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2025-02-27arm64: mte: Do not allow PROT_MTE on MAP_HUGETLB user mappingsCatalin Marinas
PROT_MTE (memory tagging extensions) is not supported on all user mmap() types for various reasons (memory attributes, backing storage, CoW handling). The arm64 arch_validate_flags() function checks whether the VM_MTE_ALLOWED flag has been set for a vma during mmap(), usually by arch_calc_vm_flag_bits(). Linux prior to 6.13 does not support PROT_MTE hugetlb mappings. This was added by commit 25c17c4b55de ("hugetlb: arm64: add mte support"). However, earlier kernels inadvertently set VM_MTE_ALLOWED on (MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_HUGETLB) mappings by only checking for MAP_ANONYMOUS. Explicitly check MAP_HUGETLB in arch_calc_vm_flag_bits() and avoid setting VM_MTE_ALLOWED for such mappings. Fixes: 9f3419315f3c ("arm64: mte: Add PROT_MTE support to mmap() and mprotect()") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.10.x-6.12.x Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-11-05mm: refactor arch_calc_vm_flag_bits() and arm64 MTE handlingLorenzo Stoakes
Currently MTE is permitted in two circumstances (desiring to use MTE having been specified by the VM_MTE flag) - where MAP_ANONYMOUS is specified, as checked by arch_calc_vm_flag_bits() and actualised by setting the VM_MTE_ALLOWED flag, or if the file backing the mapping is shmem, in which case we set VM_MTE_ALLOWED in shmem_mmap() when the mmap hook is activated in mmap_region(). The function that checks that, if VM_MTE is set, VM_MTE_ALLOWED is also set is the arm64 implementation of arch_validate_flags(). Unfortunately, we intend to refactor mmap_region() to perform this check earlier, meaning that in the case of a shmem backing we will not have invoked shmem_mmap() yet, causing the mapping to fail spuriously. It is inappropriate to set this architecture-specific flag in general mm code anyway, so a sensible resolution of this issue is to instead move the check somewhere else. We resolve this by setting VM_MTE_ALLOWED much earlier in do_mmap(), via the arch_calc_vm_flag_bits() call. This is an appropriate place to do this as we already check for the MAP_ANONYMOUS case here, and the shmem file case is simply a variant of the same idea - we permit RAM-backed memory. This requires a modification to the arch_calc_vm_flag_bits() signature to pass in a pointer to the struct file associated with the mapping, however this is not too egregious as this is only used by two architectures anyway - arm64 and parisc. So this patch performs this adjustment and removes the unnecessary assignment of VM_MTE_ALLOWED in shmem_mmap(). [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix whitespace, per Catalin] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/ec251b20ba1964fb64cf1607d2ad80c47f3873df.1730224667.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com Fixes: deb0f6562884 ("mm/mmap: undo ->mmap() when arch_validate_flags() fails") Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com> Suggested-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Andreas Larsson <andreas@gaisler.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-09-18Merge tag 'random-6.12-rc1-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random Pull random number generator updates from Jason Donenfeld: "Originally I'd planned on sending each of the vDSO getrandom() architecture ports to their respective arch trees. But as we started to work on this, we found lots of interesting issues in the shared code and infrastructure, the fixes for which the various archs needed to base their work. So in the end, this turned into a nice collaborative effort fixing up issues and porting to 5 new architectures -- arm64, powerpc64, powerpc32, s390x, and loongarch64 -- with everybody pitching in and commenting on each other's code. It was a fun development cycle. This contains: - Numerous fixups to the vDSO selftest infrastructure, getting it running successfully on more platforms, and fixing bugs in it. - Additions to the vDSO getrandom & chacha selftests. Basically every time manual review unearthed a bug in a revision of an arch patch, or an ambiguity, the tests were augmented. By the time the last arch was submitted for review, s390x, v1 of the series was essentially fine right out of the gate. - Fixes to the the generic C implementation of vDSO getrandom, to build and run successfully on all archs, decoupling it from assumptions we had (unintentionally) made on x86_64 that didn't carry through to the other architectures. - Port of vDSO getrandom to LoongArch64, from Xi Ruoyao and acked by Huacai Chen. - Port of vDSO getrandom to ARM64, from Adhemerval Zanella and acked by Will Deacon. - Port of vDSO getrandom to PowerPC, in both 32-bit and 64-bit varieties, from Christophe Leroy and acked by Michael Ellerman. - Port of vDSO getrandom to S390X from Heiko Carstens, the arch maintainer. While it'd be natural for there to be things to fix up over the course of the development cycle, these patches got a decent amount of review from a fairly diverse crew of folks on the mailing lists, and, for the most part, they've been cooking in linux-next, which has been helpful for ironing out build issues. In terms of architectures, I think that mostly takes care of the important 64-bit archs with hardware still being produced and running production loads in settings where vDSO getrandom is likely to help. Arguably there's still RISC-V left, and we'll see for 6.13 whether they find it useful and submit a port" * tag 'random-6.12-rc1-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random: (47 commits) selftests: vDSO: check cpu caps before running chacha test s390/vdso: Wire up getrandom() vdso implementation s390/vdso: Move vdso symbol handling to separate header file s390/vdso: Allow alternatives in vdso code s390/module: Provide find_section() helper s390/facility: Let test_facility() generate static branch if possible s390/alternatives: Remove ALT_FACILITY_EARLY s390/facility: Disable compile time optimization for decompressor code selftests: vDSO: fix vdso_config for s390 selftests: vDSO: fix ELF hash table entry size for s390x powerpc/vdso: Wire up getrandom() vDSO implementation on VDSO64 powerpc/vdso: Wire up getrandom() vDSO implementation on VDSO32 powerpc/vdso: Refactor CFLAGS for CVDSO build powerpc/vdso32: Add crtsavres mm: Define VM_DROPPABLE for powerpc/32 powerpc/vdso: Fix VDSO data access when running in a non-root time namespace selftests: vDSO: don't include generated headers for chacha test arm64: vDSO: Wire up getrandom() vDSO implementation arm64: alternative: make alternative_has_cap_likely() VDSO compatible selftests: vDSO: also test counter in vdso_test_chacha ...
2024-09-13arm64: vDSO: Wire up getrandom() vDSO implementationAdhemerval Zanella
Hook up the generic vDSO implementation to the aarch64 vDSO data page. The _vdso_rng_data required data is placed within the _vdso_data vvar page, by using a offset larger than the vdso_data. The vDSO function requires a ChaCha20 implementation that does not write to the stack, and that can do an entire ChaCha20 permutation. The one provided uses NEON on the permute operation, with a fallback to the syscall for chips that do not support AdvSIMD. This also passes the vdso_test_chacha test along with vdso_test_getrandom. The vdso_test_getrandom bench-single result on Neoverse-N1 shows: vdso: 25000000 times in 0.783884250 seconds libc: 25000000 times in 8.780275399 seconds syscall: 25000000 times in 8.786581518 seconds A small fixup to arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h was required to avoid pulling kernel code into the vDSO, similar to what's already done in arch/arm64/include/asm/rwonce.h. Signed-off-by: Adhemerval Zanella <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2024-09-04arm64: convert protection key into vm_flags and pgprot valuesJoey Gouly
Modify arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() and vm_get_page_prot() such that the pkey value is set in the vm_flags and then into the pgprot value. Signed-off-by: Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240822151113.1479789-15-joey.gouly@arm.com Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
2022-04-28arm64/mm: enable ARCH_HAS_VM_GET_PAGE_PROTAnshuman Khandual
This defines and exports a platform specific custom vm_get_page_prot() via subscribing ARCH_HAS_VM_GET_PAGE_PROT. It localizes arch_vm_get_page_prot() and moves it near vm_get_page_prot(). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220414062125.609297-4-anshuman.khandual@arm.com Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@oracle.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2020-09-04arm64: mte: Validate the PROT_MTE request via arch_validate_flags()Catalin Marinas
Make use of the newly introduced arch_validate_flags() hook to sanity-check the PROT_MTE request passed to mmap() and mprotect(). If the mapping does not support MTE, these syscalls will return -EINVAL. Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
2020-09-04arm64: mte: Add PROT_MTE support to mmap() and mprotect()Catalin Marinas
To enable tagging on a memory range, the user must explicitly opt in via a new PROT_MTE flag passed to mmap() or mprotect(). Since this is a new memory type in the AttrIndx field of a pte, simplify the or'ing of these bits over the protection_map[] attributes by making MT_NORMAL index 0. There are two conditions for arch_vm_get_page_prot() to return the MT_NORMAL_TAGGED memory type: (1) the user requested it via PROT_MTE, registered as VM_MTE in the vm_flags, and (2) the vma supports MTE, decided during the mmap() call (only) and registered as VM_MTE_ALLOWED. arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() is responsible for registering the user request as VM_MTE. The newly introduced arch_calc_vm_flag_bits() sets VM_MTE_ALLOWED if the mapping is MAP_ANONYMOUS. An MTE-capable filesystem (RAM-based) may be able to set VM_MTE_ALLOWED during its mmap() file ops call. In addition, update VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS to allow mprotect(PROT_MTE) on stack or brk area. The Linux mmap() syscall currently ignores unknown PROT_* flags. In the presence of MTE, an mmap(PROT_MTE) on a file which does not support MTE will not report an error and the memory will not be mapped as Normal Tagged. For consistency, mprotect(PROT_MTE) will not report an error either if the memory range does not support MTE. Two subsequent patches in the series will propose tightening of this behaviour. Co-developed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
2020-03-16arm64: Basic Branch Target Identification supportDave Martin
This patch adds the bare minimum required to expose the ARMv8.5 Branch Target Identification feature to userspace. By itself, this does _not_ automatically enable BTI for any initial executable pages mapped by execve(). This will come later, but for now it should be possible to enable BTI manually on those pages by using mprotect() from within the target process. Other arches already using the generic mman.h are already using 0x10 for arch-specific prot flags, so we use that for PROT_BTI here. For consistency, signal handler entry points in BTI guarded pages are required to be annotated as such, just like any other function. This blocks a relatively minor attack vector, but comforming userspace will have the annotations anyway, so we may as well enforce them. Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>