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2024-09-12staging: iio: frequency: ad9834: Validate frequency parameter valueAleksandr Mishin
commit b48aa991758999d4e8f9296c5bbe388f293ef465 upstream. In ad9834_write_frequency() clk_get_rate() can return 0. In such case ad9834_calc_freqreg() call will lead to division by zero. Checking 'if (fout > (clk_freq / 2))' doesn't protect in case of 'fout' is 0. ad9834_write_frequency() is called from ad9834_write(), where fout is taken from text buffer, which can contain any value. Modify parameters checking. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. Fixes: 12b9d5bf76bf ("Staging: IIO: DDS: AD9833 / AD9834 driver") Suggested-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Mishin <amishin@t-argos.ru> Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240703154506.25584-1-amishin@t-argos.ru Cc: <Stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-09-12intel: legacy: Partial revert of field get conversionSasha Neftin
commit ba54b1a276a6b69d80649942fe5334d19851443e upstream. Refactoring of the field get conversion introduced a regression in the legacy Wake On Lan from a magic packet with i219 devices. Rx address copied not correctly from MAC to PHY with FIELD_GET macro. Fixes: b9a452545075 ("intel: legacy: field get conversion") Suggested-by: Vitaly Lifshits <vitaly.lifshits@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Neftin <sasha.neftin@intel.com> Tested-by: Naama Meir <naamax.meir@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com> Cc: Florian Larysch <fl@n621.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-09-12cpufreq: amd-pstate: fix the highest frequency issue which limits performancePerry Yuan
commit bf202e654bfa57fb8cf9d93d4c6855890b70b9c4 upstream. To address the performance drop issue, an optimization has been implemented. The incorrect highest performance value previously set by the low-level power firmware for AMD CPUs with Family ID 0x19 and Model ID ranging from 0x70 to 0x7F series has been identified as the cause. To resolve this, a check has been implemented to accurately determine the CPU family and model ID. The correct highest performance value is now set and the performance drop caused by the incorrect highest performance value are eliminated. Before the fix, the highest frequency was set to 4200MHz, now it is set to 4971MHz which is correct. CPU NODE SOCKET CORE L1d:L1i:L2:L3 ONLINE MAXMHZ MINMHZ MHZ 0 0 0 0 0:0:0:0 yes 4971.0000 400.0000 400.0000 1 0 0 0 0:0:0:0 yes 4971.0000 400.0000 400.0000 2 0 0 1 1:1:1:0 yes 4971.0000 400.0000 4865.8140 3 0 0 1 1:1:1:0 yes 4971.0000 400.0000 400.0000 Fixes: f3a052391822 ("cpufreq: amd-pstate: Enable amd-pstate preferred core support") Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218759 Signed-off-by: Perry Yuan <perry.yuan@amd.com> Co-developed-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com> Tested-by: Gaha Bana <gahabana@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-09-12cpufreq: amd-pstate: Enable amd-pstate preferred core supportMeng Li
commit f3a052391822b772b4e27f2594526cf1eb103cab upstream. amd-pstate driver utilizes the functions and data structures provided by the ITMT architecture to enable the scheduler to favor scheduling on cores which can be get a higher frequency with lower voltage. We call it amd-pstate preferrred core. Here sched_set_itmt_core_prio() is called to set priorities and sched_set_itmt_support() is called to enable ITMT feature. amd-pstate driver uses the highest performance value to indicate the priority of CPU. The higher value has a higher priority. The initial core rankings are set up by amd-pstate when the system boots. Add a variable hw_prefcore in cpudata structure. It will check if the processor and power firmware support preferred core feature. Add one new early parameter `disable` to allow user to disable the preferred core. Only when hardware supports preferred core and user set `enabled` in early parameter, amd pstate driver supports preferred core featue. Tested-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@natalenko.name> Reviewed-by: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Wyes Karny <wyes.karny@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com> Co-developed-by: Perry Yuan <Perry.Yuan@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Perry Yuan <Perry.Yuan@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Meng Li <li.meng@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-09-12ACPI: CPPC: Add helper to get the highest performance valueMeng Li
commit 12753d71e8c5c3e716cedba23ddeed508da0bdc4 upstream. Add support for getting the highest performance to the generic CPPC driver. This enables downstream drivers such as amd-pstate to discover and use these values. Refer to Chapter 8.4.6.1.1.1. Highest Performance of ACPI Specification 6.5 for details on continuous performance control of CPPC (linked below). Tested-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@natalenko.name> Reviewed-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Wyes Karny <wyes.karny@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Perry Yuan <perry.yuan@amd.com> Acked-by: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Meng Li <li.meng@amd.com> Link: https://uefi.org/specs/ACPI/6.5/08_Processor_Configuration_and_Control.html?highlight=cppc#highest-performance [ rjw: Subject and changelog edits ] Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-09-12ata: pata_macio: Use WARN instead of BUGMichael Ellerman
[ Upstream commit d4bc0a264fb482b019c84fbc7202dd3cab059087 ] The overflow/underflow conditions in pata_macio_qc_prep() should never happen. But if they do there's no need to kill the system entirely, a WARN and failing the IO request should be sufficient and might allow the system to keep running. Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12spi: spi-fsl-lpspi: limit PRESCALE bit in TCR registerCarlos Song
[ Upstream commit 783bf5d09f86b9736605f3e01a3472e55ef98ff8 ] Referring to the errata ERR051608 of I.MX93, LPSPI TCR[PRESCALE] can only be configured to be 0 or 1, other values are not valid and will cause LPSPI to not work. Add the prescale limitation for LPSPI in I.MX93. Other platforms are not affected. Signed-off-by: Carlos Song <carlos.song@nxp.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240820070658.672127-1-carlos.song@nxp.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12of/irq: Prevent device address out-of-bounds read in interrupt map walkStefan Wiehler
[ Upstream commit b739dffa5d570b411d4bdf4bb9b8dfd6b7d72305 ] When of_irq_parse_raw() is invoked with a device address smaller than the interrupt parent node (from #address-cells property), KASAN detects the following out-of-bounds read when populating the initial match table (dyndbg="func of_irq_parse_* +p"): OF: of_irq_parse_one: dev=/soc@0/picasso/watchdog, index=0 OF: parent=/soc@0/pci@878000000000/gpio0@17,0, intsize=2 OF: intspec=4 OF: of_irq_parse_raw: ipar=/soc@0/pci@878000000000/gpio0@17,0, size=2 OF: -> addrsize=3 ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in of_irq_parse_raw+0x2b8/0x8d0 Read of size 4 at addr ffffff81beca5608 by task bash/764 CPU: 1 PID: 764 Comm: bash Tainted: G O 6.1.67-484c613561-nokia_sm_arm64 #1 Hardware name: Unknown Unknown Product/Unknown Product, BIOS 2023.01-12.24.03-dirty 01/01/2023 Call trace: dump_backtrace+0xdc/0x130 show_stack+0x1c/0x30 dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0x84 print_report+0x150/0x448 kasan_report+0x98/0x140 __asan_load4+0x78/0xa0 of_irq_parse_raw+0x2b8/0x8d0 of_irq_parse_one+0x24c/0x270 parse_interrupts+0xc0/0x120 of_fwnode_add_links+0x100/0x2d0 fw_devlink_parse_fwtree+0x64/0xc0 device_add+0xb38/0xc30 of_device_add+0x64/0x90 of_platform_device_create_pdata+0xd0/0x170 of_platform_bus_create+0x244/0x600 of_platform_notify+0x1b0/0x254 blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x9c/0xd0 __of_changeset_entry_notify+0x1b8/0x230 __of_changeset_apply_notify+0x54/0xe4 of_overlay_fdt_apply+0xc04/0xd94 ... The buggy address belongs to the object at ffffff81beca5600 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128 The buggy address is located 8 bytes inside of 128-byte region [ffffff81beca5600, ffffff81beca5680) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:00000000230d3d03 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x1beca4 head:00000000230d3d03 order:1 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 flags: 0x8000000000010200(slab|head|zone=2) raw: 8000000000010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 ffffff810000c300 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000200020 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffffff81beca5500: 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffffff81beca5580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffffff81beca5600: 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ffffff81beca5680: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffffff81beca5700: 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ================================================================== OF: -> got it ! Prevent the out-of-bounds read by copying the device address into a buffer of sufficient size. Signed-off-by: Stefan Wiehler <stefan.wiehler@nokia.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240812100652.3800963-1-stefan.wiehler@nokia.com Signed-off-by: Rob Herring (Arm) <robh@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12usbnet: ipheth: race between ipheth_close and error handlingOliver Neukum
[ Upstream commit e5876b088ba03a62124266fa20d00e65533c7269 ] ipheth_sndbulk_callback() can submit carrier_work as a part of its error handling. That means that the driver must make sure that the work is cancelled after it has made sure that no more URB can terminate with an error condition. Hence the order of actions in ipheth_close() needs to be inverted. Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Foster Snowhill <forst@pen.gy> Tested-by: Georgi Valkov <gvalkov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12Input: uinput - reject requests with unreasonable number of slotsDmitry Torokhov
[ Upstream commit 206f533a0a7c683982af473079c4111f4a0f9f5e ] From: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> When exercising uinput interface syzkaller may try setting up device with a really large number of slots, which causes memory allocation failure in input_mt_init_slots(). While this allocation failure is handled properly and request is rejected, it results in syzkaller reports. Additionally, such request may put undue burden on the system which will try to free a lot of memory for a bogus request. Fix it by limiting allowed number of slots to 100. This can easily be extended if we see devices that can track more than 100 contacts. Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+0122fa359a69694395d5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=0122fa359a69694395d5 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Zqgi7NYEbpRsJfa2@google.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12HID: amd_sfh: free driver_data after destroying hid deviceOlivier Sobrie
[ Upstream commit 97155021ae17b86985121b33cf8098bcde00d497 ] HID driver callbacks aren't called anymore once hid_destroy_device() has been called. Hence, hid driver_data should be freed only after the hid_destroy_device() function returned as driver_data is used in several callbacks. I observed a crash with kernel 6.10.0 on my T14s Gen 3, after enabling KASAN to debug memory allocation, I got this output: [ 13.050438] ================================================================== [ 13.054060] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in amd_sfh_get_report+0x3ec/0x530 [amd_sfh] [ 13.054809] psmouse serio1: trackpoint: Synaptics TrackPoint firmware: 0x02, buttons: 3/3 [ 13.056432] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88813152f408 by task (udev-worker)/479 [ 13.060970] CPU: 5 PID: 479 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 6.10.0-arch1-2 #1 893bb55d7f0073f25c46adbb49eb3785fefd74b0 [ 13.063978] Hardware name: LENOVO 21CQCTO1WW/21CQCTO1WW, BIOS R22ET70W (1.40 ) 03/21/2024 [ 13.067860] Call Trace: [ 13.069383] input: TPPS/2 Synaptics TrackPoint as /devices/platform/i8042/serio1/input/input8 [ 13.071486] <TASK> [ 13.071492] dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80 [ 13.074870] snd_hda_intel 0000:33:00.6: enabling device (0000 -> 0002) [ 13.078296] ? amd_sfh_get_report+0x3ec/0x530 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38] [ 13.082199] print_report+0x174/0x505 [ 13.085776] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 [ 13.089367] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.093255] ? amd_sfh_get_report+0x3ec/0x530 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38] [ 13.097464] kasan_report+0xc8/0x150 [ 13.101461] ? amd_sfh_get_report+0x3ec/0x530 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38] [ 13.105802] amd_sfh_get_report+0x3ec/0x530 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38] [ 13.110303] amdtp_hid_request+0xb8/0x110 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38] [ 13.114879] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.119450] sensor_hub_get_feature+0x1d3/0x540 [hid_sensor_hub 3f13be3016ff415bea03008d45d99da837ee3082] [ 13.124097] hid_sensor_parse_common_attributes+0x4d0/0xad0 [hid_sensor_iio_common c3a5cbe93969c28b122609768bbe23efe52eb8f5] [ 13.127404] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.131925] ? __pfx_hid_sensor_parse_common_attributes+0x10/0x10 [hid_sensor_iio_common c3a5cbe93969c28b122609768bbe23efe52eb8f5] [ 13.136455] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x96/0xf0 [ 13.140197] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 [ 13.143602] ? devm_iio_device_alloc+0x34/0x50 [industrialio 3d261d5e5765625d2b052be40e526d62b1d2123b] [ 13.147234] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.150446] ? __devm_add_action+0x167/0x1d0 [ 13.155061] hid_gyro_3d_probe+0x120/0x7f0 [hid_sensor_gyro_3d 63da36a143b775846ab2dbb86c343b401b5e3172] [ 13.158581] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.161814] platform_probe+0xa2/0x150 [ 13.165029] really_probe+0x1e3/0x8a0 [ 13.168243] __driver_probe_device+0x18c/0x370 [ 13.171500] driver_probe_device+0x4a/0x120 [ 13.175000] __driver_attach+0x190/0x4a0 [ 13.178521] ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10 [ 13.181771] bus_for_each_dev+0x106/0x180 [ 13.185033] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 [ 13.188229] ? __pfx_bus_for_each_dev+0x10/0x10 [ 13.191446] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.194382] bus_add_driver+0x29e/0x4d0 [ 13.197328] driver_register+0x1a5/0x360 [ 13.200283] ? __pfx_hid_gyro_3d_platform_driver_init+0x10/0x10 [hid_sensor_gyro_3d 63da36a143b775846ab2dbb86c343b401b5e3172] [ 13.203362] do_one_initcall+0xa7/0x380 [ 13.206432] ? __pfx_do_one_initcall+0x10/0x10 [ 13.210175] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.213211] ? kasan_unpoison+0x44/0x70 [ 13.216688] do_init_module+0x238/0x750 [ 13.219696] load_module+0x5011/0x6af0 [ 13.223096] ? kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 [ 13.226743] ? kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 [ 13.230080] ? kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 [ 13.233323] ? poison_slab_object+0x109/0x180 [ 13.236778] ? __pfx_load_module+0x10/0x10 [ 13.239703] ? poison_slab_object+0x109/0x180 [ 13.243070] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.245924] ? init_module_from_file+0x13d/0x150 [ 13.248745] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.251503] ? init_module_from_file+0xdf/0x150 [ 13.254198] init_module_from_file+0xdf/0x150 [ 13.256826] ? __pfx_init_module_from_file+0x10/0x10 [ 13.259428] ? kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 [ 13.261959] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.264471] ? kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 [ 13.267026] ? poison_slab_object+0x109/0x180 [ 13.269494] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.271949] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.274324] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x85/0xe0 [ 13.276671] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 [ 13.278963] ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x1a6/0xad0 [ 13.281193] idempotent_init_module+0x23b/0x650 [ 13.283420] ? __pfx_idempotent_init_module+0x10/0x10 [ 13.285619] ? __pfx___seccomp_filter+0x10/0x10 [ 13.287714] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.289828] ? __fget_light+0x57/0x420 [ 13.291870] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.293880] ? security_capable+0x74/0xb0 [ 13.295820] __x64_sys_finit_module+0xbe/0x130 [ 13.297874] do_syscall_64+0x82/0x190 [ 13.299898] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.301905] ? irqtime_account_irq+0x3d/0x1f0 [ 13.303877] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.305753] ? __irq_exit_rcu+0x4e/0x130 [ 13.307577] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.309489] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 13.311371] RIP: 0033:0x7a21f96ade9d [ 13.313234] Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 63 de 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 13.317051] RSP: 002b:00007ffeae934e78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 [ 13.319024] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005987276bfcf0 RCX: 00007a21f96ade9d [ 13.321100] RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 00007a21f8eda376 RDI: 000000000000001c [ 13.323314] RBP: 00007a21f8eda376 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007ffeae934ec0 [ 13.325505] R10: 0000000000000050 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000020000 [ 13.327637] R13: 00005987276c1250 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00005987276c4530 [ 13.329737] </TASK> [ 13.333945] Allocated by task 139: [ 13.336111] kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 [ 13.336121] kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 [ 13.336125] __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 [ 13.336129] amdtp_hid_probe+0xb1/0x440 [amd_sfh] [ 13.336138] amd_sfh_hid_client_init+0xb8a/0x10f0 [amd_sfh] [ 13.336144] sfh_init_work+0x47/0x120 [amd_sfh] [ 13.336150] process_one_work+0x673/0xeb0 [ 13.336155] worker_thread+0x795/0x1250 [ 13.336160] kthread+0x290/0x350 [ 13.336164] ret_from_fork+0x34/0x70 [ 13.336169] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 13.338175] Freed by task 139: [ 13.340064] kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 [ 13.340072] kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 [ 13.340076] kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 [ 13.340081] poison_slab_object+0x109/0x180 [ 13.340085] __kasan_slab_free+0x32/0x50 [ 13.340089] kfree+0xe5/0x310 [ 13.340094] amdtp_hid_remove+0xb2/0x160 [amd_sfh] [ 13.340102] amd_sfh_hid_client_deinit+0x324/0x640 [amd_sfh] [ 13.340107] amd_sfh_hid_client_init+0x94a/0x10f0 [amd_sfh] [ 13.340113] sfh_init_work+0x47/0x120 [amd_sfh] [ 13.340118] process_one_work+0x673/0xeb0 [ 13.340123] worker_thread+0x795/0x1250 [ 13.340127] kthread+0x290/0x350 [ 13.340132] ret_from_fork+0x34/0x70 [ 13.340136] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 13.342482] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88813152f400 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-64 of size 64 [ 13.347357] The buggy address is located 8 bytes inside of freed 64-byte region [ffff88813152f400, ffff88813152f440) [ 13.347367] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [ 13.355409] page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x13152f [ 13.355416] anon flags: 0x2ffff8000000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1ffff) [ 13.355423] page_type: 0xffffefff(slab) [ 13.355429] raw: 02ffff8000000000 ffff8881000428c0 ffffea0004c43a00 0000000000000005 [ 13.355435] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000200020 00000001ffffefff 0000000000000000 [ 13.355439] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 13.357295] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 13.357299] ffff88813152f300: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 13.357303] ffff88813152f380: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 13.357306] >ffff88813152f400: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 13.357309] ^ [ 13.357311] ffff88813152f480: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 13.357315] ffff88813152f500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 06 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 13.357318] ================================================================== [ 13.357405] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint [ 13.383534] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xe0a1bc4140000013: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 13.383544] KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0x050e020a00000098-0x050e020a0000009f] [ 13.383551] CPU: 3 PID: 479 Comm: (udev-worker) Tainted: G B 6.10.0-arch1-2 #1 893bb55d7f0073f25c46adbb49eb3785fefd74b0 [ 13.383561] Hardware name: LENOVO 21CQCTO1WW/21CQCTO1WW, BIOS R22ET70W (1.40 ) 03/21/2024 [ 13.383565] RIP: 0010:amd_sfh_get_report+0x81/0x530 [amd_sfh] [ 13.383580] Code: 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 78 03 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 8b 63 08 49 8d 7c 24 10 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e 1a 03 00 00 45 8b 74 24 10 45 [ 13.383585] RSP: 0018:ffff8881261f7388 EFLAGS: 00010212 [ 13.383592] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88813152f400 RCX: 0000000000000002 [ 13.383597] RDX: 00a1c04140000013 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 050e020a0000009b [ 13.383600] RBP: ffff88814d010000 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: fffffbfff3ddb8c0 [ 13.383604] R10: ffffffff9eedc607 R11: ffff88810ce98000 R12: 050e020a0000008b [ 13.383607] R13: ffff88814d010000 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: 0000000000000004 [ 13.383611] FS: 00007a21f94d0880(0000) GS:ffff8887e7d80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 13.383615] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 13.383618] CR2: 00007e0014c438f0 CR3: 000000012614c000 CR4: 0000000000f50ef0 [ 13.383622] PKRU: 55555554 [ 13.383625] Call Trace: [ 13.383629] <TASK> [ 13.383632] ? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x27 [ 13.383644] ? die_addr+0x46/0x70 [ 13.383652] ? exc_general_protection+0x150/0x240 [ 13.383664] ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30 [ 13.383674] ? amd_sfh_get_report+0x81/0x530 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38] [ 13.383686] ? amd_sfh_get_report+0x3ec/0x530 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38] [ 13.383697] amdtp_hid_request+0xb8/0x110 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38] [ 13.383706] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.383713] sensor_hub_get_feature+0x1d3/0x540 [hid_sensor_hub 3f13be3016ff415bea03008d45d99da837ee3082] [ 13.383727] hid_sensor_parse_common_attributes+0x4d0/0xad0 [hid_sensor_iio_common c3a5cbe93969c28b122609768bbe23efe52eb8f5] [ 13.383739] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.383745] ? __pfx_hid_sensor_parse_common_attributes+0x10/0x10 [hid_sensor_iio_common c3a5cbe93969c28b122609768bbe23efe52eb8f5] [ 13.383753] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x96/0xf0 [ 13.383762] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 [ 13.383768] ? devm_iio_device_alloc+0x34/0x50 [industrialio 3d261d5e5765625d2b052be40e526d62b1d2123b] [ 13.383790] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.383795] ? __devm_add_action+0x167/0x1d0 [ 13.383806] hid_gyro_3d_probe+0x120/0x7f0 [hid_sensor_gyro_3d 63da36a143b775846ab2dbb86c343b401b5e3172] [ 13.383818] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.383826] platform_probe+0xa2/0x150 [ 13.383832] really_probe+0x1e3/0x8a0 [ 13.383838] __driver_probe_device+0x18c/0x370 [ 13.383844] driver_probe_device+0x4a/0x120 [ 13.383851] __driver_attach+0x190/0x4a0 [ 13.383857] ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10 [ 13.383863] bus_for_each_dev+0x106/0x180 [ 13.383868] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 [ 13.383874] ? __pfx_bus_for_each_dev+0x10/0x10 [ 13.383880] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.383887] bus_add_driver+0x29e/0x4d0 [ 13.383895] driver_register+0x1a5/0x360 [ 13.383902] ? __pfx_hid_gyro_3d_platform_driver_init+0x10/0x10 [hid_sensor_gyro_3d 63da36a143b775846ab2dbb86c343b401b5e3172] [ 13.383910] do_one_initcall+0xa7/0x380 [ 13.383919] ? __pfx_do_one_initcall+0x10/0x10 [ 13.383927] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.383933] ? kasan_unpoison+0x44/0x70 [ 13.383943] do_init_module+0x238/0x750 [ 13.383955] load_module+0x5011/0x6af0 [ 13.383962] ? kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 [ 13.383968] ? kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 [ 13.383973] ? kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 [ 13.383980] ? poison_slab_object+0x109/0x180 [ 13.383993] ? __pfx_load_module+0x10/0x10 [ 13.384007] ? poison_slab_object+0x109/0x180 [ 13.384012] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.384018] ? init_module_from_file+0x13d/0x150 [ 13.384025] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.384032] ? init_module_from_file+0xdf/0x150 [ 13.384037] init_module_from_file+0xdf/0x150 [ 13.384044] ? __pfx_init_module_from_file+0x10/0x10 [ 13.384050] ? kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 [ 13.384055] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.384060] ? kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 [ 13.384066] ? poison_slab_object+0x109/0x180 [ 13.384071] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.384080] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.384085] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x85/0xe0 [ 13.384091] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 [ 13.384096] ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x1a6/0xad0 [ 13.384106] idempotent_init_module+0x23b/0x650 [ 13.384114] ? __pfx_idempotent_init_module+0x10/0x10 [ 13.384120] ? __pfx___seccomp_filter+0x10/0x10 [ 13.384129] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.384135] ? __fget_light+0x57/0x420 [ 13.384142] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.384147] ? security_capable+0x74/0xb0 [ 13.384157] __x64_sys_finit_module+0xbe/0x130 [ 13.384164] do_syscall_64+0x82/0x190 [ 13.384174] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.384179] ? irqtime_account_irq+0x3d/0x1f0 [ 13.384188] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.384193] ? __irq_exit_rcu+0x4e/0x130 [ 13.384201] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 13.384206] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 13.384212] RIP: 0033:0x7a21f96ade9d [ 13.384263] Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 63 de 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 13.384267] RSP: 002b:00007ffeae934e78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 [ 13.384273] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005987276bfcf0 RCX: 00007a21f96ade9d [ 13.384277] RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 00007a21f8eda376 RDI: 000000000000001c [ 13.384280] RBP: 00007a21f8eda376 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007ffeae934ec0 [ 13.384284] R10: 0000000000000050 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000020000 [ 13.384288] R13: 00005987276c1250 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00005987276c4530 [ 13.384297] </TASK> [ 13.384299] Modules linked in: soundwire_amd(+) hid_sensor_gyro_3d(+) hid_sensor_magn_3d hid_sensor_accel_3d soundwire_generic_allocation amdxcp hid_sensor_trigger drm_exec industrialio_triggered_buffer soundwire_bus gpu_sched kvm_amd kfifo_buf qmi_helpers joydev drm_buddy hid_sensor_iio_common mousedev snd_soc_core industrialio i2c_algo_bit mac80211 snd_compress drm_suballoc_helper kvm snd_hda_intel drm_ttm_helper ac97_bus snd_pcm_dmaengine snd_intel_dspcfg ttm thinkpad_acpi(+) snd_intel_sdw_acpi hid_sensor_hub snd_rpl_pci_acp6x drm_display_helper snd_hda_codec hid_multitouch libarc4 snd_acp_pci platform_profile think_lmi(+) hid_generic firmware_attributes_class wmi_bmof cec snd_acp_legacy_common sparse_keymap rapl snd_hda_core psmouse cfg80211 pcspkr snd_pci_acp6x snd_hwdep video snd_pcm snd_pci_acp5x snd_timer snd_rn_pci_acp3x ucsi_acpi snd_acp_config snd sp5100_tco rfkill snd_soc_acpi typec_ucsi thunderbolt amd_sfh k10temp mhi soundcore i2c_piix4 snd_pci_acp3x typec i2c_hid_acpi roles i2c_hid wmi acpi_tad amd_pmc [ 13.384454] mac_hid i2c_dev crypto_user loop nfnetlink zram ip_tables x_tables dm_crypt cbc encrypted_keys trusted asn1_encoder tee dm_mod crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul polyval_clmulni polyval_generic gf128mul ghash_clmulni_intel serio_raw sha512_ssse3 atkbd sha256_ssse3 libps2 sha1_ssse3 vivaldi_fmap nvme aesni_intel crypto_simd nvme_core cryptd ccp xhci_pci i8042 nvme_auth xhci_pci_renesas serio vfat fat btrfs blake2b_generic libcrc32c crc32c_generic crc32c_intel xor raid6_pq [ 13.384552] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- KASAN reports a use-after-free of hid->driver_data in function amd_sfh_get_report(). The backtrace indicates that the function is called by amdtp_hid_request() which is one of the callbacks of hid device. The current make sure that driver_data is freed only once hid_destroy_device() returned. Note that I observed the crash both on v6.9.9 and v6.10.0. The code seems to be as it was from the early days of the driver. Signed-off-by: Olivier Sobrie <olivier@sobrie.be> Acked-by: Basavaraj Natikar <Basavaraj.Natikar@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12HID: cougar: fix slab-out-of-bounds Read in cougar_report_fixupCamila Alvarez
[ Upstream commit a6e9c391d45b5865b61e569146304cff72821a5d ] report_fixup for the Cougar 500k Gaming Keyboard was not verifying that the report descriptor size was correct before accessing it Reported-by: syzbot+24c0361074799d02c452@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=24c0361074799d02c452 Signed-off-by: Camila Alvarez <cam.alvarez.i@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Silvan Jegen <s.jegen@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12spi: hisi-kunpeng: Add verification for the max_frequency provided by the ↵Devyn Liu
firmware [ Upstream commit 5127c42c77de18651aa9e8e0a3ced190103b449c ] If the value of max_speed_hz is 0, it may cause a division by zero error in hisi_calc_effective_speed(). The value of max_speed_hz is provided by firmware. Firmware is generally considered as a trusted domain. However, as division by zero errors can cause system failure, for defense measure, the value of max_speed is validated here. So 0 is regarded as invalid and an error code is returned. Signed-off-by: Devyn Liu <liudingyuan@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jay Fang <f.fangjian@huawei.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240730032040.3156393-3-liudingyuan@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12i3c: mipi-i3c-hci: Error out instead on BUG_ON() in IBI DMA setupJarkko Nikula
[ Upstream commit 8a2be2f1db268ec735419e53ef04ca039fc027dc ] Definitely condition dma_get_cache_alignment * defined value > 256 during driver initialization is not reason to BUG_ON(). Turn that to graceful error out with -EINVAL. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Nikula <jarkko.nikula@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240628131559.502822-3-jarkko.nikula@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12i3c: master: svc: resend target address when get NACKFrank Li
[ Upstream commit 9bc7501b0b90f4d0c34b97c14ff1f708ce7ad8f3 ] According to I3C Spec 1.1.1, 11-Jun-2021, section: 5.1.2.2.3: If the Controller chooses to start an I3C Message with an I3C Dynamic Address, then special provisions shall be made because that same I3C Target may be initiating an IBI or a Controller Role Request. So, one of three things may happen: (skip 1, 2) 3. The Addresses match and the RnW bits also match, and so neither Controller nor Target will ACK since both are expecting the other side to provide ACK. As a result, each side might think it had "won" arbitration, but neither side would continue, as each would subsequently see that the other did not provide ACK. ... For either value of RnW: Due to the NACK, the Controller shall defer the Private Write or Private Read, and should typically transmit the Target ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Address again after a Repeated START (i.e., the next one or any one prior ^^^^^^^^^^^^^ to a STOP in the Frame). Since the Address Header following a Repeated START is not arbitrated, the Controller will always win (see Section 5.1.2.2.4). Resend target address again if address is not 7E and controller get NACK. Reviewed-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com> Signed-off-by: Frank Li <Frank.Li@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12regmap: maple: work around gcc-14.1 false-positive warningArnd Bergmann
[ Upstream commit 542440fd7b30983cae23e32bd22f69a076ec7ef4 ] With gcc-14.1, there is a false-postive -Wuninitialized warning in regcache_maple_drop: drivers/base/regmap/regcache-maple.c: In function 'regcache_maple_drop': drivers/base/regmap/regcache-maple.c:113:23: error: 'lower_index' is used uninitialized [-Werror=uninitialized] 113 | unsigned long lower_index, lower_last; | ^~~~~~~~~~~ drivers/base/regmap/regcache-maple.c:113:36: error: 'lower_last' is used uninitialized [-Werror=uninitialized] 113 | unsigned long lower_index, lower_last; | ^~~~~~~~~~ I've created a reduced test case to see if this needs to be reported as a gcc, but it appears that the gcc-14.x branch already has a change that turns this into a more sensible -Wmaybe-uninitialized warning, so I ended up not reporting it so far. The reduced test case also produces a warning for gcc-13 and gcc-12 but I don't see that with the version in the kernel. Link: https://godbolt.org/z/oKbohKqd3 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAMuHMdWj=FLmkazPbYKPevDrcym2_HDb_U7Mb9YE9ovrP0jJfA@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240719104030.1382465-1-arnd@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12net: dpaa: avoid on-stack arrays of NR_CPUS elementsVladimir Oltean
[ Upstream commit 555a05d84ca2c587e2d4777006e2c2fb3dfbd91d ] The dpaa-eth driver is written for PowerPC and Arm SoCs which have 1-24 CPUs. It depends on CONFIG_NR_CPUS having a reasonably small value in Kconfig. Otherwise, there are 2 functions which allocate on-stack arrays of NR_CPUS elements, and these can quickly explode in size, leading to warnings such as: drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa/dpaa_eth.c:3280:12: warning: stack frame size (16664) exceeds limit (2048) in 'dpaa_eth_probe' [-Wframe-larger-than] The problem is twofold: - Reducing the array size to the boot-time num_possible_cpus() (rather than the compile-time NR_CPUS) creates a variable-length array, which should be avoided in the Linux kernel. - Using NR_CPUS as an array size makes the driver blow up in stack consumption with generic, as opposed to hand-crafted, .config files. A simple solution is to use dynamic allocation for num_possible_cpus() elements (aka a small number determined at runtime). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/202406261920.l5pzM1rj-lkp@intel.com/ Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org> Acked-by: Madalin Bucur <madalin.bucur@oss.nxp.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240713225336.1746343-2-vladimir.oltean@nxp.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12Bluetooth: btnxpuart: Fix Null pointer dereference in btnxpuart_flush()Neeraj Sanjay Kale
[ Upstream commit c68bbf5e334b35b36ac5b9f0419f1f93f796bad1 ] This adds a check before freeing the rx->skb in flush and close functions to handle the kernel crash seen while removing driver after FW download fails or before FW download completes. dmesg log: [ 54.634586] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000080 [ 54.643398] Mem abort info: [ 54.646204] ESR = 0x0000000096000004 [ 54.649964] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 54.655286] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 54.658348] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 54.661498] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault [ 54.666391] Data abort info: [ 54.669273] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000 [ 54.674768] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 [ 54.674771] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [ 54.674775] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000048860000 [ 54.674780] [0000000000000080] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 [ 54.703880] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 54.710152] Modules linked in: btnxpuart(-) overlay fsl_jr_uio caam_jr caamkeyblob_desc caamhash_desc caamalg_desc crypto_engine authenc libdes crct10dif_ce polyval_ce polyval_generic snd_soc_imx_spdif snd_soc_imx_card snd_soc_ak5558 snd_soc_ak4458 caam secvio error snd_soc_fsl_micfil snd_soc_fsl_spdif snd_soc_fsl_sai snd_soc_fsl_utils imx_pcm_dma gpio_ir_recv rc_core sch_fq_codel fuse [ 54.744357] CPU: 3 PID: 72 Comm: kworker/u9:0 Not tainted 6.6.3-otbr-g128004619037 #2 [ 54.744364] Hardware name: FSL i.MX8MM EVK board (DT) [ 54.744368] Workqueue: hci0 hci_power_on [ 54.757244] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 54.757249] pc : kfree_skb_reason+0x18/0xb0 [ 54.772299] lr : btnxpuart_flush+0x40/0x58 [btnxpuart] [ 54.782921] sp : ffff8000805ebca0 [ 54.782923] x29: ffff8000805ebca0 x28: ffffa5c6cf1869c0 x27: ffffa5c6cf186000 [ 54.782931] x26: ffff377b84852400 x25: ffff377b848523c0 x24: ffff377b845e7230 [ 54.782938] x23: ffffa5c6ce8dbe08 x22: ffffa5c6ceb65410 x21: 00000000ffffff92 [ 54.782945] x20: ffffa5c6ce8dbe98 x19: ffffffffffffffac x18: ffffffffffffffff [ 54.807651] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffa5c6ce2824ec x15: ffff8001005eb857 [ 54.821917] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: ffffa5c6cf1a02e0 x12: 0000000000000642 [ 54.821924] x11: 0000000000000040 x10: ffffa5c6cf19d690 x9 : ffffa5c6cf19d688 [ 54.821931] x8 : ffff377b86000028 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000 [ 54.821938] x5 : ffff377b86000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000 [ 54.843331] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000002 x0 : ffffffffffffffac [ 54.857599] Call trace: [ 54.857601] kfree_skb_reason+0x18/0xb0 [ 54.863878] btnxpuart_flush+0x40/0x58 [btnxpuart] [ 54.863888] hci_dev_open_sync+0x3a8/0xa04 [ 54.872773] hci_power_on+0x54/0x2e4 [ 54.881832] process_one_work+0x138/0x260 [ 54.881842] worker_thread+0x32c/0x438 [ 54.881847] kthread+0x118/0x11c [ 54.881853] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 54.896406] Code: a9be7bfd 910003fd f9000bf3 aa0003f3 (b940d400) [ 54.896410] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Signed-off-by: Neeraj Sanjay Kale <neeraj.sanjaykale@nxp.com> Tested-by: Guillaume Legoupil <guillaume.legoupil@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12PCI: Add missing bridge lock to pci_bus_lock()Dan Williams
[ Upstream commit a4e772898f8bf2e7e1cf661a12c60a5612c4afab ] One of the true positives that the cfg_access_lock lockdep effort identified is this sequence: WARNING: CPU: 14 PID: 1 at drivers/pci/pci.c:4886 pci_bridge_secondary_bus_reset+0x5d/0x70 RIP: 0010:pci_bridge_secondary_bus_reset+0x5d/0x70 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __warn+0x8c/0x190 ? pci_bridge_secondary_bus_reset+0x5d/0x70 ? report_bug+0x1f8/0x200 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70 ? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? pci_bridge_secondary_bus_reset+0x5d/0x70 pci_reset_bus+0x1d8/0x270 vmd_probe+0x778/0xa10 pci_device_probe+0x95/0x120 Where pci_reset_bus() users are triggering unlocked secondary bus resets. Ironically pci_bus_reset(), several calls down from pci_reset_bus(), uses pci_bus_lock() before issuing the reset which locks everything *but* the bridge itself. For the same motivation as adding: bridge = pci_upstream_bridge(dev); if (bridge) pci_dev_lock(bridge); to pci_reset_function() for the "bus" and "cxl_bus" reset cases, add pci_dev_lock() for @bus->self to pci_bus_lock(). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/171711747501.1628941.15217746952476635316.stgit@dwillia2-xfh.jf.intel.com Reported-by: Imre Deak <imre.deak@intel.com> Closes: http://lore.kernel.org/r/6657833b3b5ae_14984b29437@dwillia2-xfh.jf.intel.com.notmuch Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org> [bhelgaas: squash in recursive locking deadlock fix from Keith Busch: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240711193650.701834-1-kbusch@meta.com] Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Tested-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Tested-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12cxl/region: Verify target positions using the ordered target listAlison Schofield
[ Upstream commit 82a3e3a235633aa0575fac9507d648dd80f3437f ] When a root decoder is configured the interleave target list is read from the BIOS populated CFMWS structure. Per the CXL spec 3.1 Table 9-22 the target list is in interleave order. The CXL driver populates its decoder target list in the same order and stores it in 'struct cxl_switch_decoder' field "@target: active ordered target list in current decoder configuration" Given the promise of an ordered list, the driver can stop duplicating the work of BIOS and simply check target positions against the ordered list during region configuration. The simplified check against the ordered list is presented here. A follow-on patch will remove the unused code. For Modulo arithmetic this is not a fix, only a simplification. For XOR arithmetic this is a fix for HB IW of 3,6,12. Fixes: f9db85bfec0d ("cxl/acpi: Support CXL XOR Interleave Math (CXIMS)") Signed-off-by: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/35d08d3aba08fee0f9b86ab1cef0c25116ca8a55.1719980933.git.alison.schofield@intel.com Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12drm/amdgpu: reject gang submit on reserved VMIDsChristian König
[ Upstream commit 320debca1ba3a81c87247eac84eff976ead09ee0 ] A gang submit won't work if the VMID is reserved and we can't flush out VM changes from multiple engines at the same time. Signed-off-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12wifi: mwifiex: Do not return unused priv in mwifiex_get_priv_by_id()Sascha Hauer
[ Upstream commit c145eea2f75ff7949392aebecf7ef0a81c1f6c14 ] mwifiex_get_priv_by_id() returns the priv pointer corresponding to the bss_num and bss_type, but without checking if the priv is actually currently in use. Unused priv pointers do not have a wiphy attached to them which can lead to NULL pointer dereferences further down the callstack. Fix this by returning only used priv pointers which have priv->bss_mode set to something else than NL80211_IFTYPE_UNSPECIFIED. Said NULL pointer dereference happened when an Accesspoint was started with wpa_supplicant -i mlan0 with this config: network={ ssid="somessid" mode=2 frequency=2412 key_mgmt=WPA-PSK WPA-PSK-SHA256 proto=RSN group=CCMP pairwise=CCMP psk="12345678" } When waiting for the AP to be established, interrupting wpa_supplicant with <ctrl-c> and starting it again this happens: | Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000140 | Mem abort info: | ESR = 0x0000000096000004 | EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits | SET = 0, FnV = 0 | EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 | FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault | Data abort info: | ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000 | CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 | GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 | user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000046d96000 | [0000000000000140] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 | Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP | Modules linked in: caam_jr caamhash_desc spidev caamalg_desc crypto_engine authenc libdes mwifiex_sdio +mwifiex crct10dif_ce cdc_acm onboard_usb_hub fsl_imx8_ddr_perf imx8m_ddrc rtc_ds1307 lm75 rtc_snvs +imx_sdma caam imx8mm_thermal spi_imx error imx_cpufreq_dt fuse ip_tables x_tables ipv6 | CPU: 0 PID: 8 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 6.9.0-00007-g937242013fce-dirty #18 | Hardware name: somemachine (DT) | Workqueue: events sdio_irq_work | pstate: 00000005 (nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) | pc : mwifiex_get_cfp+0xd8/0x15c [mwifiex] | lr : mwifiex_get_cfp+0x34/0x15c [mwifiex] | sp : ffff8000818b3a70 | x29: ffff8000818b3a70 x28: ffff000006bfd8a5 x27: 0000000000000004 | x26: 000000000000002c x25: 0000000000001511 x24: 0000000002e86bc9 | x23: ffff000006bfd996 x22: 0000000000000004 x21: ffff000007bec000 | x20: 000000000000002c x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000 | x17: 000000040044ffff x16: 00500072b5503510 x15: ccc283740681e517 | x14: 0201000101006d15 x13: 0000000002e8ff43 x12: 002c01000000ffb1 | x11: 0100000000000000 x10: 02e8ff43002c0100 x9 : 0000ffb100100157 | x8 : ffff000003d20000 x7 : 00000000000002f1 x6 : 00000000ffffe124 | x5 : 0000000000000001 x4 : 0000000000000003 x3 : 0000000000000000 | x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0001000000011001 x0 : 0000000000000000 | Call trace: | mwifiex_get_cfp+0xd8/0x15c [mwifiex] | mwifiex_parse_single_response_buf+0x1d0/0x504 [mwifiex] | mwifiex_handle_event_ext_scan_report+0x19c/0x2f8 [mwifiex] | mwifiex_process_sta_event+0x298/0xf0c [mwifiex] | mwifiex_process_event+0x110/0x238 [mwifiex] | mwifiex_main_process+0x428/0xa44 [mwifiex] | mwifiex_sdio_interrupt+0x64/0x12c [mwifiex_sdio] | process_sdio_pending_irqs+0x64/0x1b8 | sdio_irq_work+0x4c/0x7c | process_one_work+0x148/0x2a0 | worker_thread+0x2fc/0x40c | kthread+0x110/0x114 | ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 | Code: a94153f3 a8c37bfd d50323bf d65f03c0 (f940a000) | ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de> Acked-by: Brian Norris <briannorris@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Francesco Dolcini <francesco.dolcini@toradex.com> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240703072409.556618-1-s.hauer@pengutronix.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12drm/amdgpu: Set no_hw_access when VF request full GPU failsYifan Zha
[ Upstream commit 33f23fc3155b13c4a96d94a0a22dc26db767440b ] [Why] If VF request full GPU access and the request failed, the VF driver can get stuck accessing registers for an extended period during the unload of KMS. [How] Set no_hw_access flag when VF request for full GPU access fails This prevents further hardware access attempts, avoiding the prolonged stuck state. Signed-off-by: Yifan Zha <Yifan.Zha@amd.com> Acked-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12hwmon: (w83627ehf) Fix underflows seen when writing limit attributesGuenter Roeck
[ Upstream commit 5c1de37969b7bc0abcb20b86e91e70caebbd4f89 ] DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST() after kstrtol() results in an underflow if a large negative number such as -9223372036854775808 is provided by the user. Fix it by reordering clamp_val() and DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST() operations. Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12hwmon: (nct6775-core) Fix underflows seen when writing limit attributesGuenter Roeck
[ Upstream commit 0403e10bf0824bf0ec2bb135d4cf1c0cc3bf4bf0 ] DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST() after kstrtol() results in an underflow if a large negative number such as -9223372036854775808 is provided by the user. Fix it by reordering clamp_val() and DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST() operations. Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12hwmon: (lm95234) Fix underflows seen when writing limit attributesGuenter Roeck
[ Upstream commit af64e3e1537896337405f880c1e9ac1f8c0c6198 ] DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST() after kstrtol() results in an underflow if a large negative number such as -9223372036854775808 is provided by the user. Fix it by reordering clamp_val() and DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST() operations. Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12hwmon: (adc128d818) Fix underflows seen when writing limit attributesGuenter Roeck
[ Upstream commit 8cad724c8537fe3e0da8004646abc00290adae40 ] DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST() after kstrtol() results in an underflow if a large negative number such as -9223372036854775808 is provided by the user. Fix it by reordering clamp_val() and DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST() operations. Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12crypto: qat - fix unintentional re-enabling of error interruptsHareshx Sankar Raj
[ Upstream commit f0622894c59458fceb33c4197462bc2006f3fc6b ] The logic that detects pending VF2PF interrupts unintentionally clears the section of the error mask register(s) not related to VF2PF. This might cause interrupts unrelated to VF2PF, reported through errsou3 and errsou5, to be reported again after the execution of the function disable_pending_vf2pf_interrupts() in dh895xcc and GEN2 devices. Fix by updating only section of errmsk3 and errmsk5 related to VF2PF. Signed-off-by: Hareshx Sankar Raj <hareshx.sankar.raj@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Damian Muszynski <damian.muszynski@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Giovanni Cabiddu <giovanni.cabiddu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12scsi: pm80xx: Set phy->enable_completion only when we wait for itIgor Pylypiv
[ Upstream commit e4f949ef1516c0d74745ee54a0f4882c1f6c7aea ] pm8001_phy_control() populates the enable_completion pointer with a stack address, sends a PHY_LINK_RESET / PHY_HARD_RESET, waits 300 ms, and returns. The problem arises when a phy control response comes late. After 300 ms the pm8001_phy_control() function returns and the passed enable_completion stack address is no longer valid. Late phy control response invokes complete() on a dangling enable_completion pointer which leads to a kernel crash. Signed-off-by: Igor Pylypiv <ipylypiv@google.com> Signed-off-by: Terrence Adams <tadamsjr@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240627155924.2361370-2-tadamsjr@google.com Acked-by: Jack Wang <jinpu.wang@ionos.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12scsi: ufs: core: Remove SCSI host only if addedKyoungrul Kim
[ Upstream commit 7cbff570dbe8907e23bba06f6414899a0fbb2fcc ] If host tries to remove ufshcd driver from a UFS device it would cause a kernel panic if ufshcd_async_scan fails during ufshcd_probe_hba before adding a SCSI host with scsi_add_host and MCQ is enabled since SCSI host has been defered after MCQ configuration introduced by commit 0cab4023ec7b ("scsi: ufs: core: Defer adding host to SCSI if MCQ is supported"). To guarantee that SCSI host is removed only if it has been added, set the scsi_host_added flag to true after adding a SCSI host and check whether it is set or not before removing it. Signed-off-by: Kyoungrul Kim <k831.kim@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Minwoo Im <minwoo.im@samsung.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240627085104epcms2p5897a3870ea5c6416aa44f94df6c543d7@epcms2p5 Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12wifi: rtw88: usb: schedule rx work after everything is set upMarcin Ślusarz
[ Upstream commit adc539784c98a7cc602cbf557debfc2e7b9be8b3 ] Right now it's possible to hit NULL pointer dereference in rtw_rx_fill_rx_status on hw object and/or its fields because initialization routine can start getting USB replies before rtw_dev is fully setup. The stack trace looks like this: rtw_rx_fill_rx_status rtw8821c_query_rx_desc rtw_usb_rx_handler ... queue_work rtw_usb_read_port_complete ... usb_submit_urb rtw_usb_rx_resubmit rtw_usb_init_rx rtw_usb_probe So while we do the async stuff rtw_usb_probe continues and calls rtw_register_hw, which does all kinds of initialization (e.g. via ieee80211_register_hw) that rtw_rx_fill_rx_status relies on. Fix this by moving the first usb_submit_urb after everything is set up. For me, this bug manifested as: [ 8.893177] rtw_8821cu 1-1:1.2: band wrong, packet dropped [ 8.910904] rtw_8821cu 1-1:1.2: hw->conf.chandef.chan NULL in rtw_rx_fill_rx_status because I'm using Larry's backport of rtw88 driver with the NULL checks in rtw_rx_fill_rx_status. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-wireless/CA+shoWQ7P49jhQasofDcTdQhiuarPTjYEDa--NiVVx494WcuQw@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Marcin Ślusarz <mslusarz@renau.com> Cc: Tim K <tpkuester@gmail.com> Cc: Ping-Ke Shih <pkshih@realtek.com> Cc: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net> Cc: Kalle Valo <kvalo@kernel.org> Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ping-Ke Shih <pkshih@realtek.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240528110246.477321-1-marcin.slusarz@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12virtio_ring: fix KMSAN error for premapped modeXuan Zhuo
[ Upstream commit 840b2d39a2dc1b96deb3f5c7fef76c9b24f08f51 ] Add kmsan for virtqueue_dma_map_single_attrs to fix: BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in receive_buf+0x45ca/0x6990 receive_buf+0x45ca/0x6990 virtnet_poll+0x17e0/0x3130 net_rx_action+0x832/0x26e0 handle_softirqs+0x330/0x10f0 [...] Uninit was created at: __alloc_pages_noprof+0x62a/0xe60 alloc_pages_noprof+0x392/0x830 skb_page_frag_refill+0x21a/0x5c0 virtnet_rq_alloc+0x50/0x1500 try_fill_recv+0x372/0x54c0 virtnet_open+0x210/0xbe0 __dev_open+0x56e/0x920 __dev_change_flags+0x39c/0x2000 dev_change_flags+0xaa/0x200 do_setlink+0x197a/0x7420 rtnl_setlink+0x77c/0x860 [...] Signed-off-by: Xuan Zhuo <xuanzhuo@linux.alibaba.com> Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Message-Id: <20240606111345.93600-1-xuanzhuo@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Tested-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com> # s390x Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12pci/hotplug/pnv_php: Fix hotplug driver crash on PowernvKrishna Kumar
[ Upstream commit 335e35b748527f0c06ded9eebb65387f60647fda ] The hotplug driver for powerpc (pci/hotplug/pnv_php.c) causes a kernel crash when we try to hot-unplug/disable the PCIe switch/bridge from the PHB. The crash occurs because although the MSI data structure has been released during disable/hot-unplug path and it has been assigned with NULL, still during unregistration the code was again trying to explicitly disable the MSI which causes the NULL pointer dereference and kernel crash. The patch fixes the check during unregistration path to prevent invoking pci_disable_msi/msix() since its data structure is already freed. Reported-by: Timothy Pearson <tpearson@raptorengineering.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/1981605666.2142272.1703742465927.JavaMail.zimbra@raptorengineeringinc.com/ Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Tested-by: Shawn Anastasio <sanastasio@raptorengineering.com> Signed-off-by: Krishna Kumar <krishnak@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20240701074513.94873-2-krishnak@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12devres: Initialize an uninitialized struct memberZijun Hu
[ Upstream commit 56a20ad349b5c51909cf8810f7c79b288864ad33 ] Initialize an uninitialized struct member for driver API devres_open_group(). Signed-off-by: Zijun Hu <quic_zijuhu@quicinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1719931914-19035-4-git-send-email-quic_zijuhu@quicinc.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12iommu/vt-d: Handle volatile descriptor status readJacob Pan
[ Upstream commit b5e86a95541cea737394a1da967df4cd4d8f7182 ] Queued invalidation wait descriptor status is volatile in that IOMMU hardware writes the data upon completion. Use READ_ONCE() to prevent compiler optimizations which ensures memory reads every time. As a side effect, READ_ONCE() also enforces strict types and may add an extra instruction. But it should not have negative performance impact since we use cpu_relax anyway and the extra time(by adding an instruction) may allow IOMMU HW request cacheline ownership easier. e.g. gcc 12.3 BEFORE: 81 38 ad de 00 00 cmpl $0x2,(%rax) AFTER (with READ_ONCE()) 772f: 8b 00 mov (%rax),%eax 7731: 3d ad de 00 00 cmp $0x2,%eax //status data is 32 bit Signed-off-by: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yi Liu <yi.l.liu@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240607173817.3914600-1-jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240702130839.108139-2-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12dm init: Handle minors larger than 255Benjamin Marzinski
[ Upstream commit 140ce37fd78a629105377e17842465258a5459ef ] dm_parse_device_entry() simply copies the minor number into dmi.dev, but the dev_t format splits the minor number between the lowest 8 bytes and highest 12 bytes. If the minor number is larger than 255, part of it will end up getting treated as the major number Fix this by checking that the minor number is valid and then encoding it as a dev_t. Signed-off-by: Benjamin Marzinski <bmarzins@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12phy: zynqmp: Take the phy mutex in xlateSean Anderson
[ Upstream commit d79c6840917097285e03a49f709321f5fb972750 ] Take the phy mutex in xlate to protect against concurrent modification/access to gtr_phy. This does not typically cause any issues, since in most systems the phys are only xlated once and thereafter accessed with the phy API (which takes the locks). However, we are about to allow userspace to access phys for debugging, so it's important to avoid any data races. Signed-off-by: Sean Anderson <sean.anderson@linux.dev> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240628205540.3098010-5-sean.anderson@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12firmware: cs_dsp: Don't allow writes to read-only controlsRichard Fitzgerald
[ Upstream commit 62412a9357b16a4e39dc582deb2e2a682b92524c ] Add a check to cs_dsp_coeff_write_ctrl() to abort if the control is not writeable. The cs_dsp code originated as an ASoC driver (wm_adsp) where all controls were exported as ALSA controls. It relied on ALSA to enforce the read-only permission. Now that the code has been separated from ALSA/ASoC it must perform its own permission check. This isn't currently causing any problems so there shouldn't be any need to backport this. If the client of cs_dsp exposes the control as an ALSA control, it should set permissions on that ALSA control to protect it. The few uses of cs_dsp_coeff_write_ctrl() inside drivers are for writable controls. Signed-off-by: Richard Fitzgerald <rf@opensource.cirrus.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240702110809.16836-1-rf@opensource.cirrus.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12xen: privcmd: Fix possible access to a freed kirqfd instanceViresh Kumar
[ Upstream commit 611ff1b1ae989a7bcce3e2a8e132ee30e968c557 ] Nothing prevents simultaneous ioctl calls to privcmd_irqfd_assign() and privcmd_irqfd_deassign(). If that happens, it is possible that a kirqfd created and added to the irqfds_list by privcmd_irqfd_assign() may get removed by another thread executing privcmd_irqfd_deassign(), while the former is still using it after dropping the locks. This can lead to a situation where an already freed kirqfd instance may be accessed and cause kernel oops. Use SRCU locking to prevent the same, as is done for the KVM implementation for irqfds. Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/9e884af1f1f842eacbb7afc5672c8feb4dea7f3f.1718703669.git.viresh.kumar@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12net: dsa: vsc73xx: fix possible subblocks range of CAPT blockPawel Dembicki
[ Upstream commit 8e69c96df771ab469cec278edb47009351de4da6 ] CAPT block (CPU Capture Buffer) have 7 sublocks: 0-3, 4, 6, 7. Function 'vsc73xx_is_addr_valid' allows to use only block 0 at this moment. This patch fix it. Fixes: 05bd97fc559d ("net: dsa: Add Vitesse VSC73xx DSA router driver") Signed-off-by: Pawel Dembicki <paweldembicki@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <florian.fainelli@broadcom.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240903203340.1518789-1-paweldembicki@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12r8152: fix the firmware doesn't workHayes Wang
[ Upstream commit 8487b4af59d4d7feda4b119dc2d92c67ca25c27e ] generic_ocp_write() asks the parameter "size" must be 4 bytes align. Therefore, write the bp would fail, if the mac->bp_num is odd. Align the size to 4 for fixing it. The way may write an extra bp, but the rtl8152_is_fw_mac_ok() makes sure the value must be 0 for the bp whose index is more than mac->bp_num. That is, there is no influence for the firmware. Besides, I check the return value of generic_ocp_write() to make sure everything is correct. Fixes: e5c266a61186 ("r8152: set bp in bulk") Signed-off-by: Hayes Wang <hayeswang@realtek.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240903063333.4502-1-hayeswang@realtek.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12bareudp: Fix device stats updates.Guillaume Nault
[ Upstream commit 4963d2343af81f493519f9c3ea9f2169eaa7353a ] Bareudp devices update their stats concurrently. Therefore they need proper atomic increments. Fixes: 571912c69f0e ("net: UDP tunnel encapsulation module for tunnelling different protocols like MPLS, IP, NSH etc.") Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/04b7b9d0b480158eb3ab4366ec80aa2ab7e41fcb.1725031794.git.gnault@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12usbnet: modern method to get random MACOliver Neukum
[ Upstream commit bab8eb0dd4cb995caa4a0529d5655531c2ec5e8e ] The driver generates a random MAC once on load and uses it over and over, including on two devices needing a random MAC at the same time. Jakub suggested revamping the driver to the modern API for setting a random MAC rather than fixing the old stuff. The bug is as old as the driver. Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240829175201.670718-1-oneukum@suse.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12ice: do not bring the VSI up, if it was down before the XDP setupLarysa Zaremba
[ Upstream commit 04c7e14e5b0b6227e7b00d7a96ca2f2426ab9171 ] After XDP configuration is completed, we bring the interface up unconditionally, regardless of its state before the call to .ndo_bpf(). Preserve the information whether the interface had to be brought down and later bring it up only in such case. Fixes: efc2214b6047 ("ice: Add support for XDP") Reviewed-by: Wojciech Drewek <wojciech.drewek@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com> Tested-by: Chandan Kumar Rout <chandanx.rout@intel.com> Acked-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Larysa Zaremba <larysa.zaremba@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12ice: protect XDP configuration with a mutexLarysa Zaremba
[ Upstream commit 2504b8405768a57a71e660dbfd5abd59f679a03f ] The main threat to data consistency in ice_xdp() is a possible asynchronous PF reset. It can be triggered by a user or by TX timeout handler. XDP setup and PF reset code access the same resources in the following sections: * ice_vsi_close() in ice_prepare_for_reset() - already rtnl-locked * ice_vsi_rebuild() for the PF VSI - not protected * ice_vsi_open() - already rtnl-locked With an unfortunate timing, such accesses can result in a crash such as the one below: [ +1.999878] ice 0000:b1:00.0: Registered XDP mem model MEM_TYPE_XSK_BUFF_POOL on Rx ring 14 [ +2.002992] ice 0000:b1:00.0: Registered XDP mem model MEM_TYPE_XSK_BUFF_POOL on Rx ring 18 [Mar15 18:17] ice 0000:b1:00.0 ens801f0np0: NETDEV WATCHDOG: CPU: 38: transmit queue 14 timed out 80692736 ms [ +0.000093] ice 0000:b1:00.0 ens801f0np0: tx_timeout: VSI_num: 6, Q 14, NTC: 0x0, HW_HEAD: 0x0, NTU: 0x0, INT: 0x4000001 [ +0.000012] ice 0000:b1:00.0 ens801f0np0: tx_timeout recovery level 1, txqueue 14 [ +0.394718] ice 0000:b1:00.0: PTP reset successful [ +0.006184] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000098 [ +0.000045] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ +0.000023] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ +0.000023] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ +0.000018] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ +0.000023] CPU: 38 PID: 7540 Comm: kworker/38:1 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc7 #1 [ +0.000031] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0014.082620210524 08/26/2021 [ +0.000036] Workqueue: ice ice_service_task [ice] [ +0.000183] RIP: 0010:ice_clean_tx_ring+0xa/0xd0 [ice] [...] [ +0.000013] Call Trace: [ +0.000016] <TASK> [ +0.000014] ? __die+0x1f/0x70 [ +0.000029] ? page_fault_oops+0x171/0x4f0 [ +0.000029] ? schedule+0x3b/0xd0 [ +0.000027] ? exc_page_fault+0x7b/0x180 [ +0.000022] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 [ +0.000031] ? ice_clean_tx_ring+0xa/0xd0 [ice] [ +0.000194] ice_free_tx_ring+0xe/0x60 [ice] [ +0.000186] ice_destroy_xdp_rings+0x157/0x310 [ice] [ +0.000151] ice_vsi_decfg+0x53/0xe0 [ice] [ +0.000180] ice_vsi_rebuild+0x239/0x540 [ice] [ +0.000186] ice_vsi_rebuild_by_type+0x76/0x180 [ice] [ +0.000145] ice_rebuild+0x18c/0x840 [ice] [ +0.000145] ? delay_tsc+0x4a/0xc0 [ +0.000022] ? delay_tsc+0x92/0xc0 [ +0.000020] ice_do_reset+0x140/0x180 [ice] [ +0.000886] ice_service_task+0x404/0x1030 [ice] [ +0.000824] process_one_work+0x171/0x340 [ +0.000685] worker_thread+0x277/0x3a0 [ +0.000675] ? preempt_count_add+0x6a/0xa0 [ +0.000677] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x23/0x50 [ +0.000679] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ +0.000653] kthread+0xf0/0x120 [ +0.000635] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ +0.000616] ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 [ +0.000612] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ +0.000604] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 [ +0.000604] </TASK> The previous way of handling this through returning -EBUSY is not viable, particularly when destroying AF_XDP socket, because the kernel proceeds with removal anyway. There is plenty of code between those calls and there is no need to create a large critical section that covers all of them, same as there is no need to protect ice_vsi_rebuild() with rtnl_lock(). Add xdp_state_lock mutex to protect ice_vsi_rebuild() and ice_xdp(). Leaving unprotected sections in between would result in two states that have to be considered: 1. when the VSI is closed, but not yet rebuild 2. when VSI is already rebuild, but not yet open The latter case is actually already handled through !netif_running() case, we just need to adjust flag checking a little. The former one is not as trivial, because between ice_vsi_close() and ice_vsi_rebuild(), a lot of hardware interaction happens, this can make adding/deleting rings exit with an error. Luckily, VSI rebuild is pending and can apply new configuration for us in a managed fashion. Therefore, add an additional VSI state flag ICE_VSI_REBUILD_PENDING to indicate that ice_xdp() can just hot-swap the program. Also, as ice_vsi_rebuild() flow is touched in this patch, make it more consistent by deconfiguring VSI when coalesce allocation fails. Fixes: 2d4238f55697 ("ice: Add support for AF_XDP") Fixes: efc2214b6047 ("ice: Add support for XDP") Reviewed-by: Wojciech Drewek <wojciech.drewek@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com> Tested-by: Chandan Kumar Rout <chandanx.rout@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Larysa Zaremba <larysa.zaremba@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12net: phy: Fix missing of_node_put() for ledsJinjie Ruan
[ Upstream commit 2560db6ede1aaf162a73b2df43e0b6c5ed8819f7 ] The call of of_get_child_by_name() will cause refcount incremented for leds, if it succeeds, it should call of_node_put() to decrease it, fix it. Fixes: 01e5b728e9e4 ("net: phy: Add a binding for PHY LEDs") Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240830022025.610844-1-ruanjinjie@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12hwmon: (hp-wmi-sensors) Check if WMI event data existsArmin Wolf
[ Upstream commit a54da9df75cd1b4b5028f6c60f9a211532680585 ] The BIOS can choose to return no event data in response to a WMI event, so the ACPI object passed to the WMI notify handler can be NULL. Check for such a situation and ignore the event in such a case. Fixes: 23902f98f8d4 ("hwmon: add HP WMI Sensors driver") Signed-off-by: Armin Wolf <W_Armin@gmx.de> Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> Message-ID: <20240901031055.3030-2-W_Armin@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12igc: Unlock on error in igc_io_resume()Dan Carpenter
[ Upstream commit ef4a99a0164e3972abb421cbb1b09ea6c61414df ] Call rtnl_unlock() on this error path, before returning. Fixes: bc23aa949aeb ("igc: Add pcie error handler support") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Gerhard Engleder <gerhard@engleder-embedded.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12Bluetooth: qca: If memdump doesn't work, re-enable IBSDouglas Anderson
[ Upstream commit 8ae22de9d2eae3c432de64bf2b3a5a69cf1d1124 ] On systems in the field, we are seeing this sometimes in the kernel logs: Bluetooth: qca_controller_memdump() hci0: hci_devcd_init Return:-95 This means that _something_ decided that it wanted to get a memdump but then hci_devcd_init() returned -EOPNOTSUPP (AKA -95). The cleanup code in qca_controller_memdump() when we get back an error from hci_devcd_init() undoes most things but forgets to clear QCA_IBS_DISABLED. One side effect of this is that, during the next suspend, qca_suspend() will always get a timeout. Let's fix it so that we clear the bit. Fixes: 06d3fdfcdf5c ("Bluetooth: hci_qca: Add qcom devcoredump support") Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-09-12can: kvaser_pciefd: Use a single write when releasing RX buffersMartin Jocic
[ Upstream commit dd885d90c047dbdd2773c1d33954cbd8747d81e2 ] Kvaser's PCIe cards uses the KCAN FPGA IP block which has dual 4K buffers for incoming messages shared by all (currently up to eight) channels. While the driver processes messages in one buffer, new incoming messages are stored in the other and so on. The design of KCAN is such that a buffer must be fully read and then released. Releasing a buffer will make the FPGA switch buffers. If the other buffer contains at least one incoming message the FPGA will also instantly issue a new interrupt, if not the interrupt will be issued after receiving the first new message. With IRQx interrupts, it takes a little time for the interrupt to happen, enough for any previous ISR call to do it's business and return, but MSI interrupts are way faster so this time is reduced to almost nothing. So with MSI, releasing the buffer HAS to be the very last action of the ISR before returning, otherwise the new interrupt might be "masked" by the kernel because the previous ISR call hasn't returned. And the interrupts are edge-triggered so we cannot loose one, or the ping-pong reading process will stop. This is why this patch modifies the driver to use a single write to the SRB_CMD register before returning. Signed-off-by: Martin Jocic <martin.jocic@kvaser.com> Reviewed-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol.vincent@wanadoo.fr> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240830153113.2081440-1-martin.jocic@kvaser.com Fixes: 26ad340e582d ("can: kvaser_pciefd: Add driver for Kvaser PCIEcan devices") Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>