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2016-02-25fuse: break infinite loop in fuse_fill_write_pages()Roman Gushchin
commit 3ca8138f014a913f98e6ef40e939868e1e9ea876 upstream. I got a report about unkillable task eating CPU. Further investigation shows, that the problem is in the fuse_fill_write_pages() function. If iov's first segment has zero length, we get an infinite loop, because we never reach iov_iter_advance() call. Fix this by calling iov_iter_advance() before repeating an attempt to copy data from userspace. A similar problem is described in 124d3b7041f ("fix writev regression: pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable"). If zero-length segmend is followed by segment with invalid address, iov_iter_fault_in_readable() checks only first segment (zero-length), iov_iter_copy_from_user_atomic() skips it, fails at second and returns zero -> goto again without skipping zero-length segment. Patch calls iov_iter_advance() before goto again: we'll skip zero-length segment at second iteraction and iov_iter_fault_in_readable() will detect invalid address. Special thanks to Konstantin Khlebnikov, who helped a lot with the commit description. Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Maxim Patlasov <mpatlasov@parallels.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru> Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <klamm@yandex-team.ru> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Fixes: ea9b9907b82a ("fuse: implement perform_write") Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-02-25udf: Check output buffer length when converting name to CS0Andrew Gabbasov
commit bb00c898ad1ce40c4bb422a8207ae562e9aea7ae upstream. If a name contains at least some characters with Unicode values exceeding single byte, the CS0 output should have 2 bytes per character. And if other input characters have single byte Unicode values, then the single input byte is converted to 2 output bytes, and the length of output becomes larger than the length of input. And if the input name is long enough, the output length may exceed the allocated buffer length. All this means that conversion from UTF8 or NLS to CS0 requires checking of output length in order to stop when it exceeds the given output buffer size. [JK: Make code return -ENAMETOOLONG instead of silently truncating the name] Signed-off-by: Andrew Gabbasov <andrew_gabbasov@mentor.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-02-25udf: Prevent buffer overrun with multi-byte charactersAndrew Gabbasov
commit ad402b265ecf6fa22d04043b41444cdfcdf4f52d upstream. udf_CS0toUTF8 function stops the conversion when the output buffer length reaches UDF_NAME_LEN-2, which is correct maximum name length, but, when checking, it leaves the space for a single byte only, while multi-bytes output characters can take more space, causing buffer overflow. Similar error exists in udf_CS0toNLS function, that restricts the output length to UDF_NAME_LEN, while actual maximum allowed length is UDF_NAME_LEN-2. In these cases the output can override not only the current buffer length field, causing corruption of the name buffer itself, but also following allocation structures, causing kernel crash. Adjust the output length checks in both functions to prevent buffer overruns in case of multi-bytes UTF8 or NLS characters. Signed-off-by: Andrew Gabbasov <andrew_gabbasov@mentor.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-02-25udf: limit the maximum number of indirect extents in a rowVegard Nossum
commit b0918d9f476a8434b055e362b83fa4fd1d462c3f upstream. udf_next_aext() just follows extent pointers while extents are marked as indirect. This can loop forever for corrupted filesystem. Limit number the of indirect extents we are willing to follow in a row. [JK: Updated changelog, limit, style] Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-02-25nfs: Fix race in __update_open_stateid()Andrew Elble
commit 361cad3c89070aeb37560860ea8bfc092d545adc upstream. We've seen this in a packet capture - I've intermixed what I think was going on. The fix here is to grab the so_lock sooner. 1964379 -> #1 open (for write) reply seqid=1 1964393 -> #2 open (for read) reply seqid=2 __nfs4_close(), state->n_wronly-- nfs4_state_set_mode_locked(), changes state->state = [R] state->flags is [RW] state->state is [R], state->n_wronly == 0, state->n_rdonly == 1 1964398 -> #3 open (for write) call -> because close is already running 1964399 -> downgrade (to read) call seqid=2 (close of #1) 1964402 -> #3 open (for write) reply seqid=3 __update_open_stateid() nfs_set_open_stateid_locked(), changes state->flags state->flags is [RW] state->state is [R], state->n_wronly == 0, state->n_rdonly == 1 new sequence number is exposed now via nfs4_stateid_copy() next step would be update_open_stateflags(), pending so_lock 1964403 -> downgrade reply seqid=2, fails with OLD_STATEID (close of #1) nfs4_close_prepare() gets so_lock and recalcs flags -> send close 1964405 -> downgrade (to read) call seqid=3 (close of #1 retry) __update_open_stateid() gets so_lock * update_open_stateflags() updates state->n_wronly. nfs4_state_set_mode_locked() updates state->state state->flags is [RW] state->state is [RW], state->n_wronly == 1, state->n_rdonly == 1 * should have suppressed the preceding nfs4_close_prepare() from sending open_downgrade 1964406 -> write call 1964408 -> downgrade (to read) reply seqid=4 (close of #1 retry) nfs_clear_open_stateid_locked() state->flags is [R] state->state is [RW], state->n_wronly == 1, state->n_rdonly == 1 1964409 -> write reply (fails, openmode) Signed-off-by: Andrew Elble <aweits@rit.edu> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-02-25cifs: fix erroneous return valueAnton Protopopov
commit 4b550af519854421dfec9f7732cdddeb057134b2 upstream. The setup_ntlmv2_rsp() function may return positive value ENOMEM instead of -ENOMEM in case of kmalloc failure. Signed-off-by: Anton Protopopov <a.s.protopopov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-02-25ptrace: use fsuid, fsgid, effective creds for fs access checksJann Horn
commit caaee6234d05a58c5b4d05e7bf766131b810a657 upstream. By checking the effective credentials instead of the real UID / permitted capabilities, ensure that the calling process actually intended to use its credentials. To ensure that all ptrace checks use the correct caller credentials (e.g. in case out-of-tree code or newly added code omits the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS flag), use two new flags and require one of them to be set. The problem was that when a privileged task had temporarily dropped its privileges, e.g. by calling setreuid(0, user_uid), with the intent to perform following syscalls with the credentials of a user, it still passed ptrace access checks that the user would not be able to pass. While an attacker should not be able to convince the privileged task to perform a ptrace() syscall, this is a problem because the ptrace access check is reused for things in procfs. In particular, the following somewhat interesting procfs entries only rely on ptrace access checks: /proc/$pid/stat - uses the check for determining whether pointers should be visible, useful for bypassing ASLR /proc/$pid/maps - also useful for bypassing ASLR /proc/$pid/cwd - useful for gaining access to restricted directories that contain files with lax permissions, e.g. in this scenario: lrwxrwxrwx root root /proc/13020/cwd -> /root/foobar drwx------ root root /root drwxr-xr-x root root /root/foobar -rw-r--r-- root root /root/foobar/secret Therefore, on a system where a root-owned mode 6755 binary changes its effective credentials as described and then dumps a user-specified file, this could be used by an attacker to reveal the memory layout of root's processes or reveal the contents of files he is not allowed to access (through /proc/$pid/cwd). [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning] Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-02-25Btrfs: fix hang on extent buffer lock caused by the inode_paths ioctlFilipe Manana
commit 0c0fe3b0fa45082cd752553fdb3a4b42503a118e upstream. While doing some tests I ran into an hang on an extent buffer's rwlock that produced the following trace: [39389.800012] NMI watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#15 stuck for 22s! [fdm-stress:32166] [39389.800016] NMI watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#14 stuck for 22s! [fdm-stress:32165] [39389.800016] Modules linked in: btrfs dm_mod ppdev xor sha256_generic hmac raid6_pq drbg ansi_cprng aesni_intel i2c_piix4 acpi_cpufreq aes_x86_64 ablk_helper tpm_tis parport_pc i2c_core sg cryptd evdev psmouse lrw tpm parport gf128mul serio_raw pcspkr glue_helper processor button loop autofs4 ext4 crc16 mbcache jbd2 sd_mod sr_mod cdrom ata_generic virtio_scsi ata_piix libata virtio_pci virtio_ring crc32c_intel scsi_mod e1000 virtio floppy [last unloaded: btrfs] [39389.800016] irq event stamp: 0 [39389.800016] hardirqs last enabled at (0): [< (null)>] (null) [39389.800016] hardirqs last disabled at (0): [<ffffffff8104e58d>] copy_process+0x638/0x1a35 [39389.800016] softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffffff8104e58d>] copy_process+0x638/0x1a35 [39389.800016] softirqs last disabled at (0): [< (null)>] (null) [39389.800016] CPU: 14 PID: 32165 Comm: fdm-stress Not tainted 4.4.0-rc6-btrfs-next-18+ #1 [39389.800016] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 [39389.800016] task: ffff880175b1ca40 ti: ffff8800a185c000 task.ti: ffff8800a185c000 [39389.800016] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810902af>] [<ffffffff810902af>] queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x57/0x158 [39389.800016] RSP: 0018:ffff8800a185fb80 EFLAGS: 00000202 [39389.800016] RAX: 0000000000000101 RBX: ffff8801710c4e9c RCX: 0000000000000101 [39389.800016] RDX: 0000000000000100 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000001 [39389.800016] RBP: ffff8800a185fb98 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 [39389.800016] R10: ffff8800a185fb68 R11: 6db6db6db6db6db7 R12: ffff8801710c4e98 [39389.800016] R13: ffff880175b1ca40 R14: ffff8800a185fc10 R15: ffff880175b1ca40 [39389.800016] FS: 00007f6d37fff700(0000) GS:ffff8802be9c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [39389.800016] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [39389.800016] CR2: 00007f6d300019b8 CR3: 0000000037c93000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 [39389.800016] Stack: [39389.800016] ffff8801710c4e98 ffff8801710c4e98 ffff880175b1ca40 ffff8800a185fbb0 [39389.800016] ffffffff81091e11 ffff8801710c4e98 ffff8800a185fbc8 ffffffff81091895 [39389.800016] ffff8801710c4e98 ffff8800a185fbe8 ffffffff81486c5c ffffffffa067288c [39389.800016] Call Trace: [39389.800016] [<ffffffff81091e11>] queued_read_lock_slowpath+0x46/0x60 [39389.800016] [<ffffffff81091895>] do_raw_read_lock+0x3e/0x41 [39389.800016] [<ffffffff81486c5c>] _raw_read_lock+0x3d/0x44 [39389.800016] [<ffffffffa067288c>] ? btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x54/0x125 [btrfs] [39389.800016] [<ffffffffa067288c>] btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x54/0x125 [btrfs] [39389.800016] [<ffffffffa0622ced>] ? btrfs_find_item+0xa7/0xd2 [btrfs] [39389.800016] [<ffffffffa069363f>] btrfs_ref_to_path+0xd6/0x174 [btrfs] [39389.800016] [<ffffffffa0693730>] inode_to_path+0x53/0xa2 [btrfs] [39389.800016] [<ffffffffa0693e2e>] paths_from_inode+0x117/0x2ec [btrfs] [39389.800016] [<ffffffffa0670cff>] btrfs_ioctl+0xd5b/0x2793 [btrfs] [39389.800016] [<ffffffff8108a8b0>] ? arch_local_irq_save+0x9/0xc [39389.800016] [<ffffffff81276727>] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x15 [39389.800016] [<ffffffff8108a8b0>] ? arch_local_irq_save+0x9/0xc [39389.800016] [<ffffffff8118b3d4>] ? rcu_read_unlock+0x3e/0x5d [39389.800016] [<ffffffff811822f8>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x42b/0x4ea [39389.800016] [<ffffffff8118b4f3>] ? __fget_light+0x62/0x71 [39389.800016] [<ffffffff8118240e>] SyS_ioctl+0x57/0x79 [39389.800016] [<ffffffff814872d7>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f [39389.800016] Code: b9 01 01 00 00 f7 c6 00 ff ff ff 75 32 83 fe 01 89 ca 89 f0 0f 45 d7 f0 0f b1 13 39 f0 74 04 89 c6 eb e2 ff ca 0f 84 fa 00 00 00 <8b> 03 84 c0 74 04 f3 90 eb f6 66 c7 03 01 00 e9 e6 00 00 00 e8 [39389.800012] Modules linked in: btrfs dm_mod ppdev xor sha256_generic hmac raid6_pq drbg ansi_cprng aesni_intel i2c_piix4 acpi_cpufreq aes_x86_64 ablk_helper tpm_tis parport_pc i2c_core sg cryptd evdev psmouse lrw tpm parport gf128mul serio_raw pcspkr glue_helper processor button loop autofs4 ext4 crc16 mbcache jbd2 sd_mod sr_mod cdrom ata_generic virtio_scsi ata_piix libata virtio_pci virtio_ring crc32c_intel scsi_mod e1000 virtio floppy [last unloaded: btrfs] [39389.800012] irq event stamp: 0 [39389.800012] hardirqs last enabled at (0): [< (null)>] (null) [39389.800012] hardirqs last disabled at (0): [<ffffffff8104e58d>] copy_process+0x638/0x1a35 [39389.800012] softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffffff8104e58d>] copy_process+0x638/0x1a35 [39389.800012] softirqs last disabled at (0): [< (null)>] (null) [39389.800012] CPU: 15 PID: 32166 Comm: fdm-stress Tainted: G L 4.4.0-rc6-btrfs-next-18+ #1 [39389.800012] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 [39389.800012] task: ffff880179294380 ti: ffff880034a60000 task.ti: ffff880034a60000 [39389.800012] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81091e8d>] [<ffffffff81091e8d>] queued_write_lock_slowpath+0x62/0x72 [39389.800012] RSP: 0018:ffff880034a639f0 EFLAGS: 00000206 [39389.800012] RAX: 0000000000000101 RBX: ffff8801710c4e98 RCX: 0000000000000000 [39389.800012] RDX: 00000000000000ff RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8801710c4e9c [39389.800012] RBP: ffff880034a639f8 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 [39389.800012] R10: ffff880034a639b0 R11: 0000000000001000 R12: ffff8801710c4e98 [39389.800012] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff880172cbc000 R15: ffff8801710c4e00 [39389.800012] FS: 00007f6d377fe700(0000) GS:ffff8802be9e0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [39389.800012] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [39389.800012] CR2: 00007f6d3d3c1000 CR3: 0000000037c93000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 [39389.800012] Stack: [39389.800012] ffff8801710c4e98 ffff880034a63a10 ffffffff81091963 ffff8801710c4e98 [39389.800012] ffff880034a63a30 ffffffff81486f1b ffffffffa0672cb3 ffff8801710c4e00 [39389.800012] ffff880034a63a78 ffffffffa0672cb3 ffff8801710c4e00 ffff880034a63a58 [39389.800012] Call Trace: [39389.800012] [<ffffffff81091963>] do_raw_write_lock+0x72/0x8c [39389.800012] [<ffffffff81486f1b>] _raw_write_lock+0x3a/0x41 [39389.800012] [<ffffffffa0672cb3>] ? btrfs_tree_lock+0x119/0x251 [btrfs] [39389.800012] [<ffffffffa0672cb3>] btrfs_tree_lock+0x119/0x251 [btrfs] [39389.800012] [<ffffffffa061aeba>] ? rcu_read_unlock+0x5b/0x5d [btrfs] [39389.800012] [<ffffffffa061ce13>] ? btrfs_root_node+0xda/0xe6 [btrfs] [39389.800012] [<ffffffffa061ce83>] btrfs_lock_root_node+0x22/0x42 [btrfs] [39389.800012] [<ffffffffa062046b>] btrfs_search_slot+0x1b8/0x758 [btrfs] [39389.800012] [<ffffffff810fc6b0>] ? time_hardirqs_on+0x15/0x28 [39389.800012] [<ffffffffa06365db>] btrfs_lookup_inode+0x31/0x95 [btrfs] [39389.800012] [<ffffffff8108d62f>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0xf [39389.800012] [<ffffffff8148482b>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x397/0x3bc [39389.800012] [<ffffffffa068821b>] __btrfs_update_delayed_inode+0x59/0x1c0 [btrfs] [39389.800012] [<ffffffffa068858e>] __btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_items+0x194/0x5aa [btrfs] [39389.800012] [<ffffffff81486ab7>] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x31/0x44 [39389.800012] [<ffffffffa0688a48>] __btrfs_run_delayed_items+0xa4/0x15c [btrfs] [39389.800012] [<ffffffffa0688d62>] btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x11/0x13 [btrfs] [39389.800012] [<ffffffffa064048e>] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x234/0x96e [btrfs] [39389.800012] [<ffffffffa0618d10>] btrfs_sync_fs+0x145/0x1ad [btrfs] [39389.800012] [<ffffffffa0671176>] btrfs_ioctl+0x11d2/0x2793 [btrfs] [39389.800012] [<ffffffff8108a8b0>] ? arch_local_irq_save+0x9/0xc [39389.800012] [<ffffffff81140261>] ? __might_fault+0x4c/0xa7 [39389.800012] [<ffffffff81140261>] ? __might_fault+0x4c/0xa7 [39389.800012] [<ffffffff8108a8b0>] ? arch_local_irq_save+0x9/0xc [39389.800012] [<ffffffff8118b3d4>] ? rcu_read_unlock+0x3e/0x5d [39389.800012] [<ffffffff811822f8>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x42b/0x4ea [39389.800012] [<ffffffff8118b4f3>] ? __fget_light+0x62/0x71 [39389.800012] [<ffffffff8118240e>] SyS_ioctl+0x57/0x79 [39389.800012] [<ffffffff814872d7>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f [39389.800012] Code: f0 0f b1 13 85 c0 75 ef eb 2a f3 90 8a 03 84 c0 75 f8 f0 0f b0 13 84 c0 75 f0 ba ff 00 00 00 eb 0a f0 0f b1 13 ff c8 74 0b f3 90 <8b> 03 83 f8 01 75 f7 eb ed c6 43 04 00 5b 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 This happens because in the code path executed by the inode_paths ioctl we end up nesting two calls to read lock a leaf's rwlock when after the first call to read_lock() and before the second call to read_lock(), another task (running the delayed items as part of a transaction commit) has already called write_lock() against the leaf's rwlock. This situation is illustrated by the following diagram: Task A Task B btrfs_ref_to_path() btrfs_commit_transaction() read_lock(&eb->lock); btrfs_run_delayed_items() __btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_items() __btrfs_update_delayed_inode() btrfs_lookup_inode() write_lock(&eb->lock); --> task waits for lock read_lock(&eb->lock); --> makes this task hang forever (and task B too of course) So fix this by avoiding doing the nested read lock, which is easily avoidable. This issue does not happen if task B calls write_lock() after task A does the second call to read_lock(), however there does not seem to exist anything in the documentation that mentions what is the expected behaviour for recursive locking of rwlocks (leaving the idea that doing so is not a good usage of rwlocks). Also, as a side effect necessary for this fix, make sure we do not needlessly read lock extent buffers when the input path has skip_locking set (used when called from send). Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-02-25ext4: fix potential integer overflowInsu Yun
commit 46901760b46064964b41015d00c140c83aa05bcf upstream. Since sizeof(ext_new_group_data) > sizeof(ext_new_flex_group_data), integer overflow could be happened. Therefore, need to fix integer overflow sanitization. Signed-off-by: Insu Yun <wuninsu@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-02-25AIO: properly check iovec sizesGreg Kroah-Hartman
In Linus's tree, the iovec code has been reworked massively, but in older kernels the AIO layer should be checking this before passing the request on to other layers. Many thanks to Ben Hawkes of Google Project Zero for pointing out the issue. Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com> Acked-by: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org> Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> [backported to 3.10 - willy] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-02-25pty: make sure super_block is still valid in final /dev/tty closeHerton R. Krzesinski
commit 1f55c718c290616889c04946864a13ef30f64929 upstream. Considering current pty code and multiple devpts instances, it's possible to umount a devpts file system while a program still has /dev/tty opened pointing to a previosuly closed pty pair in that instance. In the case all ptmx and pts/N files are closed, umount can be done. If the program closes /dev/tty after umount is done, devpts_kill_index will use now an invalid super_block, which was already destroyed in the umount operation after running ->kill_sb. This is another "use after free" type of issue, but now related to the allocated super_block instance. To avoid the problem (warning at ida_remove and potential crashes) for this specific case, I added two functions in devpts which grabs additional references to the super_block, which pty code now uses so it makes sure the super block structure is still valid until pty shutdown is done. I also moved the additional inode references to the same functions, which also covered similar case with inode being freed before /dev/tty final close/shutdown. Signed-off-by: Herton R. Krzesinski <herton@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-02-19binfmt_elf: Don't clobber passed executable's file headerMaciej W. Rozycki
commit b582ef5c53040c5feef4c96a8f9585b6831e2441 upstream. Do not clobber the buffer space passed from `search_binary_handler' and originally preloaded by `prepare_binprm' with the executable's file header by overwriting it with its interpreter's file header. Instead keep the buffer space intact and directly use the data structure locally allocated for the interpreter's file header, fixing a bug introduced in 2.1.14 with loadable module support (linux-mips.org commit beb11695 [Import of Linux/MIPS 2.1.14], predating kernel.org repo's history). Adjust the amount of data read from the interpreter's file accordingly. This was not an issue before loadable module support, because back then `load_elf_binary' was executed only once for a given ELF executable, whether the function succeeded or failed. With loadable module support supported and enabled, upon a failure of `load_elf_binary' -- which may for example be caused by architecture code rejecting an executable due to a missing hardware feature requested in the file header -- a module load is attempted and then the function reexecuted by `search_binary_handler'. With the executable's file header replaced with its interpreter's file header the executable can then be erroneously accepted in this subsequent attempt. Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@imgtec.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-02-19FS-Cache: Increase reference of parent after registering, netfs successKinglong Mee
commit 86108c2e34a26e4bec3c6ddb23390bf8cedcf391 upstream. If netfs exist, fscache should not increase the reference of parent's usage and n_children, otherwise, never be decreased. v2: thanks David's suggest, move increasing reference of parent if success use kmem_cache_free() freeing primary_index directly v3: don't move "netfs->primary_index->parent = &fscache_fsdef_index;" Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-02-19ext4: Fix handling of extended tv_secDavid Turner
commit a4dad1ae24f850410c4e60f22823cba1289b8d52 upstream. In ext4, the bottom two bits of {a,c,m}time_extra are used to extend the {a,c,m}time fields, deferring the year 2038 problem to the year 2446. When decoding these extended fields, for times whose bottom 32 bits would represent a negative number, sign extension causes the 64-bit extended timestamp to be negative as well, which is not what's intended. This patch corrects that issue, so that the only negative {a,c,m}times are those between 1901 and 1970 (as per 32-bit signed timestamps). Some older kernels might have written pre-1970 dates with 1,1 in the extra bits. This patch treats those incorrectly-encoded dates as pre-1970, instead of post-2311, until kernel 4.20 is released. Hopefully by then e2fsck will have fixed up the bad data. Also add a comment explaining the encoding of ext4's extra {a,c,m}time bits. Signed-off-by: David Turner <novalis@novalis.org> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Reported-by: Mark Harris <mh8928@yahoo.com> Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=23732 Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-02-19fix sysvfs symlinksAl Viro
commit 0ebf7f10d67a70e120f365018f1c5fce9ddc567d upstream. The thing got broken back in 2002 - sysvfs does *not* have inline symlinks; even short ones have bodies stored in the first block of file. sysv_symlink() handles that correctly; unfortunately, attempting to look an existing symlink up will end up confusing them for inline symlinks, and interpret the block number containing the body as the body itself. Nobody has noticed until now, which says something about the level of testing sysvfs gets ;-/ Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-02-19fix calculation of meta_bg descriptor backupsAndy Leiserson
commit 904dad4742d211b7a8910e92695c0fa957483836 upstream. "group" is the group where the backup will be placed, and is initialized to zero in the declaration. This meant that backups for meta_bg descriptors were erroneously written to the backup block group descriptors in groups 1 and (desc_per_block-1). Reproduction information: mke2fs -Fq -t ext4 -b 1024 -O ^resize_inode /tmp/foo.img 16G truncate -s 24G /tmp/foo.img losetup /dev/loop0 /tmp/foo.img mount /dev/loop0 /mnt resize2fs /dev/loop0 umount /dev/loop0 dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/loop0 bs=1024 count=2 e2fsck -fy /dev/loop0 losetup -d /dev/loop0 Signed-off-by: Andy Leiserson <andy@leiserson.org> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-02-19jbd2: Fix unreclaimed pages after truncate in data=journal modeJan Kara
commit bc23f0c8d7ccd8d924c4e70ce311288cb3e61ea8 upstream. Ted and Namjae have reported that truncated pages don't get timely reclaimed after being truncated in data=journal mode. The following test triggers the issue easily: for (i = 0; i < 1000; i++) { pwrite(fd, buf, 1024*1024, 0); fsync(fd); fsync(fd); ftruncate(fd, 0); } The reason is that journal_unmap_buffer() finds that truncated buffers are not journalled (jh->b_transaction == NULL), they are part of checkpoint list of a transaction (jh->b_cp_transaction != NULL) and have been already written out (!buffer_dirty(bh)). We clean such buffers but we leave them in the checkpoint list. Since checkpoint transaction holds a reference to the journal head, these buffers cannot be released until the checkpoint transaction is cleaned up. And at that point we don't call release_buffer_page() anymore so pages detached from mapping are lingering in the system waiting for reclaim to find them and free them. Fix the problem by removing buffers from transaction checkpoint lists when journal_unmap_buffer() finds out they don't have to be there anymore. Reported-and-tested-by: Namjae Jeon <namjae.jeon@samsung.com> Fixes: de1b794130b130e77ffa975bb58cb843744f9ae5 Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-02-19ocfs2/dlm: clear refmap bit of recovery lock while doing local recovery cleanupxuejiufei
commit c95a51807b730e4681e2ecbdfd669ca52601959e upstream. When recovery master down, dlm_do_local_recovery_cleanup() only remove the $RECOVERY lock owned by dead node, but do not clear the refmap bit. Which will make umount thread falling in dead loop migrating $RECOVERY to the dead node. Signed-off-by: xuejiufei <xuejiufei@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@huawei.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-02-19ocfs2/dlm: ignore cleaning the migration mle that is inusexuejiufei
commit bef5502de074b6f6fa647b94b73155d675694420 upstream. We have found that migration source will trigger a BUG that the refcount of mle is already zero before put when the target is down during migration. The situation is as follows: dlm_migrate_lockres dlm_add_migration_mle dlm_mark_lockres_migrating dlm_get_mle_inuse <<<<<< Now the refcount of the mle is 2. dlm_send_one_lockres and wait for the target to become the new master. <<<<<< o2hb detect the target down and clean the migration mle. Now the refcount is 1. dlm_migrate_lockres woken, and put the mle twice when found the target goes down which trigger the BUG with the following message: "ERROR: bad mle: ". Signed-off-by: Jiufei Xue <xuejiufei@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@huawei.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-01-22nfs: if we have no valid attrs, then don't declare the attribute cache validJeff Layton
commit c812012f9ca7cf89c9e1a1cd512e6c3b5be04b85 upstream. If we pass in an empty nfs_fattr struct to nfs_update_inode, it will (correctly) not update any of the attributes, but it then clears the NFS_INO_INVALID_ATTR flag, which indicates that the attributes are up to date. Don't clear the flag if the fattr struct has no valid attrs to apply. Reviewed-by: Steve French <steve.french@primarydata.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-01-22nfs4: start callback_ident at idr 1Benjamin Coddington
commit c68a027c05709330fe5b2f50c50d5fa02124b5d8 upstream. If clp->cl_cb_ident is zero, then nfs_cb_idr_remove_locked() skips removing it when the nfs_client is freed. A decoding or server bug can then find and try to put that first nfs_client which would lead to a crash. Signed-off-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com> Fixes: d6870312659d ("nfs4client: convert to idr_alloc()") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-01-22ext4, jbd2: ensure entering into panic after recording an error in superblockDaeho Jeong
commit 4327ba52afd03fc4b5afa0ee1d774c9c5b0e85c5 upstream. If a EXT4 filesystem utilizes JBD2 journaling and an error occurs, the journaling will be aborted first and the error number will be recorded into JBD2 superblock and, finally, the system will enter into the panic state in "errors=panic" option. But, in the rare case, this sequence is little twisted like the below figure and it will happen that the system enters into panic state, which means the system reset in mobile environment, before completion of recording an error in the journal superblock. In this case, e2fsck cannot recognize that the filesystem failure occurred in the previous run and the corruption wouldn't be fixed. Task A Task B ext4_handle_error() -> jbd2_journal_abort() -> __journal_abort_soft() -> __jbd2_journal_abort_hard() | -> journal->j_flags |= JBD2_ABORT; | | __ext4_abort() | -> jbd2_journal_abort() | | -> __journal_abort_soft() | | -> if (journal->j_flags & JBD2_ABORT) | | return; | -> panic() | -> jbd2_journal_update_sb_errno() Tested-by: Hobin Woo <hobin.woo@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Daeho Jeong <daeho.jeong@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-01-22Btrfs: fix race leading to BUG_ON when running delalloc for nodatacowFilipe Manana
commit 1d512cb77bdbda80f0dd0620a3b260d697fd581d upstream. If we are using the NO_HOLES feature, we have a tiny time window when running delalloc for a nodatacow inode where we can race with a concurrent link or xattr add operation leading to a BUG_ON. This happens because at run_delalloc_nocow() we end up casting a leaf item of type BTRFS_INODE_[REF|EXTREF]_KEY or of type BTRFS_XATTR_ITEM_KEY to a file extent item (struct btrfs_file_extent_item) and then analyse its extent type field, which won't match any of the expected extent types (values BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_[REG|PREALLOC|INLINE]) and therefore trigger an explicit BUG_ON(1). The following sequence diagram shows how the race happens when running a no-cow dellaloc range [4K, 8K[ for inode 257 and we have the following neighbour leafs: Leaf X (has N items) Leaf Y [ ... (257 INODE_ITEM 0) (257 INODE_REF 256) ] [ (257 EXTENT_DATA 8192), ... ] slot N - 2 slot N - 1 slot 0 (Note the implicit hole for inode 257 regarding the [0, 8K[ range) CPU 1 CPU 2 run_dealloc_nocow() btrfs_lookup_file_extent() --> searches for a key with value (257 EXTENT_DATA 4096) in the fs/subvol tree --> returns us a path with path->nodes[0] == leaf X and path->slots[0] == N because path->slots[0] is >= btrfs_header_nritems(leaf X), it calls btrfs_next_leaf() btrfs_next_leaf() --> releases the path hard link added to our inode, with key (257 INODE_REF 500) added to the end of leaf X, so leaf X now has N + 1 keys --> searches for the key (257 INODE_REF 256), because it was the last key in leaf X before it released the path, with path->keep_locks set to 1 --> ends up at leaf X again and it verifies that the key (257 INODE_REF 256) is no longer the last key in the leaf, so it returns with path->nodes[0] == leaf X and path->slots[0] == N, pointing to the new item with key (257 INODE_REF 500) the loop iteration of run_dealloc_nocow() does not break out the loop and continues because the key referenced in the path at path->nodes[0] and path->slots[0] is for inode 257, its type is < BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY and its offset (500) is less then our delalloc range's end (8192) the item pointed by the path, an inode reference item, is (incorrectly) interpreted as a file extent item and we get an invalid extent type, leading to the BUG_ON(1): if (extent_type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_REG || extent_type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_PREALLOC) { (...) } else if (extent_type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE) { (...) } else { BUG_ON(1) } The same can happen if a xattr is added concurrently and ends up having a key with an offset smaller then the delalloc's range end. So fix this by skipping keys with a type smaller than BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY. Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2015-10-22vfs: Test for and handle paths that are unreachable from their mnt_rootEric W. Biederman
commit 397d425dc26da728396e66d392d5dcb8dac30c37 upstream. In rare cases a directory can be renamed out from under a bind mount. In those cases without special handling it becomes possible to walk up the directory tree to the root dentry of the filesystem and down from the root dentry to every other file or directory on the filesystem. Like division by zero .. from an unconnected path can not be given a useful semantic as there is no predicting at which path component the code will realize it is unconnected. We certainly can not match the current behavior as the current behavior is a security hole. Therefore when encounting .. when following an unconnected path return -ENOENT. - Add a function path_connected to verify path->dentry is reachable from path->mnt.mnt_root. AKA to validate that rename did not do something nasty to the bind mount. To avoid races path_connected must be called after following a path component to it's next path component. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2015-10-22dcache: Handle escaped paths in prepend_pathEric W. Biederman
commit cde93be45a8a90d8c264c776fab63487b5038a65 upstream. A rename can result in a dentry that by walking up d_parent will never reach it's mnt_root. For lack of a better term I call this an escaped path. prepend_path is called by four different functions __d_path, d_absolute_path, d_path, and getcwd. __d_path only wants to see paths are connected to the root it passes in. So __d_path needs prepend_path to return an error. d_absolute_path similarly wants to see paths that are connected to some root. Escaped paths are not connected to any mnt_root so d_absolute_path needs prepend_path to return an error greater than 1. So escaped paths will be treated like paths on lazily unmounted mounts. getcwd needs to prepend "(unreachable)" so getcwd also needs prepend_path to return an error. d_path is the interesting hold out. d_path just wants to print something, and does not care about the weird cases. Which raises the question what should be printed? Given that <escaped_path>/<anything> should result in -ENOENT I believe it is desirable for escaped paths to be printed as empty paths. As there are not really any meaninful path components when considered from the perspective of a mount tree. So tweak prepend_path to return an empty path with an new error code of 3 when it encounters an escaped path. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2015-10-22udf: Check length of extended attributes and allocation descriptorsJan Kara
commit 23b133bdc452aa441fcb9b82cbf6dd05cfd342d0 upstream. Check length of extended attributes and allocation descriptors when loading inodes from disk. Otherwise corrupted filesystems could confuse the code and make the kernel oops. Reported-by: Carl Henrik Lunde <chlunde@ping.uio.no> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> [Jan and Jiri fixed it in 3.12 stable, i ported it to 3.10 stable, replaced bs by inode->i_sb->s_blocksize] Signed-off-by: Zhang Zhen <zhenzhang.zhang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2015-10-22disabling oplocks/leases via module parm enable_oplocks broken for SMB3Steve French
commit e0ddde9d44e37fbc21ce893553094ecf1a633ab5 upstream. leases (oplocks) were always requested for SMB2/SMB3 even when oplocks disabled in the cifs.ko module. Signed-off-by: Steve French <steve.french@primarydata.com> Reviewed-by: Chandrika Srinivasan <chandrika.srinivasan@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2015-10-22btrfs: skip waiting on ordered range for special filesJeff Mahoney
commit a30e577c96f59b1e1678ea5462432b09bf7d5cbc upstream. In btrfs_evict_inode, we properly truncate the page cache for evicted inodes but then we call btrfs_wait_ordered_range for every inode as well. It's the right thing to do for regular files but results in incorrect behavior for device inodes for block devices. filemap_fdatawrite_range gets called with inode->i_mapping which gets resolved to the block device inode before getting passed to wbc_attach_fdatawrite_inode and ultimately to inode_to_bdi. What happens next depends on whether there's an open file handle associated with the inode. If there is, we write to the block device, which is unexpected behavior. If there isn't, we through normally and inode->i_data is used. We can also end up racing against open/close which can result in crashes when i_mapping points to a block device inode that has been closed. Since there can't be any page cache associated with special file inodes, it's safe to skip the btrfs_wait_ordered_range call entirely and avoid the problem. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=100911 Tested-by: Christoph Biedl <linux-kernel.bfrz@manchmal.in-ulm.de> Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2015-10-01vfs: Remove incorrect debugging WARN in prepend_pathEric W. Biederman
commit 93e3bce6287e1fb3e60d3324ed08555b5bbafa89 upstream. The warning message in prepend_path is unclear and outdated. It was added as a warning that the mechanism for generating names of pseudo files had been removed from prepend_path and d_dname should be used instead. Unfortunately the warning reads like a general warning, making it unclear what to do with it. Remove the warning. The transition it was added to warn about is long over, and I added code several years ago which in rare cases causes the warning to fire on legitimate code, and the warning is now firing and scaring people for no good reason. Reported-by: Ivan Delalande <colona@arista.com> Reported-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@osandov.com> Fixes: f48cfddc6729e ("vfs: In d_path don't call d_dname on a mount point") Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> [ vlee: Backported to 3.10. Adjusted context. ] Signed-off-by: Vinson Lee <vlee@twitter.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2015-10-01hfs,hfsplus: cache pages correctly between bnode_create and bnode_freeHin-Tak Leung
commit 7cb74be6fd827e314f81df3c5889b87e4c87c569 upstream. Pages looked up by __hfs_bnode_create() (called by hfs_bnode_create() and hfs_bnode_find() for finding or creating pages corresponding to an inode) are immediately kmap()'ed and used (both read and write) and kunmap()'ed, and should not be page_cache_release()'ed until hfs_bnode_free(). This patch fixes a problem I first saw in July 2012: merely running "du" on a large hfsplus-mounted directory a few times on a reasonably loaded system would get the hfsplus driver all confused and complaining about B-tree inconsistencies, and generates a "BUG: Bad page state". Most recently, I can generate this problem on up-to-date Fedora 22 with shipped kernel 4.0.5, by running "du /" (="/" + "/home" + "/mnt" + other smaller mounts) and "du /mnt" simultaneously on two windows, where /mnt is a lightly-used QEMU VM image of the full Mac OS X 10.9: $ df -i / /home /mnt Filesystem Inodes IUsed IFree IUse% Mounted on /dev/mapper/fedora-root 3276800 551665 2725135 17% / /dev/mapper/fedora-home 52879360 716221 52163139 2% /home /dev/nbd0p2 4294967295 1387818 4293579477 1% /mnt After applying the patch, I was able to run "du /" (60+ times) and "du /mnt" (150+ times) continuously and simultaneously for 6+ hours. There are many reports of the hfsplus driver getting confused under load and generating "BUG: Bad page state" or other similar issues over the years. [1] The unpatched code [2] has always been wrong since it entered the kernel tree. The only reason why it gets away with it is that the kmap/memcpy/kunmap follow very quickly after the page_cache_release() so the kernel has not had a chance to reuse the memory for something else, most of the time. The current RW driver appears to have followed the design and development of the earlier read-only hfsplus driver [3], where-by version 0.1 (Dec 2001) had a B-tree node-centric approach to read_cache_page()/page_cache_release() per bnode_get()/bnode_put(), migrating towards version 0.2 (June 2002) of caching and releasing pages per inode extents. When the current RW code first entered the kernel [2] in 2005, there was an REF_PAGES conditional (and "//" commented out code) to switch between B-node centric paging to inode-centric paging. There was a mistake with the direction of one of the REF_PAGES conditionals in __hfs_bnode_create(). In a subsequent "remove debug code" commit [4], the read_cache_page()/page_cache_release() per bnode_get()/bnode_put() were removed, but a page_cache_release() was mistakenly left in (propagating the "REF_PAGES <-> !REF_PAGE" mistake), and the commented-out page_cache_release() in bnode_release() (which should be spanned by !REF_PAGES) was never enabled. References: [1]: Michael Fox, Apr 2013 http://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-fsdevel/msg63807.html ("hfsplus volume suddenly inaccessable after 'hfs: recoff %d too large'") Sasha Levin, Feb 2015 http://lkml.org/lkml/2015/2/20/85 ("use after free") https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/740814 https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/1027887 https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=42342 https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=63841 https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=78761 [2]: http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git/commit/\ fs/hfs/bnode.c?id=d1081202f1d0ee35ab0beb490da4b65d4bc763db commit d1081202f1d0ee35ab0beb490da4b65d4bc763db Author: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Date: Wed Feb 25 16:17:36 2004 -0800 [PATCH] HFS rewrite http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git/commit/\ fs/hfsplus/bnode.c?id=91556682e0bf004d98a529bf829d339abb98bbbd commit 91556682e0bf004d98a529bf829d339abb98bbbd Author: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Date: Wed Feb 25 16:17:48 2004 -0800 [PATCH] HFS+ support [3]: http://sourceforge.net/projects/linux-hfsplus/ http://sourceforge.net/projects/linux-hfsplus/files/Linux%202.4.x%20patch/hfsplus%200.1/ http://sourceforge.net/projects/linux-hfsplus/files/Linux%202.4.x%20patch/hfsplus%200.2/ http://linux-hfsplus.cvs.sourceforge.net/viewvc/linux-hfsplus/linux/\ fs/hfsplus/bnode.c?r1=1.4&r2=1.5 Date: Thu Jun 6 09:45:14 2002 +0000 Use buffer cache instead of page cache in bnode.c. Cache inode extents. [4]: http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/\ stable/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a5e3985fa014029eb6795664c704953720cc7f7d commit a5e3985fa014029eb6795664c704953720cc7f7d Author: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org> Date: Tue Sep 6 15:18:47 2005 -0700 [PATCH] hfs: remove debug code Signed-off-by: Hin-Tak Leung <htl10@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Sergei Antonov <saproj@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Anton Altaparmakov <anton@tuxera.com> Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Vyacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com> Cc: Sougata Santra <sougata@tuxera.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2015-10-01hfs: fix B-tree corruption after insertion at position 0Hin-Tak Leung
commit b4cc0efea4f0bfa2477c56af406cfcf3d3e58680 upstream. Fix B-tree corruption when a new record is inserted at position 0 in the node in hfs_brec_insert(). This is an identical change to the corresponding hfs b-tree code to Sergei Antonov's "hfsplus: fix B-tree corruption after insertion at position 0", to keep similar code paths in the hfs and hfsplus drivers in sync, where appropriate. Signed-off-by: Hin-Tak Leung <htl10@users.sourceforge.net> Cc: Sergei Antonov <saproj@gmail.com> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Reviewed-by: Vyacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com> Cc: Anton Altaparmakov <anton@tuxera.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2015-10-01fs: if a coredump already exists, unlink and recreate with O_EXCLJann Horn
commit fbb1816942c04429e85dbf4c1a080accc534299e upstream. It was possible for an attacking user to trick root (or another user) into writing his coredumps into an attacker-readable, pre-existing file using rename() or link(), causing the disclosure of secret data from the victim process' virtual memory. Depending on the configuration, it was also possible to trick root into overwriting system files with coredumps. Fix that issue by never writing coredumps into existing files. Requirements for the attack: - The attack only applies if the victim's process has a nonzero RLIMIT_CORE and is dumpable. - The attacker can trick the victim into coredumping into an attacker-writable directory D, either because the core_pattern is relative and the victim's cwd is attacker-writable or because an absolute core_pattern pointing to a world-writable directory is used. - The attacker has one of these: A: on a system with protected_hardlinks=0: execute access to a folder containing a victim-owned, attacker-readable file on the same partition as D, and the victim-owned file will be deleted before the main part of the attack takes place. (In practice, there are lots of files that fulfill this condition, e.g. entries in Debian's /var/lib/dpkg/info/.) This does not apply to most Linux systems because most distros set protected_hardlinks=1. B: on a system with protected_hardlinks=1: execute access to a folder containing a victim-owned, attacker-readable and attacker-writable file on the same partition as D, and the victim-owned file will be deleted before the main part of the attack takes place. (This seems to be uncommon.) C: on any system, independent of protected_hardlinks: write access to a non-sticky folder containing a victim-owned, attacker-readable file on the same partition as D (This seems to be uncommon.) The basic idea is that the attacker moves the victim-owned file to where he expects the victim process to dump its core. The victim process dumps its core into the existing file, and the attacker reads the coredump from it. If the attacker can't move the file because he does not have write access to the containing directory, he can instead link the file to a directory he controls, then wait for the original link to the file to be deleted (because the kernel checks that the link count of the corefile is 1). A less reliable variant that requires D to be non-sticky works with link() and does not require deletion of the original link: link() the file into D, but then unlink() it directly before the kernel performs the link count check. On systems with protected_hardlinks=0, this variant allows an attacker to not only gain information from coredumps, but also clobber existing, victim-writable files with coredumps. (This could theoretically lead to a privilege escalation.) Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2015-10-01NFS: nfs_set_pgio_error sometimes misses errorsTrond Myklebust
commit e9ae58aeee8842a50f7e199d602a5ccb2e41a95f upstream. We should ensure that we always set the pgio_header's error field if a READ or WRITE RPC call returns an error. The current code depends on 'hdr->good_bytes' always being initialised to a large value, which is not always done correctly by callers. When this happens, applications may end up missing important errors. Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2015-10-01NFSv4: don't set SETATTR for O_RDONLY|O_EXCLNeilBrown
commit efcbc04e16dfa95fef76309f89710dd1d99a5453 upstream. It is unusual to combine the open flags O_RDONLY and O_EXCL, but it appears that libre-office does just that. [pid 3250] stat("/home/USER/.config", {st_mode=S_IFDIR|0700, st_size=8192, ...}) = 0 [pid 3250] open("/home/USER/.config/libreoffice/4-suse/user/extensions/buildid", O_RDONLY|O_EXCL <unfinished ...> NFSv4 takes O_EXCL as a sign that a setattr command should be sent, probably to reset the timestamps. When it was an O_RDONLY open, the SETATTR command does not identify any actual attributes to change. If no delegation was provided to the open, the SETATTR uses the all-zeros stateid and the request is accepted (at least by the Linux NFS server - no harm, no foul). If a read-delegation was provided, this is used in the SETATTR request, and a Netapp filer will justifiably claim NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID, which the Linux client takes as a sign to retry - indefinitely. So only treat O_EXCL specially if O_CREAT was also given. Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2015-09-21hpfs: update ctime and mtime on directory modificationMikulas Patocka
commit f49a26e7718dd30b49e3541e3e25aecf5e7294e2 upstream. Update ctime and mtime when a directory is modified. (though OS/2 doesn't update them anyway) Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2015-08-16signalfd: fix information leak in signalfd_copyinfoAmanieu d'Antras
commit 3ead7c52bdb0ab44f4bb1feed505a8323cc12ba7 upstream. This function may copy the si_addr_lsb field to user mode when it hasn't been initialized, which can leak kernel stack data to user mode. Just checking the value of si_code is insufficient because the same si_code value is shared between multiple signals. This is solved by checking the value of si_signo in addition to si_code. Signed-off-by: Amanieu d'Antras <amanieu@gmail.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2015-08-16ocfs2: fix BUG in ocfs2_downconvert_thread_do_work()Joseph Qi
commit 209f7512d007980fd111a74a064d70a3656079cf upstream. The "BUG_ON(list_empty(&osb->blocked_lock_list))" in ocfs2_downconvert_thread_do_work can be triggered in the following case: ocfs2dc has firstly saved osb->blocked_lock_count to local varibale processed, and then processes the dentry lockres. During the dentry put, it calls iput and then deletes rw, inode and open lockres from blocked list in ocfs2_mark_lockres_freeing. And this causes the variable `processed' to not reflect the number of blocked lockres to be processed, which triggers the BUG. Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@huawei.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2015-08-16fsnotify: fix oops in fsnotify_clear_marks_by_group_flags()Jan Kara
commit 8f2f3eb59dff4ec538de55f2e0592fec85966aab upstream. fsnotify_clear_marks_by_group_flags() can race with fsnotify_destroy_marks() so that when fsnotify_destroy_mark_locked() drops mark_mutex, a mark from the list iterated by fsnotify_clear_marks_by_group_flags() can be freed and thus the next entry pointer we have cached may become stale and we dereference free memory. Fix the problem by first moving marks to free to a special private list and then always free the first entry in the special list. This method is safe even when entries from the list can disappear once we drop the lock. Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com> Reported-by: Ashish Sangwan <a.sangwan@samsung.com> Reviewed-by: Ashish Sangwan <a.sangwan@samsung.com> Cc: Lino Sanfilippo <LinoSanfilippo@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2015-08-10freeing unlinked file indefinitely delayedAl Viro
commit 75a6f82a0d10ef8f13cd8fe7212911a0252ab99e upstream. Normally opening a file, unlinking it and then closing will have the inode freed upon close() (provided that it's not otherwise busy and has no remaining links, of course). However, there's one case where that does *not* happen. Namely, if you open it by fhandle with cold dcache, then unlink() and close(). In normal case you get d_delete() in unlink(2) notice that dentry is busy and unhash it; on the final dput() it will be forcibly evicted from dcache, triggering iput() and inode removal. In this case, though, we end up with *two* dentries - disconnected (created by open-by-fhandle) and regular one (used by unlink()). The latter will have its reference to inode dropped just fine, but the former will not - it's considered hashed (it is on the ->s_anon list), so it will stay around until the memory pressure will finally do it in. As the result, we have the final iput() delayed indefinitely. It's trivial to reproduce - void flush_dcache(void) { system("mount -o remount,rw /"); } static char buf[20 * 1024 * 1024]; main() { int fd; union { struct file_handle f; char buf[MAX_HANDLE_SZ]; } x; int m; x.f.handle_bytes = sizeof(x); chdir("/root"); mkdir("foo", 0700); fd = open("foo/bar", O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0600); close(fd); name_to_handle_at(AT_FDCWD, "foo/bar", &x.f, &m, 0); flush_dcache(); fd = open_by_handle_at(AT_FDCWD, &x.f, O_RDWR); unlink("foo/bar"); write(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); system("df ."); /* 20Mb eaten */ close(fd); system("df ."); /* should've freed those 20Mb */ flush_dcache(); system("df ."); /* should be the same as #2 */ } will spit out something like Filesystem 1K-blocks Used Available Use% Mounted on /dev/root 322023 303843 1131 100% / Filesystem 1K-blocks Used Available Use% Mounted on /dev/root 322023 303843 1131 100% / Filesystem 1K-blocks Used Available Use% Mounted on /dev/root 322023 283282 21692 93% / - inode gets freed only when dentry is finally evicted (here we trigger than by remount; normally it would've happened in response to memory pressure hell knows when). Acked-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2015-08-03hpfs: hpfs_error: Remove static buffer, use vsprintf extension %pV insteadJoe Perches
commit a28e4b2b18ccb90df402da3f21e1a83c9d4f8ec1 upstream. Removing unnecessary static buffers is good. Use the vsprintf %pV extension instead. Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mikulas@twibright.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2015-08-039p: don't leave a half-initialized inode sitting aroundAl Viro
commit 0a73d0a204a4a04a1e110539c5a524ae51f91d6d upstream. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2015-08-03fixing infinite OPEN loop in 4.0 stateid recoveryOlga Kornievskaia
commit e8d975e73e5fa05f983fbf2723120edcf68e0b38 upstream. Problem: When an operation like WRITE receives a BAD_STATEID, even though recovery code clears the RECLAIM_NOGRACE recovery flag before recovering the open state, because of clearing delegation state for the associated inode, nfs_inode_find_state_and_recover() gets called and it makes the same state with RECLAIM_NOGRACE flag again. As a results, when we restart looking over the open states, we end up in the infinite loop instead of breaking out in the next test of state flags. Solution: unset the RECLAIM_NOGRACE set because of calling of nfs_inode_find_state_and_recover() after returning from calling recover_open() function. Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2015-08-03NFS: Fix size of NFSACL SETACL operationsChuck Lever
commit d683cc49daf7c5afca8cd9654aaa1bf63cdf2ad9 upstream. When encoding the NFSACL SETACL operation, reserve just the estimated size of the ACL rather than a fixed maximum. This eliminates needless zero padding on the wire that the server ignores. Fixes: ee5dc7732bd5 ('NFS: Fix "kernel BUG at fs/nfs/nfs3xdr.c:1338!"') Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2015-08-03fuse: initialize fc->release before calling itMiklos Szeredi
commit 0ad0b3255a08020eaf50e34ef0d6df5bdf5e09ed upstream. fc->release is called from fuse_conn_put() which was used in the error cleanup before fc->release was initialized. [Jeremiah Mahler <jmmahler@gmail.com>: assign fc->release after calling fuse_conn_init(fc) instead of before.] Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Fixes: a325f9b92273 ("fuse: update fuse_conn_init() and separate out fuse_conn_kill()") Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2015-08-03Btrfs: use kmem_cache_free when freeing entry in inode cacheFilipe Manana
commit c3f4a1685bb87e59c886ee68f7967eae07d4dffa upstream. The free space entries are allocated using kmem_cache_zalloc(), through __btrfs_add_free_space(), therefore we should use kmem_cache_free() and not kfree() to avoid any confusion and any potential problem. Looking at the kfree() definition at mm/slab.c it has the following comment: /* * (...) * * Don't free memory not originally allocated by kmalloc() * or you will run into trouble. */ So better be safe and use kmem_cache_free(). Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2015-08-03xfs: fix remote symlinks on V5/CRC filesystemsEric Sandeen
commit 2ac56d3d4bd625450a54d4c3f9292d58f6b88232 upstream. If we create a CRC filesystem, mount it, and create a symlink with a path long enough that it can't live in the inode, we get a very strange result upon remount: # ls -l mnt total 4 lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 929 Jun 15 16:58 link -> XSLM XSLM is the V5 symlink block header magic (which happens to be followed by a NUL, so the string looks terminated). xfs_readlink_bmap() advanced cur_chunk by the size of the header for CRC filesystems, but never actually used that pointer; it kept reading from bp->b_addr, which is the start of the block, rather than the start of the symlink data after the header. Looks like this problem goes back to v3.10. Fixing this gets us reading the proper link target, again. Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2015-08-03jbd2: fix ocfs2 corrupt when updating journal superblock failsJoseph Qi
commit 6f6a6fda294506dfe0e3e0a253bb2d2923f28f0a upstream. If updating journal superblock fails after journal data has been flushed, the error is omitted and this will mislead the caller as a normal case. In ocfs2, the checkpoint will be treated successfully and the other node can get the lock to update. Since the sb_start is still pointing to the old log block, it will rewrite the journal data during journal recovery by the other node. Thus the new updates will be overwritten and ocfs2 corrupts. So in above case we have to return the error, and ocfs2_commit_cache will take care of the error and prevent the other node to do update first. And only after recovering journal it can do the new updates. The issue discussion mail can be found at: https://oss.oracle.com/pipermail/ocfs2-devel/2015-June/010856.html http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.comp.file-systems.ext4/48841 [ Fixed bug in patch which allowed a non-negative error return from jbd2_cleanup_journal_tail() to leak out of jbd2_fjournal_flush(); this was causing xfstests ext4/306 to fail. -- Ted ] Reported-by: Yiwen Jiang <jiangyiwen@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Tested-by: Yiwen Jiang <jiangyiwen@huawei.com> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2015-08-03jbd2: use GFP_NOFS in jbd2_cleanup_journal_tail()Dmitry Monakhov
commit b4f1afcd068f6e533230dfed00782cd8a907f96b upstream. jbd2_cleanup_journal_tail() can be invoked by jbd2__journal_start() So allocations should be done with GFP_NOFS [Full stack trace snipped from 3.10-rh7] [<ffffffff815c4bd4>] dump_stack+0x19/0x1b [<ffffffff8105dba1>] warn_slowpath_common+0x61/0x80 [<ffffffff8105dcca>] warn_slowpath_null+0x1a/0x20 [<ffffffff815c2142>] slab_pre_alloc_hook.isra.31.part.32+0x15/0x17 [<ffffffff8119c045>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x55/0x210 [<ffffffff811477f5>] ? mempool_alloc_slab+0x15/0x20 [<ffffffff811477f5>] mempool_alloc_slab+0x15/0x20 [<ffffffff81147939>] mempool_alloc+0x69/0x170 [<ffffffff815cb69e>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0xe/0x20 [<ffffffff8109160d>] ? finish_task_switch+0x5d/0x150 [<ffffffff811f1a8e>] bio_alloc_bioset+0x1be/0x2e0 [<ffffffff8127ee49>] blkdev_issue_flush+0x99/0x120 [<ffffffffa019a733>] jbd2_cleanup_journal_tail+0x93/0xa0 [jbd2] -->GFP_KERNEL [<ffffffffa019aca1>] jbd2_log_do_checkpoint+0x221/0x4a0 [jbd2] [<ffffffffa019afc7>] __jbd2_log_wait_for_space+0xa7/0x1e0 [jbd2] [<ffffffffa01952d8>] start_this_handle+0x2d8/0x550 [jbd2] [<ffffffff811b02a9>] ? __memcg_kmem_put_cache+0x29/0x30 [<ffffffff8119c120>] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x130/0x210 [<ffffffffa019573a>] jbd2__journal_start+0xba/0x190 [jbd2] [<ffffffff811532ce>] ? lru_cache_add+0xe/0x10 [<ffffffffa01c9549>] ? ext4_da_write_begin+0xf9/0x330 [ext4] [<ffffffffa01f2c77>] __ext4_journal_start_sb+0x77/0x160 [ext4] [<ffffffffa01c9549>] ext4_da_write_begin+0xf9/0x330 [ext4] [<ffffffff811446ec>] generic_file_buffered_write_iter+0x10c/0x270 [<ffffffff81146918>] __generic_file_write_iter+0x178/0x390 [<ffffffff81146c6b>] __generic_file_aio_write+0x8b/0xb0 [<ffffffff81146ced>] generic_file_aio_write+0x5d/0xc0 [<ffffffffa01bf289>] ext4_file_write+0xa9/0x450 [ext4] [<ffffffff811c31d9>] ? pipe_read+0x379/0x4f0 [<ffffffff811b93f0>] do_sync_write+0x90/0xe0 [<ffffffff811b9b6d>] vfs_write+0xbd/0x1e0 [<ffffffff811ba5b8>] SyS_write+0x58/0xb0 [<ffffffff815d4799>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Signed-off-by: Dmitry Monakhov <dmonakhov@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2015-08-03ext4: replace open coded nofail allocation in ext4_free_blocks()Michal Hocko
commit 7444a072c387a93ebee7066e8aee776954ab0e41 upstream. ext4_free_blocks is looping around the allocation request and mimics __GFP_NOFAIL behavior without any allocation fallback strategy. Let's remove the open coded loop and replace it with __GFP_NOFAIL. Without the flag the allocator has no way to find out never-fail requirement and cannot help in any way. Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2015-08-03ext4: correctly migrate a file with a hole at the beginningEryu Guan
commit 8974fec7d72e3e02752fe0f27b4c3719c78d9a15 upstream. Currently ext4_ind_migrate() doesn't correctly handle a file which contains a hole at the beginning of the file. This caused the migration to be done incorrectly, and then if there is a subsequent following delayed allocation write to the "hole", this would reclaim the same data blocks again and results in fs corruption. # assmuing 4k block size ext4, with delalloc enabled # skip the first block and write to the second block xfs_io -fc "pwrite 4k 4k" -c "fsync" /mnt/ext4/testfile # converting to indirect-mapped file, which would move the data blocks # to the beginning of the file, but extent status cache still marks # that region as a hole chattr -e /mnt/ext4/testfile # delayed allocation writes to the "hole", reclaim the same data block # again, results in i_blocks corruption xfs_io -c "pwrite 0 4k" /mnt/ext4/testfile umount /mnt/ext4 e2fsck -nf /dev/sda6 ... Inode 53, i_blocks is 16, should be 8. Fix? no ... Signed-off-by: Eryu Guan <guaneryu@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2025-08-03 21:00:55 +0000