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The new efi_secret module exposes the confidential computing (coco)
EFI secret area via securityfs interface.
When the module is loaded (and securityfs is mounted, typically under
/sys/kernel/security), a "secrets/coco" directory is created in
securityfs. In it, a file is created for each secret entry. The name
of each such file is the GUID of the secret entry, and its content is
the secret data.
This allows applications running in a confidential computing setting to
read secrets provided by the guest owner via a secure secret injection
mechanism (such as AMD SEV's LAUNCH_SECRET command).
Removing (unlinking) files in the "secrets/coco" directory will zero out
the secret in memory, and remove the filesystem entry. If the module is
removed and loaded again, that secret will not appear in the filesystem.
Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220412212127.154182-3-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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If alloc_pages() fails, it returns a NULL pointer. Replace the wrong
IS_ERR() check with the proper NULL pointer check.
Fixes: fce96cf04430 ("virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220411111213.1477853-1-yangyingliang@huawei.com
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Version 2 of GHCB specification defines Non-Automatic-Exit (NAE) to get
extended guest report which is similar to the SNP_GET_REPORT ioctl. The
main difference is related to the additional data that will be returned.
That additional data returned is a certificate blob that can be used by
the SNP guest user. The certificate blob layout is defined in the GHCB
specification. The driver simply treats the blob as a opaque data and
copies it to userspace.
[ bp: Massage commit message, cast 1st arg of access_ok() ]
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-46-brijesh.singh@amd.com
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The SNP_GET_DERIVED_KEY ioctl interface can be used by the SNP guest to
ask the firmware to provide a key derived from a root key. The derived
key may be used by the guest for any purposes it chooses, such as a
sealing key or communicating with the external entities.
See SEV-SNP firmware spec for more information.
[ bp: No need to memset "req" - it will get overwritten. ]
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Liam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-45-brijesh.singh@amd.com
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The SEV-SNP specification provides the guest a mechanism to communicate
with the PSP without risk from a malicious hypervisor who wishes to
read, alter, drop or replay the messages sent. The driver uses
snp_issue_guest_request() to issue GHCB SNP_GUEST_REQUEST or
SNP_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST NAE events to submit the request to PSP.
The PSP requires that all communication should be encrypted using key
specified through a struct snp_guest_platform_data descriptor.
Userspace can use SNP_GET_REPORT ioctl() to query the guest attestation
report.
See SEV-SNP spec section Guest Messages for more details.
[ bp: Remove the "what" from the commit message, massage. ]
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-44-brijesh.singh@amd.com
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