| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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Add a new cmdline arg to set the EOI mode for all vgic_irq tests. This
specifies whether a write to EOIR will deactivate IRQs or not.
Signed-off-by: Ricardo Koller <ricarkol@google.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211109023906.1091208-10-ricarkol@google.com
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Add the ability to specify the number of vIRQs exposed by KVM (arg
defaults to 64). Then extend the KVM_IRQ_LINE test by injecting all
available SPIs at once (specified by the nr-irqs arg). As a bonus,
inject all SGIs at once as well.
Signed-off-by: Ricardo Koller <ricarkol@google.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211109023906.1091208-9-ricarkol@google.com
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Build an abstraction around the injection functions, so the preparation
and checking around the actual injection can be shared between tests.
All functions are stored as pointers in arrays of kvm_inject_desc's
which include the pointer and what kind of interrupts they can inject.
Signed-off-by: Ricardo Koller <ricarkol@google.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211109023906.1091208-8-ricarkol@google.com
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Add a new KVM selftest, vgic_irq, for testing userspace IRQ injection. This
particular test injects an SPI using KVM_IRQ_LINE on GICv3 and verifies
that the IRQ is handled in the guest. The next commits will add more
types of IRQs and different modes.
Signed-off-by: Ricardo Koller <ricarkol@google.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211109023906.1091208-7-ricarkol@google.com
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Add a set of library functions for userspace code in selftests to deal
with vIRQ state (i.e., ioctl wrappers).
Signed-off-by: Ricardo Koller <ricarkol@google.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211109023906.1091208-6-ricarkol@google.com
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Add an architecture independent wrapper function for the KVM_IRQ_LINE
ioctl.
Signed-off-by: Ricardo Koller <ricarkol@google.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211109023906.1091208-5-ricarkol@google.com
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Add library functions for accessing GICv3 registers: DIR, PMR, CTLR,
ISACTIVER, ISPENDR.
Signed-off-by: Ricardo Koller <ricarkol@google.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211109023906.1091208-4-ricarkol@google.com
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registers
Add a generic library function for reading and writing GICv3 distributor
and redistributor registers. Then adapt some functions to use it; more
will come and use it in the next commit.
Signed-off-by: Ricardo Koller <ricarkol@google.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211109023906.1091208-3-ricarkol@google.com
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Move gic_v3.h to the shared headers location. There are some definitions
that will be used in the vgic-irq test.
Signed-off-by: Ricardo Koller <ricarkol@google.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211109023906.1091208-2-ricarkol@google.com
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The 16kB page size is not a popular choice, due to only a few CPUs
actually implementing support for it. However, it can lead to some
interesting performance improvements given the right uarch choices.
Add support for this page size for various PA/VA combinations.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211227124809.1335409-7-maz@kernel.org
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Some of the arm64 systems out there have an IPA space that is
positively tiny. Nonetheless, they make great KVM hosts.
Add support for 36bit IPA support with 4kB pages, which makes
some of the fruity machines happy. Whilst we're at it, add support
for 64kB pages as well, though these boxes have no support for it.
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211227124809.1335409-6-maz@kernel.org
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The current way we initialise TCR_EL1 is a bit cumbersome, as
we mix setting TG0 and IPS in the same swtch statement.
Split it into two statements (one for the base granule size, and
another for the IPA size), allowing new modes to be added in a
more elegant way.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211227124809.1335409-5-maz@kernel.org
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Just as arm64 implemenations don't necessary support all IPA
ranges, they don't all support the same page sizes either. Fun.
Create a dummy VM to snapshot the page sizes supported by the
host, and filter the supported modes.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211227124809.1335409-4-maz@kernel.org
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Contrary to popular belief, there is no such thing as a default
IPA size on arm64. Anything goes, and implementations are the
usual Wild West.
The selftest infrastructure default to 40bit IPA, which obviously
doesn't work for some systems out there.
Turn VM_MODE_DEFAULT from a constant into a variable, and let
guest_modes_append_default() populate it, depending on what
the HW can do. In order to preserve the current behaviour, we
still pick 40bits IPA as the default if it is available, and
the largest supported IPA space otherwise.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211227124809.1335409-3-maz@kernel.org
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As we are going to add support for a variable default mode on arm64,
let's make sure it is setup first by using a constructor that gets
called before the actual test runs.
Suggested-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211227124809.1335409-2-maz@kernel.org
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvms390/linux into HEAD
KVM: s390: Fix and cleanup
- fix sigp sense/start/stop/inconsistency
- cleanups
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Pick commit fdba608f15e2 ("KVM: VMX: Wake vCPU when delivering posted
IRQ even if vCPU == this vCPU"). In addition to fixing a bug, it
also aligns the non-nested and nested usage of triggering posted
interrupts, allowing for additional cleanups.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Drop a check that guards triggering a posted interrupt on the currently
running vCPU, and more importantly guards waking the target vCPU if
triggering a posted interrupt fails because the vCPU isn't IN_GUEST_MODE.
If a vIRQ is delivered from asynchronous context, the target vCPU can be
the currently running vCPU and can also be blocking, in which case
skipping kvm_vcpu_wake_up() is effectively dropping what is supposed to
be a wake event for the vCPU.
The "do nothing" logic when "vcpu == running_vcpu" mostly works only
because the majority of calls to ->deliver_posted_interrupt(), especially
when using posted interrupts, come from synchronous KVM context. But if
a device is exposed to the guest using vfio-pci passthrough, the VFIO IRQ
and vCPU are bound to the same pCPU, and the IRQ is _not_ configured to
use posted interrupts, wake events from the device will be delivered to
KVM from IRQ context, e.g.
vfio_msihandler()
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|-> eventfd_signal()
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|-> ...
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|-> irqfd_wakeup()
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|->kvm_arch_set_irq_inatomic()
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|-> kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast()
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|-> kvm_apic_set_irq()
This also aligns the non-nested and nested usage of triggering posted
interrupts, and will allow for additional cleanups.
Fixes: 379a3c8ee444 ("KVM: VMX: Optimize posted-interrupt delivery for timer fastpath")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Longpeng (Mike) <longpeng2@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211208015236.1616697-18-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The barrier is there for power_off rather than power_state.
Probably typo in commit 358b28f09f0ab074 ("arm/arm64: KVM: Allow
a VCPU to fully reset itself").
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211208193257.667613-3-tabba@google.com
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The comment for kvm_reset_vcpu() refers to the sysreg table as
being the table above, probably because of the code extracted at
commit f4672752c321ea36 ("arm64: KVM: virtual CPU reset").
Fix the comment to remove the potentially confusing reference.
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211208193257.667613-2-tabba@google.com
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Replace the hardcoded value with the existing definition.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211208192810.657360-1-tabba@google.com
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Add a selftest to attempt to enter L2 with invalid guests state by
exiting to userspace via I/O from L2, and then using KVM_SET_SREGS to set
invalid guest state (marking TR unusable is arbitrary chosen for its
relative simplicity).
This is a regression test for a bug introduced by commit c8607e4a086f
("KVM: x86: nVMX: don't fail nested VM entry on invalid guest state if
!from_vmentry"), which incorrectly set vmx->fail=true when L2 had invalid
guest state and ultimately triggered a WARN due to nested_vmx_vmexit()
seeing vmx->fail==true while attempting to synthesize a nested VM-Exit.
The is also a functional test to verify that KVM sythesizes TRIPLE_FAULT
for L2, which is somewhat arbitrary behavior, instead of emulating L2.
KVM should never emulate L2 due to invalid guest state, as it's
architecturally impossible for L1 to run an L2 guest with invalid state
as nested VM-Enter should always fail, i.e. L1 needs to do the emulation.
Stuffing state via KVM ioctl() is a non-architctural, out-of-band case,
hence the TRIPLE_FAULT being rather arbitrary.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211207193006.120997-5-seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Update the documentation for kvm-intel's emulate_invalid_guest_state to
rectify the description of KVM's default behavior, and to document that
the behavior and thus parameter only applies to L1.
Fixes: a27685c33acc ("KVM: VMX: Emulate invalid guest state by default")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211207193006.120997-4-seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Synthesize a triple fault if L2 guest state is invalid at the time of
VM-Enter, which can happen if L1 modifies SMRAM or if userspace stuffs
guest state via ioctls(), e.g. KVM_SET_SREGS. KVM should never emulate
invalid guest state, since from L1's perspective, it's architecturally
impossible for L2 to have invalid state while L2 is running in hardware.
E.g. attempts to set CR0 or CR4 to unsupported values will either VM-Exit
or #GP.
Modifying vCPU state via RSM+SMRAM and ioctl() are the only paths that
can trigger this scenario, as nested VM-Enter correctly rejects any
attempt to enter L2 with invalid state.
RSM is a straightforward case as (a) KVM follows AMD's SMRAM layout and
behavior, and (b) Intel's SDM states that loading reserved CR0/CR4 bits
via RSM results in shutdown, i.e. there is precedent for KVM's behavior.
Following AMD's SMRAM layout is important as AMD's layout saves/restores
the descriptor cache information, including CS.RPL and SS.RPL, and also
defines all the fields relevant to invalid guest state as read-only, i.e.
so long as the vCPU had valid state before the SMI, which is guaranteed
for L2, RSM will generate valid state unless SMRAM was modified. Intel's
layout saves/restores only the selector, which means that scenarios where
the selector and cached RPL don't match, e.g. conforming code segments,
would yield invalid guest state. Intel CPUs fudge around this issued by
stuffing SS.RPL and CS.RPL on RSM. Per Intel's SDM on the "Default
Treatment of RSM", paraphrasing for brevity:
IF internal storage indicates that the [CPU was post-VMXON]
THEN
enter VMX operation (root or non-root);
restore VMX-critical state as defined in Section 34.14.1;
set to their fixed values any bits in CR0 and CR4 whose values must
be fixed in VMX operation [unless coming from an unrestricted guest];
IF RFLAGS.VM = 0 AND (in VMX root operation OR the
“unrestricted guest” VM-execution control is 0)
THEN
CS.RPL := SS.DPL;
SS.RPL := SS.DPL;
FI;
restore current VMCS pointer;
FI;
Note that Intel CPUs also overwrite the fixed CR0/CR4 bits, whereas KVM
will sythesize TRIPLE_FAULT in this scenario. KVM's behavior is allowed
as both Intel and AMD define CR0/CR4 SMRAM fields as read-only, i.e. the
only way for CR0 and/or CR4 to have illegal values is if they were
modified by the L1 SMM handler, and Intel's SDM "SMRAM State Save Map"
section states "modifying these registers will result in unpredictable
behavior".
KVM's ioctl() behavior is less straightforward. Because KVM allows
ioctls() to be executed in any order, rejecting an ioctl() if it would
result in invalid L2 guest state is not an option as KVM cannot know if
a future ioctl() would resolve the invalid state, e.g. KVM_SET_SREGS, or
drop the vCPU out of L2, e.g. KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE. Ideally, KVM would
reject KVM_RUN if L2 contained invalid guest state, but that carries the
risk of a false positive, e.g. if RSM loaded invalid guest state and KVM
exited to userspace. Setting a flag/request to detect such a scenario is
undesirable because (a) it's extremely unlikely to add value to KVM as a
whole, and (b) KVM would need to consider ioctl() interactions with such
a flag, e.g. if userspace migrated the vCPU while the flag were set.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211207193006.120997-3-seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Revert a relatively recent change that set vmx->fail if the vCPU is in L2
and emulation_required is true, as that behavior is completely bogus.
Setting vmx->fail and synthesizing a VM-Exit is contradictory and wrong:
(a) it's impossible to have both a VM-Fail and VM-Exit
(b) vmcs.EXIT_REASON is not modified on VM-Fail
(c) emulation_required refers to guest state and guest state checks are
always VM-Exits, not VM-Fails.
For KVM specifically, emulation_required is handled before nested exits
in __vmx_handle_exit(), thus setting vmx->fail has no immediate effect,
i.e. KVM calls into handle_invalid_guest_state() and vmx->fail is ignored.
Setting vmx->fail can ultimately result in a WARN in nested_vmx_vmexit()
firing when tearing down the VM as KVM never expects vmx->fail to be set
when L2 is active, KVM always reflects those errors into L1.
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 21158 at arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c:4548
nested_vmx_vmexit+0x16bd/0x17e0
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c:4547
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 21158 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc3-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:nested_vmx_vmexit+0x16bd/0x17e0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c:4547
Code: <0f> 0b e9 2e f8 ff ff e8 57 b3 5d 00 0f 0b e9 00 f1 ff ff 89 e9 80
Call Trace:
vmx_leave_nested arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c:6220 [inline]
nested_vmx_free_vcpu+0x83/0xc0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c:330
vmx_free_vcpu+0x11f/0x2a0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6799
kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy+0x6b/0x240 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:10989
kvm_vcpu_destroy+0x29/0x90 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:441
kvm_free_vcpus arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11426 [inline]
kvm_arch_destroy_vm+0x3ef/0x6b0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11545
kvm_destroy_vm arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1189 [inline]
kvm_put_kvm+0x751/0xe40 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1220
kvm_vcpu_release+0x53/0x60 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:3489
__fput+0x3fc/0x870 fs/file_table.c:280
task_work_run+0x146/0x1c0 kernel/task_work.c:164
exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:32 [inline]
do_exit+0x705/0x24f0 kernel/exit.c:832
do_group_exit+0x168/0x2d0 kernel/exit.c:929
get_signal+0x1740/0x2120 kernel/signal.c:2852
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x9c/0x730 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:868
handle_signal_work kernel/entry/common.c:148 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:172 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x191/0x220 kernel/entry/common.c:207
__syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:289 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x2e/0x70 kernel/entry/common.c:300
do_syscall_64+0x53/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Fixes: c8607e4a086f ("KVM: x86: nVMX: don't fail nested VM entry on invalid guest state if !from_vmentry")
Reported-by: syzbot+f1d2136db9c80d4733e8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211207193006.120997-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Attempting to compile on a non-x86 architecture fails with
include/kvm_util.h: In function ‘vm_compute_max_gfn’:
include/kvm_util.h:79:21: error: dereferencing pointer to incomplete type ‘struct kvm_vm’
return ((1ULL << vm->pa_bits) >> vm->page_shift) - 1;
^~
This is because the declaration of struct kvm_vm is in
lib/kvm_util_internal.h as an effort to make it private to
the test lib code. We can still provide arch specific functions,
though, by making the generic function symbols weak. Do that to
fix the compile error.
Fixes: c8cc43c1eae2 ("selftests: KVM: avoid failures due to reserved HyperTransport region")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211214151842.848314-1-drjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The kvm_run struct's if_flag is a part of the userspace/kernel API. The
SEV-ES patches failed to set this flag because it's no longer needed by
QEMU (according to the comment in the source code). However, other
hypervisors may make use of this flag. Therefore, set the flag for
guests with encrypted registers (i.e., with guest_state_protected set).
Fixes: f1c6366e3043 ("KVM: SVM: Add required changes to support intercepts under SEV-ES")
Signed-off-by: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211209155257.128747-1-marcorr@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
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After dropping mmu_lock in the TDP MMU, restart the iterator during
tdp_iter_next() and do not advance the iterator. Advancing the iterator
results in skipping the top-level SPTE and all its children, which is
fatal if any of the skipped SPTEs were not visited before yielding.
When zapping all SPTEs, i.e. when min_level == root_level, restarting the
iter and then invoking tdp_iter_next() is always fatal if the current gfn
has as a valid SPTE, as advancing the iterator results in try_step_side()
skipping the current gfn, which wasn't visited before yielding.
Sprinkle WARNs on iter->yielded being true in various helpers that are
often used in conjunction with yielding, and tag the helper with
__must_check to reduce the probabily of improper usage.
Failing to zap a top-level SPTE manifests in one of two ways. If a valid
SPTE is skipped by both kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_all() and kvm_tdp_mmu_put_root(),
the shadow page will be leaked and KVM will WARN accordingly.
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3509 at arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c:46 [kvm]
RIP: 0010:kvm_mmu_uninit_tdp_mmu+0x3e/0x50 [kvm]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
kvm_arch_destroy_vm+0x130/0x1b0 [kvm]
kvm_destroy_vm+0x162/0x2a0 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_release+0x34/0x60 [kvm]
__fput+0x82/0x240
task_work_run+0x5c/0x90
do_exit+0x364/0xa10
? futex_unqueue+0x38/0x60
do_group_exit+0x33/0xa0
get_signal+0x155/0x850
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0xed/0x750
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xc5/0x120
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x40
do_syscall_64+0x48/0xc0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
If kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_all() skips a gfn/SPTE but that SPTE is then zapped by
kvm_tdp_mmu_put_root(), KVM triggers a use-after-free in the form of
marking a struct page as dirty/accessed after it has been put back on the
free list. This directly triggers a WARN due to encountering a page with
page_count() == 0, but it can also lead to data corruption and additional
errors in the kernel.
WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1995658 at arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:171
RIP: 0010:kvm_is_zone_device_pfn.part.0+0x9e/0xd0 [kvm]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
kvm_set_pfn_dirty+0x120/0x1d0 [kvm]
__handle_changed_spte+0x92e/0xca0 [kvm]
__handle_changed_spte+0x63c/0xca0 [kvm]
__handle_changed_spte+0x63c/0xca0 [kvm]
__handle_changed_spte+0x63c/0xca0 [kvm]
zap_gfn_range+0x549/0x620 [kvm]
kvm_tdp_mmu_put_root+0x1b6/0x270 [kvm]
mmu_free_root_page+0x219/0x2c0 [kvm]
kvm_mmu_free_roots+0x1b4/0x4e0 [kvm]
kvm_mmu_unload+0x1c/0xa0 [kvm]
kvm_arch_destroy_vm+0x1f2/0x5c0 [kvm]
kvm_put_kvm+0x3b1/0x8b0 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_release+0x4e/0x70 [kvm]
__fput+0x1f7/0x8c0
task_work_run+0xf8/0x1a0
do_exit+0x97b/0x2230
do_group_exit+0xda/0x2a0
get_signal+0x3be/0x1e50
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x244/0x17f0
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xcb/0x120
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x40
do_syscall_64+0x4d/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Note, the underlying bug existed even before commit 1af4a96025b3 ("KVM:
x86/mmu: Yield in TDU MMU iter even if no SPTES changed") moved calls to
tdp_mmu_iter_cond_resched() to the beginning of loops, as KVM could still
incorrectly advance past a top-level entry when yielding on a lower-level
entry. But with respect to leaking shadow pages, the bug was introduced
by yielding before processing the current gfn.
Alternatively, tdp_mmu_iter_cond_resched() could simply fall through, or
callers could jump to their "retry" label. The downside of that approach
is that tdp_mmu_iter_cond_resched() _must_ be called before anything else
in the loop, and there's no easy way to enfornce that requirement.
Ideally, KVM would handling the cond_resched() fully within the iterator
macro (the code is actually quite clean) and avoid this entire class of
bugs, but that is extremely difficult do while also supporting yielding
after tdp_mmu_set_spte_atomic() fails. Yielding after failing to set a
SPTE is very desirable as the "owner" of the REMOVED_SPTE isn't strictly
bounded, e.g. if it's zapping a high-level shadow page, the REMOVED_SPTE
may block operations on the SPTE for a significant amount of time.
Fixes: faaf05b00aec ("kvm: x86/mmu: Support zapping SPTEs in the TDP MMU")
Fixes: 1af4a96025b3 ("KVM: x86/mmu: Yield in TDU MMU iter even if no SPTES changed")
Reported-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211214033528.123268-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The fixed counter 3 is used for the Topdown metrics, which hasn't been
enabled for KVM guests. Userspace accessing to it will fail as it's not
included in get_fixed_pmc(). This breaks KVM selftests on ICX+ machines,
which have this counter.
To reproduce it on ICX+ machines, ./state_test reports:
==== Test Assertion Failure ====
lib/x86_64/processor.c:1078: r == nmsrs
pid=4564 tid=4564 - Argument list too long
1 0x000000000040b1b9: vcpu_save_state at processor.c:1077
2 0x0000000000402478: main at state_test.c:209 (discriminator 6)
3 0x00007fbe21ed5f92: ?? ??:0
4 0x000000000040264d: _start at ??:?
Unexpected result from KVM_GET_MSRS, r: 17 (failed MSR was 0x30c)
With this patch, it works well.
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <wei.w.wang@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20211217124934.32893-1-wei.w.wang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Play nice with a NULL shadow page when checking for an obsolete root in
the page fault handler by flagging the page fault as stale if there's no
shadow page associated with the root and KVM_REQ_MMU_RELOAD is pending.
Invalidating memslots, which is the only case where _all_ roots need to
be reloaded, requests all vCPUs to reload their MMUs while holding
mmu_lock for lock.
The "special" roots, e.g. pae_root when KVM uses PAE paging, are not
backed by a shadow page. Running with TDP disabled or with nested NPT
explodes spectaculary due to dereferencing a NULL shadow page pointer.
Skip the KVM_REQ_MMU_RELOAD check if there is a valid shadow page for the
root. Zapping shadow pages in response to guest activity, e.g. when the
guest frees a PGD, can trigger KVM_REQ_MMU_RELOAD even if the current
vCPU isn't using the affected root. I.e. KVM_REQ_MMU_RELOAD can be seen
with a completely valid root shadow page. This is a bit of a moot point
as KVM currently unloads all roots on KVM_REQ_MMU_RELOAD, but that will
be cleaned up in the future.
Fixes: a955cad84cda ("KVM: x86/mmu: Retry page fault if root is invalidated by memslot update")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211209060552.2956723-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Host initiated writes to MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES should not depend
on guest visible CPUIDs and (incorrect) KVM logic implementing it is
about to change. Also, KVM_SET_CPUID{,2} after KVM_RUN is now forbidden
and causes test to fail.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Fixes: feb627e8d6f6 ("KVM: x86: Forbid KVM_SET_CPUID{,2} after KVM_RUN")
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211216165213.338923-2-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES
The ability to write to MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES from the host should
not depend on guest visible CPUID entries, even if just to allow
creating/restoring guest MSRs and CPUIDs in any sequence.
Fixes: 27461da31089 ("KVM: x86/pmu: Support full width counting")
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211216165213.338923-3-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux into HEAD
Fix conflicts between memslot overhaul and commit 511d25d6b789f ("KVM:
PPC: Book3S: Suppress warnings when allocating too big memory slots")
from the powerpc tree.
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With KVM_CAP_S390_USER_SIGP, there are only five Signal Processor
orders (CONDITIONAL EMERGENCY SIGNAL, EMERGENCY SIGNAL, EXTERNAL CALL,
SENSE, and SENSE RUNNING STATUS) which are intended for frequent use
and thus are processed in-kernel. The remainder are sent to userspace
with the KVM_CAP_S390_USER_SIGP capability. Of those, three orders
(RESTART, STOP, and STOP AND STORE STATUS) have the potential to
inject work back into the kernel, and thus are asynchronous.
Let's look for those pending IRQs when processing one of the in-kernel
SIGP orders, and return BUSY (CC2) if one is in process. This is in
agreement with the Principles of Operation, which states that only one
order can be "active" on a CPU at a time.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Farman <farman@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211213210550.856213-2-farman@linux.ibm.com
[borntraeger@linux.ibm.com: add stable tag]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
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Changes to the struct are easier to manage with offset comments so
let's add some. And now that we know that the last struct member has
the wrong name let's also fix this.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
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Introduce a helper function for guest frame access.
Signed-off-by: Janis Schoetterl-Glausch <scgl@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Message-Id: <20211126164549.7046-4-scgl@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
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Do not round down the first address to the page boundary, just translate
it normally, which gives the value we care about in the first place.
Given this, translating a single address is just the special case of
translating a range spanning a single page.
Make the output optional, so the function can be used to just check a
range.
Signed-off-by: Janis Schoetterl-Glausch <scgl@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Message-Id: <20211126164549.7046-3-scgl@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
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Improve readability by renaming the length variable and
not calculating the offset manually.
Signed-off-by: Janis Schoetterl-Glausch <scgl@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Message-Id: <20211126164549.7046-2-scgl@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
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Ganapatrao reported that the kvm_pgtable->mmu pointer is more or
less hardcoded to the main S2 mmu structure, while the nested
code needs it to point to other instances (as we have one instance
per nested context).
Rework the initialisation of the kvm_pgtable structure so that
this assumtion doesn't hold true anymore. This requires some
minor changes to the order in which things are initialised
(the mmu->arch pointer being the critical one).
Reported-by: Ganapatrao Kulkarni <gankulkarni@os.amperecomputing.com>
Reviewed-by: Ganapatrao Kulkarni <gankulkarni@os.amperecomputing.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211129200150.351436-5-maz@kernel.org
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* kvm-arm64/pkvm-hyp-sharing:
: .
: Series from Quentin Perret, implementing HYP page share/unshare:
:
: This series implements an unshare hypercall at EL2 in nVHE
: protected mode, and makes use of it to unmmap guest-specific
: data-structures from EL2 stage-1 during guest tear-down.
: Crucially, the implementation of the share and unshare
: routines use page refcounts in the host kernel to avoid
: accidentally unmapping data-structures that overlap a common
: page.
: [...]
: .
KVM: arm64: pkvm: Unshare guest structs during teardown
KVM: arm64: Expose unshare hypercall to the host
KVM: arm64: Implement do_unshare() helper for unsharing memory
KVM: arm64: Implement __pkvm_host_share_hyp() using do_share()
KVM: arm64: Implement do_share() helper for sharing memory
KVM: arm64: Introduce wrappers for host and hyp spin lock accessors
KVM: arm64: Extend pkvm_page_state enumeration to handle absent pages
KVM: arm64: pkvm: Refcount the pages shared with EL2
KVM: arm64: Introduce kvm_share_hyp()
KVM: arm64: Implement kvm_pgtable_hyp_unmap() at EL2
KVM: arm64: Hook up ->page_count() for hypervisor stage-1 page-table
KVM: arm64: Fixup hyp stage-1 refcount
KVM: arm64: Refcount hyp stage-1 pgtable pages
KVM: arm64: Provide {get,put}_page() stubs for early hyp allocator
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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Make use of the newly introduced unshare hypercall during guest teardown
to unmap guest-related data structures from the hyp stage-1.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211215161232.1480836-15-qperret@google.com
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Introduce an unshare hypercall which can be used to unmap memory from
the hypervisor stage-1 in nVHE protected mode. This will be useful to
update the EL2 ownership state of pages during guest teardown, and
avoids keeping dangling mappings to unreferenced portions of memory.
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211215161232.1480836-14-qperret@google.com
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Tearing down a previously shared memory region results in the borrower
losing access to the underlying pages and returning them to the "owned"
state in the owner.
Implement a do_unshare() helper, along the same lines as do_share(), to
provide this functionality for the host-to-hyp case.
Reviewed-by: Andrew Walbran <qwandor@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211215161232.1480836-13-qperret@google.com
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__pkvm_host_share_hyp() shares memory between the host and the
hypervisor so implement it as an invocation of the new do_share()
mechanism.
Note that double-sharing is no longer permitted (as this allows us to
reduce the number of page-table walks significantly), but is thankfully
no longer relied upon by the host.
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211215161232.1480836-12-qperret@google.com
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By default, protected KVM isolates memory pages so that they are
accessible only to their owner: be it the host kernel, the hypervisor
at EL2 or (in future) the guest. Establishing shared-memory regions
between these components therefore involves a transition for each page
so that the owner can share memory with a borrower under a certain set
of permissions.
Introduce a do_share() helper for safely sharing a memory region between
two components. Currently, only host-to-hyp sharing is implemented, but
the code is easily extended to handle other combinations and the
permission checks for each component are reusable.
Reviewed-by: Andrew Walbran <qwandor@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211215161232.1480836-11-qperret@google.com
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In preparation for adding additional locked sections for manipulating
page-tables at EL2, introduce some simple wrappers around the host and
hypervisor locks so that it's a bit easier to read and bit more difficult
to take the wrong lock (or even take them in the wrong order).
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211215161232.1480836-10-qperret@google.com
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Explicitly name the combination of SW0 | SW1 as reserved in the pte and
introduce a new PKVM_NOPAGE meta-state which, although not directly
stored in the software bits of the pte, can be used to represent an
entry for which there is no underlying page. This is distinct from an
invalid pte, as stage-2 identity mappings for the host are created
lazily and so an invalid pte there is the same as a valid mapping for
the purposes of ownership information.
This state will be used for permission checking during page transitions
in later patches.
Reviewed-by: Andrew Walbran <qwandor@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211215161232.1480836-9-qperret@google.com
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In order to simplify the page tracking infrastructure at EL2 in nVHE
protected mode, move the responsibility of refcounting pages that are
shared multiple times on the host. In order to do so, let's create a
red-black tree tracking all the PFNs that have been shared, along with
a refcount.
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211215161232.1480836-8-qperret@google.com
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The create_hyp_mappings() function can currently be called at any point
in time. However, its behaviour in protected mode changes widely
depending on when it is being called. Prior to KVM init, it is used to
create the temporary page-table used to bring-up the hypervisor, and
later on it is transparently turned into a 'share' hypercall when the
kernel has lost control over the hypervisor stage-1. In order to prepare
the ground for also unsharing pages with the hypervisor during guest
teardown, introduce a kvm_share_hyp() function to make it clear in which
places a share hypercall should be expected, as we will soon need a
matching unshare hypercall in all those places.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211215161232.1480836-7-qperret@google.com
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Implement kvm_pgtable_hyp_unmap() which can be used to remove hypervisor
stage-1 mappings at EL2.
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211215161232.1480836-6-qperret@google.com
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