| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|---|
|
Commit 9bcb90650e31 ("KVM: VMX: Get rid of eVMCS specific VMX controls
sanitization") dropped 'vmcs_conf' sanitization for KVM-on-Hyper-V because
there's no known Hyper-V version which would expose a feature
unsupported in eVMCS in VMX feature MSRs. This works well for all
currently existing Hyper-V version, however, future Hyper-V versions
may add features which are supported by KVM and are currently missing
in eVMCSv1 definition (e.g. APIC virtualization, PML,...). When this
happens, existing KVMs will get broken. With the inverted 'unsupported
by eVMCSv1' checks, we can resurrect vmcs_conf sanitization and make
KVM future proof.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20221104144708.435865-5-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
In preparation to restoring vmcs_conf sanitization for KVM-on-Hyper-V,
(and for completeness) add tertiary VM-execution controls to
'evmcs_supported_ctrls'.
No functional change intended as KVM doesn't yet expose
MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS3 to its guests.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20221104144708.435865-4-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
When a new feature gets implemented in KVM, EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_* defines
need to be adjusted to avoid the situation when the feature is exposed
to the guest but there's no corresponding eVMCS field[s] for it. This
is not obvious and fragile. Invert 'unsupported by eVMCSv1' check and
make it 'supported by eVMCSv1' instead, this way it's much harder to
make a mistake. New features will get added to EVMCS1_SUPPORTED_*
defines when the corresponding fields are added to eVMCS definition.
No functional change intended. EVMCS1_SUPPORTED_* defines are composed
by taking KVM_{REQUIRED,OPTIONAL}_VMX_ defines and filtering out what
was previously known as EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_*.
From all the controls, SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING requires special
handling as it's actually present in eVMCSv1 definition but is not
currently supported for Hyper-V-on-KVM, just for KVM-on-Hyper-V. As
evmcs_supported_ctrls will be used for both scenarios, just add it
there instead of EVMCS1_SUPPORTED_2NDEXEC.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20221104144708.435865-3-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
The only unsupported primary processor-based VM-execution control at the
moment is CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_TERTIARY_CONTROLS and KVM doesn't expose it
in nested VMX feature MSRs anyway (see nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs())
but in preparation to inverting "unsupported with eVMCS" checks (and
for completeness) it's better to sanitize MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS/
MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_PROCBASED_CTLS too.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20221104144708.435865-2-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
When stuffing the allowed secondary execution controls for nested VMX in
response to CPUID updates, don't set the allowed-1 bit for a feature that
isn't supported by KVM, i.e. isn't allowed by the canonical vmcs_config.
WARN if KVM attempts to manipulate a feature that isn't supported. All
features that are currently stuffed are always advertised to L1 for
nested VMX if they are supported in KVM's base configuration, and no
additional features should ever be added to the CPUID-induced stuffing
(updating VMX MSRs in response to CPUID updates is a long-standing KVM
flaw that is slowly being fixed).
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20221213062306.667649-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Set ENABLE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE in KVM's supported VMX MSR configuration if the
feature is supported in hardware and enabled in KVM's base, non-nested
configuration, i.e. expose ENABLE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE to L1 if it's supported.
This fixes a bug where saving/restoring, i.e. migrating, a vCPU will fail
if WAITPKG (the associated CPUID feature) is enabled for the vCPU, and
obviously allows L1 to enable the feature for L2.
KVM already effectively exposes ENABLE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE to L1 by stuffing
the allowed-1 control ina vCPU's virtual MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2 when
updating secondary controls in response to KVM_SET_CPUID(2), but (a) that
depends on flawed code (KVM shouldn't touch VMX MSRs in response to CPUID
updates) and (b) runs afoul of vmx_restore_control_msr()'s restriction
that the guest value must be a strict subset of the supported host value.
Although no past commit explicitly enabled nested support for WAITPKG,
doing so is safe and functionally correct from an architectural
perspective as no additional KVM support is needed to virtualize TPAUSE,
UMONITOR, and UMWAIT for L2 relative to L1, and KVM already forwards
VM-Exits to L1 as necessary (commit bf653b78f960, "KVM: vmx: Introduce
handle_unexpected_vmexit and handle WAITPKG vmexit").
Note, KVM always keeps the hosts MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL resident in
hardware, i.e. always runs both L1 and L2 with the host's power management
settings for TPAUSE and UMWAIT. See commit bf09fb6cba4f ("KVM: VMX: Stop
context switching MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL") for more details.
Fixes: e69e72faa3a0 ("KVM: x86: Add support for user wait instructions")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com>
Reported-by: Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Message-Id: <20221213062306.667649-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Explicitly drop the result of kvm_vcpu_write_guest() when writing the
"launch state" as part of VMCLEAR emulation, and add a comment to call
out that KVM's behavior is architecturally valid. Intel's pseudocode
effectively says that VMCLEAR is a nop if the target VMCS address isn't
in memory, e.g. if the address points at MMIO.
Add a FIXME to call out that suppressing failures on __copy_to_user() is
wrong, as memory (a memslot) does exist in that case. Punt the issue to
the future as open coding kvm_vcpu_write_guest() just to make sure the
guest dies with -EFAULT isn't worth the extra complexity. The flaw will
need to be addressed if KVM ever does something intelligent on uaccess
failures, e.g. to support post-copy demand paging, but in that case KVM
will need a more thorough overhaul, i.e. VMCLEAR shouldn't need to open
code a core KVM helper.
No functional change intended.
Reported-by: coverity-bot <keescook+coverity-bot@chromium.org>
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1527765 ("Error handling issues")
Fixes: 587d7e72aedc ("kvm: nVMX: VMCLEAR should not cause the vCPU to shut down")
Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20221220154224.526568-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Move the check on IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL being locked, i.e. read-only from
the guest, into the helper to check the overall validity of the incoming
value. Opportunistically rename the helper to make it clear that it
returns a bool.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220607232353.3375324-3-seanjc@google.com
|
|
Allow userspace to set all supported bits in MSR IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL
irrespective of the guest CPUID model, e.g. via KVM_SET_MSRS. KVM's ABI
is that userspace is allowed to set MSRs before CPUID, i.e. can set MSRs
to values that would fault according to the guest CPUID model.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220607232353.3375324-2-seanjc@google.com
|
|
Declare vmread_error_trampoline() as an opaque symbol so that it cannot
be called from C code, at least not without some serious fudging. The
trampoline always passes parameters on the stack so that the inline
VMREAD sequence doesn't need to clobber registers. regparm(0) was
originally added to document the stack behavior, but it ended up being
confusing because regparm(0) is a nop for 64-bit targets.
Opportunustically wrap the trampoline and its declaration in #ifdeffery
to make it even harder to invoke incorrectly, to document why it exists,
and so that it's not left behind if/when CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_OUTPUT
is true for all supported toolchains.
No functional change intended.
Cc: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220928232015.745948-1-seanjc@google.com
|
|
Reword the comments that (attempt to) document nVMX's overrides of the
CR0/4 read shadows for L2 after calling vmx_set_cr0/4(). The important
behavior that needs to be documented is that KVM needs to override the
shadows to account for L1's masks even though the shadows are set by the
common helpers (and that setting the shadows first would result in the
correct shadows being clobbered).
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220831000721.4066617-1-seanjc@google.com
|
|
According to Intel's document on Indirect Branch Restricted
Speculation, "Enabling IBRS does not prevent software from controlling
the predicted targets of indirect branches of unrelated software
executed later at the same predictor mode (for example, between two
different user applications, or two different virtual machines). Such
isolation can be ensured through use of the Indirect Branch Predictor
Barrier (IBPB) command." This applies to both basic and enhanced IBRS.
Since L1 and L2 VMs share hardware predictor modes (guest-user and
guest-kernel), hardware IBRS is not sufficient to virtualize
IBRS. (The way that basic IBRS is implemented on pre-eIBRS parts,
hardware IBRS is actually sufficient in practice, even though it isn't
sufficient architecturally.)
For virtual CPUs that support IBRS, add an indirect branch prediction
barrier on emulated VM-exit, to ensure that the predicted targets of
indirect branches executed in L1 cannot be controlled by software that
was executed in L2.
Since we typically don't intercept guest writes to IA32_SPEC_CTRL,
perform the IBPB at emulated VM-exit regardless of the current
IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS value, even though the IBPB could technically be
deferred until L1 sets IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS, if IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS is
clear at emulated VM-exit.
This is CVE-2022-2196.
Fixes: 5c911beff20a ("KVM: nVMX: Skip IBPB when switching between vmcs01 and vmcs02")
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221019213620.1953281-3-jmattson@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
|
|
At this point in time, most guests (in the default, out-of-the-box
configuration) are likely to use IA32_SPEC_CTRL. Therefore, drop the
compiler hint that it is unlikely for KVM to be intercepting WRMSR of
IA32_SPEC_CTRL.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221019213620.1953281-2-jmattson@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
|
|
Inject #GP for if VMXON is attempting with a CR0/CR4 that fails the
generic "is CRx valid" check, but passes the CR4.VMXE check, and do the
generic checks _after_ handling the post-VMXON VM-Fail.
The CR4.VMXE check, and all other #UD cases, are special pre-conditions
that are enforced prior to pivoting on the current VMX mode, i.e. occur
before interception if VMXON is attempted in VMX non-root mode.
All other CR0/CR4 checks generate #GP and effectively have lower priority
than the post-VMXON check.
Per the SDM:
IF (register operand) or (CR0.PE = 0) or (CR4.VMXE = 0) or ...
THEN #UD;
ELSIF not in VMX operation
THEN
IF (CPL > 0) or (in A20M mode) or
(the values of CR0 and CR4 are not supported in VMX operation)
THEN #GP(0);
ELSIF in VMX non-root operation
THEN VMexit;
ELSIF CPL > 0
THEN #GP(0);
ELSE VMfail("VMXON executed in VMX root operation");
FI;
which, if re-written without ELSIF, yields:
IF (register operand) or (CR0.PE = 0) or (CR4.VMXE = 0) or ...
THEN #UD
IF in VMX non-root operation
THEN VMexit;
IF CPL > 0
THEN #GP(0)
IF in VMX operation
THEN VMfail("VMXON executed in VMX root operation");
IF (in A20M mode) or
(the values of CR0 and CR4 are not supported in VMX operation)
THEN #GP(0);
Note, KVM unconditionally forwards VMXON VM-Exits that occur in L2 to L1,
i.e. there is no need to check the vCPU is not in VMX non-root mode. Add
a comment to explain why unconditionally forwarding such exits is
functionally correct.
Reported-by: Eric Li <ercli@ucdavis.edu>
Fixes: c7d855c2aff2 ("KVM: nVMX: Inject #UD if VMXON is attempted with incompatible CR0/CR4")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221006001956.329314-1-seanjc@google.com
|
|
Resume the guest immediately when injecting a #GP on ECREATE due to an
invalid enclave size, i.e. don't attempt ECREATE in the host. The #GP is
a terminal fault, e.g. skipping the instruction if ECREATE is successful
would result in KVM injecting #GP on the instruction following ECREATE.
Fixes: 70210c044b4e ("KVM: VMX: Add SGX ENCLS[ECREATE] handler to enforce CPUID restrictions")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220930233132.1723330-1-seanjc@google.com
|
|
Convert kvm_hv_get_assist_page() to return 'int' and propagate possible
errors from kvm_read_guest_cached().
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20221101145426.251680-28-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Enable L2 TLB flush feature on nVMX when:
- Enlightened VMCS is in use.
- The feature flag is enabled in eVMCS.
- The feature flag is enabled in partition assist page.
Perform synthetic vmexit to L1 after processing TLB flush call upon
request (HV_VMX_SYNTHETIC_EXIT_REASON_TRAP_AFTER_FLUSH).
Note: nested_evmcs_l2_tlb_flush_enabled() uses cached VP assist page copy
which gets updated from nested_vmx_handle_enlightened_vmptrld(). This is
also guaranteed to happen post migration with eVMCS backed L2 running.
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20221101145426.251680-27-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
In preparation to enabling L2 TLB flush, cache VP assist page in
'struct kvm_vcpu_hv'. While on it, rename nested_enlightened_vmentry()
to nested_get_evmptr() and make it return eVMCS GPA directly.
No functional change intended.
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20221101145426.251680-26-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Hyper-V supports injecting synthetic L2->L1 exit after performing
L2 TLB flush operation but the procedure is vendor specific. Introduce
.hv_inject_synthetic_vmexit_post_tlb_flush nested hook for it.
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20221101145426.251680-22-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
To handle L2 TLB flush requests, KVM needs to keep track of L2's VM_ID/
VP_IDs which are set by L1 hypervisor. 'Partition assist page' address is
also needed to handle post-flush exit to L1 upon request.
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20221101145426.251680-20-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
To conform with SVM, rename VMX specific Hyper-V files from "evmcs.{ch}"
to "hyperv.{ch}". While Enlightened VMCS is a lion's share of these
files, some stuff (e.g. enlightened MSR bitmap, the upcoming Hyper-V
L2 TLB flush, ...) goes beyond that.
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20221101145426.251680-7-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
To make terminology between Hyper-V-on-KVM and KVM-on-Hyper-V consistent,
rename 'enable_direct_tlbflush' to 'enable_l2_tlb_flush'. The change
eliminates the use of confusing 'direct' and adds the missing underscore.
No functional change.
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20221101145426.251680-6-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
This fixes three issues in nested SVM:
1) in the shutdown_interception() vmexit handler we call kvm_vcpu_reset().
However, if running nested and L1 doesn't intercept shutdown, the function
resets vcpu->arch.hflags without properly leaving the nested state.
This leaves the vCPU in inconsistent state and later triggers a kernel
panic in SVM code. The same bug can likely be triggered by sending INIT
via local apic to a vCPU which runs a nested guest.
On VMX we are lucky that the issue can't happen because VMX always
intercepts triple faults, thus triple fault in L2 will always be
redirected to L1. Plus, handle_triple_fault() doesn't reset the vCPU.
INIT IPI can't happen on VMX either because INIT events are masked while
in VMX mode.
Secondarily, KVM doesn't honour SHUTDOWN intercept bit of L1 on SVM.
A normal hypervisor should always intercept SHUTDOWN, a unit test on
the other hand might want to not do so.
Finally, the guest can trigger a kernel non rate limited printk on SVM
from the guest, which is fixed as well.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
This is SVM correctness fix - although a sane L1 would intercept
SHUTDOWN event, it doesn't have to, so we have to honour this.
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20221103141351.50662-8-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
add kvm_leave_nested which wraps a call to nested_ops->leave_nested
into a function.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20221103141351.50662-4-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Defer reprogramming counters and handling overflow via KVM_REQ_PMU
when incrementing counters. KVM skips emulated WRMSR in the VM-Exit
fastpath, the fastpath runs with IRQs disabled, skipping instructions
can increment and reprogram counters, reprogramming counters can
sleep, and sleeping is disallowed while IRQs are disabled.
[*] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:580
[*] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 2981888, name: CPU 15/KVM
[*] preempt_count: 1, expected: 0
[*] RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
[*] INFO: lockdep is turned off.
[*] irq event stamp: 0
[*] hardirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
[*] hardirqs last disabled at (0): [<ffffffff8121222a>] copy_process+0x146a/0x62d0
[*] softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffffff81212269>] copy_process+0x14a9/0x62d0
[*] softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
[*] Preemption disabled at:
[*] [<ffffffffc2063fc1>] vcpu_enter_guest+0x1001/0x3dc0 [kvm]
[*] CPU: 17 PID: 2981888 Comm: CPU 15/KVM Kdump: 5.19.0-rc1-g239111db364c-dirty #2
[*] Call Trace:
[*] <TASK>
[*] dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0x9b
[*] __might_resched.cold+0x22e/0x297
[*] __mutex_lock+0xc0/0x23b0
[*] perf_event_ctx_lock_nested+0x18f/0x340
[*] perf_event_pause+0x1a/0x110
[*] reprogram_counter+0x2af/0x1490 [kvm]
[*] kvm_pmu_trigger_event+0x429/0x950 [kvm]
[*] kvm_skip_emulated_instruction+0x48/0x90 [kvm]
[*] handle_fastpath_set_msr_irqoff+0x349/0x3b0 [kvm]
[*] vmx_vcpu_run+0x268e/0x3b80 [kvm_intel]
[*] vcpu_enter_guest+0x1d22/0x3dc0 [kvm]
Add a field to kvm_pmc to track the previous counter value in order
to defer overflow detection to kvm_pmu_handle_event() (the counter must
be paused before handling overflow, and that may increment the counter).
Opportunistically shrink sizeof(struct kvm_pmc) a bit.
Suggested-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Fixes: 9cd803d496e7 ("KVM: x86: Update vPMCs when retiring instructions")
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220831085328.45489-6-likexu@tencent.com
[sean: avoid re-triggering KVM_REQ_PMU on overflow, tweak changelog]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220923001355.3741194-5-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Batch reprogramming PMU counters by setting KVM_REQ_PMU and thus
deferring reprogramming kvm_pmu_handle_event() to avoid reprogramming
a counter multiple times during a single VM-Exit.
Deferring programming will also allow KVM to fix a bug where immediately
reprogramming a counter can result in sleeping (taking a mutex) while
interrupts are disabled in the VM-Exit fastpath.
Introduce kvm_pmu_request_counter_reprogam() to make it obvious that
KVM is _requesting_ a reprogram and not actually doing the reprogram.
Opportunistically refine related comments to avoid misunderstandings.
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220831085328.45489-5-likexu@tencent.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220923001355.3741194-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Use kvm_smram union instad of raw arrays in the common smm code.
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20221025124741.228045-18-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Vendor-specific code that deals with SMI injection and saving/restoring
SMM state is not needed if CONFIG_KVM_SMM is disabled, so remove the
four callbacks smi_allowed, enter_smm, leave_smm and enable_smi_window.
The users in svm/nested.c and x86.c also have to be compiled out; the
amount of #ifdef'ed code is small and it's not worth moving it to
smm.c.
enter_smm is now used only within #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_SMM, and the stub
can therefore be removed.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220929172016.319443-7-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Some users of KVM implement the UEFI variable store through a paravirtual device
that does not require the "SMM lockbox" component of edk2; allow them to
compile out system management mode, which is not a full implementation
especially in how it interacts with nested virtualization.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220929172016.319443-6-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Create a new header and source with code related to system management
mode emulation. Entry and exit will move there too; for now,
opportunistically rename put_smstate to PUT_SMSTATE while moving
it to smm.h, and adjust the SMM state saving code.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220929172016.319443-2-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
ASSERT_STRUCT_OFFSET allows to assert during the build of
the kernel that a field in a struct have an expected offset.
KVM used to have such macro, but there is almost nothing KVM specific
in it so move it to build_bug.h, so that it can be used in other
places in KVM.
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20221025124741.228045-10-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Handle PERF_CAPABILITIES directly in kvm_get_msr_feature() now that the
supported value is available in kvm_caps.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20221006000314.73240-8-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Initialize vcpu->arch.perf_capabilities in x86's kvm_arch_vcpu_create()
instead of deferring initialization to vendor code. For better or worse,
common x86 handles reads and writes to the MSR, and so common x86 should
also handle initializing the MSR.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20221006000314.73240-7-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Track KVM's supported PERF_CAPABILITIES in kvm_caps instead of computing
the supported capabilities on the fly every time. Using kvm_caps will
also allow for future cleanups as the kvm_caps values can be used
directly in common x86 code.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Acked-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
Message-Id: <20221006000314.73240-6-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Drop the return value from x86_perf_get_lbr() and have the stub zero out
the @lbr structure instead of returning -1 to indicate "no LBR support".
KVM doesn't actually check the return value, and instead subtly relies on
zeroing the number of LBRs in intel_pmu_init().
Formalize "nr=0 means unsupported" so that KVM doesn't need to add a
pointless check on the return value to fix KVM's benign bug.
Note, the stub is necessary even though KVM x86 selects PERF_EVENTS and
the caller exists only when CONFIG_KVM_INTEL=y. Despite the name,
KVM_INTEL doesn't strictly require CPU_SUP_INTEL, it can be built with
any of INTEL || CENTAUR || ZHAOXIN CPUs.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20221006000314.73240-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
The Intel Architectural IA32_PMCx MSRs addresses range allows for a
maximum of 8 GP counters, and KVM cannot address any more. Introduce a
local macro (named KVM_INTEL_PMC_MAX_GENERIC) and use it consistently to
refer to the number of counters supported by KVM, thus avoiding possible
out-of-bound accesses.
Suggested-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220919091008.60695-2-likexu@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
This already removes an ugly #include "" from asm-offsets.c, but
especially it avoids a future error when trying to define asm-offsets
for KVM's svm/svm.h header.
This would not work for kernel/asm-offsets.c, because svm/svm.h
includes kvm_cache_regs.h which is not in the include path when
compiling asm-offsets.c. The problem is not there if the .c file is
in arch/x86/kvm.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a149180fbcf3 ("x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk")
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Ignore guest CPUID for host userspace writes to the DEBUGCTL MSR, KVM's
ABI is that setting CPUID vs. state can be done in any order, i.e. KVM
allows userspace to stuff MSRs prior to setting the guest's CPUID that
makes the new MSR "legal".
Keep the vmx_get_perf_capabilities() check for guest writes, even though
it's technically unnecessary since the vCPU's PERF_CAPABILITIES is
consulted when refreshing LBR support. A future patch will clean up
vmx_get_perf_capabilities() to avoid the RDMSR on every call, at which
point the paranoia will incur no meaningful overhead.
Note, prior to vmx_get_perf_capabilities() checking that the host fully
supports LBRs via x86_perf_get_lbr(), KVM effectively relied on
intel_pmu_lbr_is_enabled() to guard against host userspace enabling LBRs
on platforms without full support.
Fixes: c646236344e9 ("KVM: vmx/pmu: Add PMU_CAP_LBR_FMT check when guest LBR is enabled")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20221006000314.73240-5-seanjc@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Fold vmx_supported_debugctl() into vcpu_supported_debugctl(), its only
caller. Setting bits only to clear them a few instructions later is
rather silly, and splitting the logic makes things seem more complicated
than they actually are.
Opportunistically drop DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR_MASK now that there's a single
reference to the pair of bits. The extra layer of indirection provides
no meaningful value and makes it unnecessarily tedious to understand
what KVM is doing.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20221006000314.73240-4-seanjc@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Advertise LBR support to userspace via MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES if and
only if perf fully supports LBRs. Perf may disable LBRs (by zeroing the
number of LBRs) even on platforms the allegedly support LBRs, e.g. if
probing any LBR MSRs during setup fails.
Fixes: be635e34c284 ("KVM: vmx/pmu: Expose LBR_FMT in the MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES")
Reported-by: Like Xu <like.xu.linux@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20221006000314.73240-3-seanjc@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Clear enable_sgx if ENCLS-exiting is not supported, i.e. if SGX cannot be
virtualized. When KVM is loaded, adjust_vmx_controls checks that the
bit is available before enabling the feature; however, other parts of the
code check enable_sgx and not clearing the variable caused two different
bugs, mostly affecting nested virtualization scenarios.
First, because enable_sgx remained true, SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING
would be marked available in the capability MSR that are accessed by a
nested hypervisor. KVM would then propagate the control from vmcs12
to vmcs02 even if it isn't supported by the processor, thus causing an
unexpected VM-Fail (exit code 0x7) in L1.
Second, vmx_set_cpu_caps() would not clear the SGX bits when hardware
support is unavailable. This is a much less problematic bug as it only
happens if SGX is soft-disabled (available in the processor but hidden
in CPUID) or if SGX is supported for bare metal but not in the VMCS
(will never happen when running on bare metal, but can theoertically
happen when running in a VM).
Last but not least, this ensures that module params in sysfs reflect
KVM's actual configuration.
RHBZ: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2127128
Fixes: 72add915fbd5 ("KVM: VMX: Enable SGX virtualization for SGX1, SGX2 and LC")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Suggested-by: Bandan Das <bsd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Emanuele Giuseppe Esposito <eesposit@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20221025123749.2201649-1-eesposit@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Pull more kvm updates from Paolo Bonzini:
"The main batch of ARM + RISC-V changes, and a few fixes and cleanups
for x86 (PMU virtualization and selftests).
ARM:
- Fixes for single-stepping in the presence of an async exception as
well as the preservation of PSTATE.SS
- Better handling of AArch32 ID registers on AArch64-only systems
- Fixes for the dirty-ring API, allowing it to work on architectures
with relaxed memory ordering
- Advertise the new kvmarm mailing list
- Various minor cleanups and spelling fixes
RISC-V:
- Improved instruction encoding infrastructure for instructions not
yet supported by binutils
- Svinval support for both KVM Host and KVM Guest
- Zihintpause support for KVM Guest
- Zicbom support for KVM Guest
- Record number of signal exits as a VCPU stat
- Use generic guest entry infrastructure
x86:
- Misc PMU fixes and cleanups.
- selftests: fixes for Hyper-V hypercall
- selftests: fix nx_huge_pages_test on TDP-disabled hosts
- selftests: cleanups for fix_hypercall_test"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (57 commits)
riscv: select HAVE_POSIX_CPU_TIMERS_TASK_WORK
RISC-V: KVM: Use generic guest entry infrastructure
RISC-V: KVM: Record number of signal exits as a vCPU stat
RISC-V: KVM: add __init annotation to riscv_kvm_init()
RISC-V: KVM: Expose Zicbom to the guest
RISC-V: KVM: Provide UAPI for Zicbom block size
RISC-V: KVM: Make ISA ext mappings explicit
RISC-V: KVM: Allow Guest use Zihintpause extension
RISC-V: KVM: Allow Guest use Svinval extension
RISC-V: KVM: Use Svinval for local TLB maintenance when available
RISC-V: Probe Svinval extension form ISA string
RISC-V: KVM: Change the SBI specification version to v1.0
riscv: KVM: Apply insn-def to hlv encodings
riscv: KVM: Apply insn-def to hfence encodings
riscv: Introduce support for defining instructions
riscv: Add X register names to gpr-nums
KVM: arm64: Advertise new kvmarm mailing list
kvm: vmx: keep constant definition format consistent
kvm: mmu: fix typos in struct kvm_arch
KVM: selftests: Fix nx_huge_pages_test on TDP-disabled hosts
...
|
|
Pull kvm updates from Paolo Bonzini:
"The first batch of KVM patches, mostly covering x86.
ARM:
- Account stage2 page table allocations in memory stats
x86:
- Account EPT/NPT arm64 page table allocations in memory stats
- Tracepoint cleanups/fixes for nested VM-Enter and emulated MSR
accesses
- Drop eVMCS controls filtering for KVM on Hyper-V, all known
versions of Hyper-V now support eVMCS fields associated with
features that are enumerated to the guest
- Use KVM's sanitized VMCS config as the basis for the values of
nested VMX capabilities MSRs
- A myriad event/exception fixes and cleanups. Most notably, pending
exceptions morph into VM-Exits earlier, as soon as the exception is
queued, instead of waiting until the next vmentry. This fixed a
longstanding issue where the exceptions would incorrecly become
double-faults instead of triggering a vmexit; the common case of
page-fault vmexits had a special workaround, but now it's fixed for
good
- A handful of fixes for memory leaks in error paths
- Cleanups for VMREAD trampoline and VMX's VM-Exit assembly flow
- Never write to memory from non-sleepable kvm_vcpu_check_block()
- Selftests refinements and cleanups
- Misc typo cleanups
Generic:
- remove KVM_REQ_UNHALT"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (94 commits)
KVM: remove KVM_REQ_UNHALT
KVM: mips, x86: do not rely on KVM_REQ_UNHALT
KVM: x86: never write to memory from kvm_vcpu_check_block()
KVM: x86: Don't snapshot pending INIT/SIPI prior to checking nested events
KVM: nVMX: Make event request on VMXOFF iff INIT/SIPI is pending
KVM: nVMX: Make an event request if INIT or SIPI is pending on VM-Enter
KVM: SVM: Make an event request if INIT or SIPI is pending when GIF is set
KVM: x86: lapic does not have to process INIT if it is blocked
KVM: x86: Rename kvm_apic_has_events() to make it INIT/SIPI specific
KVM: x86: Rename and expose helper to detect if INIT/SIPI are allowed
KVM: nVMX: Make an event request when pending an MTF nested VM-Exit
KVM: x86: make vendor code check for all nested events
mailmap: Update Oliver's email address
KVM: x86: Allow force_emulation_prefix to be written without a reload
KVM: selftests: Add an x86-only test to verify nested exception queueing
KVM: selftests: Use uapi header to get VMX and SVM exit reasons/codes
KVM: x86: Rename inject_pending_events() to kvm_check_and_inject_events()
KVM: VMX: Update MTF and ICEBP comments to document KVM's subtle behavior
KVM: x86: Treat pending TRIPLE_FAULT requests as pending exceptions
KVM: x86: Morph pending exceptions to pending VM-Exits at queue time
...
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 cleanups from Borislav Petkov:
- The usual round of smaller fixes and cleanups all over the tree
* tag 'x86_cleanups_for_v6.1_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/cpu: Include the header of init_ia32_feat_ctl()'s prototype
x86/uaccess: Improve __try_cmpxchg64_user_asm() for x86_32
x86: Fix various duplicate-word comment typos
x86/boot: Remove superfluous type casting from arch/x86/boot/bitops.h
|
|
The check logic in the pmc_resume_counter() to determine whether
a perf_event is reusable is partial and flawed, especially when it
comes to a pseudocode sequence (contrived, but valid) like:
- enabling a counter and its PEBS bit
- enable global_ctrl
- run workload
- disable only the PEBS bit, leaving the global_ctrl bit enabled
In this corner case, a perf_event created for PEBS can be reused by
a normal counter before it has been released and recreated, and when this
normal counter overflows, it triggers a PEBS interrupt (precise_ip != 0).
To address this issue, reprogram all affected counters when PEBS_ENABLE
change and reuse a counter if and only if PEBS exactly matches precise.
Fixes: 79f3e3b58386 ("KVM: x86/pmu: Reprogram PEBS event to emulate guest PEBS counter")
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220831085328.45489-4-likexu@tencent.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
|
|
Extract the "global ctrl" specific bits out of global_ctrl_changed() so
that the helper only deals with reprogramming general purpose counters,
and rename the helper accordingly. PEBS needs the same logic, i.e needs
to reprogram counters associated when PEBS_ENABLE bits are toggled, and
will use the helper in a future fix.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220831085328.45489-4-likexu@tencent.com
[sean: split to separate patch, write changelog]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
|
|
In the extreme case of host counters multiplexing and contention, the
perf_event requested by the guest's pebs counter is not allocated to any
actual physical counter, in which case hw.idx is bookkept as -1,
resulting in an out-of-bounds access to host_cross_mapped_mask.
Fixes: 854250329c02 ("KVM: x86/pmu: Disable guest PEBS temporarily in two rare situations")
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220831085328.45489-2-likexu@tencent.com
[sean: expand comment to explain how a negative idx can be encountered]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
|
|
Explicitly check for a pending INIT/SIPI event when emulating VMXOFF
instead of blindly making an event request. There's obviously no need
to evaluate events if none are pending.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220921003201.1441511-9-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Evaluate interrupts, i.e. set KVM_REQ_EVENT, if INIT or SIPI is pending
when emulating nested VM-Enter. INIT is blocked while the CPU is in VMX
root mode, but not in VMX non-root, i.e. becomes unblocked on VM-Enter.
This bug has been masked by KVM calling ->check_nested_events() in the
core run loop, but that hack will be fixed in the near future.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220921003201.1441511-8-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
