785732-2-void@manifault.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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KF_TRUSTED_ARGS kfuncs currently have a subtle and insidious bug in
validating pointers to scalars. Say that you have a kfunc like the
following, which takes an array as the first argument:
bool bpf_cpumask_empty(const struct cpumask *cpumask)
{
return cpumask_empty(cpumask);
}
...
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_empty, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
...
If a BPF program were to invoke the kfunc with a NULL argument, it would
crash the kernel. The reason is that struct cpumask is defined as a
bitmap, which is itself defined as an array, and is accessed as a memory
address by bitmap operations. So when the verifier analyzes the
register, it interprets it as a pointer to a scalar struct, which is an
array of size 8. check_mem_reg() then sees that the register is NULL and
returns 0, and the kfunc crashes when it passes it down to the cpumask
wrappers.
To fix this, this patch adds a check for KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM which
verifies that the register doesn't contain a possibly-NULL pointer if
the kfunc is KF_TRUSTED_ARGS.
Signed-off-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125143816.721952-2-void@manifault.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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When validating BTF types for KF_TRUSTED_ARGS kfuncs, the verifier
currently enforces that the top-level type must match when calling
the kfunc. In other words, the verifier does not allow the BPF program
to pass a bitwise equivalent struct, despite it being allowed according
to the C standard.
For example, if you have the following type:
struct nf_conn___init {
struct nf_conn ct;
};
The C standard stipulates that it would be safe to pass a struct
nf_conn___init to a kfunc expecting a struct nf_conn. The verifier
currently disallows this, however, as semantically kfuncs may want to
enforce that structs that have equivalent types according to the C
standard, but have different BTF IDs, are not able to be passed to
kfuncs expecting one or the other. For example, struct nf_conn___init
may not be queried / looked up, as it is allocated but may not yet be
fully initialized.
On the other hand, being able to pass types that are equivalent
according to the C standard will be useful for other types of kfunc /
kptrs enabled by BPF. For example, in a follow-on patch, a series of
kfuncs will be added which allow programs to do bitwise queries on
cpumasks that are either allocated by the program (in which case they'll
be a 'struct bpf_cpumask' type that wraps a cpumask_t as its first
element), or a cpumask that was allocated by the main kernel (in which
case it will just be a straight cpumask_t, as in task->cpus_ptr).
Having the two types of cpumasks allows us to distinguish between the
two for when a cpumask is read-only vs. mutatable. A struct bpf_cpumask
can be mutated by e.g. bpf_cpumask_clear(), whereas a regular cpumask_t
cannot be. On the other hand, a struct bpf_cpumask can of course be
queried in the exact same manner as a cpumask_t, with e.g.
bpf_cpumask_test_cpu().
If we were to enforce that top level types match, then a user that's
passing a struct bpf_cpumask to a read-only cpumask_t argument would
have to cast with something like bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx() (which itself
would need to be updated to expect the alias, and currently it only
accommodates a single alias per prog type). Additionally, not specifying
KF_TRUSTED_ARGS is not an option, as some kfuncs take one argument as a
struct bpf_cpumask *, and another as a struct cpumask *
(i.e. cpumask_t).
In order to enable this, this patch relaxes the constraint that a
KF_TRUSTED_ARGS kfunc must have strict type matching, and instead only
enforces strict type matching if a type is observed to be a "no-cast
alias" (i.e., that the type names are equivalent, but one is suffixed
with ___init).
Additionally, in order to try and be conservative and match existing
behavior / expectations, this patch also enforces strict type checking
for acquire kfuncs. We were already enforcing it for release kfuncs, so
this should also improve the consistency of the semantics for kfuncs.
Signed-off-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230120192523.3650503-3-void@manifault.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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In kfuncs, a "trusted" pointer is a pointer that the kfunc can assume is
safe, and which the verifier will allow to be passed to a
KF_TRUSTED_ARGS kfunc. Currently, a KF_TRUSTED_ARGS kfunc disallows any
pointer to be passed at a nonzero offset, but sometimes this is in fact
safe if the "nested" pointer's lifetime is inherited from its parent.
For example, the const cpumask_t *cpus_ptr field in a struct task_struct
will remain valid until the task itself is destroyed, and thus would
also be safe to pass to a KF_TRUSTED_ARGS kfunc.
While it would be conceptually simple to enable this by using BTF tags,
gcc unfortunately does not yet support this. In the interim, this patch
enables support for this by using a type-naming convention. A new
BTF_TYPE_SAFE_NESTED macro is defined in verifier.c which allows a
developer to specify the nested fields of a type which are considered
trusted if its parent is also trusted. The verifier is also updated to
account for this. A patch with selftests will be added in a follow-on
change, along with documentation for this feature.
Signed-off-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230120192523.3650503-2-void@manifault.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Instead of rejecting the attaching of PROG_TYPE_EXT programs to XDP
programs that consume HW metadata, implement support for propagating the
offload information. The extension program doesn't need to set a flag or
ifindex, these will just be propagated from the target by the verifier.
We need to create a separate offload object for the extension program,
though, since it can be reattached to a different program later (which
means we can't just inherit the offload information from the target).
An additional check is added on attach that the new target is compatible
with the offload information in the extension prog.
Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230119221536.3349901-9-sdf@google.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
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Define a new kfunc set (xdp_metadata_kfunc_ids) which implements all possible
XDP metatada kfuncs. Not all devices have to implement them. If kfunc is not
supported by the target device, the default implementation is called instead.
The verifier, at load time, replaces a call to the generic kfunc with a call
to the per-device one. Per-device kfunc pointers are stored in separate
struct xdp_metadata_ops.
Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Cc: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Cc: Anatoly Burakov <anatoly.burakov@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Lobakin <alexandr.lobakin@intel.com>
Cc: Magnus Karlsson <magnus.karlsson@gmail.com>
Cc: Maryam Tahhan <mtahhan@redhat.com>
Cc: xdp-hints@xdp-project.net
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230119221536.3349901-8-sdf@google.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
|
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BPF offloading infra will be reused to implement
bound-but-not-offloaded bpf programs. Rename existing
helpers for clarity. No functional changes.
Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Cc: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Cc: Anatoly Burakov <anatoly.burakov@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Lobakin <alexandr.lobakin@intel.com>
Cc: Magnus Karlsson <magnus.karlsson@gmail.com>
Cc: Maryam Tahhan <mtahhan@redhat.com>
Cc: xdp-hints@xdp-project.net
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230119221536.3349901-3-sdf@google.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
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Currently, process_dynptr_func first calls dynptr_get_spi and then
is_dynptr_reg_valid_init and is_dynptr_reg_valid_uninit have to call it
again to obtain the spi value. Instead of doing this twice, reuse the
already obtained value (which is by default 0, and is only set for
PTR_TO_STACK, and only used in that case in aforementioned functions).
The input value for these two functions will either be -ERANGE or >= 1,
and can either be permitted or rejected based on the respective check.
Suggested-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230121002241.2113993-8-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
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Currently, a check on spi resides in dynptr_get_spi, while others
checking its validity for being within the allocated stack slots happens
in is_spi_bounds_valid. Almost always barring a couple of cases (where
being beyond allocated stack slots is not an error as stack slots need
to be populated), both are used together to make checks. Hence, subsume
the is_spi_bounds_valid check in dynptr_get_spi, and return -ERANGE to
specially distinguish the case where spi is valid but not within
allocated slots in the stack state.
The is_spi_bounds_valid function is still kept around as it is a generic
helper that will be useful for other objects on stack similar to dynptr
in the future.
Suggested-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230121002241.2113993-7-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
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Consider a program like below:
void prog(void)
{
{
struct bpf_dynptr ptr;
bpf_dynptr_from_mem(...);
}
...
{
struct bpf_dynptr ptr;
bpf_dynptr_from_mem(...);
}
}
Here, the C compiler based on lifetime rules in the C standard would be
well within in its rights to share stack storage for dynptr 'ptr' as
their lifetimes do not overlap in the two distinct scopes. Currently,
such an example would be rejected by the verifier, but this is too
strict. Instead, we should allow reinitializing over dynptr stack slots
and forget information about the old dynptr object.
The destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot function already makes necessary checks
to avoid overwriting referenced dynptr slots. This is done to present a
better error message instead of forgetting dynptr information on stack
and preserving reference state, leading to an inevitable but
undecipherable error at the end about an unreleased reference which has
to be associated back to its allocating call instruction to make any
sense to the user.
Acked-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230121002241.2113993-6-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
|
The previous commit implemented destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot. It
destroys the dynptr which given spi belongs to, but still doesn't
invalidate the slices that belong to such a dynptr. While for the case
of referenced dynptr, we don't allow their overwrite and return an error
early, we still allow it and destroy the dynptr for unreferenced dynptr.
To be able to enable precise and scoped invalidation of dynptr slices in
this case, we must be able to associate the source dynptr of slices that
have been obtained using bpf_dynptr_data. When doing destruction, only
slices belonging to the dynptr being destructed should be invalidated,
and nothing else. Currently, dynptr slices belonging to different
dynptrs are indistinguishible.
Hence, allocate a unique id to each dynptr (CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR and
those on stack). This will be stored as part of reg->id. Whenever using
bpf_dynptr_data, transfer this unique dynptr id to the returned
PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL slice pointer, and store it in a new per-PTR_TO_MEM
dynptr_id register state member.
Finally, after establishing such a relationship between dynptrs and
their slices, implement precise invalidation logic that only invalidates
slices belong to the destroyed dynptr in destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot.
Acked-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230121002241.2113993-5-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
|
Currently, while reads are disallowed for dynptr stack slots, writes are
not. Reads don't work from both direct access and helpers, while writes
do work in both cases, but have the effect of overwriting the slot_type.
While this is fine, handling for a few edge cases is missing. Firstly,
a user can overwrite the stack slots of dynptr partially.
Consider the following layout:
spi: [d][d][?]
2 1 0
First slot is at spi 2, second at spi 1.
Now, do a write of 1 to 8 bytes for spi 1.
This will essentially either write STACK_MISC for all slot_types or
STACK_MISC and STACK_ZERO (in case of size < BPF_REG_SIZE partial write
of zeroes). The end result is that slot is scrubbed.
Now, the layout is:
spi: [d][m][?]
2 1 0
Suppose if user initializes spi = 1 as dynptr.
We get:
spi: [d][d][d]
2 1 0
But this time, both spi 2 and spi 1 have first_slot = true.
Now, when passing spi 2 to dynptr helper, it will consider it as
initialized as it does not check whether second slot has first_slot ==
false. And spi 1 should already work as normal.
This effectively replaced size + offset of first dynptr, hence allowing
invalid OOB reads and writes.
Make a few changes to protect against this:
When writing to PTR_TO_STACK using BPF insns, when we touch spi of a
STACK_DYNPTR type, mark both first and second slot (regardless of which
slot we touch) as STACK_INVALID. Reads are already prevented.
Second, prevent writing to stack memory from helpers if the range may
contain any STACK_DYNPTR slots. Reads are already prevented.
For helpers, we cannot allow it to destroy dynptrs from the writes as
depending on arguments, helper may take uninit_mem and dynptr both at
the same time. This would mean that helper may write to uninit_mem
before it reads the dynptr, which would be bad.
PTR_TO_MEM: [?????dd]
Depending on the code inside the helper, it may end up overwriting the
dynptr contents first and then read those as the dynptr argument.
Verifier would only simulate destruction when it does byte by byte
access simulation in check_helper_call for meta.access_size, and
fail to catch this case, as it happens after argument checks.
The same would need to be done for any other non-trivial objects created
on the stack in the future, such as bpf_list_head on stack, or
bpf_rb_root on stack.
A common misunderstanding in the current code is that MEM_UNINIT means
writes, but note that writes may also be performed even without
MEM_UNINIT in case of helpers, in that case the code after handling meta
&& meta->raw_mode will complain when it sees STACK_DYNPTR. So that
invalid read case also covers writes to potential STACK_DYNPTR slots.
The only loophole was in case of meta->raw_mode which simulated writes
through instructions which could overwrite them.
A future series sequenced after this will focus on the clean up of
helper access checks and bugs around that.
Fixes: 97e03f521050 ("bpf: Add verifier support for dynptrs")
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230121002241.2113993-4-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
|
Currently, the dynptr function is not checking the variable offset part
of PTR_TO_STACK that it needs to check. The fixed offset is considered
when computing the stack pointer index, but if the variable offset was
not a constant (such that it could not be accumulated in reg->off), we
will end up a discrepency where runtime pointer does not point to the
actual stack slot we mark as STACK_DYNPTR.
It is impossible to precisely track dynptr state when variable offset is
not constant, hence, just like bpf_timer, kptr, bpf_spin_lock, etc.
simply reject the case where reg->var_off is not constant. Then,
consider both reg->off and reg->var_off.value when computing the stack
pointer index.
A new helper dynptr_get_spi is introduced to hide over these details
since the dynptr needs to be located in multiple places outside the
process_dynptr_func checks, hence once we know it's a PTR_TO_STACK, we
need to enforce these checks in all places.
Note that it is disallowed for unprivileged users to have a non-constant
var_off, so this problem should only be possible to trigger from
programs having CAP_PERFMON. However, its effects can vary.
Without the fix, it is possible to replace the contents of the dynptr
arbitrarily by making verifier mark different stack slots than actual
location and then doing writes to the actual stack address of dynptr at
runtime.
Fixes: 97e03f521050 ("bpf: Add verifier support for dynptrs")
Acked-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230121002241.2113993-3-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
|
The root of the problem is missing liveness marking for STACK_DYNPTR
slots. This leads to all kinds of problems inside stacksafe.
The verifier by default inside stacksafe ignores spilled_ptr in stack
slots which do not have REG_LIVE_READ marks. Since this is being checked
in the 'old' explored state, it must have already done clean_live_states
for this old bpf_func_state. Hence, it won't be receiving any more
liveness marks from to be explored insns (it has received REG_LIVE_DONE
marking from liveness point of view).
What this means is that verifier considers that it's safe to not compare
the stack slot if was never read by children states. While liveness
marks are usually propagated correctly following the parentage chain for
spilled registers (SCALAR_VALUE and PTR_* types), the same is not the
case for STACK_DYNPTR.
clean_live_states hence simply rewrites these stack slots to the type
STACK_INVALID since it sees no REG_LIVE_READ marks.
The end result is that we will never see STACK_DYNPTR slots in explored
state. Even if verifier was conservatively matching !REG_LIVE_READ
slots, very next check continuing the stacksafe loop on seeing
STACK_INVALID would again prevent further checks.
Now as long as verifier stores an explored state which we can compare to
when reaching a pruning point, we can abuse this bug to make verifier
prune search for obviously unsafe paths using STACK_DYNPTR slots
thinking they are never used hence safe.
Doing this in unprivileged mode is a bit challenging. add_new_state is
only set when seeing BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ (which requires privileges)
or when jmps_processed difference is >= 2 and insn_processed difference
is >= 8. So coming up with the unprivileged case requires a little more
work, but it is still totally possible. The test case being discussed
below triggers the heuristic even in unprivileged mode.
However, it no longer works since commit
8addbfc7b308 ("bpf: Gate dynptr API behind CAP_BPF").
Let's try to study the test step by step.
Consider the following program (C style BPF ASM):
0 r0 = 0;
1 r6 = &ringbuf_map;
3 r1 = r6;
4 r2 = 8;
5 r3 = 0;
6 r4 = r10;
7 r4 -= -16;
8 call bpf_ringbuf_reserve_dynptr;
9 if r0 == 0 goto pc+1;
10 goto pc+1;
11 *(r10 - 16) = 0xeB9F;
12 r1 = r10;
13 r1 -= -16;
14 r2 = 0;
15 call bpf_ringbuf_discard_dynptr;
16 r0 = 0;
17 exit;
We know that insn 12 will be a pruning point, hence if we force
add_new_state for it, it will first verify the following path as
safe in straight line exploration:
0 1 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 -> 10 -> (12) 13 14 15 16 17
Then, when we arrive at insn 12 from the following path:
0 1 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 -> 11 (12)
We will find a state that has been verified as safe already at insn 12.
Since register state is same at this point, regsafe will pass. Next, in
stacksafe, for spi = 0 and spi = 1 (location of our dynptr) is skipped
seeing !REG_LIVE_READ. The rest matches, so stacksafe returns true.
Next, refsafe is also true as reference state is unchanged in both
states.
The states are considered equivalent and search is pruned.
Hence, we are able to construct a dynptr with arbitrary contents and use
the dynptr API to operate on this arbitrary pointer and arbitrary size +
offset.
To fix this, first define a mark_dynptr_read function that propagates
liveness marks whenever a valid initialized dynptr is accessed by dynptr
helpers. REG_LIVE_WRITTEN is marked whenever we initialize an
uninitialized dynptr. This is done in mark_stack_slots_dynptr. It allows
screening off mark_reg_read and not propagating marks upwards from that
point.
This ensures that we either set REG_LIVE_READ64 on both dynptr slots, or
none, so clean_live_states either sets both slots to STACK_INVALID or
none of them. This is the invariant the checks inside stacksafe rely on.
Next, do a complete comparison of both stack slots whenever they have
STACK_DYNPTR. Compare the dynptr type stored in the spilled_ptr, and
also whether both form the same first_slot. Only then is the later path
safe.
Fixes: 97e03f521050 ("bpf: Add verifier support for dynptrs")
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230121002241.2113993-2-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
|
drivers/net/ipa/ipa_interrupt.c
drivers/net/ipa/ipa_interrupt.h
9ec9b2a30853 ("net: ipa: disable ipa interrupt during suspend")
8e461e1f092b ("net: ipa: introduce ipa_interrupt_enable()")
d50ed3558719 ("net: ipa: enable IPA interrupt handlers separate from registration")
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230119114125.5182c7ab@canb.auug.org.au/
https://lore.kernel.org/all/79e46152-8043-a512-79d9-c3b905462774@tessares.net/
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
Register range information is copied in several places. The intent is
to transfer range/id information from one register/stack spill to
another. Currently this is done using direct register assignment, e.g.:
static void find_equal_scalars(..., struct bpf_reg_state *known_reg)
{
...
struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
...
*reg = *known_reg;
...
}
However, such assignments also copy the following bpf_reg_state fields:
struct bpf_reg_state {
...
struct bpf_reg_state *parent;
...
enum bpf_reg_liveness live;
...
};
Copying of these fields is accidental and incorrect, as could be
demonstrated by the following example:
0: call ktime_get_ns()
1: r6 = r0
2: call ktime_get_ns()
3: r7 = r0
4: if r0 > r6 goto +1 ; r0 & r6 are unbound thus generated
; branch states are identical
5: *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = 0xdeadbeef ; 64-bit write to fp[-8]
--- checkpoint ---
6: r1 = 42 ; r1 marked as written
7: *(u8 *)(r10 - 8) = r1 ; 8-bit write, fp[-8] parent & live
; overwritten
8: r2 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8)
9: r0 = 0
10: exit
This example is unsafe because 64-bit write to fp[-8] at (5) is
conditional, thus not all bytes of fp[-8] are guaranteed to be set
when it is read at (8). However, currently the example passes
verification.
First, the execution path 1-10 is examined by verifier.
Suppose that a new checkpoint is created by is_state_visited() at (6).
After checkpoint creation:
- r1.parent points to checkpoint.r1,
- fp[-8].parent points to checkpoint.fp[-8].
At (6) the r1.live is set to REG_LIVE_WRITTEN.
At (7) the fp[-8].parent is set to r1.parent and fp[-8].live is set to
REG_LIVE_WRITTEN, because of the following code called in
check_stack_write_fixed_off():
static void save_register_state(struct bpf_func_state *state,
int spi, struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
int size)
{
...
state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr = *reg; // <--- parent & live copied
if (size == BPF_REG_SIZE)
state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
...
}
Note the intent to mark stack spill as written only if 8 bytes are
spilled to a slot, however this intent is spoiled by a 'live' field copy.
At (8) the checkpoint.fp[-8] should be marked as REG_LIVE_READ but
this does not happen:
- fp[-8] in a current state is already marked as REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
- fp[-8].parent points to checkpoint.r1, parentage chain is used by
mark_reg_read() to mark checkpoint states.
At (10) the verification is finished for path 1-10 and jump 4-6 is
examined. The checkpoint.fp[-8] never gets REG_LIVE_READ mark and this
spill is pruned from the cached states by clean_live_states(). Hence
verifier state obtained via path 1-4,6 is deemed identical to one
obtained via path 1-6 and program marked as safe.
Note: the example should be executed with BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ flag
set to force creation of intermediate verifier states.
This commit revisits the locations where bpf_reg_state instances are
copied and replaces the direct copies with a call to a function
copy_register_state(dst, src) that preserves 'parent' and 'live'
fields of the 'dst'.
Fixes: 679c782de14b ("bpf/verifier: per-register parent pointers")
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230106142214.1040390-2-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
|
Currently we allow to load any tracing program as sleepable,
but BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP can't sleep. Making the check explicit
for tracing programs attach types, so sleepable BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP
will fail to load.
Updating the verifier error to mention iter programs as well.
Acked-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230117223705.440975-1-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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|
To mitigate Spectre v4, 2039f26f3aca ("bpf: Fix leakage due to
insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation") inserts lfence
instructions after 1) initializing a stack slot and 2) spilling a
pointer to the stack.
However, this does not cover cases where a stack slot is first
initialized with a pointer (subject to sanitization) but then
overwritten with a scalar (not subject to sanitization because
the slot was already initialized). In this case, the second write
may be subject to speculative store bypass (SSB) creating a
speculative pointer-as-scalar type confusion. This allows the
program to subsequently leak the numerical pointer value using,
for example, a branch-based cache side channel.
To fix this, also sanitize scalars if they write a stack slot
that previously contained a pointer. Assuming that pointer-spills
are only generated by LLVM on register-pressure, the performance
impact on most real-world BPF programs should be small.
The following unprivileged BPF bytecode drafts a minimal exploit
and the mitigation:
[...]
// r6 = 0 or 1 (skalar, unknown user input)
// r7 = accessible ptr for side channel
// r10 = frame pointer (fp), to be leaked
//
r9 = r10 # fp alias to encourage ssb
*(u64 *)(r9 - 8) = r10 // fp[-8] = ptr, to be leaked
// lfence added here because of pointer spill to stack.
//
// Ommitted: Dummy bpf_ringbuf_output() here to train alias predictor
// for no r9-r10 dependency.
//
*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r6 // fp[-8] = scalar, overwrites ptr
// 2039f26f3aca: no lfence added because stack slot was not STACK_INVALID,
// store may be subject to SSB
//
// fix: also add an lfence when the slot contained a ptr
//
r8 = *(u64 *)(r9 - 8)
// r8 = architecturally a scalar, speculatively a ptr
//
// leak ptr using branch-based cache side channel:
r8 &= 1 // choose bit to leak
if r8 == 0 goto SLOW // no mispredict
// architecturally dead code if input r6 is 0,
// only executes speculatively iff ptr bit is 1
r8 = *(u64 *)(r7 + 0) # encode bit in cache (0: slow, 1: fast)
SLOW:
[...]
After running this, the program can time the access to *(r7 + 0) to
determine whether the chosen pointer bit was 0 or 1. Repeat this 64
times to recover the whole address on amd64.
In summary, sanitization can only be skipped if one scalar is
overwritten with another scalar. Scalar-confusion due to speculative
store bypass can not lead to invalid accesses because the pointer
bounds deducted during verification are enforced using branchless
logic. See 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on
pointer arithmetic") for details.
Do not make the mitigation depend on !env->allow_{uninit_stack,ptr_leaks}
because speculative leaks are likely unexpected if these were enabled.
For example, leaking the address to a protected log file may be acceptable
while disabling the mitigation might unintentionally leak the address
into the cached-state of a map that is accessible to unprivileged
processes.
Fixes: 2039f26f3aca ("bpf: Fix leakage due to insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation")
Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <gerhorst@cs.fau.de>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Henriette Hofmeier <henriette.hofmeier@rub.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/edc95bad-aada-9cfc-ffe2-fa9bb206583c@cs.fau.de
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230109150544.41465-1-gerhorst@cs.fau.de
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The verifier skips invalid kfunc call in check_kfunc_call(), which
would be captured in fixup_kfunc_call() if such insn is not eliminated
by dead code elimination. However, this can lead to the following
warning in backtrack_insn(), also see [1]:
------------[ cut here ]------------
verifier backtracking bug
WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 8646 at kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2756 backtrack_insn
kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2756
__mark_chain_precision kernel/bpf/verifier.c:3065
mark_chain_precision kernel/bpf/verifier.c:3165
adjust_reg_min_max_vals kernel/bpf/verifier.c:10715
check_alu_op kernel/bpf/verifier.c:10928
do_check kernel/bpf/verifier.c:13821 [inline]
do_check_common kernel/bpf/verifier.c:16289
[...]
So make backtracking conservative with this by returning ENOTSUPP.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CACkBjsaXNceR8ZjkLG=dT3P=4A8SBsg0Z5h5PWLryF5=ghKq=g@mail.gmail.com/
Reported-by: syzbot+4da3ff23081bafe74fc2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Hao Sun <sunhao.th@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230104014709.9375-1-sunhao.th@gmail.com
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No conflicts.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
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Many of the structs recently added to track field info for linked-list
head are useful as-is for rbtree root. So let's do a mechanical renaming
of list_head-related types and fields:
include/linux/bpf.h:
struct btf_field_list_head -> struct btf_field_graph_root
list_head -> graph_root in struct btf_field union
kernel/bpf/btf.c:
list_head -> graph_root in struct btf_field_info
This is a nonfunctional change, functionality to actually use these
fields for rbtree will be added in further patches.
Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221217082506.1570898-5-davemarchevsky@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Instead of counting on prior allocations to have sized allocations to
the next kmalloc bucket size, always perform a krealloc that is at least
ksize(dst) in size (which is a no-op), so the size can be correctly
tracked by all the various allocation size trackers (KASAN,
__alloc_size, etc).
Reported-by: Hyunwoo Kim <v4bel@theori.io>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20221223094551.GA1439509@ubuntu
Fixes: ceb35b666d42 ("bpf/verifier: Use kmalloc_size_roundup() to match ksize() usage")
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev>
Cc: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Cc: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Cc: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Cc: Hao Luo <haoluo@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221223182836.never.866-kees@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Comparing IDs exactly between two separate states is not just
suboptimal, but also incorrect in some cases. So update regs_exact()
check to do byte-by-byte memcmp() only up to id/ref_obj_id. For id and
ref_obj_id perform proper check_ids() checks, taking into account idmap.
This change makes more states equivalent improving insns and states
stats across a bunch of selftest BPF programs:
File Program Insns (A) Insns (B) Insns (DIFF) States (A) States (B) States (DIFF)
------------------------------------------- -------------------------------- --------- --------- -------------- ---------- ---------- -------------
cgrp_kfunc_success.bpf.linked1.o test_cgrp_get_release 141 137 -4 (-2.84%) 13 13 +0 (+0.00%)
cgrp_kfunc_success.bpf.linked1.o test_cgrp_xchg_release 142 139 -3 (-2.11%) 14 13 -1 (-7.14%)
connect6_prog.bpf.linked1.o connect_v6_prog 139 102 -37 (-26.62%) 9 6 -3 (-33.33%)
ima.bpf.linked1.o bprm_creds_for_exec 68 61 -7 (-10.29%) 6 5 -1 (-16.67%)
linked_list.bpf.linked1.o global_list_in_list 569 499 -70 (-12.30%) 60 52 -8 (-13.33%)
linked_list.bpf.linked1.o global_list_push_pop 167 150 -17 (-10.18%) 18 16 -2 (-11.11%)
linked_list.bpf.linked1.o global_list_push_pop_multiple 881 815 -66 (-7.49%) 74 63 -11 (-14.86%)
linked_list.bpf.linked1.o inner_map_list_in_list 579 534 -45 (-7.77%) 61 55 -6 (-9.84%)
linked_list.bpf.linked1.o inner_map_list_push_pop 190 181 -9 (-4.74%) 19 18 -1 (-5.26%)
linked_list.bpf.linked1.o inner_map_list_push_pop_multiple 916 850 -66 (-7.21%) 75 64 -11 (-14.67%)
linked_list.bpf.linked1.o map_list_in_list 588 525 -63 (-10.71%) 62 55 -7 (-11.29%)
linked_list.bpf.linked1.o map_list_push_pop 183 174 -9 (-4.92%) 18 17 -1 (-5.56%)
linked_list.bpf.linked1.o map_list_push_pop_multiple 909 843 -66 (-7.26%) 75 64 -11 (-14.67%)
map_kptr.bpf.linked1.o test_map_kptr 264 256 -8 (-3.03%) 26 26 +0 (+0.00%)
map_kptr.bpf.linked1.o test_map_kptr_ref 95 91 -4 (-4.21%) 9 8 -1 (-11.11%)
task_kfunc_success.bpf.linked1.o test_task_xchg_release 139 136 -3 (-2.16%) 14 13 -1 (-7.14%)
test_bpf_nf.bpf.linked1.o nf_skb_ct_test 815 509 -306 (-37.55%) 57 30 -27 (-47.37%)
test_bpf_nf.bpf.linked1.o nf_xdp_ct_test 815 509 -306 (-37.55%) 57 30 -27 (-47.37%)
test_cls_redirect.bpf.linked1.o cls_redirect 78925 78390 -535 (-0.68%) 4782 4704 -78 (-1.63%)
test_cls_redirect_subprogs.bpf.linked1.o cls_redirect 64901 63897 -1004 (-1.55%) 4612 4470 -142 (-3.08%)
test_sk_lookup.bpf.linked1.o access_ctx_sk 181 95 -86 (-47.51%) 19 10 -9 (-47.37%)
test_sk_lookup.bpf.linked1.o ctx_narrow_access 447 437 -10 (-2.24%) 38 37 -1 (-2.63%)
test_sk_lookup_kern.bpf.linked1.o sk_lookup_success 148 133 -15 (-10.14%) 14 12 -2 (-14.29%)
test_tcp_check_syncookie_kern.bpf.linked1.o check_syncookie_clsact 304 300 -4 (-1.32%) 23 22 -1 (-4.35%)
test_tcp_check_syncookie_kern.bpf.linked1.o check_syncookie_xdp 304 300 -4 (-1.32%) 23 22 -1 (-4.35%)
test_verify_pkcs7_sig.bpf.linked1.o bpf 87 76 -11 (-12.64%) 7 6 -1 (-14.29%)
------------------------------------------- -------------------------------- --------- --------- -------------- ---------- ---------- -------------
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221223054921.958283-7-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Extract byte-by-byte comparison of bpf_reg_state in regsafe() into
a helper function, which makes it more convenient to use it "on demand"
only for registers that benefit from such checks, instead of doing it
all the time, even if result of such comparison is ignored.
Also, remove WARN_ON_ONCE(1)+return false dead code. There is no risk of
missing some case as compiler will warn about non-void function not
returning value in some branches (and that under assumption that default
case is removed in the future).
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221223054921.958283-6-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Generalize the (somewhat implicit) rule of regsafe(), which states that
if register types in old and current states do not match *exactly*, they
can't be safely considered equivalent.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221223054921.958283-5-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
|
Make generic check to prevent XXX_OR_NULL and XXX register types to be
intermixed. While technically in some situations it could be safe, it's
impossible to enforce due to the loss of an ID when converting
XXX_OR_NULL to its non-NULL variant. So prevent this in general, not
just for PTR_TO_MAP_KEY and PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE.
PTR_TO_MAP_KEY_OR_NULL and PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL checks, which were
previously special-cased, are simplified to generic check that takes
into account range_within() and tnum_in(). This is correct as BPF
verifier doesn't allow arithmetic on XXX_OR_NULL register types, so
var_off and ranges should stay zero. But even if in the future this
restriction is lifted, it's even more important to enforce that var_off
and ranges are compatible, otherwise it's possible to construct case
where this can be exploited to bypass verifier's memory range safety
checks.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221223054921.958283-4-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
|
Move id and ref_obj_id fields after scalar data section (var_off and
ranges). This is necessary to simplify next patch which will change
regsafe()'s logic to be safer, as it makes the contents that has to be
an exact match (type-specific parts, off, type, and var_off+ranges)
a single sequential block of memory, while id and ref_obj_id should
always be remapped and thus can't be memcp()'ed.
There are few places that assume that var_off is after id/ref_obj_id to
clear out id/ref_obj_id with the single memset(0). These are changed to
explicitly zero-out id/ref_obj_id fields. Other places are adjusted to
preserve exact byte-by-byte comparison behavior.
No functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221223054921.958283-3-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
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states_equal() check performs ID mapping between old and new states to
establish a 1-to-1 correspondence between IDs, even if their absolute
numberic values across two equivalent states differ. This is important
both for correctness and to avoid unnecessary work when two states are
equivalent.
With recent changes we partially fixed this logic by maintaining ID map
across all function frames. This patch also makes refsafe() check take
into account (and maintain) ID map, making states_equal() behavior more
optimal and correct.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221223054921.958283-2-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
|
After befae75856ab, the verifier would propagate null information after
JEQ/JNE, e.g., if two pointers, one is maybe_null and the other is not,
the former would be marked as non-null in eq path. However, as comment
"PTR_TO_BTF_ID points to a kernel struct that does not need to be null
checked by the BPF program ... The verifier must keep this in mind and
can make no assumptions about null or non-null when doing branch ...".
If one pointer is maybe_null and the other is PTR_TO_BTF, the former is
incorrectly marked non-null. The following BPF prog can trigger a
null-ptr-deref, also see this report for more details[1]:
0: (18) r1 = map_fd ; R1_w=map_ptr(ks=4, vs=4)
2: (79) r6 = *(u64 *)(r1 +8) ; R6_w=bpf_map->inner_map_data
; R6 is PTR_TO_BTF_ID
; equals to null at runtime
3: (bf) r2 = r10
4: (07) r2 += -4
5: (62) *(u32 *)(r2 +0) = 0
6: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 ; R0_w=map_value_or_null
7: (1d) if r6 == r0 goto pc+1
8: (95) exit
; from 7 to 9: R0=map_value R6=ptr_bpf_map
9: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r0 +0) ; null-ptr-deref
10: (95) exit
So, make the verifier propagate nullness information for reg to reg
comparisons only if neither reg is PTR_TO_BTF_ID.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CACkBjsaFJwjC5oiw-1KXvcazywodwXo4zGYsRHwbr2gSG9WcSw@mail.gmail.com/T/#u
Fixes: befae75856ab ("bpf: propagate nullness information for reg to reg comparisons")
Signed-off-by: Hao Sun <sunhao.th@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221222024414.29539-1-sunhao.th@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
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Adding struct bpf_bprintf_data to hold bin_args argument for
bpf_bprintf_prepare function.
We will add another return argument to bpf_bprintf_prepare and
pass the struct to bpf_bprintf_cleanup for proper cleanup in
following changes.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20221215214430.1336195-2-jolsa@kernel.org
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An update for verifier.c:states_equal()/regsafe() to use check_ids()
for active spin lock comparisons. This fixes the issue reported by
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi in [1] using technique suggested by Edward Cree.
W/o this commit the verifier might be tricked to accept the following
program working with a map containing spin locks:
0: r9 = map_lookup_elem(...) ; Returns PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL id=1.
1: r8 = map_lookup_elem(...) ; Returns PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL id=2.
2: if r9 == 0 goto exit ; r9 -> PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE.
3: if r8 == 0 goto exit ; r8 -> PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE.
4: r7 = ktime_get_ns() ; Unbound SCALAR_VALUE.
5: r6 = ktime_get_ns() ; Unbound SCALAR_VALUE.
6: bpf_spin_lock(r8) ; active_lock.id == 2.
7: if r6 > r7 goto +1 ; No new information about the state
; is derived from this check, thus
; produced verifier states differ only
; in 'insn_idx'.
8: r9 = r8 ; Optionally make r9.id == r8.id.
--- checkpoint --- ; Assume is_state_visisted() creates a
; checkpoint here.
9: bpf_spin_unlock(r9) ; (a,b) active_lock.id == 2.
; (a) r9.id == 2, (b) r9.id == 1.
10: exit(0)
Consider two verification paths:
(a) 0-10
(b) 0-7,9-10
The path (a) is verified first. If checkpoint is created at (8)
the (b) would assume that (8) is safe because regsafe() does not
compare register ids for registers of type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20221111202719.982118-1-memxor@gmail.com/
Reported-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Edward Cree <ecree.xilinx@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221209135733.28851-6-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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verifier.c:states_equal() must maintain register ID mapping across all
function frames. Otherwise the following example might be erroneously
marked as safe:
main:
fp[-24] = map_lookup_elem(...) ; frame[0].fp[-24].id == 1
fp[-32] = map_lookup_elem(...) ; frame[0].fp[-32].id == 2
r1 = &fp[-24]
r2 = &fp[-32]
call foo()
r0 = 0
exit
foo:
0: r9 = r1
1: r8 = r2
2: r7 = ktime_get_ns()
3: r6 = ktime_get_ns()
4: if (r6 > r7) goto skip_assign
5: r9 = r8
skip_assign: ; <--- checkpoint
6: r9 = *r9 ; (a) frame[1].r9.id == 2
; (b) frame[1].r9.id == 1
7: if r9 == 0 goto exit: ; mark_ptr_or_null_regs() transfers != 0 info
; for all regs sharing ID:
; (a) r9 != 0 => &frame[0].fp[-32] != 0
; (b) r9 != 0 => &frame[0].fp[-24] != 0
8: r8 = *r8 ; (a) r8 == &frame[0].fp[-32]
; (b) r8 == &frame[0].fp[-32]
9: r0 = *r8 ; (a) safe
; (b) unsafe
exit:
10: exit
While processing call to foo() verifier considers the following
execution paths:
(a) 0-10
(b) 0-4,6-10
(There is also path 0-7,10 but it is not interesting for the issue at
hand. (a) is verified first.)
Suppose that checkpoint is created at (6) when path (a) is verified,
next path (b) is verified and (6) is reached.
If states_equal() maintains separate 'idmap' for each frame the
mapping at (6) for frame[1] would be empty and
regsafe(r9)::check_ids() would add a pair 2->1 and return true,
which is an error.
If states_equal() maintains single 'idmap' for all frames the mapping
at (6) would be { 1->1, 2->2 } and regsafe(r9)::check_ids() would
return false when trying to add a pair 2->1.
This issue was suggested in the following discussion:
https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAEf4BzbFB5g4oUfyxk9rHy-PJSLQ3h8q9mV=rVoXfr_JVm8+1Q@mail.gmail.com/
Suggested-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221209135733.28851-4-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
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The verifier.c:regsafe() has the following shortcut:
equal = memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, parent)) == 0;
...
if (equal)
return true;
Which is executed regardless old register type. This is incorrect for
register types that might have an ID checked by check_ids(), namely:
- PTR_TO_MAP_KEY
- PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE
- PTR_TO_PACKET_META
- PTR_TO_PACKET
The following pattern could be used to exploit this:
0: r9 = map_lookup_elem(...) ; Returns PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL id=1.
1: r8 = map_lookup_elem(...) ; Returns PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL id=2.
2: r7 = ktime_get_ns() ; Unbound SCALAR_VALUE.
3: r6 = ktime_get_ns() ; Unbound SCALAR_VALUE.
4: if r6 > r7 goto +1 ; No new information about the state
; is derived from this check, thus
; produced verifier states differ only
; in 'insn_idx'.
5: r9 = r8 ; Optionally make r9.id == r8.id.
--- checkpoint --- ; Assume is_state_visisted() creates a
; checkpoint here.
6: if r9 == 0 goto <exit> ; Nullness info is propagated to all
; registers with matching ID.
7: r1 = *(u64 *) r8 ; Not always safe.
Verifier first visits path 1-7 where r8 is verified to be not null
at (6). Later the jump from 4 to 6 is examined. The checkpoint for (6)
looks as follows:
R8_rD=map_value_or_null(id=2,off=0,ks=4,vs=8,imm=0)
R9_rwD=map_value_or_null(id=2,off=0,ks=4,vs=8,imm=0)
R10=fp0
The current state is:
R0=... R6=... R7=... fp-8=...
R8=map_value_or_null(id=2,off=0,ks=4,vs=8,imm=0)
R9=map_value_or_null(id=1,off=0,ks=4,vs=8,imm=0)
R10=fp0
Note that R8 states are byte-to-byte identical, so regsafe() would
exit early and skip call to check_ids(), thus ID mapping 2->2 will not
be added to 'idmap'. Next, states for R9 are compared: these are not
identical and check_ids() is executed, but 'idmap' is empty, so
check_ids() adds mapping 2->1 to 'idmap' and returns success.
This commit pushes the 'equal' down to register types that don't need
check_ids().
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221209135733.28851-2-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
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After previous commit, we are minimizing helper specific assumptions
from check_func_arg_reg_off, making it generic, and offloading checks
for a specific argument type to their respective functions called after
check_func_arg_reg_off has been called.
This allows relying on a consistent set of guarantees after that call
and then relying on them in code that deals with registers for each
argument type later. This is in line with how process_spin_lock,
process_timer_func, process_kptr_func check reg->var_off to be constant.
The same reasoning is used here to move the alignment check into
process_dynptr_func. Note that it also needs to check for constant
var_off, and accumulate the constant var_off when computing the spi in
get_spi, but that fix will come in later changes.
Acked-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221207204141.308952-6-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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While check_func_arg_reg_off is the place which performs generic checks
needed by various candidates of reg->type, there is some handling for
special cases, like ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, OBJ_RELEASE, and
ARG_PTR_TO_RINGBUF_MEM.
This commit aims to streamline these special cases and instead leave
other things up to argument type specific code to handle. The function
will be restrictive by default, and cover all possible cases when
OBJ_RELEASE is set, without having to update the function again (and
missing to do that being a bug).
This is done primarily for two reasons: associating back reg->type to
its argument leaves room for the list getting out of sync when a new
reg->type is supported by an arg_type.
The other case is ARG_PTR_TO_RINGBUF_MEM. The problem there is something
we already handle, whenever a release argument is expected, it should
be passed as the pointer that was received from the acquire function.
Hence zero fixed and variable offset.
There is nothing special about ARG_PTR_TO_RINGBUF_MEM, where technically
its target register type PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RINGBUF can already be passed
with non-zero offset to other helper functions, which makes sense.
Hence, lift the arg_type_is_release check for reg->off and cover all
possible register types, instead of duplicating the same kind of check
twice for current OBJ_RELEASE arg_types (alloc_mem and ptr_to_btf_id).
For the release argument, arg_type_is_dynptr is the special case, where
we go to actual object being freed through the dynptr, so the offset of
the pointer still needs to allow fixed and variable offset and
process_dynptr_func will verify them later for the release argument case
as well.
This is not specific to ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR though, we will need to make
this exception for any future object on the stack that needs to be
released. In this sense, PTR_TO_STACK as a candidate for object on stack
argument is a special case for release offset checks, and they need to
be done by the helper releasing the object on stack.
Since the check has been lifted above all register type checks, remove
the duplicated check that is being done for PTR_TO_BTF_ID.
Acked-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com>
Acked-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com>
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221207204141.308952-5-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Recently, user ringbuf support introduced a PTR_TO_DYNPTR register type
for use in callback state, because in case of user ringbuf helpers,
there is no dynptr on the stack that is passed into the callback. To
reflect such a state, a special register type was created.
However, some checks have been bypassed incorrectly during the addition
of this feature. First, for arg_type with MEM_UNINIT flag which
initialize a dynptr, they must be rejected for such register type.
Secondly, in the future, there are plans to add dynptr helpers that
operate on the dynptr itself and may change its offset and other
properties.
In all of these cases, PTR_TO_DYNPTR shouldn't be allowed to be passed
to such helpers, however the current code simply returns 0.
The rejection for helpers that release the dynptr is already handled.
For fixing this, we take a step back and rework existing code in a way
that will allow fitting in all classes of helpers and have a coherent
model for dealing with the variety of use cases in which dynptr is used.
First, for ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, it can either be set alone or together
with a DYNPTR_TYPE_* constant that denotes the only type it accepts.
Next, helpers which initialize a dynptr use MEM_UNINIT to indicate this
fact. To make the distinction clear, use MEM_RDONLY flag to indicate
that the helper only operates on the memory pointed to by the dynptr,
not the dynptr itself. In C parlance, it would be equivalent to taking
the dynptr as a point to const argument.
When either of these flags are not present, the helper is allowed to
mutate both the dynptr itself and also the memory it points to.
Currently, the read only status of the memory is not tracked in the
dynptr, but it would be trivial to add this support inside dynptr state
of the register.
With these changes and renaming PTR_TO_DYNPTR to CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR to
better reflect its usage, it can no longer be passed to helpers that
initialize a dynptr, i.e. bpf_dynptr_from_mem, bpf_ringbuf_reserve_dynptr.
A note to reviewers is that in code that does mark_stack_slots_dynptr,
and unmark_stack_slots_dynptr, we implicitly rely on the fact that
PTR_TO_STACK reg is the only case that can reach that code path, as one
cannot pass CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR to helpers that don't set MEM_RDONLY. In
both cases such helpers won't be setting that flag.
The next patch will add a couple of selftest cases to make sure this
doesn't break.
Fixes: 205715673844 ("bpf: Add bpf_user_ringbuf_drain() helper")
Acked-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221207204141.308952-4-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Currently, we simply ignore the errors in process_spin_lock,
process_timer_func, process_kptr_func, process_dynptr_func. Instead,
bubble up the error by storing and checking err variable.
Acked-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221207204141.308952-3-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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