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commit 4ce827b4cc58bec7952591b96cce2b28553e4d5b upstream.
In kernel bug 150021, a kernel panic was reported when restoring a
hibernate image. Only a picture of the oops was reported, so I can't
paste the whole thing here. But here are the most interesting parts:
kernel tried to execute NX-protected page - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff8804615cfd78
...
RIP: ffff8804615cfd78
RSP: ffff8804615f0000
RBP: ffff8804615cfdc0
...
Call Trace:
do_signal+0x23
exit_to_usermode_loop+0x64
...
The RIP is on the same page as RBP, so it apparently started executing
on the stack.
The bug was bisected to commit ef0f3ed5a4ac (x86/asm/power: Create
stack frames in hibernate_asm_64.S), which in retrospect seems quite
dangerous, since that code saves and restores the stack pointer from a
global variable ('saved_context').
There are a lot of moving parts in the hibernate save and restore paths,
so I don't know exactly what caused the panic. Presumably, a FRAME_END
was executed without the corresponding FRAME_BEGIN, or vice versa. That
would corrupt the return address on the stack and would be consistent
with the details of the above panic.
[ rjw: One major problem is that by the time the FRAME_BEGIN in
restore_registers() is executed, the stack pointer value may not
be valid any more. Namely, the stack area pointed to by it
previously may have been overwritten by some image memory contents
and that page frame may now be used for whatever different purpose
it had been allocated for before hibernation. In that case, the
FRAME_BEGIN will corrupt that memory. ]
Instead of doing the frame pointer save/restore around the bounds of the
affected functions, just do it around the call to swsusp_save().
That has the same effect of ensuring that if swsusp_save() sleeps, the
frame pointers will be correct. It's also a much more obviously safe
way to do it than the original patch. And objtool still doesn't report
any warnings.
Fixes: ef0f3ed5a4ac (x86/asm/power: Create stack frames in hibernate_asm_64.S)
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=150021
Reported-by: Andre Reinke <andre.reinke@mailbox.org>
Tested-by: Andre Reinke <andre.reinke@mailbox.org>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4b703305d98bf7350d4b2953ee39a3aa2eeb1778 upstream.
Usually, after we have found the proper microcode blob for the current
machine, we stash it away for later use with save_microcode_in_initrd().
However, with builtin microcode which doesn't come from the initrd, we
don't call that function because CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD=n and even if
set, we don't have a valid initrd.
In order to fix this, let's make save_microcode_in_initrd() an
fs_initcall which runs before rootfs_initcall() as this was the time it
was called previously through:
rootfs_initcall(populate_rootfs)
|-> free_initrd()
|-> free_initrd_mem()
|-> save_microcode_in_initrd()
Also, we make it run independently from initrd functionality being
present or not.
And since it is called in the microcode loader only now, we can also
make it static.
Reported-and-tested-by: Jim Bos <jim876@xs4all.nl>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1465225850-7352-3-git-send-email-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f7d665627e103e82d34306c7d3f6f46f387c0d8b upstream.
x86_64 needs to use compat_sys_keyctl for 32-bit userspace rather than
calling sys_keyctl(). The latter will work in a lot of cases, thereby
hiding the issue.
Reported-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Tested-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/146961615805.14395.5581949237156769439.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 844e3be47693f92a108cb1fb3b0606bf25e9c7a6 upstream.
Classic BPF JIT was never ported completely to work on little endian
powerpc. However, it can be enabled and will crash the system when used.
As such, disable use of BPF JIT on ppc64le.
Fixes: 7c105b63bd98 ("powerpc: Add CONFIG_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN kernel config option.")
Reported-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a3aa256b7258b3d19f8b44557cc64525a993b941 upstream.
The PE primary bus cannot be got from its child devices when having
full hotplug in error recovery. The PE primary bus is cached, which
is done in commit <05ba75f84864> ("powerpc/eeh: Fix stale cached primary
bus"). In eeh_reset_device(), the flag (EEH_PE_PRI_BUS) is cleared
before the PCI hot remove. eeh_pe_bus_get() then returns NULL as the
PE primary bus in pnv_eeh_reset() and it crashes the kernel eventually.
This fixes the issue by clearing the flag (EEH_PE_PRI_BUS) before the
PCI hot add. With it, the PowerNV EEH reset backend (pnv_eeh_reset())
can get valid PE primary bus through eeh_pe_bus_get().
Fixes: 67086e32b564 ("powerpc/eeh: powerpc/eeh: Support error recovery for VF PE")
Reported-by: Pridhiviraj Paidipeddi <ppaiddipe@in.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Gavin Shan <gwshan@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1886297ce0c8d563a08c8a8c4c0b97743e06cd37 upstream.
The following BUG_ON() crash was reported on QEMU/i386:
kernel BUG at arch/x86/mm/physaddr.c:79!
Call Trace:
phys_mem_access_prot_allowed
mmap_mem
? mmap_region
mmap_region
do_mmap
vm_mmap_pgoff
SyS_mmap_pgoff
do_int80_syscall_32
entry_INT80_32
after commit:
edfe63ec97ed ("x86/mtrr: Fix Xorg crashes in Qemu sessions")
PAT is now set to disabled state when MTRRs are disabled.
Thus, reactivating the __pa(high_memory) check in
phys_mem_access_prot_allowed().
When CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL is set, __pa() calls __phys_addr(),
which in turn calls slow_virt_to_phys() for 'high_memory'.
Because 'high_memory' is set to (the max direct mapped virt
addr + 1), it is not a valid virtual address. Hence,
slow_virt_to_phys() returns 0 and hit the BUG_ON. Using
__pa_nodebug() instead of __pa() will fix this BUG_ON.
However, this code block, originally written for Pentiums and
earlier, is no longer adequate since a 32-bit Xen guest has
MTRRs disabled and supports ZONE_HIGHMEM. In this setup,
this code sets UC attribute for accessing RAM in high memory
range.
Delete this code block as it has been unused for a long time.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <ying.huang@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1460403360-25441-1-git-send-email-toshi.kani@hpe.com
Link: https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/4/1/608
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 88ba281108ed0c25c9d292b48bd3f272fcb90dd0 upstream.
Xen supports PAT without MTRRs for its guests. In order to
enable WC attribute, it was necessary for xen_start_kernel()
to call pat_init_cache_modes() to update PAT table before
starting guest kernel.
Now that the kernel initializes PAT table to the BIOS handoff
state when MTRR is disabled, this Xen-specific PAT init code
is no longer necessary. Delete it from xen_start_kernel().
Also change __init_cache_modes() to a static function since
PAT table should not be tweaked by other modules.
Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com>
Cc: elliott@hpe.com
Cc: paul.gortmaker@windriver.com
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1458769323-24491-7-git-send-email-toshi.kani@hpe.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ad025a73f0e9344ac73ffe1b74c184033e08e7d5 upstream.
get_mtrr_state() calls pat_init() on BSP even if MTRR is disabled.
This results in calling pat_init() on BSP only since APs do not call
pat_init() when MTRR is disabled. This inconsistency between BSP
and APs leads to undefined behavior.
Make BSP's calling condition to pat_init() consistent with AP's,
mtrr_ap_init() and mtrr_aps_init().
Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com>
Cc: elliott@hpe.com
Cc: konrad.wilk@oracle.com
Cc: paul.gortmaker@windriver.com
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1458769323-24491-6-git-send-email-toshi.kani@hpe.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit edfe63ec97ed8d4496225f7ba54c9ce4207c5431 upstream.
A Xorg failure on qemu32 was reported as a regression [1] caused by
commit 9cd25aac1f44 ("x86/mm/pat: Emulate PAT when it is disabled").
This patch fixes the Xorg crash.
Negative effects of this regression were the following two failures [2]
in Xorg on QEMU with QEMU CPU model "qemu32" (-cpu qemu32), which were
triggered by the fact that its virtual CPU does not support MTRRs.
#1. copy_process() failed in the check in reserve_pfn_range()
copy_process
copy_mm
dup_mm
dup_mmap
copy_page_range
track_pfn_copy
reserve_pfn_range
A WC map request was tracked as WC in memtype, which set a PTE as
UC (pgprot) per __cachemode2pte_tbl[]. This led to this error in
reserve_pfn_range() called from track_pfn_copy(), which obtained
a pgprot from a PTE. It converts pgprot to page_cache_mode, which
does not necessarily result in the original page_cache_mode since
__cachemode2pte_tbl[] redirects multiple types to UC.
#2. error path in copy_process() then hit WARN_ON_ONCE in
untrack_pfn().
x86/PAT: Xorg:509 map pfn expected mapping type uncached-
minus for [mem 0xfd000000-0xfdffffff], got write-combining
Call Trace:
dump_stack
warn_slowpath_common
? untrack_pfn
? untrack_pfn
warn_slowpath_null
untrack_pfn
? __kunmap_atomic
unmap_single_vma
? pagevec_move_tail_fn
unmap_vmas
exit_mmap
mmput
copy_process.part.47
_do_fork
SyS_clone
do_syscall_32_irqs_on
entry_INT80_32
These negative effects are caused by two separate bugs, but they
can be addressed in separate patches. Fixing the pat_init() issue
described below addresses the root cause, and avoids Xorg to hit
these cases.
When the CPU does not support MTRRs, MTRR does not call pat_init(),
which leaves PAT enabled without initializing PAT. This pat_init()
issue is a long-standing issue, but manifested as issue #1 (and then
hit issue #2) with the above-mentioned commit because the memtype
now tracks cache attribute with 'page_cache_mode'.
This pat_init() issue existed before the commit, but we used pgprot
in memtype. Hence, we did not have issue #1 before. But WC request
resulted in WT in effect because WC pgrot is actually WT when PAT
is not initialized. This is not how it was designed to work. When
PAT is set to disable properly, WC is converted to UC. The use of
WT can result in a system crash if the target range does not support
WT. Fortunately, nobody ran into such issue before.
To fix this pat_init() issue, PAT code has been enhanced to provide
pat_disable() interface. Call this interface when MTRRs are disabled.
By setting PAT to disable properly, PAT bypasses the memtype check,
and avoids issue #1.
[1]: https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/3/3/828
[2]: https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/3/4/775
Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com>
Cc: elliott@hpe.com
Cc: konrad.wilk@oracle.com
Cc: paul.gortmaker@windriver.com
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1458769323-24491-5-git-send-email-toshi.kani@hpe.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d63dcf49cf5ae5605f4d14229e3888e104f294b1 upstream.
Borislav Petkov suggested:
> Please use on init paths boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PAT) and on fast
> paths static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PAT). No more of that cpu_has_XXX
> ugliness.
Replace the use of cpu_has_pat on init paths with boot_cpu_has().
Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Robert Elliott <elliott@hpe.com>
Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com>
Cc: konrad.wilk@oracle.com
Cc: paul.gortmaker@windriver.com
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1458769323-24491-4-git-send-email-toshi.kani@hpe.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 224bb1e5d67ba0f2872c98002d6a6f991ac6fd4a upstream.
In preparation for fixing a regression caused by:
9cd25aac1f44 ("x86/mm/pat: Emulate PAT when it is disabled")
... PAT needs to provide an interface that prevents the OS from
initializing the PAT MSR.
PAT MSR initialization must be done on all CPUs using the specific
sequence of operations defined in the Intel SDM. This requires MTRRs
to be enabled since pat_init() is called as part of MTRR init
from mtrr_rendezvous_handler().
Make pat_disable() as the interface that prevents the OS from
initializing the PAT MSR. MTRR will call this interface when it
cannot provide the SDM-defined sequence to initialize PAT.
This also assures that pat_disable() called from pat_bsp_init()
will set the PAT table properly when CPU does not support PAT.
Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Robert Elliott <elliott@hpe.com>
Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com>
Cc: konrad.wilk@oracle.com
Cc: paul.gortmaker@windriver.com
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1458769323-24491-3-git-send-email-toshi.kani@hpe.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 02f037d641dc6672be5cfe7875a48ab99b95b154 upstream.
In preparation for fixing a regression caused by:
9cd25aac1f44 ("x86/mm/pat: Emulate PAT when it is disabled")'
... PAT needs to support a case that PAT MSR is initialized with a
non-default value.
When pat_init() is called and PAT is disabled, it initializes the
PAT table with the BIOS default value. Xen, however, sets PAT MSR
with a non-default value to enable WC. This causes inconsistency
between the PAT table and PAT MSR when PAT is set to disable on Xen.
Change pat_init() to handle the PAT disable cases properly. Add
init_cache_modes() to handle two cases when PAT is set to disable.
1. CPU supports PAT: Set PAT table to be consistent with PAT MSR.
2. CPU does not support PAT: Set PAT table to be consistent with
PWT and PCD bits in a PTE.
Note, __init_cache_modes(), renamed from pat_init_cache_modes(),
will be changed to a static function in a later patch.
Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com>
Cc: elliott@hpe.com
Cc: konrad.wilk@oracle.com
Cc: paul.gortmaker@windriver.com
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1458769323-24491-2-git-send-email-toshi.kani@hpe.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 20f06ed9f61a185c6dabd662c310bed6189470df upstream.
MIPS64 needs to use compat_sys_keyctl for 32-bit userspace rather than
calling sys_keyctl. The latter will work in a lot of cases, thereby hiding
the issue.
Reported-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/13832/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7de249964f5578e67b99699c5f0b405738d820a2 upstream.
Add access checks to sys_oabi_epoll_wait() and sys_oabi_semtimedop().
This fixes CVE-2016-3857, a local privilege escalation under
CONFIG_OABI_COMPAT.
Reported-by: Chiachih Wu <wuchiachih@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Weinstein <olorin@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a60ae81e5e5918138703f22427dd8f2445985b55 upstream.
Fix mips_cm_max_vp_width for UP kernels where it previously referenced
smp_num_siblings, which is not declared for UP kernels. This led to
build errors such as the following:
drivers/built-in.o: In function `$L446':
irq-mips-gic.c:(.text+0x1994): undefined reference to `smp_num_siblings'
drivers/built-in.o:irq-mips-gic.c:(.text+0x199c): more undefined references to `smp_num_siblings' follow
On UP kernels simply return 1, leaving the reference to smp_num_siblings
in place only for SMP kernels.
Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com>
Cc: Matt Redfearn <matt.redfearn@imgtec.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/12332/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 749d088b8e7f4b9826ede02b9a043e417fa84aa1 upstream.
Protocol for the "version" fields is: hypervisor raises it (making it
uneven) before it starts updating the fields and raises it again (making
it even) when it is done. Thus the guest can make sure the time values
it got are consistent by checking the version before and after reading
them.
Add CPU barries after getting version value just like what function
vread_pvclock does, because all of callees in this function is inline.
Fixes: 502dfeff239e8313bfbe906ca0a1a6827ac8481b
Signed-off-by: Minfei Huang <mnghuan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f52e126cc7476196f44f3c313b7d9f0699a881fc upstream.
With recent binutils update to support dwarf CFI pseudo-ops in gas, we
now get .eh_frame vs. .debug_frame. Although the call frame info is
exactly the same in both, the CIE differs, which the current kernel
unwinder can't cope with.
This broke both the kernel unwinder as well as loadable modules (latter
because of a new unhandled relo R_ARC_32_PCREL from .rela.eh_frame in
the module loader)
The ideal solution would be to switch unwinder to .eh_frame.
For now however we can make do by just ensureing .debug_frame is
generated by removing -fasynchronous-unwind-tables
.eh_frame generated with -gdwarf-2 -fasynchronous-unwind-tables
.debug_frame generated with -gdwarf-2
Fixes STAR 9001058196
Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9bd54517ee86cb164c734f72ea95aeba4804f10b upstream.
If CONFIG_ARC_DW2_UNWIND is disabled every time arc_unwind_core()
gets called following message gets printed in debug console:
----------------->8---------------
CONFIG_ARC_DW2_UNWIND needs to be enabled
----------------->8---------------
That message makes sense if user indeed wants to see a backtrace or
get nice function call-graphs in perf but what if user disabled
unwinder for the purpose? Why pollute his debug console?
So instead we'll warn user about possibly missing feature once and
let him decide if that was what he or she really wanted.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Brodkin <abrodkin@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit abb2bafd295fe962bbadc329dbfb2146457283ac upstream.
The EFI firmware on Macs contains a full-fledged network stack for
downloading OS X images from osrecovery.apple.com. Unfortunately
on Macs introduced 2011 and 2012, EFI brings up the Broadcom 4331
wireless card on every boot and leaves it enabled even after
ExitBootServices has been called. The card continues to assert its IRQ
line, causing spurious interrupts if the IRQ is shared. It also corrupts
memory by DMAing received packets, allowing for remote code execution
over the air. This only stops when a driver is loaded for the wireless
card, which may be never if the driver is not installed or blacklisted.
The issue seems to be constrained to the Broadcom 4331. Chris Milsted
has verified that the newer Broadcom 4360 built into the MacBookPro11,3
(2013/2014) does not exhibit this behaviour. The chances that Apple will
ever supply a firmware fix for the older machines appear to be zero.
The solution is to reset the card on boot by writing to a reset bit in
its mmio space. This must be done as an early quirk and not as a plain
vanilla PCI quirk to successfully combat memory corruption by DMAed
packets: Matthew Garrett found out in 2012 that the packets are written
to EfiBootServicesData memory (http://mjg59.dreamwidth.org/11235.html).
This type of memory is made available to the page allocator by
efi_free_boot_services(). Plain vanilla PCI quirks run much later, in
subsys initcall level. In-between a time window would be open for memory
corruption. Random crashes occurring in this time window and attributed
to DMAed packets have indeed been observed in the wild by Chris
Bainbridge.
When Matthew Garrett analyzed the memory corruption issue in 2012, he
sought to fix it with a grub quirk which transitions the card to D3hot:
http://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=9d34bb85da56
This approach does not help users with other bootloaders and while it
may prevent DMAed packets, it does not cure the spurious interrupts
emanating from the card. Unfortunately the card's mmio space is
inaccessible in D3hot, so to reset it, we have to undo the effect of
Matthew's grub patch and transition the card back to D0.
Note that the quirk takes a few shortcuts to reduce the amount of code:
The size of BAR 0 and the location of the PM capability is identical
on all affected machines and therefore hardcoded. Only the address of
BAR 0 differs between models. Also, it is assumed that the BCMA core
currently mapped is the 802.11 core. The EFI driver seems to always take
care of this.
Michael Büsch, Bjorn Helgaas and Matt Fleming contributed feedback
towards finding the best solution to this problem.
The following should be a comprehensive list of affected models:
iMac13,1 2012 21.5" [Root Port 00:1c.3 = 8086:1e16]
iMac13,2 2012 27" [Root Port 00:1c.3 = 8086:1e16]
Macmini5,1 2011 i5 2.3 GHz [Root Port 00:1c.1 = 8086:1c12]
Macmini5,2 2011 i5 2.5 GHz [Root Port 00:1c.1 = 8086:1c12]
Macmini5,3 2011 i7 2.0 GHz [Root Port 00:1c.1 = 8086:1c12]
Macmini6,1 2012 i5 2.5 GHz [Root Port 00:1c.1 = 8086:1e12]
Macmini6,2 2012 i7 2.3 GHz [Root Port 00:1c.1 = 8086:1e12]
MacBookPro8,1 2011 13" [Root Port 00:1c.1 = 8086:1c12]
MacBookPro8,2 2011 15" [Root Port 00:1c.1 = 8086:1c12]
MacBookPro8,3 2011 17" [Root Port 00:1c.1 = 8086:1c12]
MacBookPro9,1 2012 15" [Root Port 00:1c.1 = 8086:1e12]
MacBookPro9,2 2012 13" [Root Port 00:1c.1 = 8086:1e12]
MacBookPro10,1 2012 15" [Root Port 00:1c.1 = 8086:1e12]
MacBookPro10,2 2012 13" [Root Port 00:1c.1 = 8086:1e12]
For posterity, spurious interrupts caused by the Broadcom 4331 wireless
card resulted in splats like this (stacktrace omitted):
irq 17: nobody cared (try booting with the "irqpoll" option)
handlers:
[<ffffffff81374370>] pcie_isr
[<ffffffffc0704550>] sdhci_irq [sdhci] threaded [<ffffffffc07013c0>] sdhci_thread_irq [sdhci]
[<ffffffffc0a0b960>] azx_interrupt [snd_hda_codec]
Disabling IRQ #17
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=79301
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111781
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=728916
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=895951#c16
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1009819
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1098621
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1149632#c5
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1279130
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1332732
Tested-by: Konstantin Simanov <k.simanov@stlk.ru> # [MacBookPro8,1]
Tested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> # [MacBookPro9,1]
Tested-by: Bryan Paradis <bryan.paradis@gmail.com> # [MacBookPro9,2]
Tested-by: Andrew Worsley <amworsley@gmail.com> # [MacBookPro10,1]
Tested-by: Chris Bainbridge <chris.bainbridge@gmail.com> # [MacBookPro10,2]
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Acked-by: Rafał Miłecki <zajec5@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Chris Milsted <cmilsted@redhat.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
Cc: Michael Buesch <m@bues.ch>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: b43-dev@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/48d0972ac82a53d460e5fce77a07b2560db95203.1465690253.git.lukas@wunner.de
[ Did minor readability edits. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 850c321027c2e31d0afc71588974719a4b565550 upstream.
We used to scan secondary buses until the following commit that
was applied in 2009:
8659c406ade3 ("x86: only scan the root bus in early PCI quirks")
which commit constrained early quirks to the root bus only. Its
motivation was to prevent application of the nvidia_bugs quirk
on secondary buses.
We're about to add a quirk to reset the Broadcom 4331 wireless card on
2011/2012 Macs, which is located on a secondary bus behind a PCIe root
port. To facilitate that, reintroduce scanning of secondary buses.
The commit message of 8659c406ade3 notes that scanning only the root bus
"saves quite some unnecessary scanning work". The algorithm used prior
to 8659c406ade3 was particularly time consuming because it scanned
buses 0 to 31 brute force. To avoid lengthening boot time, employ a
recursive strategy which only scans buses that are actually reachable
from the root bus.
Yinghai Lu pointed out that the secondary bus number read from a
bridge's config space may be invalid, in particular a value of 0 would
cause an infinite loop. The PCI core goes beyond that and recurses to a
child bus only if its bus number is greater than the parent bus number
(see pci_scan_bridge()). Since the root bus is numbered 0, this implies
that secondary buses may not be 0. Do the same on early scanning.
If this algorithm is found to significantly impact boot time or cause
infinite loops on broken hardware, it would be possible to limit its
recursion depth: The Broadcom 4331 quirk applies at depth 1, all others
at depth 0, so the bus need not be scanned deeper than that for now. An
alternative approach would be to revert to scanning only the root bus,
and apply the Broadcom 4331 quirk to the root ports 8086:1c12, 8086:1e12
and 8086:1e16. Apple always positioned the card behind either of these
three ports. The quirk would then check presence of the card in slot 0
below the root port and do its deed.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f0daa70dac1a9b2483abdb31887173eb6ab77bdf.1465690253.git.lukas@wunner.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 447d29d1d3aed839e74c2401ef63387780ac51ed upstream.
Since the following commit:
8659c406ade3 ("x86: only scan the root bus in early PCI quirks")
... early quirks are only applied to devices on the root bus.
The motivation was to prevent application of the nvidia_bugs quirk on
secondary buses.
We're about to reintroduce scanning of secondary buses for a quirk to
reset the Broadcom 4331 wireless card on 2011/2012 Macs. To prevent
regressions, open code the requirement to apply nvidia_bugs only on the
root bus.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/4d5477c1d76b2f0387a780f2142bbcdd9fee869b.1465690253.git.lukas@wunner.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5419447e2142d6ed68c9f5c1a28630b3a290a845 upstream.
This reverts commit 852ffd0f4e23248b47531058e531066a988434b5.
There are use cases where an intermediate boot kernel (1) uses kexec
to boot the final production kernel (2). For this scenario we should
provide the original boot information to the production kernel (2).
Therefore clearing the boot information during kexec() should not
be done.
Reported-by: Steffen Maier <maier@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit bcf4dd5f9ee096bd1510f838dd4750c35df4e38b upstream.
The test_fp_ctl function is used to test if a given value is a valid
floating-point control. The inline assembly in test_fp_ctl uses an
incorrect constraint for the 'orig_fpc' variable. If the compiler
chooses the same register for 'fpc' and 'orig_fpc' the test_fp_ctl()
function always returns true. This allows user space to trigger
kernel oopses with invalid floating-point control values on the
signal stack.
This problem has been introduced with git commit 4725c86055f5bbdcdf
"s390: fix save and restore of the floating-point-control register"
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c5379ba8fccd99d5f99632c789f0393d84a57805 upstream.
Until now, our understanding for HW I/O coherency to work on the
Cortex-A9 based Marvell SoC was that only the PCIe regions should be
mapped strongly-ordered. However, we were still encountering some
deadlocks, especially when testing the CESA crypto engine. After
checking with the HW designers, it was concluded that all the MMIO
registers should be mapped as strongly ordered for the HW I/O coherency
mechanism to work properly.
This fixes some easy to reproduce deadlocks with the CESA crypto engine
driver (dmcrypt on a sufficiently large disk partition).
Tested-by: Terry Stockert <stockert@inkblotadmirer.me>
Tested-by: Romain Perier <romain.perier@free-electrons.com>
Cc: Terry Stockert <stockert@inkblotadmirer.me>
Cc: Romain Perier <romain.perier@free-electrons.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
Signed-off-by: Gregory CLEMENT <gregory.clement@free-electrons.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 929e604efa3dc0522214e0dc18984be23993e9f0 upstream.
When the support for the Marvell crypto engine was added in the Device
Tree of the various Armada 385 Device Tree files in commit
d716f2e837ac6 ("ARM: mvebu: define crypto SRAM ranges for all armada-38x
boards"), a typo was made in the MBus window attributes for the Armada
385 Linksys board: 0x09/0x05 are used instead of 0x19/0x15. This commit
fixes this typo, which makes the CESA engines operational on Armada 385
Linksys boards.
Reported-by: Terry Stockert <stockert@inkblotadmirer.me>
Cc: Terry Stockert <stockert@inkblotadmirer.me>
Cc: Imre Kaloz <kaloz@openwrt.org>
Cc: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@free-electrons.com>
Fixes: d716f2e837ac6 ("ARM: mvebu: define crypto SRAM ranges for all armada-38x boards")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
Signed-off-by: Gregory CLEMENT <gregory.clement@free-electrons.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5fc39d347267bd029fcc9099c70e2fe2d53130e9 upstream.
The sun4i-timer driver registers its sched_clock only if the machine is
compatible with "allwinner,sun5i-a13", "allwinner,sun5i-a10s" or
"allwinner,sun4i-a10".
Add the missing "allwinner,sun5i-a13" string to the machine compatible.
Signed-off-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@free-electrons.com>
Fixes: 465a225fb2af ("ARM: sun5i: Add C.H.I.P DTS")
Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <maxime.ripard@free-electrons.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e19a6ee2460bdd0d0055a6029383422773f9999a upstream.
If we take an exception while at EL1, the exception handler inherits
the original context's addr_limit and PSTATE.UAO values. To be consistent
always reset addr_limit and PSTATE.UAO on (re-)entry to EL1. This
prevents accidental re-use of the original context's addr_limit.
Based on a similar patch for arm from Russell King.
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 20c27a4270c775d7ed661491af8ac03264d60fc6 upstream.
__sync_icache_dcache unconditionally skips the cache maintenance for
anonymous pages, under the assumption that flushing is only required in
the presence of D-side aliases [see 7249b79f6b4cc ("arm64: Do not flush
the D-cache for anonymous pages")].
Unfortunately, this breaks migration of anonymous pages holding
self-modifying code, where userspace cannot be reasonably expected to
reissue maintenance instructions in response to a migration.
This patch fixes the problem by removing the broken page_mapping(page)
check from the cache syncing code, otherwise we may end up fetching and
executing stale instructions from the PoU.
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Shaokun Zhang <zhangshaokun@hisilicon.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c5cea06be060f38e5400d796e61cfc8c36e52924 upstream.
If the kernel is set to show unhandled signals, and a user task does not
handle a SIGILL as a result of an instruction abort, we will attempt to
log the offending instruction with dump_instr before killing the task.
We use dump_instr to log the encoding of the offending userspace
instruction. However, dump_instr is also used to dump instructions from
kernel space, and internally always switches to KERNEL_DS before dumping
the instruction with get_user. When both PAN and UAO are in use, reading
a user instruction via get_user while in KERNEL_DS will result in a
permission fault, which leads to an Oops.
As we have regs corresponding to the context of the original instruction
abort, we can inspect this and only flip to KERNEL_DS if the original
abort was taken from the kernel, avoiding this issue. At the same time,
remove the redundant (and incorrect) comments regarding the order
dump_mem and dump_instr are called in.
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reported-by: Vladimir Murzin <vladimir.murzin@arm.com>
Tested-by: Vladimir Murzin <vladimir.murzin@arm.com>
Fixes: 57f4959bad0a154a ("arm64: kernel: Add support for User Access Override")
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ff30ef40deca4658e27b0c596e7baf39115e858f upstream.
I couldn't get Xen to boot a L2 HVM when it was nested under KVM - it was
getting a GP(0) on a rather unspecial vmread from Xen:
(XEN) ----[ Xen-4.7.0-rc x86_64 debug=n Not tainted ]----
(XEN) CPU: 1
(XEN) RIP: e008:[<ffff82d0801e629e>] vmx_get_segment_register+0x14e/0x450
(XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000010202 CONTEXT: hypervisor (d1v0)
(XEN) rax: ffff82d0801e6288 rbx: ffff83003ffbfb7c rcx: fffffffffffab928
(XEN) rdx: 0000000000000000 rsi: 0000000000000000 rdi: ffff83000bdd0000
(XEN) rbp: ffff83000bdd0000 rsp: ffff83003ffbfab0 r8: ffff830038813910
(XEN) r9: ffff83003faf3958 r10: 0000000a3b9f7640 r11: ffff83003f82d418
(XEN) r12: 0000000000000000 r13: ffff83003ffbffff r14: 0000000000004802
(XEN) r15: 0000000000000008 cr0: 0000000080050033 cr4: 00000000001526e0
(XEN) cr3: 000000003fc79000 cr2: 0000000000000000
(XEN) ds: 0000 es: 0000 fs: 0000 gs: 0000 ss: 0000 cs: e008
(XEN) Xen code around <ffff82d0801e629e> (vmx_get_segment_register+0x14e/0x450):
(XEN) 00 00 41 be 02 48 00 00 <44> 0f 78 74 24 08 0f 86 38 56 00 00 b8 08 68 00
(XEN) Xen stack trace from rsp=ffff83003ffbfab0:
...
(XEN) Xen call trace:
(XEN) [<ffff82d0801e629e>] vmx_get_segment_register+0x14e/0x450
(XEN) [<ffff82d0801f3695>] get_page_from_gfn_p2m+0x165/0x300
(XEN) [<ffff82d0801bfe32>] hvmemul_get_seg_reg+0x52/0x60
(XEN) [<ffff82d0801bfe93>] hvm_emulate_prepare+0x53/0x70
(XEN) [<ffff82d0801ccacb>] handle_mmio+0x2b/0xd0
(XEN) [<ffff82d0801be591>] emulate.c#_hvm_emulate_one+0x111/0x2c0
(XEN) [<ffff82d0801cd6a4>] handle_hvm_io_completion+0x274/0x2a0
(XEN) [<ffff82d0801f334a>] __get_gfn_type_access+0xfa/0x270
(XEN) [<ffff82d08012f3bb>] timer.c#add_entry+0x4b/0xb0
(XEN) [<ffff82d08012f80c>] timer.c#remove_entry+0x7c/0x90
(XEN) [<ffff82d0801c8433>] hvm_do_resume+0x23/0x140
(XEN) [<ffff82d0801e4fe7>] vmx_do_resume+0xa7/0x140
(XEN) [<ffff82d080164aeb>] context_switch+0x13b/0xe40
(XEN) [<ffff82d080128e6e>] schedule.c#schedule+0x22e/0x570
(XEN) [<ffff82d08012c0cc>] softirq.c#__do_softirq+0x5c/0x90
(XEN) [<ffff82d0801602c5>] domain.c#idle_loop+0x25/0x50
(XEN)
(XEN)
(XEN) ****************************************
(XEN) Panic on CPU 1:
(XEN) GENERAL PROTECTION FAULT
(XEN) [error_code=0000]
(XEN) ****************************************
Tracing my host KVM showed it was the one injecting the GP(0) when
emulating the VMREAD and checking the destination segment permissions in
get_vmx_mem_address():
3) | vmx_handle_exit() {
3) | handle_vmread() {
3) | nested_vmx_check_permission() {
3) | vmx_get_segment() {
3) 0.074 us | vmx_read_guest_seg_base();
3) 0.065 us | vmx_read_guest_seg_selector();
3) 0.066 us | vmx_read_guest_seg_ar();
3) 1.636 us | }
3) 0.058 us | vmx_get_rflags();
3) 0.062 us | vmx_read_guest_seg_ar();
3) 3.469 us | }
3) | vmx_get_cs_db_l_bits() {
3) 0.058 us | vmx_read_guest_seg_ar();
3) 0.662 us | }
3) | get_vmx_mem_address() {
3) 0.068 us | vmx_cache_reg();
3) | vmx_get_segment() {
3) 0.074 us | vmx_read_guest_seg_base();
3) 0.068 us | vmx_read_guest_seg_selector();
3) 0.071 us | vmx_read_guest_seg_ar();
3) 1.756 us | }
3) | kvm_queue_exception_e() {
3) 0.066 us | kvm_multiple_exception();
3) 0.684 us | }
3) 4.085 us | }
3) 9.833 us | }
3) + 10.366 us | }
Cross-checking the KVM/VMX VMREAD emulation code with the Intel Software
Developper Manual Volume 3C - "VMREAD - Read Field from Virtual-Machine
Control Structure", I found that we're enforcing that the destination
operand is NOT located in a read-only data segment or any code segment when
the L1 is in long mode - BUT that check should only happen when it is in
protected mode.
Shuffling the code a bit to make our emulation follow the specification
allows me to boot a Xen dom0 in a nested KVM and start HVM L2 guests
without problems.
Fixes: f9eb4af67c9d ("KVM: nVMX: VMX instructions: add checks for #GP/#SS exceptions")
Signed-off-by: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Eugene Korenevsky <ekorenevsky@gmail.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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|
commit 591d215afcc2f94e8e2c69a63c924c044677eb31 upstream.
kvm provides kvm_vcpu_uninit(), which amongst other things, releases the
last reference to the struct pid of the task that was last running the vcpu.
On arm64 built with CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK, starting a guest with kvmtool,
then killing it with SIGKILL results (after some considerable time) in:
> cat /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
> unreferenced object 0xffff80007d5ea080 (size 128):
> comm "lkvm", pid 2025, jiffies 4294942645 (age 1107.776s)
> hex dump (first 32 bytes):
> 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
> 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
> backtrace:
> [<ffff8000001b30ec>] create_object+0xfc/0x278
> [<ffff80000071da34>] kmemleak_alloc+0x34/0x70
> [<ffff80000019fa2c>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x16c/0x1d8
> [<ffff8000000d0474>] alloc_pid+0x34/0x4d0
> [<ffff8000000b5674>] copy_process.isra.6+0x79c/0x1338
> [<ffff8000000b633c>] _do_fork+0x74/0x320
> [<ffff8000000b66b0>] SyS_clone+0x18/0x20
> [<ffff800000085cb0>] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28
> [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff
On x86 kvm_vcpu_uninit() is called on the path from kvm_arch_destroy_vm(),
on arm no equivalent call is made. Add the call to kvm_arch_vcpu_free().
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Fixes: 749cf76c5a36 ("KVM: ARM: Initial skeleton to compile KVM support")
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1c343f7b0e177e8ca7f4d4a5dd1fa790f85abbcc upstream.
commit 1e133ab296f ("s390/mm: split arch/s390/mm/pgtable.c") factored
out the page table handling code from __gmap_zap and __s390_reset_cmma
into ptep_zap_unused and added a simple flag that tells which one of the
function (reset or not) is to be made. This also changed the behaviour,
as it also zaps unused page table entries on reset.
Turns out that this is wrong as s390_reset_cmma uses the page walker,
which DOES NOT take the ptl lock.
The most simple fix is to not do the zapping part on reset (which uses
the walker)
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Fixes: 1e133ab296f ("s390/mm: split arch/s390/mm/pgtable.c")
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a0052191624e9bf8a8f9dc41b92ab5f252566c3c upstream.
VT-d posted interrupt is relying on the CPU side's posted interrupt.
Need to check whether VCPU's APICv is active before enabing VT-d
posted interrupt.
Fixes: d62caabb41f33d96333f9ef15e09cd26e1c12760
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.zhang.wz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Shengge Ding <shengge.dsg@alibaba-inc.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 797179bc4fe06c89e47a9f36f886f68640b423f8 upstream.
Copy __kvm_mips_vcpu_run() into unmapped memory, so that we can never
get a TLB refill exception in it when KVM is built as a module.
This was observed to happen with the host MIPS kernel running under
QEMU, due to a not entirely transparent optimisation in the QEMU TLB
handling where TLB entries replaced with TLBWR are copied to a separate
part of the TLB array. Code in those pages continue to be executable,
but those mappings persist only until the next ASID switch, even if they
are marked global.
An ASID switch happens in __kvm_mips_vcpu_run() at exception level after
switching to the guest exception base. Subsequent TLB mapped kernel
instructions just prior to switching to the guest trigger a TLB refill
exception, which enters the guest exception handlers without updating
EPC. This appears as a guest triggered TLB refill on a host kernel
mapped (host KSeg2) address, which is not handled correctly as user
(guest) mode accesses to kernel (host) segments always generate address
error exceptions.
Signed-off-by: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit cb84f6c0a25eb76b1f838eb63e212705c0c06b5f upstream.
This is the same issue fixed in commit dcf5341f0150 ("ARM: dts:
sun8i-q8-common: Do not set constraints on dc1sw regulator").
Commit message copied:
dc1sw is an on/off only regulator and as such it cannot have constraints.
This is a limitation of the kernel regulator implementation which resolves
supplies on the first regulator_get(), which is done after applying
constraints, and applying the constrains will fail because it calls
_regulator_get_voltage() and _regulator_do_set_voltage() both of which
will fail on a switch regulator when there is no supply (yet).
This causes registering of all axp22x regulators to fail with the
following errors:
[ 1.395249] vcc-lcd: failed to get the current voltage(-22)
[ 1.405131] axp20x-regulator axp20x-regulator: Failed to register dc1sw
[ 1.412436] axp20x-regulator: probe of axp20x-regulator failed with error -22
This commit removes the constrains on dc1sw / vcc-lcd fixing this problem.
Note that dcdc1 itself is contrained to the exact same values, so this
does not change anything.
Cc: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chen-Yu Tsai <wens@csie.org>
Acked-by: Maxime Ripard <maxime.ripard@free-electrons.com>
Signed-off-by: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b223d6242c372a81cca3bb81998f53d3b3e3fb70 upstream.
This is the same issue fixed in commit dcf5341f0150 ("ARM: dts:
sun8i-q8-common: Do not set constraints on dc1sw regulator").
Commit message copied:
dc1sw is an on/off only regulator and as such it cannot have constraints.
This is a limitation of the kernel regulator implementation which resolves
supplies on the first regulator_get(), which is done after applying
constraints, and applying the constrains will fail because it calls
_regulator_get_voltage() and _regulator_do_set_voltage() both of which
will fail on a switch regulator when there is no supply (yet).
This causes registering of all axp22x regulators to fail with the
following errors:
[ 1.395249] vcc-lcd: failed to get the current voltage(-22)
[ 1.405131] axp20x-regulator axp20x-regulator: Failed to register dc1sw
[ 1.412436] axp20x-regulator: probe of axp20x-regulator failed with error -22
This commit removes the constrains on dc1sw / vcc-lcd fixing this problem.
Note that dcdc1 itself is contrained to the exact same values, so this
does not change anything.
Cc: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chen-Yu Tsai <wens@csie.org>
Acked-by: Maxime Ripard <maxime.ripard@free-electrons.com>
Signed-off-by: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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|
commit 56530f5d2ddc9b9fade7ef8db9cb886e9dc689b5 upstream.
Currently pmd_mknotpresent will use a zero entry to respresent an
invalidated pmd.
Unfortunately this definition clashes with pmd_none, thus it is
possible for a race condition to occur if zap_pmd_range sees pmd_none
whilst __split_huge_pmd_locked is running too with pmdp_invalidate
just called.
This patch fixes the race condition by modifying pmd_mknotpresent to
create non-zero faulting entries (as is done in other architectures),
removing the ambiguity with pmd_none.
[catalin.marinas@arm.com: using L_PMD_SECT_VALID instead of PMD_TYPE_SECT]
Fixes: 8d9625070073 ("ARM: mm: Transparent huge page support for LPAE systems.")
Reported-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Steve Capper <steve.capper@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 624531886987f0f1b5d01fb598034d039198e090 upstream.
In a subsequent patch, pmd_mknotpresent will clear the valid bit of the
pmd entry, resulting in a not-present entry from the hardware's
perspective. Unfortunately, pmd_present simply checks for a non-zero pmd
value and will therefore continue to return true even after a
pmd_mknotpresent operation. Since pmd_mknotpresent is only used for
managing huge entries, this is only an issue for the 3-level case.
This patch fixes the 3-level pmd_present implementation to take into
account the valid bit. For bisectability, the change is made before the
fix to pmd_mknotpresent.
[catalin.marinas@arm.com: comment update regarding pmd_mknotpresent patch]
Fixes: 8d9625070073 ("ARM: mm: Transparent huge page support for LPAE systems.")
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Steve Capper <Steve.Capper@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 20c15226d1c73150c4d9107301cac5dda0b7f995 upstream.
The value used for Micrel PHY mask is not correct. Use the
MICREL_PHY_ID_MASK definition instead.
Thanks to Jiri Luznicky for proposing the fix at
https://community.freescale.com/thread/387739
Fixes: 709bc0657fe6f9f55 ("ARM: imx6ul: add fec MAC refrence clock and phy fixup init")
Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit fc18822510721fe694d273c5211c71ea52796d76 upstream.
A basic perf callgraph record operation causes an immediate panic on a
32-bit kernel compiled with CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y:
$ perf record -g ls
Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: c0404fbd
CPU: 0 PID: 998 Comm: ls Not tainted 4.7.0-rc5+ #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.9.1-1.fc24 04/01/2014
c0dd5967 ff7afe1c 00000086 f41dbc2c c07445a0 464c457f f41dbca8 f41dbc44
c05646f4 f41dbca8 464c457f f41dbca8 464c457f f41dbc54 c04625be c0ce56fc
c0404fbd f41dbc88 c0404fbd b74668f0 f41dc000 00000000 c0000000 00000000
Call Trace:
[<c07445a0>] dump_stack+0x58/0x78
[<c05646f4>] panic+0x8e/0x1c6
[<c04625be>] __stack_chk_fail+0x1e/0x30
[<c0404fbd>] ? perf_callchain_user+0x22d/0x230
[<c0404fbd>] perf_callchain_user+0x22d/0x230
[<c055f89f>] get_perf_callchain+0x1ff/0x270
[<c055f988>] perf_callchain+0x78/0x90
[<c055c7eb>] perf_prepare_sample+0x24b/0x370
[<c055c934>] perf_event_output_forward+0x24/0x70
[<c05531c0>] __perf_event_overflow+0xa0/0x210
[<c0550a93>] ? cpu_clock_event_read+0x43/0x50
[<c0553431>] perf_swevent_hrtimer+0x101/0x180
[<c0456235>] ? kmap_atomic_prot+0x35/0x140
[<c056dc69>] ? get_page_from_freelist+0x279/0x950
[<c058fdd8>] ? vma_interval_tree_remove+0x158/0x230
[<c05939f4>] ? wp_page_copy.isra.82+0x2f4/0x630
[<c05a050d>] ? page_add_file_rmap+0x1d/0x50
[<c0565611>] ? unlock_page+0x61/0x80
[<c0566755>] ? filemap_map_pages+0x305/0x320
[<c059769f>] ? handle_mm_fault+0xb7f/0x1560
[<c074cbeb>] ? timerqueue_del+0x1b/0x70
[<c04cfefe>] ? __remove_hrtimer+0x2e/0x60
[<c04d017b>] __hrtimer_run_queues+0xcb/0x2a0
[<c0553330>] ? __perf_event_overflow+0x210/0x210
[<c04d0a2a>] hrtimer_interrupt+0x8a/0x180
[<c043ecc2>] local_apic_timer_interrupt+0x32/0x60
[<c043f643>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x33/0x50
[<c0b0cd38>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x34/0x3c
Kernel Offset: disabled
---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: c0404fbd
The panic is caused by the fact that perf_callchain_user() mistakenly
assumes it's 64-bit only and ends up corrupting the stack.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Fixes: 75925e1ad7f5 ("perf/x86: Optimize stack walk user accesses")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1a547f5077ec30f75f9b57074837c3c80df86e5e.1467432113.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1ead852dd88779eda12cb09cc894a03d9abfe1ec upstream.
Fix boot crash that triggers if this driver is built into a kernel and
run on non-AMD systems.
AMD northbridges users call amd_cache_northbridges() and it returns
a negative value to signal that we weren't able to cache/detect any
northbridges on the system.
At least, it should do so as all its callers expect it to do so. But it
does return a negative value only when kmalloc() fails.
Fix it to return -ENODEV if there are no NBs cached as otherwise, amd_nb
users like amd64_edac, for example, which relies on it to know whether
it should load or not, gets loaded on systems like Intel Xeons where it
shouldn't.
Reported-and-tested-by: Tony Battersby <tonyb@cybernetics.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466097230-5333-2-git-send-email-bp@alien8.de
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/5761BEB0.9000807@cybernetics.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 275ae411e56f8f900fa364da29c4706f9af4e1f3 upstream.
On rapl cleanup path, kfree() is given by mistake the address of the
pointer of the structure to free (rapl_pmus->pmus + i). Pass the pointer
instead (rapl_pmus->pmus[i]).
Fixes: 9de8d686955b "perf/x86/intel/rapl: Convert it to a per package facility"
Signed-off-by: Vincent Stehlé <vincent.stehle@intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464101629-14905-1-git-send-email-vincent.stehle@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit dcfc47248d3f7d28df6f531e6426b933de94370d upstream.
Fix kprobe_fault_handler() to clear the TF (trap flag) bit of
the flags register in the case of a fault fixup on single-stepping.
If we put a kprobe on the instruction which caused a
page fault (e.g. actual mov instructions in copy_user_*),
that fault happens on the single-stepping buffer. In this
case, kprobes resets running instance so that the CPU can
retry execution on the original ip address.
However, current code forgets to reset the TF bit. Since this
fault happens with TF bit set for enabling single-stepping,
when it retries, it causes a debug exception and kprobes
can not handle it because it already reset itself.
On the most of x86-64 platform, it can be easily reproduced
by using kprobe tracer. E.g.
# cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
# echo p copy_user_enhanced_fast_string+5 > kprobe_events
# echo 1 > events/kprobes/enable
And you'll see a kernel panic on do_debug(), since the debug
trap is not handled by kprobes.
To fix this problem, we just need to clear the TF bit when
resetting running kprobe.
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Cc: systemtap@sourceware.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160611140648.25885.37482.stgit@devbox
[ Updated the comments. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9c77679cadb118c0aa99e6f88533d91765a131ba upstream.
For newer versions of Syslinux, we need ldlinux.c32 in addition to
isolinux.bin to reside on the boot disk, so if the latter is found,
copy it, too, to the isoimage tree.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 08dd8cd06ed95625b9e2fac43c78fcb45b7eaf94 upstream.
The msr tracing for writes is incorrectly conditional on the read trace.
Fixes: 7f47d8cc039f "x86, tracing, perf: Add trace point for MSR accesses"
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464976859-21850-1-git-send-email-dgilbert@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8e96a87c5431c256feb65bcfc5aec92d9f7839b6 upstream.
Userspace can quite legitimately perform an exec() syscall with a
suspended transaction. exec() does not return to the old process, rather
it load a new one and starts that, the expectation therefore is that the
new process starts not in a transaction. Currently exec() is not treated
any differently to any other syscall which creates problems.
Firstly it could allow a new process to start with a suspended
transaction for a binary that no longer exists. This means that the
checkpointed state won't be valid and if the suspended transaction were
ever to be resumed and subsequently aborted (a possibility which is
exceedingly likely as exec()ing will likely doom the transaction) the
new process will jump to invalid state.
Secondly the incorrect attempt to keep the transactional state while
still zeroing state for the new process creates at least two TM Bad
Things. The first triggers on the rfid to return to userspace as
start_thread() has given the new process a 'clean' MSR but the suspend
will still be set in the hardware MSR. The second TM Bad Thing triggers
in __switch_to() as the processor is still transactionally suspended but
__switch_to() wants to zero the TM sprs for the new process.
This is an example of the outcome of calling exec() with a suspended
transaction. Note the first 700 is likely the first TM bad thing
decsribed earlier only the kernel can't report it as we've loaded
userspace registers. c000000000009980 is the rfid in
fast_exception_return()
Bad kernel stack pointer 3fffcfa1a370 at c000000000009980
Oops: Bad kernel stack pointer, sig: 6 [#1]
CPU: 0 PID: 2006 Comm: tm-execed Not tainted
NIP: c000000000009980 LR: 0000000000000000 CTR: 0000000000000000
REGS: c00000003ffefd40 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted
MSR: 8000000300201031 <SF,ME,IR,DR,LE,TM[SE]> CR: 00000000 XER: 00000000
CFAR: c0000000000098b4 SOFTE: 0
PACATMSCRATCH: b00000010000d033
GPR00: 0000000000000000 00003fffcfa1a370 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
GPR04: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
GPR08: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
GPR12: 00003fff966611c0 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
NIP [c000000000009980] fast_exception_return+0xb0/0xb8
LR [0000000000000000] (null)
Call Trace:
Instruction dump:
f84d0278 e9a100d8 7c7b03a6 e84101a0 7c4ff120 e8410170 7c5a03a6 e8010070
e8410080 e8610088 e8810090 e8210078 <4c000024> 48000000 e8610178 88ed023b
Kernel BUG at c000000000043e80 [verbose debug info unavailable]
Unexpected TM Bad Thing exception at c000000000043e80 (msr 0x201033)
Oops: Unrecoverable exception, sig: 6 [#2]
CPU: 0 PID: 2006 Comm: tm-execed Tainted: G D
task: c0000000fbea6d80 ti: c00000003ffec000 task.ti: c0000000fb7ec000
NIP: c000000000043e80 LR: c000000000015a24 CTR: 0000000000000000
REGS: c00000003ffef7e0 TRAP: 0700 Tainted: G D
MSR: 8000000300201033 <SF,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE,TM[SE]> CR: 28002828 XER: 00000000
CFAR: c000000000015a20 SOFTE: 0
PACATMSCRATCH: b00000010000d033
GPR00: 0000000000000000 c00000003ffefa60 c000000000db5500 c0000000fbead000
GPR04: 8000000300001033 2222222222222222 2222222222222222 00000000ff160000
GPR08: 0000000000000000 800000010000d033 c0000000fb7e3ea0 c00000000fe00004
GPR12: 0000000000002200 c00000000fe00000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 c0000000fbea7410 00000000ff160000
GPR24: c0000000ffe1f600 c0000000fbea8700 c0000000fbea8700 c0000000fbead000
GPR28: c000000000e20198 c0000000fbea6d80 c0000000fbeab680 c0000000fbea6d80
NIP [c000000000043e80] tm_restore_sprs+0xc/0x1c
LR [c000000000015a24] __switch_to+0x1f4/0x420
Call Trace:
Instruction dump:
7c800164 4e800020 7c0022a6 f80304a8 7c0222a6 f80304b0 7c0122a6 f80304b8
4e800020 e80304a8 7c0023a6 e80304b0 <7c0223a6> e80304b8 7c0123a6 4e800020
This fixes CVE-2016-5828.
Fixes: bc2a9408fa65 ("powerpc: Hook in new transactional memory code")
Signed-off-by: Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2c2a63e301fd19ccae673e79de59b30a232ff7f9 upstream.
The recent commit 7cc851039d64 ("powerpc/pseries: Add POWER8NVL support
to ibm,client-architecture-support call") added a new PVR mask & value
to the start of the ibm_architecture_vec[] array.
However it missed the fact that further down in the array, we hard code
the offset of one of the fields, and then at boot use that value to
patch the value in the array. This means every update to the array must
also update the #define, ugh.
This means that on pseries machines we will misreport to firmware the
number of cores we support, by a factor of threads_per_core.
Fix it for now by updating the #define.
Fixes: 7cc851039d64 ("powerpc/pseries: Add POWER8NVL support to ibm,client-architecture-support call")
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8a934efe94347eee843aeea65bdec8077a79e259 upstream.
In commit 8445a87f7092 "powerpc/iommu: Remove the dependency on EEH
struct in DDW mechanism", the PE address was replaced with the PCI
config address in order to remove dependency on EEH. According to PAPR
spec, firmware (pHyp or QEMU) should accept "xxBBSSxx" format PCI config
address, not "xxxxBBSS" provided by the patch. Note that "BB" is PCI bus
number and "SS" is the combination of slot and function number.
This fixes the PCI address passed to DDW RTAS calls.
Fixes: 8445a87f7092 ("powerpc/iommu: Remove the dependency on EEH struct in DDW mechanism")
Reported-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli <gpiccoli@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Gavin Shan <gwshan@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli <gpiccoli@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8445a87f7092bc8336ea1305be9306f26b846d93 upstream.
Commit 39baadbf36ce ("powerpc/eeh: Remove eeh information from pci_dn")
changed the pci_dn struct by removing its EEH-related members.
As part of this clean-up, DDW mechanism was modified to read the device
configuration address from eeh_dev struct.
As a consequence, now if we disable EEH mechanism on kernel command-line
for example, the DDW mechanism will fail, generating a kernel oops by
dereferencing a NULL pointer (which turns to be the eeh_dev pointer).
This patch just changes the configuration address calculation on DDW
functions to a manual calculation based on pci_dn members instead of
using eeh_dev-based address.
No functional changes were made. This was tested on pSeries, both
in PHyp and qemu guest.
Fixes: 39baadbf36ce ("powerpc/eeh: Remove eeh information from pci_dn")
Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gwshan@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli <gpiccoli@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7cafc0b8bf130f038b0ec2dcdd6a9de6dc59b65a ]
We must handle data access exception as well as memory address unaligned
exceptions from return from trap window fill faults, not just normal
TLB misses.
Otherwise we can get an OOPS that looks like this:
ld-linux.so.2(36808): Kernel bad sw trap 5 [#1]
CPU: 1 PID: 36808 Comm: ld-linux.so.2 Not tainted 4.6.0 #34
task: fff8000303be5c60 ti: fff8000301344000 task.ti: fff8000301344000
TSTATE: 0000004410001601 TPC: 0000000000a1a784 TNPC: 0000000000a1a788 Y: 00000002 Not tainted
TPC: <do_sparc64_fault+0x5c4/0x700>
g0: fff8000024fc8248 g1: 0000000000db04dc g2: 0000000000000000 g3: 0000000000000001
g4: fff8000303be5c60 g5: fff800030e672000 g6: fff8000301344000 g7: 0000000000000001
o0: 0000000000b95ee8 o1: 000000000000012b o2: 0000000000000000 o3: 0000000200b9b358
o4: 0000000000000000 o5: fff8000301344040 sp: fff80003013475c1 ret_pc: 0000000000a1a77c
RPC: <do_sparc64_fault+0x5bc/0x700>
l0: 00000000000007ff l1: 0000000000000000 l2: 000000000000005f l3: 0000000000000000
l4: fff8000301347e98 l5: fff8000024ff3060 l6: 0000000000000000 l7: 0000000000000000
i0: fff8000301347f60 i1: 0000000000102400 i2: 0000000000000000 i3: 0000000000000000
i4: 0000000000000000 i5: 0000000000000000 i6: fff80003013476a1 i7: 0000000000404d4c
I7: <user_rtt_fill_fixup+0x6c/0x7c>
Call Trace:
[0000000000404d4c] user_rtt_fill_fixup+0x6c/0x7c
The window trap handlers are slightly clever, the trap table entries for them are
composed of two pieces of code. First comes the code that actually performs
the window fill or spill trap handling, and then there are three instructions at
the end which are for exception processing.
The userland register window fill handler is:
add %sp, STACK_BIAS + 0x00, %g1; \
ldxa [%g1 + %g0] ASI, %l0; \
mov 0x08, %g2; \
mov 0x10, %g3; \
ldxa [%g1 + %g2] ASI, %l1; \
mov 0x18, %g5; \
ldxa [%g1 + %g3] ASI, %l2; \
ldxa [%g1 + %g5] ASI, %l3; \
add %g1, 0x20, %g1; \
ldxa [%g1 + %g0] ASI, %l4; \
ldxa [%g1 + %g2] ASI, %l5; \
ldxa [%g1 + %g3] ASI, %l6; \
ldxa [%g1 + %g5] ASI, %l7; \
add %g1, 0x20, %g1; \
ldxa [%g1 + %g0] ASI, %i0; \
ldxa [%g1 + %g2] ASI, %i1; \
ldxa [%g1 + %g3] ASI, %i2; \
ldxa [%g1 + %g5] ASI, %i3; \
add %g1, 0x20, %g1; \
ldxa [%g1 + %g0] ASI, %i4; \
ldxa [%g1 + %g2] ASI, %i5; \
ldxa [%g1 + %g3] ASI, %i6; \
ldxa [%g1 + %g5] ASI, %i7; \
restored; \
retry; nop; nop; nop; nop; \
b,a,pt %xcc, fill_fixup_dax; \
b,a,pt %xcc, fill_fixup_mna; \
b,a,pt %xcc, fill_fixup;
And the way this works is that if any of those memory accesses
generate an exception, the exception handler can revector to one of
those final three branch instructions depending upon which kind of
exception the memory access took. In this way, the fault handler
doesn't have to know if it was a spill or a fill that it's handling
the fault for. It just always branches to the last instruction in
the parent trap's handler.
For example, for a regular fault, the code goes:
winfix_trampoline:
rdpr %tpc, %g3
or %g3, 0x7c, %g3
wrpr %g3, %tnpc
done
All window trap handlers are 0x80 aligned, so if we "or" 0x7c into the
trap time program counter, we'll get that final instruction in the
trap handler.
On return from trap, we have to pull the register window in but we do
this by hand instead of just executing a "restore" instruction for
several reasons. The largest being that from Niagara and onward we
simply don't have enough levels in the trap stack to fully resolve all
possible exception cases of a window fault when we are already at
trap level 1 (which we enter to get ready to return from the original
trap).
This is executed inline via the FILL_*_RTRAP handlers. rtrap_64.S's
code branches directly to these to do the window fill by hand if
necessary. Now if you look at them, we'll see at the end:
ba,a,pt %xcc, user_rtt_fill_fixup;
ba,a,pt %xcc, user_rtt_fill_fixup;
ba,a,pt %xcc, user_rtt_fill_fixup;
And oops, all three cases are handled like a fault.
This doesn't work because each of these trap types (data access
exception, memory address unaligned, and faults) store their auxiliary
info in different registers to pass on to the C handler which does the
real work.
So in the case where the stack was unaligned, the unaligned trap
handler sets up the arg registers one way, and then we branched to
the fault handler which expects them setup another way.
So the FAULT_TYPE_* value ends up basically being garbage, and
randomly would generate the backtrace seen above.
Reported-by: Nick Alcock <nix@esperi.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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