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The lkdtm_STACKLEAK_ERASING() test is instrumentable and runs with IRQs
unmasked, so it's possible for unrelated code to clobber the task stack
and/or manipulate current->lowest_stack while the test is running,
resulting in spurious failures.
The regular stackleak erasing code is non-instrumentable and runs with
IRQs masked, preventing similar issues.
Make the body of the test non-instrumentable, and run it with IRQs
masked, avoiding such spurious failures.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427173128.2603085-11-mark.rutland@arm.com
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There are a few problems with the way the LKDTM STACKLEAK_ERASING test
manipulates the stack pointer and boundary values:
* It uses the address of a local variable to determine the current stack
pointer, rather than using current_stack_pointer directly. As the
local variable could be placed anywhere within the stack frame, this
can be an over-estimate of the true stack pointer value.
* Is uses an estimate of the current stack pointer as the upper boundary
when scanning for poison, even though prior functions could have used
more stack (and may have updated current->lowest stack accordingly).
* A pr_info() call is made in the middle of the test. As the printk()
code is out-of-line and will make use of the stack, this could clobber
poison and/or adjust current->lowest_stack. It would be better to log
the metadata after the body of the test to avoid such problems.
These have been observed to result in spurious test failures on arm64.
In addition to this there are a couple of things which are sub-optimal:
* To avoid the STACK_END_MAGIC value, it conditionally modifies 'left'
if this contains more than a single element, when it could instead
calculate the bound unconditionally using stackleak_task_low_bound().
* It open-codes the poison scanning. It would be better if this used the
same helper code as used by erasing function so that the two cannot
diverge.
This patch reworks the test to avoid these issues, making use of the
recently introduced helpers to ensure this is aligned with the regular
stackleak code.
As the new code tests stack boundaries before accessing the stack, there
is no need to fail early when the tracked or untracked portions of the
stack extend all the way to the low stack boundary.
As stackleak_find_top_of_poison() is now used to find the top of the
poisoned region of the stack, the subsequent poison checking starts at
this boundary and verifies that stackleak_find_top_of_poison() is
working correctly.
The pr_info() which logged the untracked portion of stack is now moved
to the end of the function, and logs the size of all the portions of the
stack relevant to the test, including the portions at the top and bottom
of the stack which are not erased or scanned, and the current / lowest
recorded stack usage.
Tested on x86_64:
| # echo STACKLEAK_ERASING > /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT
| lkdtm: Performing direct entry STACKLEAK_ERASING
| lkdtm: stackleak stack usage:
| high offset: 168 bytes
| current: 336 bytes
| lowest: 656 bytes
| tracked: 656 bytes
| untracked: 400 bytes
| poisoned: 15152 bytes
| low offset: 8 bytes
| lkdtm: OK: the rest of the thread stack is properly erased
Tested on arm64:
| # echo STACKLEAK_ERASING > /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT
| lkdtm: Performing direct entry STACKLEAK_ERASING
| lkdtm: stackleak stack usage:
| high offset: 336 bytes
| current: 656 bytes
| lowest: 1232 bytes
| tracked: 1232 bytes
| untracked: 672 bytes
| poisoned: 14136 bytes
| low offset: 8 bytes
| lkdtm: OK: the rest of the thread stack is properly erased
Tested on arm64 with deliberate breakage to the starting stack value and
poison scanning:
| # echo STACKLEAK_ERASING > /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT
| lkdtm: Performing direct entry STACKLEAK_ERASING
| lkdtm: FAIL: non-poison value 24 bytes below poison boundary: 0x0
| lkdtm: FAIL: non-poison value 32 bytes below poison boundary: 0xffff8000083dbc00
...
| lkdtm: FAIL: non-poison value 1912 bytes below poison boundary: 0x78b4b9999e8cb15
| lkdtm: FAIL: non-poison value 1920 bytes below poison boundary: 0xffff8000083db400
| lkdtm: stackleak stack usage:
| high offset: 336 bytes
| current: 688 bytes
| lowest: 1232 bytes
| tracked: 576 bytes
| untracked: 288 bytes
| poisoned: 15176 bytes
| low offset: 8 bytes
| lkdtm: FAIL: the thread stack is NOT properly erased!
| lkdtm: Unexpected! This kernel (5.18.0-rc1-00013-g1f7b1f1e29e0-dirty aarch64) was built with CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=y
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427173128.2603085-10-mark.rutland@arm.com
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The lkdtm_STACKLEAK_ERASING() test scans for a contiguous block of
poison values between the low stack bound and the stack pointer, and
fails if it does not find a sufficiently large block.
This can happen legitimately if the scan the low stack bound, which
could occur if functions called prior to lkdtm_STACKLEAK_ERASING() used
a large amount of stack. If this were to occur, it means that the erased
portion of the stack is smaller than the size used by the scan, but does
not cause a functional problem
In practice this is unlikely to happen, but as this is legitimate and
would not result in a functional problem, the test should not fail in
this case.
Remove the spurious failure case.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427173128.2603085-9-mark.rutland@arm.com
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Currently we over-estimate the region of stack which must be erased.
To determine the region to be erased, we scan downwards for a contiguous
block of poison values (or the low bound of the stack). There are a few
minor problems with this today:
* When we find a block of poison values, we include this block within
the region to erase.
As this is included within the region to erase, this causes us to
redundantly overwrite 'STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH' (128) bytes with
poison.
* As the loop condition checks 'poison_count <= depth', it will run an
additional iteration after finding the contiguous block of poison,
decrementing 'erase_low' once more than necessary.
As this is included within the region to erase, this causes us to
redundantly overwrite an additional unsigned long with poison.
* As we always decrement 'erase_low' after checking an element on the
stack, we always include the element below this within the region to
erase.
As this is included within the region to erase, this causes us to
redundantly overwrite an additional unsigned long with poison.
Note that this is not a functional problem. As the loop condition
checks 'erase_low > task_stack_low', we'll never clobber the
STACK_END_MAGIC. As we always decrement 'erase_low' after this, we'll
never fail to erase the element immediately above the STACK_END_MAGIC.
In total, this can cause us to erase `128 + 2 * sizeof(unsigned long)`
bytes more than necessary, which is unfortunate.
This patch reworks the logic to find the address immediately above the
poisoned region, by finding the lowest non-poisoned address. This is
factored into a stackleak_find_top_of_poison() helper both for clarity
and so that this can be shared with the LKDTM test in subsequent
patches.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427173128.2603085-8-mark.rutland@arm.com
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Prior to returning to userspace, we reset current->lowest_stack to a
reasonable high bound. Currently we do this by subtracting the arbitrary
value `THREAD_SIZE/64` from the top of the stack, for reasons lost to
history.
Looking at configurations today:
* On i386 where THREAD_SIZE is 8K, the bound will be 128 bytes. The
pt_regs at the top of the stack is 68 bytes (with 0 to 16 bytes of
padding above), and so this covers an additional portion of 44 to 60
bytes.
* On x86_64 where THREAD_SIZE is at least 16K (up to 32K with KASAN) the
bound will be at least 256 bytes (up to 512 with KASAN). The pt_regs
at the top of the stack is 168 bytes, and so this cover an additional
88 bytes of stack (up to 344 with KASAN).
* On arm64 where THREAD_SIZE is at least 16K (up to 64K with 64K pages
and VMAP_STACK), the bound will be at least 256 bytes (up to 1024 with
KASAN). The pt_regs at the top of the stack is 336 bytes, so this can
fall within the pt_regs, or can cover an additional 688 bytes of
stack.
Clearly the `THREAD_SIZE/64` value doesn't make much sense -- in the
worst case, this will cause more than 600 bytes of stack to be erased
for every syscall, even if actual stack usage were substantially
smaller.
This patches makes this slightly less nonsensical by consistently
resetting current->lowest_stack to the base of the task pt_regs. For
clarity and for consistency with the handling of the low bound, the
generation of the high bound is split into a helper with commentary
explaining why.
Since the pt_regs at the top of the stack will be clobbered upon the
next exception entry, we don't need to poison these at exception exit.
By using task_pt_regs() as the high stack boundary instead of
current_top_of_stack() we avoid some redundant poisoning, and the
compiler can share the address generation between the poisoning and
resetting of `current->lowest_stack`, making the generated code more
optimal.
It's not clear to me whether the existing `THREAD_SIZE/64` offset was a
dodgy heuristic to skip the pt_regs, or whether it was attempting to
minimize the number of times stackleak_check_stack() would have to
update `current->lowest_stack` when stack usage was shallow at the cost
of unconditionally poisoning a small portion of the stack for every exit
to userspace.
For now I've simply removed the offset, and if we need/want to minimize
updates for shallow stack usage it should be easy to add a better
heuristic atop, with appropriate commentary so we know what's going on.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427173128.2603085-7-mark.rutland@arm.com
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The logic within __stackleak_erase() can be a little hard to follow, as
`boundary` switches from being the low bound to the high bound mid way
through the function, and `kstack_ptr` is used to represent the start of
the region to erase while `boundary` represents the end of the region to
erase.
Make this a little clearer by consistently using clearer variable names.
The `boundary` variable is removed, the bounds of the region to erase
are described by `erase_low` and `erase_high`, and bounds of the task
stack are described by `task_stack_low` and `task_stack_high`.
As the same time, remove the comment above the variables, since it is
unclear whether it's intended as rationale, a complaint, or a TODO, and
is more confusing than helpful.
There should be no functional change as a result of this patch.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427173128.2603085-6-mark.rutland@arm.com
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In stackleak_task_init(), stackleak_track_stack(), and
__stackleak_erase(), we open-code skipping the STACK_END_MAGIC at the
bottom of the stack. Each case is implemented slightly differently, and
only the __stackleak_erase() case is commented.
In stackleak_task_init() and stackleak_track_stack() we unconditionally
add sizeof(unsigned long) to the lowest stack address. In
stackleak_task_init() we use end_of_stack() for this, and in
stackleak_track_stack() we use task_stack_page(). In __stackleak_erase()
we handle this by detecting if `kstack_ptr` has hit the stack end
boundary, and if so, conditionally moving it above the magic.
This patch adds a new stackleak_task_low_bound() helper which is used in
all three cases, which unconditionally adds sizeof(unsigned long) to the
lowest address on the task stack, with commentary as to why. This uses
end_of_stack() as stackleak_task_init() did prior to this patch, as this
is consistent with the code in kernel/fork.c which initializes the
STACK_END_MAGIC value.
In __stackleak_erase() we no longer need to check whether we've spilled
into the STACK_END_MAGIC value, as stackleak_track_stack() ensures that
`current->lowest_stack` stops immediately above this, and similarly the
poison scan will stop immediately above this.
For stackleak_task_init() and stackleak_track_stack() this results in no
change to code generation. For __stackleak_erase() the generated
assembly is slightly simpler and shorter.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427173128.2603085-5-mark.rutland@arm.com
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In __stackleak_erase() we check that the `erase_low` value derived from
`current->lowest_stack` is above the lowest legitimate stack pointer
value, but this is already enforced by stackleak_track_stack() when
recording the lowest stack value.
Remove the redundant check.
There should be no functional change as a result of this patch.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427173128.2603085-4-mark.rutland@arm.com
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In stackleak_erase() we check skip_erasing() after accessing some fields
from current. As generating the address of current uses asm which
hazards with the static branch asm, this work is always performed, even
when the static branch is patched to jump to the return at the end of the
function.
This patch avoids this redundant work by moving the skip_erasing() check
earlier.
To avoid complicating initialization within stackleak_erase(), the body
of the function is split out into a __stackleak_erase() helper, with the
check left in a wrapper function. The __stackleak_erase() helper is
marked __always_inline to ensure that this is inlined into
stackleak_erase() and not instrumented.
Before this patch, on x86-64 w/ GCC 11.1.0 the start of the function is:
<stackleak_erase>:
65 48 8b 04 25 00 00 mov %gs:0x0,%rax
00 00
48 8b 48 20 mov 0x20(%rax),%rcx
48 8b 80 98 0a 00 00 mov 0xa98(%rax),%rax
66 90 xchg %ax,%ax <------------ static branch
48 89 c2 mov %rax,%rdx
48 29 ca sub %rcx,%rdx
48 81 fa ff 3f 00 00 cmp $0x3fff,%rdx
After this patch, on x86-64 w/ GCC 11.1.0 the start of the function is:
<stackleak_erase>:
0f 1f 44 00 00 nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1) <--- static branch
65 48 8b 04 25 00 00 mov %gs:0x0,%rax
00 00
48 8b 48 20 mov 0x20(%rax),%rcx
48 8b 80 98 0a 00 00 mov 0xa98(%rax),%rax
48 89 c2 mov %rax,%rdx
48 29 ca sub %rcx,%rdx
48 81 fa ff 3f 00 00 cmp $0x3fff,%rdx
Before this patch, on arm64 w/ GCC 11.1.0 the start of the function is:
<stackleak_erase>:
d503245f bti c
d5384100 mrs x0, sp_el0
f9401003 ldr x3, [x0, #32]
f9451000 ldr x0, [x0, #2592]
d503201f nop <------------------------------- static branch
d503233f paciasp
cb030002 sub x2, x0, x3
d287ffe1 mov x1, #0x3fff
eb01005f cmp x2, x1
After this patch, on arm64 w/ GCC 11.1.0 the start of the function is:
<stackleak_erase>:
d503245f bti c
d503201f nop <------------------------------- static branch
d503233f paciasp
d5384100 mrs x0, sp_el0
f9401003 ldr x3, [x0, #32]
d287ffe1 mov x1, #0x3fff
f9451000 ldr x0, [x0, #2592]
cb030002 sub x2, x0, x3
eb01005f cmp x2, x1
While this may not be a huge win on its own, moving the static branch
will permit further optimization of the body of the function in
subsequent patches.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427173128.2603085-3-mark.rutland@arm.com
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Due to some historical confusion, arm64's current_top_of_stack() isn't
what the stackleak code expects. This could in theory result in a number
of problems, and practically results in an unnecessary performance hit.
We can avoid this by aligning the arm64 implementation with the x86
implementation.
The arm64 implementation of current_top_of_stack() was added
specifically for stackleak in commit:
0b3e336601b82c6a ("arm64: Add support for STACKLEAK gcc plugin")
This was intended to be equivalent to the x86 implementation, but the
implementation, semantics, and performance characteristics differ
wildly:
* On x86, current_top_of_stack() returns the top of the current task's
task stack, regardless of which stack is in active use.
The implementation accesses a percpu variable which the x86 entry code
maintains, and returns the location immediately above the pt_regs on
the task stack (above which x86 has some padding).
* On arm64 current_top_of_stack() returns the top of the stack in active
use (i.e. the one which is currently being used).
The implementation checks the SP against a number of
potentially-accessible stacks, and will BUG() if no stack is found.
The core stackleak_erase() code determines the upper bound of stack to
erase with:
| if (on_thread_stack())
| boundary = current_stack_pointer;
| else
| boundary = current_top_of_stack();
On arm64 stackleak_erase() is always called on a task stack, and
on_thread_stack() should always be true. On x86, stackleak_erase() is
mostly called on a trampoline stack, and is sometimes called on a task
stack.
Currently, this results in a lot of unnecessary code being generated for
arm64 for the impossible !on_thread_stack() case. Some of this is
inlined, bloating stackleak_erase(), while portions of this are left
out-of-line and permitted to be instrumented (which would be a
functional problem if that code were reachable).
As a first step towards improving this, this patch aligns arm64's
implementation of current_top_of_stack() with x86's, always returning
the top of the current task's stack. With GCC 11.1.0 this results in the
bulk of the unnecessary code being removed, including all of the
out-of-line instrumentable code.
While I don't believe there's a functional problem in practice I've
marked this as a fix since the semantic was clearly wrong, the fix
itself is simple, and other code might rely upon this in future.
Fixes: 0b3e336601b82c6a ("arm64: Add support for STACKLEAK gcc plugin")
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427173128.2603085-2-mark.rutland@arm.com
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Clang 15 will support randstruct via the -frandomize-layout-seed-file=...
option. Update the Kconfig and Makefile to recognize this feature.
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220503205503.3054173-7-keescook@chromium.org
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To enable Clang randstruct support, move the structure layout
randomization seed generation out of scripts/gcc-plugins/ into
scripts/basic/ so it happens early enough that it can be used by either
compiler implementation. The gcc-plugin still builds its own header file,
but now does so from the common "randstruct.seed" file.
Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220503205503.3054173-6-keescook@chromium.org
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To enable the new Clang randstruct implementation[1], move
randstruct into its own Makefile and split the CFLAGS from
GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS into RANDSTRUCT_CFLAGS.
[1] https://reviews.llvm.org/D121556
Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220503205503.3054173-5-keescook@chromium.org
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In preparation for Clang supporting randstruct, reorganize the Kconfigs,
move the attribute macros, and generalize the feature to be named
CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT for on/off, CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT_FULL for the full
randomization mode, and CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE for the cache-line
sized mode.
Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220503205503.3054173-4-keescook@chromium.org
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When the sancov_plugin is enabled, it gets added to gcc-plugin-y which
is used to populate both GCC_PLUGIN (for building the plugin) and
GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS (for enabling and options). Instead of adding sancov
to both and then removing it from GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS, create a separate
list, gcc-plugin-external-y, which is only added to GCC_PLUGIN.
This will also be used by the coming randstruct build changes.
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220503205503.3054173-3-keescook@chromium.org
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Clang's structure layout randomization feature gets upset when it sees
struct inode (which is randomized) cast to struct netfs_i_context. This
is due to seeing the inode pointer as being treated as an array of inodes,
rather than "something else, following struct inode".
Since netfs can't use container_of() (since it doesn't know what the
true containing struct is), it uses this direct offset instead. Adjust
the code to better reflect what is happening: an arbitrary pointer is
being adjusted and cast to something else: use a "void *" for the math.
The resulting binary output is the same, but Clang no longer sees an
unexpected cross-structure cast:
In file included from ../fs/nfs/inode.c:50:
In file included from ../fs/nfs/fscache.h:15:
In file included from ../include/linux/fscache.h:18:
../include/linux/netfs.h:298:9: error: casting from randomized structure pointer type 'struct inode *' to 'struct netfs_i_context *'
return (struct netfs_i_context *)(inode + 1);
^
1 error generated.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220503205503.3054173-2-keescook@chromium.org
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/7562f8eccd7cc0e447becfe9912179088784e3b9.camel@kernel.org
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Clang 14 added support for the __builtin_function_start function,
which allows us to implement the function_nocfi macro without
architecture-specific inline assembly and in a way that also works
with static initializers.
Change CONFIG_CFI_CLANG to depend on Clang >= 14, define
function_nocfi using __builtin_function_start, and remove the arm64
inline assembly implementation.
Link: https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/ec2e26eaf63558934f5b73a6e530edc453cf9508
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1353
Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> # arm64
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220405221618.633743-1-samitolvanen@google.com
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The initialization of "security_hook_heads" is done by casting it to
another structure pointer type, and treating it as an array of "struct
hlist_head" objects. This requires an exception be made in "randstruct",
because otherwise it will emit an error, reducing the effectiveness of
the hardening technique.
Instead of using a cast, initialize the individual struct hlist_head
elements in security_hook_heads explicitly. This removes the need for
the cast and randstruct exception.
Signed-off-by: Bill Wendling <morbo@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220407175930.471870-1-morbo@google.com
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There isn't enough information to make this a useful check any more;
the useful parts of it were moved in earlier patches, so remove this
set of checks now.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220110231530.665970-5-willy@infradead.org
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Move the compound page overrun detection out of
CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN and convert it to use folios so it's
enabled for more people.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220110231530.665970-4-willy@infradead.org
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If you have a vmalloc() allocation, or an address from calling vmap(),
you cannot overrun the vm_area which describes it, regardless of the
size of the underlying allocation. This probably doesn't do much for
security because vmalloc comes with guard pages these days, but it
prevents usercopy aborts when copying to a vmap() of smaller pages.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220110231530.665970-3-willy@infradead.org
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If you are copying to an address in the kmap region, you may not copy
across a page boundary, no matter what the size of the underlying
allocation. You can't kmap() a slab page because slab pages always
come from low memory.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220110231530.665970-2-willy@infradead.org
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull hardening fixes from Kees Cook:
- latent_entropy: Use /dev/urandom instead of small GCC seed (Jason
Donenfeld)
- uapi/stddef.h: add missed include guards (Tadeusz Struk)
* tag 'hardening-v5.18-rc3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
gcc-plugins: latent_entropy: use /dev/urandom
uapi/linux/stddef.h: Add include guards
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cel/linux
Pull nfsd fixes from Chuck Lever:
- Fix a write performance regression
- Fix crashes during request deferral on RDMA transports
* tag 'nfsd-5.18-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cel/linux:
SUNRPC: Fix the svc_deferred_event trace class
SUNRPC: Fix NFSD's request deferral on RDMA transports
nfsd: Clean up nfsd_file_put()
nfsd: Fix a write performance regression
SUNRPC: Return true/false (not 1/0) from bool functions
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Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
"x86:
- Miscellaneous bugfixes
- A small cleanup for the new workqueue code
- Documentation syntax fix
RISC-V:
- Remove hgatp zeroing in kvm_arch_vcpu_put()
- Fix alignment of the guest_hang() in KVM selftest
- Fix PTE A and D bits in KVM selftest
- Missing #include in vcpu_fp.c
ARM:
- Some PSCI fixes after introducing PSCIv1.1 and SYSTEM_RESET2
- Fix the MMU write-lock not being taken on THP split
- Fix mixed-width VM handling
- Fix potential UAF when debugfs registration fails
- Various selftest updates for all of the above"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (24 commits)
KVM: x86: hyper-v: Avoid writing to TSC page without an active vCPU
KVM: SVM: Do not activate AVIC for SEV-enabled guest
Documentation: KVM: Add SPDX-License-Identifier tag
selftests: kvm: add tsc_scaling_sync to .gitignore
RISC-V: KVM: include missing hwcap.h into vcpu_fp
KVM: selftests: riscv: Fix alignment of the guest_hang() function
KVM: selftests: riscv: Set PTE A and D bits in VS-stage page table
RISC-V: KVM: Don't clear hgatp CSR in kvm_arch_vcpu_put()
selftests: KVM: Free the GIC FD when cleaning up in arch_timer
selftests: KVM: Don't leak GIC FD across dirty log test iterations
KVM: Don't create VM debugfs files outside of the VM directory
KVM: selftests: get-reg-list: Add KVM_REG_ARM_FW_REG(3)
KVM: avoid NULL pointer dereference in kvm_dirty_ring_push
KVM: arm64: selftests: Introduce vcpu_width_config
KVM: arm64: mixed-width check should be skipped for uninitialized vCPUs
KVM: arm64: vgic: Remove unnecessary type castings
KVM: arm64: Don't split hugepages outside of MMU write lock
KVM: arm64: Drop unneeded minor version check from PSCI v1.x handler
KVM: arm64: Actually prevent SMC64 SYSTEM_RESET2 from AArch32
KVM: arm64: Generally disallow SMC64 for AArch32 guests
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mchehab/linux-media
Pull media fixes from Mauro Carvalho Chehab:
- a regression fix for si2157
- a Kconfig dependency fix for imx-mipi-csis
- fix the rockchip/rga driver probing logic
* tag 'media/v5.18-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mchehab/linux-media:
media: si2157: unknown chip version Si2147-A30 ROM 0x50
media: platform: imx-mipi-csis: Add dependency on VIDEO_DEV
media: rockchip/rga: do proper error checking in probe
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struct stat (defined in arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/stat.h) has 32-bit
st_dev and st_rdev; struct compat_stat (defined in
arch/x86/include/asm/compat.h) has 16-bit st_dev and st_rdev followed by
a 16-bit padding.
This patch fixes struct compat_stat to match struct stat.
[ Historical note: the old x86 'struct stat' did have that 16-bit field
that the compat layer had kept around, but it was changes back in 2003
by "struct stat - support larger dev_t":
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git/commit/?id=e95b2065677fe32512a597a79db94b77b90c968d
and back in those days, the x86_64 port was still new, and separate
from the i386 code, and had already picked up the old version with a
16-bit st_dev field ]
Note that we can't change compat_dev_t because it is used by
compat_loop_info.
Also, if the st_dev and st_rdev values are 32-bit, we don't have to use
old_valid_dev to test if the value fits into them. This fixes
-EOVERFLOW on filesystems that are on NVMe because NVMe uses the major
number 259.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: Andreas Schwab <schwab@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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While the latent entropy plugin mostly doesn't derive entropy from
get_random_const() for measuring the call graph, when __latent_entropy is
applied to a constant, then it's initialized statically to output from
get_random_const(). In that case, this data is derived from a 64-bit
seed, which means a buffer of 512 bits doesn't really have that amount
of compile-time entropy.
This patch fixes that shortcoming by just buffering chunks of
/dev/urandom output and doling it out as requested.
At the same time, it's important that we don't break the use of
-frandom-seed, for people who want the runtime benefits of the latent
entropy plugin, while still having compile-time determinism. In that
case, we detect whether gcc's set_random_seed() has been called by
making a call to get_random_seed(noinit=true) in the plugin init
function, which is called after set_random_seed() is called but before
anything that calls get_random_seed(noinit=false), and seeing if it's
zero or not. If it's not zero, we're in deterministic mode, and so we
just generate numbers with a basic xorshift prng.
Note that we don't detect if -frandom-seed is being used using the
documented local_tick variable, because it's assigned via:
local_tick = (unsigned) tv.tv_sec * 1000 + tv.tv_usec / 1000;
which may well overflow and become -1 on its own, and so isn't
reliable: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=105171
[kees: The 256 byte rnd_buf size was chosen based on average (250),
median (64), and std deviation (575) bytes of used entropy for a
defconfig x86_64 build]
Fixes: 38addce8b600 ("gcc-plugins: Add latent_entropy plugin")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220405222815.21155-1-Jason@zx2c4.com
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pdx86/platform-drivers-x86
Pull x86 platform drivers fixes from Hans de Goede:
- Documentation and compilation warning fixes
- Kconfig dep fixes
- Misc small code cleanups
* tag 'platform-drivers-x86-v5.18-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pdx86/platform-drivers-x86:
platform/x86: amd-pmc: Fix compilation without CONFIG_SUSPEND
platform/x86: acerhdf: Cleanup str_starts_with()
Documentation/ABI: sysfs-class-firmware-attributes: Misc. cleanups
Documentation/ABI: sysfs-class-firmware-attributes: Fix Sphinx errors
Documentation/ABI: sysfs-driver-intel_sdsi: Fix sphinx warnings
platform/x86: barco-p50-gpio: Fix duplicate included linux/io.h
platform/x86: samsung-laptop: Fix an unsigned comparison which can never be negative
platform/x86: think-lmi: certificate support clean ups
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The following WARN is triggered from kvm_vm_ioctl_set_clock():
WARNING: CPU: 10 PID: 579353 at arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:3161 mark_page_dirty_in_slot+0x6c/0x80 [kvm]
...
CPU: 10 PID: 579353 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Tainted: G W O 5.16.0.stable #20
Hardware name: LENOVO 20UF001CUS/20UF001CUS, BIOS R1CET65W(1.34 ) 06/17/2021
RIP: 0010:mark_page_dirty_in_slot+0x6c/0x80 [kvm]
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? kvm_write_guest+0x114/0x120 [kvm]
kvm_hv_invalidate_tsc_page+0x9e/0xf0 [kvm]
kvm_arch_vm_ioctl+0xa26/0xc50 [kvm]
? schedule+0x4e/0xc0
? __cond_resched+0x1a/0x50
? futex_wait+0x166/0x250
? __send_signal+0x1f1/0x3d0
kvm_vm_ioctl+0x747/0xda0 [kvm]
...
The WARN was introduced by commit 03c0304a86bc ("KVM: Warn if
mark_page_dirty() is called without an active vCPU") but the change seems
to be correct (unlike Hyper-V TSC page update mechanism). In fact, there's
no real need to actually write to guest memory to invalidate TSC page, this
can be done by the first vCPU which goes through kvm_guest_time_update().
Reported-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org>
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220407201013.963226-1-vkuznets@redhat.com>
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Since current AVIC implementation cannot support encrypted memory,
inhibit AVIC for SEV-enabled guest.
Signed-off-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Message-Id: <20220408133710.54275-1-suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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+new file mode 100644
+WARNING: Missing or malformed SPDX-License-Identifier tag in line 1
+#27: FILE: Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/errata.rst:1:
Opportunistically update all other non-added KVM documents and
remove a new extra blank line at EOF for x86/errata.rst.
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
Message-Id: <20220406063715.55625-5-likexu@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The tsc_scaling_sync's binary should be present in the .gitignore
file for the git to ignore it.
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
Message-Id: <20220406063715.55625-3-likexu@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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into HEAD
KVM/riscv fixes for 5.18, take #1
- Remove hgatp zeroing in kvm_arch_vcpu_put()
- Fix alignment of the guest_hang() in KVM selftest
- Fix PTE A and D bits in KVM selftest
- Missing #include in vcpu_fp.c
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|
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/tty
Pull serial driver fix from Greg KH:
"This is a single serial driver fix for a build issue that showed up
due to changes that came in through the tty tree in 5.18-rc1 that were
missed previously. It resolves a build error with the mpc52xx_uart
driver.
It has been in linux-next this week with no reported problems"
* tag 'tty-5.18-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/tty:
tty: serial: mpc52xx_uart: make rx/tx hooks return unsigned, part II.
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/staging
Pull staging driver fix from Greg KH:
"Here is a single staging driver fix for 5.18-rc2 that resolves an
endian issue for the r8188eu driver. It has been in linux-next all
this week with no reported problems"
* tag 'staging-5.18-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/staging:
staging: r8188eu: Fix PPPoE tag insertion on little endian systems
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core
Pull driver core updates from Greg KH:
"Here are two small driver core changes for 5.18-rc2.
They are the final bits in the removal of the default_attrs field in
struct kobj_type. I had to wait until after 5.18-rc1 for all of the
changes to do this came in through different development trees, and
then one new user snuck in. So this series has two changes:
- removal of the default_attrs field in the powerpc/pseries/vas code.
The change has been acked by the PPC maintainers to come through
this tree
- removal of default_attrs from struct kobj_type now that all
in-kernel users are removed.
This cleans up the kobject code a little bit and removes some
duplicated functionality that confused people (now there is only
one way to do default groups)
Both of these have been in linux-next for all of this week with no
reported problems"
* tag 'driver-core-5.18-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core:
kobject: kobj_type: remove default_attrs
powerpc/pseries/vas: use default_groups in kobj_type
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc
Pull char/misc driver fix from Greg KH:
"A single driver fix. It resolves the build warning issue on 32bit
systems in the habannalabs driver that came in during the 5.18-rc1
merge cycle.
It has been in linux-next for all this week with no reported problems"
* tag 'char-misc-5.18-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc:
habanalabs: Fix test build failures
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux
Pull powerpc fixes from Michael Ellerman:
- Fix KVM "lost kick" race, where an attempt to pull a vcpu out of the
guest could be lost (or delayed until the next guest exit).
- Disable SCV (system call vectored) when PR KVM guests could be run.
- Fix KVM PR guests using SCV, by disallowing AIL != 0 for KVM PR
guests.
- Add a new KVM CAP to indicate if AIL == 3 is supported.
- Fix a regression when hotplugging a CPU to a memoryless/cpuless node.
- Make virt_addr_valid() stricter for 64-bit Book3E & 32-bit, which
fixes crashes seen due to hardened usercopy.
- Revert a change to max_mapnr which broke HIGHMEM.
Thanks to Christophe Leroy, Fabiano Rosas, Kefeng Wang, Nicholas Piggin,
and Srikar Dronamraju.
* tag 'powerpc-5.18-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux:
Revert "powerpc: Set max_mapnr correctly"
powerpc: Fix virt_addr_valid() for 64-bit Book3E & 32-bit
KVM: PPC: Move kvmhv_on_pseries() into kvm_ppc.h
powerpc/numa: Handle partially initialized numa nodes
powerpc/64: Fix build failure with allyesconfig in book3s_64_entry.S
KVM: PPC: Use KVM_CAP_PPC_AIL_MODE_3
KVM: PPC: Book3S PR: Disallow AIL != 0
KVM: PPC: Book3S PR: Disable SCV when AIL could be disabled
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV P9: Fix "lost kick" race
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull irq fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
"A set of interrupt chip driver fixes:
- A fix for a long standing bug in the ARM GICv3 redistributor
polling which uses the wrong bit number to test.
- Prevent translation of bogus ACPI table entries which map device
interrupts into the IPI space on ARM GICs.
- Don't write into the pending register of ARM GICV4 before the scan
in hardware has completed.
- A set of build and correctness fixes for the Qualcomm MPM driver"
* tag 'irq-urgent-2022-04-10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
irqchip/gic, gic-v3: Prevent GSI to SGI translations
irqchip/gic-v3: Fix GICR_CTLR.RWP polling
irqchip/gic-v4: Wait for GICR_VPENDBASER.Dirty to clear before descheduling
irqchip/irq-qcom-mpm: fix return value check in qcom_mpm_init()
irq/qcom-mpm: Fix build error without MAILBOX
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|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Borislav Petkov:
- Fix the MSI message data struct definition
- Use local labels in the exception table macros to avoid symbol
conflicts with clang LTO builds
- A couple of fixes to objtool checking of the relatively newly added
SLS and IBT code
- Rename a local var in the WARN* macro machinery to prevent shadowing
* tag 'x86_urgent_for_v5.18_rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/msi: Fix msi message data shadow struct
x86/extable: Prefer local labels in .set directives
x86,bpf: Avoid IBT objtool warning
objtool: Fix SLS validation for kcov tail-call replacement
objtool: Fix IBT tail-call detection
x86/bug: Prevent shadowing in __WARN_FLAGS
x86/mm/tlb: Revert retpoline avoidance approach
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull perf fixes from Borislav Petkov:
- A couple of fixes to cgroup-related handling of perf events
- A couple of fixes to event encoding on Sapphire Rapids
- Pass event caps of inherited events so that perf doesn't fail wrongly
at fork()
- Add support for a new Raptor Lake CPU
* tag 'perf_urgent_for_v5.18_rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
perf/core: Always set cpuctx cgrp when enable cgroup event
perf/core: Fix perf_cgroup_switch()
perf/core: Use perf_cgroup_info->active to check if cgroup is active
perf/core: Don't pass task around when ctx sched in
perf/x86/intel: Update the FRONTEND MSR mask on Sapphire Rapids
perf/x86/intel: Don't extend the pseudo-encoding to GP counters
perf/core: Inherit event_caps
perf/x86/uncore: Add Raptor Lake uncore support
perf/x86/msr: Add Raptor Lake CPU support
perf/x86/cstate: Add Raptor Lake support
perf/x86: Add Intel Raptor Lake support
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull locking fixes from Borislav Petkov:
- Allow the compiler to optimize away unused percpu accesses and change
the local_lock_* macros back to inline functions
- A couple of fixes to static call insn patching
* tag 'locking_urgent_for_v5.18_rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
Revert "mm/page_alloc: mark pagesets as __maybe_unused"
Revert "locking/local_lock: Make the empty local_lock_*() function a macro."
x86/percpu: Remove volatile from arch_raw_cpu_ptr().
static_call: Remove __DEFINE_STATIC_CALL macro
static_call: Properly initialise DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_RET0()
static_call: Don't make __static_call_return0 static
x86,static_call: Fix __static_call_return0 for i386
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|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull scheduler fixes from Borislav Petkov:
- Use the correct static key checking primitive on the IRQ exit path
- Two fixes for the new forceidle balancer
* tag 'sched_urgent_for_v5.18_rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
entry: Fix compile error in dynamic_irqentry_exit_cond_resched()
sched: Teach the forced-newidle balancer about CPU affinity limitation.
sched/core: Fix forceidle balancing
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/acme/linux
Pull perf tools fixes from Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo:
- Fix the clang command line option probing and remove some options to
filter out, fixing the build with the latest clang versions
- Fix 'perf bench' futex and epoll benchmarks to deal with machines
with more than 1K CPUs
- Fix 'perf test tsc' error message when not supported
- Remap perf ring buffer if there is no space for event, fixing perf
usage in 32-bit ChromeOS
- Drop objdump stderr to avoid getting stuck waiting for stdout output
in 'perf annotate'
- Fix up garbled output by now showing unwind error messages when
augmenting frame in best effort mode
- Fix perf's libperf_print callback, use the va_args eprintf() variant
- Sync vhost and arm64 cputype headers with the kernel sources
- Fix 'perf report --mem-mode' with ARM SPE
- Add missing external commands ('iiostat', etc) to 'perf --list-cmds'
* tag 'perf-tools-fixes-for-v5.18-2022-04-09' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/acme/linux:
perf annotate: Drop objdump stderr to avoid getting stuck waiting for stdout output
perf tools: Add external commands to list-cmds
perf docs: Add perf-iostat link to manpages
perf session: Remap buf if there is no space for event
perf bench: Fix epoll bench to correct usage of affinity for machines with #CPUs > 1K
perf bench: Fix futex bench to correct usage of affinity for machines with #CPUs > 1K
perf tools: Fix perf's libperf_print callback
perf: arm-spe: Fix perf report --mem-mode
perf unwind: Don't show unwind error messages when augmenting frame pointer stack
tools headers arm64: Sync arm64's cputype.h with the kernel sources
perf test tsc: Fix error message when not supported
perf build: Don't use -ffat-lto-objects in the python feature test when building with clang-13
perf python: Fix probing for some clang command line options
tools build: Filter out options and warnings not supported by clang
tools build: Use $(shell ) instead of `` to get embedded libperl's ccopts
tools include UAPI: Sync linux/vhost.h with the kernel sources
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|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/nvdimm/nvdimm
Pull cxl and nvdimm fixes from Dan Williams:
- Fix a compile error in the nvdimm unit tests
- Fix a shadowed variable warning in the CXL PCI driver
* tag 'cxl+nvdimm-for-5.18-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/nvdimm/nvdimm:
cxl/pci: Drop shadowed variable
tools/testing/nvdimm: Fix security_init() symbol collision
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brgl/linux
Pull gpio fix from Bartosz Golaszewski:
- fix a race condition with consumers accessing the fields of GPIO IRQ
chips before they're fully initialized
* tag 'gpio-fixes-for-v5.18-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brgl/linux:
gpio: Restrict usage of GPIO chip irq members before initialization
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/maz/arm-platforms into irq/urgent
Pull irqchip fixes from Marc Zyngier:
- Fix GICv3 polling for RWP in redistributors
- Reject ACPI attempts to use SGIs on GIC/GICv3
- Fix unpredictible behaviour when making a VPE non-resident
with GICv4
- A couple of fixes for the newly merged qcom-mpm driver
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220409094229.267649-1-maz@kernel.org
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output
If objdump writes to stderr it can block waiting for it to be read. As
perf doesn't read stderr then progress stops with perf waiting for
stdout output.
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Alexandre Truong <alexandre.truong@arm.com>
Cc: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com>
Cc: Denis Nikitin <denik@chromium.org>
Cc: German Gomez <german.gomez@arm.com>
Cc: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
Cc: Leo Yan <leo.yan@linaro.org>
Cc: Lexi Shao <shaolexi@huawei.com>
Cc: Li Huafei <lihuafei1@huawei.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Martin Liška <mliska@suse.cz>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
Cc: Michael Petlan <mpetlan@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Cc: Remi Bernon <rbernon@codeweavers.com>
Cc: Riccardo Mancini <rickyman7@gmail.com>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Richter <tmricht@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: William Cohen <wcohen@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220407230503.1265036-2-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
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