Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mkl/linux-can
Marc Kleine-Budde says:
====================
pull-request: can 2023-03-27
Oleksij Rempel and Hillf Danton contribute a patch for the CAN J1939
protocol that prevents a potential deadlock in j1939_sk_errqueue().
Ivan Orlov fixes an uninit-value in the CAN BCM protocol in the
bcm_tx_setup() function.
* tag 'linux-can-fixes-for-6.3-20230327' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mkl/linux-can:
can: bcm: bcm_tx_setup(): fix KMSAN uninit-value in vfs_write
can: j1939: prevent deadlock by moving j1939_sk_errqueue()
====================
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230327124807.1157134-1-mkl@pengutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Some MAINTAINERS sections mention to mail patches to the list
linux-nfc@lists.01.org. Probably due to changes on Intel's 01.org website
and servers, the list server lists.01.org/ml01.01.org is simply gone.
Considering emails recorded on lore.kernel.org, only a handful of emails
where sent to the linux-nfc@lists.01.org list, and they are usually also
sent to the netdev mailing list as well, where they are then picked up.
So, there is no big benefit in restoring the linux-nfc elsewhere.
Remove all occurrences of the linux-nfc@lists.01.org list in MAINTAINERS.
Suggested-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAKXUXMzggxQ43DUZZRkPMGdo5WkzgA=i14ySJUFw4kZfE5ZaZA@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230324081613.32000-1-lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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I've read through or reworked a good portion of this driver. Add myself
as a reviewer.
Signed-off-by: Sean Anderson <sean.anderson@seco.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Acked-by: Madalin Bucur <madalin.bucur@oss.nxp.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230323145957.2999211-1-sean.anderson@seco.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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A system with more than one of these SSDs will only have one usable.
The kernel fails to detect more than one nvme device due to duplicate
cntlids.
before:
[ 9.395229] nvme 0000:01:00.0: platform quirk: setting simple suspend
[ 9.395262] nvme nvme0: pci function 0000:01:00.0
[ 9.395282] nvme 0000:03:00.0: platform quirk: setting simple suspend
[ 9.395305] nvme nvme1: pci function 0000:03:00.0
[ 9.409873] nvme nvme0: Duplicate cntlid 1 with nvme1, subsys nqn.2022-07.com.siliconmotion:nvm-subsystem-sn- , rejecting
[ 9.409982] nvme nvme0: Removing after probe failure status: -22
[ 9.427487] nvme nvme1: allocated 64 MiB host memory buffer.
[ 9.445088] nvme nvme1: 16/0/0 default/read/poll queues
[ 9.449898] nvme nvme1: Ignoring bogus Namespace Identifiers
after:
[ 1.161890] nvme 0000:01:00.0: platform quirk: setting simple suspend
[ 1.162660] nvme nvme0: pci function 0000:01:00.0
[ 1.162684] nvme 0000:03:00.0: platform quirk: setting simple suspend
[ 1.162707] nvme nvme1: pci function 0000:03:00.0
[ 1.191354] nvme nvme0: allocated 64 MiB host memory buffer.
[ 1.193378] nvme nvme1: allocated 64 MiB host memory buffer.
[ 1.211044] nvme nvme1: 16/0/0 default/read/poll queues
[ 1.211080] nvme nvme0: 16/0/0 default/read/poll queues
[ 1.216145] nvme nvme0: Ignoring bogus Namespace Identifiers
[ 1.216261] nvme nvme1: Ignoring bogus Namespace Identifiers
Adding the NVME_QUIRK_IGNORE_DEV_SUBNQN quirk to resolves the issue.
Signed-off-by: Juraj Pecigos <kernel@juraj.dev>
Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni <kch@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
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da7213.c is missing pm_runtime_disable(), thus we will get
below error when rmmod -> insmod.
$ rmmod snd-soc-da7213.ko
$ insmod snd-soc-da7213.ko
da7213 0-001a: Unbalanced pm_runtime_enable!"
[Kuninori adjusted to latest upstream]
Signed-off-by: Duy Nguyen <duy.nguyen.rh@renesas.com>
Signed-off-by: Kuninori Morimoto <kuninori.morimoto.gx@renesas.com>
Tested-by: Khanh Le <khanh.le.xr@renesas.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87mt3xg2tk.wl-kuninori.morimoto.gx@renesas.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
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Before relocating a block group we pause scrub, then do the relocation and
then unpause scrub. The relocation process requires starting and committing
a transaction, and if we have a failure in the critical section of the
transaction commit path (transaction state >= TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_START),
we will deadlock if there is a paused scrub.
That results in stack traces like the following:
[42.479] BTRFS info (device sdc): relocating block group 53876686848 flags metadata|raid6
[42.936] BTRFS warning (device sdc): Skipping commit of aborted transaction.
[42.936] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[42.936] BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -28)
[42.936] WARNING: CPU: 11 PID: 346822 at fs/btrfs/transaction.c:1977 btrfs_commit_transaction+0xcc8/0xeb0 [btrfs]
[42.936] Modules linked in: dm_flakey dm_mod loop btrfs (...)
[42.936] CPU: 11 PID: 346822 Comm: btrfs Tainted: G W 6.3.0-rc2-btrfs-next-127+ #1
[42.936] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[42.936] RIP: 0010:btrfs_commit_transaction+0xcc8/0xeb0 [btrfs]
[42.936] Code: ff ff 45 8b (...)
[42.936] RSP: 0018:ffffb58649633b48 EFLAGS: 00010282
[42.936] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8be6ef4d5bd8 RCX: 0000000000000000
[42.936] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: ffffffffb35e7782 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
[42.936] RBP: ffff8be6ef4d5c98 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffb586496339e8
[42.936] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff8be6d38c7c00
[42.936] R13: 00000000ffffffe4 R14: ffff8be6c268c000 R15: ffff8be6ef4d5cf0
[42.936] FS: 00007f381a82b340(0000) GS:ffff8beddfcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[42.936] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[42.936] CR2: 00007f1e35fb7638 CR3: 0000000117680006 CR4: 0000000000370ee0
[42.936] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[42.936] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[42.936] Call Trace:
[42.936] <TASK>
[42.936] ? start_transaction+0xcb/0x610 [btrfs]
[42.936] prepare_to_relocate+0x111/0x1a0 [btrfs]
[42.936] relocate_block_group+0x57/0x5d0 [btrfs]
[42.936] ? btrfs_wait_nocow_writers+0x25/0xb0 [btrfs]
[42.936] btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x248/0x3c0 [btrfs]
[42.936] ? __pfx_autoremove_wake_function+0x10/0x10
[42.936] btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x3b/0x150 [btrfs]
[42.936] btrfs_balance+0x8ff/0x11d0 [btrfs]
[42.936] ? __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x14a/0x410
[42.936] btrfs_ioctl+0x2334/0x32c0 [btrfs]
[42.937] ? mod_objcg_state+0xd2/0x360
[42.937] ? refill_obj_stock+0xb0/0x160
[42.937] ? seq_release+0x25/0x30
[42.937] ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x3b5/0x4b0
[42.937] ? percpu_counter_add_batch+0x2e/0xa0
[42.937] ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x88/0xc0
[42.937] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x88/0xc0
[42.937] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[42.937] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
[42.937] RIP: 0033:0x7f381a6ffe9b
[42.937] Code: 00 48 89 44 24 (...)
[42.937] RSP: 002b:00007ffd45ecf060 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
[42.937] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 00007f381a6ffe9b
[42.937] RDX: 00007ffd45ecf150 RSI: 00000000c4009420 RDI: 0000000000000003
[42.937] RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000013 R09: 0000000000000000
[42.937] R10: 00007f381a60c878 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffd45ed0423
[42.937] R13: 00007ffd45ecf150 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffd45ecf148
[42.937] </TASK>
[42.937] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[42.937] BTRFS: error (device sdc: state A) in cleanup_transaction:1977: errno=-28 No space left
[59.196] INFO: task btrfs:346772 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
[59.196] Tainted: G W 6.3.0-rc2-btrfs-next-127+ #1
[59.196] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
[59.196] task:btrfs state:D stack:0 pid:346772 ppid:1 flags:0x00004002
[59.196] Call Trace:
[59.196] <TASK>
[59.196] __schedule+0x392/0xa70
[59.196] ? __pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x165/0x370
[59.196] schedule+0x5d/0xd0
[59.196] __scrub_blocked_if_needed+0x74/0xc0 [btrfs]
[59.197] ? __pfx_autoremove_wake_function+0x10/0x10
[59.197] scrub_pause_off+0x21/0x50 [btrfs]
[59.197] scrub_simple_mirror+0x1c7/0x950 [btrfs]
[59.197] ? scrub_parity_put+0x1a5/0x1d0 [btrfs]
[59.198] ? __pfx_autoremove_wake_function+0x10/0x10
[59.198] scrub_stripe+0x20d/0x740 [btrfs]
[59.198] scrub_chunk+0xc4/0x130 [btrfs]
[59.198] scrub_enumerate_chunks+0x3e4/0x7a0 [btrfs]
[59.198] ? __pfx_autoremove_wake_function+0x10/0x10
[59.198] btrfs_scrub_dev+0x236/0x6a0 [btrfs]
[59.199] ? btrfs_ioctl+0xd97/0x32c0 [btrfs]
[59.199] ? _copy_from_user+0x7b/0x80
[59.199] btrfs_ioctl+0xde1/0x32c0 [btrfs]
[59.199] ? refill_stock+0x33/0x50
[59.199] ? should_failslab+0xa/0x20
[59.199] ? kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x151/0x460
[59.199] ? alloc_io_context+0x1b/0x80
[59.199] ? preempt_count_add+0x70/0xa0
[59.199] ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x88/0xc0
[59.199] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x88/0xc0
[59.199] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[59.199] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
[59.199] RIP: 0033:0x7f82ffaffe9b
[59.199] RSP: 002b:00007f82ff9fcc50 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
[59.199] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055b191e36310 RCX: 00007f82ffaffe9b
[59.199] RDX: 000055b191e36310 RSI: 00000000c400941b RDI: 0000000000000003
[59.199] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00007fff1575016f R09: 0000000000000000
[59.199] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f82ff9fd640
[59.199] R13: 000000000000006b R14: 00007f82ffa87580 R15: 0000000000000000
[59.199] </TASK>
[59.199] INFO: task btrfs:346773 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
[59.200] Tainted: G W 6.3.0-rc2-btrfs-next-127+ #1
[59.200] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
[59.201] task:btrfs state:D stack:0 pid:346773 ppid:1 flags:0x00004002
[59.201] Call Trace:
[59.201] <TASK>
[59.201] __schedule+0x392/0xa70
[59.201] ? __pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x165/0x370
[59.201] schedule+0x5d/0xd0
[59.201] __scrub_blocked_if_needed+0x74/0xc0 [btrfs]
[59.201] ? __pfx_autoremove_wake_function+0x10/0x10
[59.201] scrub_pause_off+0x21/0x50 [btrfs]
[59.202] scrub_simple_mirror+0x1c7/0x950 [btrfs]
[59.202] ? scrub_parity_put+0x1a5/0x1d0 [btrfs]
[59.202] ? __pfx_autoremove_wake_function+0x10/0x10
[59.202] scrub_stripe+0x20d/0x740 [btrfs]
[59.202] scrub_chunk+0xc4/0x130 [btrfs]
[59.203] scrub_enumerate_chunks+0x3e4/0x7a0 [btrfs]
[59.203] ? __pfx_autoremove_wake_function+0x10/0x10
[59.203] btrfs_scrub_dev+0x236/0x6a0 [btrfs]
[59.203] ? btrfs_ioctl+0xd97/0x32c0 [btrfs]
[59.203] ? _copy_from_user+0x7b/0x80
[59.203] btrfs_ioctl+0xde1/0x32c0 [btrfs]
[59.204] ? should_failslab+0xa/0x20
[59.204] ? kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x151/0x460
[59.204] ? alloc_io_context+0x1b/0x80
[59.204] ? preempt_count_add+0x70/0xa0
[59.204] ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x88/0xc0
[59.204] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x88/0xc0
[59.204] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[59.204] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
[59.204] RIP: 0033:0x7f82ffaffe9b
[59.204] RSP: 002b:00007f82ff1fbc50 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
[59.204] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055b191e36790 RCX: 00007f82ffaffe9b
[59.204] RDX: 000055b191e36790 RSI: 00000000c400941b RDI: 0000000000000003
[59.204] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00007fff1575016f R09: 0000000000000000
[59.204] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f82ff1fc640
[59.204] R13: 000000000000006b R14: 00007f82ffa87580 R15: 0000000000000000
[59.204] </TASK>
[59.204] INFO: task btrfs:346774 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
[59.205] Tainted: G W 6.3.0-rc2-btrfs-next-127+ #1
[59.205] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
[59.206] task:btrfs state:D stack:0 pid:346774 ppid:1 flags:0x00004002
[59.206] Call Trace:
[59.206] <TASK>
[59.206] __schedule+0x392/0xa70
[59.206] schedule+0x5d/0xd0
[59.206] __scrub_blocked_if_needed+0x74/0xc0 [btrfs]
[59.206] ? __pfx_autoremove_wake_function+0x10/0x10
[59.206] scrub_pause_off+0x21/0x50 [btrfs]
[59.207] scrub_simple_mirror+0x1c7/0x950 [btrfs]
[59.207] ? scrub_parity_put+0x1a5/0x1d0 [btrfs]
[59.207] ? __pfx_autoremove_wake_function+0x10/0x10
[59.207] scrub_stripe+0x20d/0x740 [btrfs]
[59.208] scrub_chunk+0xc4/0x130 [btrfs]
[59.208] scrub_enumerate_chunks+0x3e4/0x7a0 [btrfs]
[59.208] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath.isra.0+0x9a/0x120
[59.208] btrfs_scrub_dev+0x236/0x6a0 [btrfs]
[59.208] ? btrfs_ioctl+0xd97/0x32c0 [btrfs]
[59.209] ? _copy_from_user+0x7b/0x80
[59.209] btrfs_ioctl+0xde1/0x32c0 [btrfs]
[59.209] ? should_failslab+0xa/0x20
[59.209] ? kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x151/0x460
[59.209] ? alloc_io_context+0x1b/0x80
[59.209] ? preempt_count_add+0x70/0xa0
[59.209] ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x88/0xc0
[59.209] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x88/0xc0
[59.209] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[59.209] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
[59.209] RIP: 0033:0x7f82ffaffe9b
[59.209] RSP: 002b:00007f82fe9fac50 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
[59.209] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055b191e36c10 RCX: 00007f82ffaffe9b
[59.209] RDX: 000055b191e36c10 RSI: 00000000c400941b RDI: 0000000000000003
[59.209] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00007fff1575016f R09: 0000000000000000
[59.209] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f82fe9fb640
[59.209] R13: 000000000000006b R14: 00007f82ffa87580 R15: 0000000000000000
[59.209] </TASK>
[59.209] INFO: task btrfs:346775 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
[59.210] Tainted: G W 6.3.0-rc2-btrfs-next-127+ #1
[59.210] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
[59.211] task:btrfs state:D stack:0 pid:346775 ppid:1 flags:0x00004002
[59.211] Call Trace:
[59.211] <TASK>
[59.211] __schedule+0x392/0xa70
[59.211] schedule+0x5d/0xd0
[59.211] __scrub_blocked_if_needed+0x74/0xc0 [btrfs]
[59.211] ? __pfx_autoremove_wake_function+0x10/0x10
[59.211] scrub_pause_off+0x21/0x50 [btrfs]
[59.212] scrub_simple_mirror+0x1c7/0x950 [btrfs]
[59.212] ? scrub_parity_put+0x1a5/0x1d0 [btrfs]
[59.212] ? __pfx_autoremove_wake_function+0x10/0x10
[59.212] scrub_stripe+0x20d/0x740 [btrfs]
[59.213] scrub_chunk+0xc4/0x130 [btrfs]
[59.213] scrub_enumerate_chunks+0x3e4/0x7a0 [btrfs]
[59.213] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath.isra.0+0x9a/0x120
[59.213] btrfs_scrub_dev+0x236/0x6a0 [btrfs]
[59.213] ? btrfs_ioctl+0xd97/0x32c0 [btrfs]
[59.214] ? _copy_from_user+0x7b/0x80
[59.214] btrfs_ioctl+0xde1/0x32c0 [btrfs]
[59.214] ? should_failslab+0xa/0x20
[59.214] ? kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x151/0x460
[59.214] ? alloc_io_context+0x1b/0x80
[59.214] ? preempt_count_add+0x70/0xa0
[59.214] ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x88/0xc0
[59.214] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x88/0xc0
[59.214] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[59.214] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
[59.214] RIP: 0033:0x7f82ffaffe9b
[59.214] RSP: 002b:00007f82fe1f9c50 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
[59.214] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055b191e37090 RCX: 00007f82ffaffe9b
[59.214] RDX: 000055b191e37090 RSI: 00000000c400941b RDI: 0000000000000003
[59.214] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00007fff1575016f R09: 0000000000000000
[59.214] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f82fe1fa640
[59.214] R13: 000000000000006b R14: 00007f82ffa87580 R15: 0000000000000000
[59.214] </TASK>
[59.214] INFO: task btrfs:346776 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
[59.215] Tainted: G W 6.3.0-rc2-btrfs-next-127+ #1
[59.216] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
[59.217] task:btrfs state:D stack:0 pid:346776 ppid:1 flags:0x00004002
[59.217] Call Trace:
[59.217] <TASK>
[59.217] __schedule+0x392/0xa70
[59.217] ? __pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x165/0x370
[59.217] schedule+0x5d/0xd0
[59.217] __scrub_blocked_if_needed+0x74/0xc0 [btrfs]
[59.217] ? __pfx_autoremove_wake_function+0x10/0x10
[59.217] scrub_pause_off+0x21/0x50 [btrfs]
[59.217] scrub_simple_mirror+0x1c7/0x950 [btrfs]
[59.217] ? scrub_parity_put+0x1a5/0x1d0 [btrfs]
[59.218] ? __pfx_autoremove_wake_function+0x10/0x10
[59.218] scrub_stripe+0x20d/0x740 [btrfs]
[59.218] scrub_chunk+0xc4/0x130 [btrfs]
[59.218] scrub_enumerate_chunks+0x3e4/0x7a0 [btrfs]
[59.219] ? __pfx_autoremove_wake_function+0x10/0x10
[59.219] btrfs_scrub_dev+0x236/0x6a0 [btrfs]
[59.219] ? btrfs_ioctl+0xd97/0x32c0 [btrfs]
[59.219] ? _copy_from_user+0x7b/0x80
[59.219] btrfs_ioctl+0xde1/0x32c0 [btrfs]
[59.219] ? should_failslab+0xa/0x20
[59.219] ? kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x151/0x460
[59.219] ? alloc_io_context+0x1b/0x80
[59.219] ? preempt_count_add+0x70/0xa0
[59.219] ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x88/0xc0
[59.219] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x88/0xc0
[59.219] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[59.219] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
[59.219] RIP: 0033:0x7f82ffaffe9b
[59.219] RSP: 002b:00007f82fd9f8c50 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
[59.219] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055b191e37510 RCX: 00007f82ffaffe9b
[59.219] RDX: 000055b191e37510 RSI: 00000000c400941b RDI: 0000000000000003
[59.219] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00007fff1575016f R09: 0000000000000000
[59.219] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f82fd9f9640
[59.219] R13: 000000000000006b R14: 00007f82ffa87580 R15: 0000000000000000
[59.219] </TASK>
[59.219] INFO: task btrfs:346822 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
[59.220] Tainted: G W 6.3.0-rc2-btrfs-next-127+ #1
[59.221] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
[59.222] task:btrfs state:D stack:0 pid:346822 ppid:1 flags:0x00004002
[59.222] Call Trace:
[59.222] <TASK>
[59.222] __schedule+0x392/0xa70
[59.222] schedule+0x5d/0xd0
[59.222] btrfs_scrub_cancel+0x91/0x100 [btrfs]
[59.222] ? __pfx_autoremove_wake_function+0x10/0x10
[59.222] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x572/0xeb0 [btrfs]
[59.223] ? start_transaction+0xcb/0x610 [btrfs]
[59.223] prepare_to_relocate+0x111/0x1a0 [btrfs]
[59.223] relocate_block_group+0x57/0x5d0 [btrfs]
[59.223] ? btrfs_wait_nocow_writers+0x25/0xb0 [btrfs]
[59.223] btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x248/0x3c0 [btrfs]
[59.224] ? __pfx_autoremove_wake_function+0x10/0x10
[59.224] btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x3b/0x150 [btrfs]
[59.224] btrfs_balance+0x8ff/0x11d0 [btrfs]
[59.224] ? __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x14a/0x410
[59.224] btrfs_ioctl+0x2334/0x32c0 [btrfs]
[59.225] ? mod_objcg_state+0xd2/0x360
[59.225] ? refill_obj_stock+0xb0/0x160
[59.225] ? seq_release+0x25/0x30
[59.225] ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x3b5/0x4b0
[59.225] ? percpu_counter_add_batch+0x2e/0xa0
[59.225] ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x88/0xc0
[59.225] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x88/0xc0
[59.225] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[59.225] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
[59.225] RIP: 0033:0x7f381a6ffe9b
[59.225] RSP: 002b:00007ffd45ecf060 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
[59.225] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 00007f381a6ffe9b
[59.225] RDX: 00007ffd45ecf150 RSI: 00000000c4009420 RDI: 0000000000000003
[59.225] RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000013 R09: 0000000000000000
[59.225] R10: 00007f381a60c878 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffd45ed0423
[59.225] R13: 00007ffd45ecf150 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffd45ecf148
[59.225] </TASK>
What happens is the following:
1) A scrub is running, so fs_info->scrubs_running is 1;
2) Task A starts block group relocation, and at btrfs_relocate_chunk() it
pauses scrub by calling btrfs_scrub_pause(). That increments
fs_info->scrub_pause_req from 0 to 1 and waits for the scrub task to
pause (for fs_info->scrubs_paused to be == to fs_info->scrubs_running);
3) The scrub task pauses at scrub_pause_off(), waiting for
fs_info->scrub_pause_req to decrease to 0;
4) Task A then enters btrfs_relocate_block_group(), and down that call
chain we start a transaction and then attempt to commit it;
5) When task A calls btrfs_commit_transaction(), it either will do the
commit itself or wait for some other task that already started the
commit of the transaction - it doesn't matter which case;
6) The transaction commit enters state TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_START;
7) An error happens during the transaction commit, like -ENOSPC when
running delayed refs or delayed items for example;
8) This results in calling transaction.c:cleanup_transaction(), where
we call btrfs_scrub_cancel(), incrementing fs_info->scrub_cancel_req
from 0 to 1, and blocking this task waiting for fs_info->scrubs_running
to decrease to 0;
9) From this point on, both the transaction commit and the scrub task
hang forever:
1) The transaction commit is waiting for fs_info->scrubs_running to
be decreased to 0;
2) The scrub task is at scrub_pause_off() waiting for
fs_info->scrub_pause_req to decrease to 0 - so it can not proceed
to stop the scrub and decrement fs_info->scrubs_running from 0 to 1.
Therefore resulting in a deadlock.
Fix this by having cleanup_transaction(), called if a transaction commit
fails, not call btrfs_scrub_cancel() if relocation is in progress, and
having btrfs_relocate_block_group() call btrfs_scrub_cancel() instead if
the relocation failed and a transaction abort happened.
This was triggered with btrfs/061 from fstests.
Fixes: 55e3a601c81c ("btrfs: Fix data checksum error cause by replace with io-load.")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
|
|
This fixes mkfs/mount/check failures due to race with systemd-udevd
scan.
During the device scan initiated by systemd-udevd, other user space
EXCL operations such as mkfs, mount, or check may get blocked and result
in a "Device or resource busy" error. This is because the device
scan process opens the device with the EXCL flag in the kernel.
Two reports were received:
- btrfs/179 test case, where the fsck command failed with the -EBUSY
error
- LTP pwritev03 test case, where mkfs.vfs failed with
the -EBUSY error, when mkfs.vfs tried to overwrite old btrfs filesystem
on the device.
In both cases, fsck and mkfs (respectively) were racing with a
systemd-udevd device scan, and systemd-udevd won, resulting in the
-EBUSY error for fsck and mkfs.
Reproducing the problem has been difficult because there is a very
small window during which these userspace threads can race to
acquire the exclusive device open. Even on the system where the problem
was observed, the problem occurrences were anywhere between 10 to 400
iterations and chances of reproducing decreases with debug printk()s.
However, an exclusive device open is unnecessary for the scan process,
as there are no write operations on the device during scan. Furthermore,
during the mount process, the superblock is re-read in the below
function call chain:
btrfs_mount_root
btrfs_open_devices
open_fs_devices
btrfs_open_one_device
btrfs_get_bdev_and_sb
So, to fix this issue, removes the FMODE_EXCL flag from the scan
operation, and add a comment.
The case where mkfs may still write to the device and a scan is running,
the btrfs signature is not written at that time so scan will not
recognize such device.
Reported-by: Sherry Yang <sherry.yang@oracle.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/202303170839.fdf23068-oliver.sang@intel.com
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
|
|
The quota assign ioctl can currently run in parallel with a quota disable
ioctl call. The assign ioctl uses the quota root, while the disable ioctl
frees that root, and therefore we can have a use-after-free triggered in
the assign ioctl, leading to a trace like the following when KASAN is
enabled:
[672.723][T736] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in btrfs_search_slot+0x2962/0x2db0
[672.723][T736] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888022ec0208 by task btrfs_search_sl/27736
[672.724][T736]
[672.725][T736] CPU: 1 PID: 27736 Comm: btrfs_search_sl Not tainted 6.3.0-rc3 #37
[672.723][T736] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
[672.727][T736] Call Trace:
[672.728][T736] <TASK>
[672.728][T736] dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x150
[672.725][T736] print_report+0xc1/0x5e0
[672.720][T736] ? __virt_addr_valid+0x61/0x2e0
[672.727][T736] ? __phys_addr+0xc9/0x150
[672.725][T736] ? btrfs_search_slot+0x2962/0x2db0
[672.722][T736] kasan_report+0xc0/0xf0
[672.729][T736] ? btrfs_search_slot+0x2962/0x2db0
[672.724][T736] btrfs_search_slot+0x2962/0x2db0
[672.723][T736] ? fs_reclaim_acquire+0xba/0x160
[672.722][T736] ? split_leaf+0x13d0/0x13d0
[672.726][T736] ? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0xb0
[672.723][T736] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x338/0x3c0
[672.722][T736] update_qgroup_status_item+0xf7/0x320
[672.724][T736] ? add_qgroup_rb+0x3d0/0x3d0
[672.739][T736] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x12d/0x2b0
[672.730][T736] ? spin_bug+0x1d0/0x1d0
[672.737][T736] btrfs_run_qgroups+0x5de/0x840
[672.730][T736] ? btrfs_qgroup_rescan_worker+0xa70/0xa70
[672.738][T736] ? __del_qgroup_relation+0x4ba/0xe00
[672.738][T736] btrfs_ioctl+0x3d58/0x5d80
[672.735][T736] ? tomoyo_path_number_perm+0x16a/0x550
[672.737][T736] ? tomoyo_execute_permission+0x4a0/0x4a0
[672.731][T736] ? btrfs_ioctl_get_supported_features+0x50/0x50
[672.737][T736] ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_switch+0x54/0x90
[672.734][T736] ? do_vfs_ioctl+0x132/0x1660
[672.730][T736] ? vfs_fileattr_set+0xc40/0xc40
[672.730][T736] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x2e/0x50
[672.732][T736] ? sigprocmask+0xf2/0x340
[672.737][T736] ? __fget_files+0x26a/0x480
[672.732][T736] ? bpf_lsm_file_ioctl+0x9/0x10
[672.738][T736] ? btrfs_ioctl_get_supported_features+0x50/0x50
[672.736][T736] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x198/0x210
[672.736][T736] do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0
[672.731][T736] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[672.739][T736] RIP: 0033:0x4556ad
[672.742][T736] </TASK>
[672.743][T736]
[672.748][T736] Allocated by task 27677:
[672.743][T736] kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x40
[672.741][T736] kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30
[672.741][T736] __kasan_kmalloc+0xa4/0xb0
[672.749][T736] btrfs_alloc_root+0x48/0x90
[672.746][T736] btrfs_create_tree+0x146/0xa20
[672.744][T736] btrfs_quota_enable+0x461/0x1d20
[672.743][T736] btrfs_ioctl+0x4a1c/0x5d80
[672.747][T736] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x198/0x210
[672.749][T736] do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0
[672.744][T736] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[672.756][T736]
[672.757][T736] Freed by task 27677:
[672.759][T736] kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x40
[672.759][T736] kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30
[672.756][T736] kasan_save_free_info+0x2e/0x50
[672.751][T736] ____kasan_slab_free+0x162/0x1c0
[672.758][T736] slab_free_freelist_hook+0x89/0x1c0
[672.752][T736] __kmem_cache_free+0xaf/0x2e0
[672.752][T736] btrfs_put_root+0x1ff/0x2b0
[672.759][T736] btrfs_quota_disable+0x80a/0xbc0
[672.752][T736] btrfs_ioctl+0x3e5f/0x5d80
[672.756][T736] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x198/0x210
[672.753][T736] do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0
[672.765][T736] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[672.769][T736]
[672.768][T736] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888022ec0000
[672.768][T736] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-4k of size 4096
[672.769][T736] The buggy address is located 520 bytes inside of
[672.769][T736] freed 4096-byte region [ffff888022ec0000, ffff888022ec1000)
[672.760][T736]
[672.764][T736] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[672.761][T736] page:ffffea00008bb000 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x22ec0
[672.766][T736] head:ffffea00008bb000 order:3 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
[672.779][T736] flags: 0xfff00000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
[672.770][T736] raw: 00fff00000010200 ffff888012842140 ffffea000054ba00 dead000000000002
[672.770][T736] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000040004 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[672.771][T736] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[672.778][T736] page_owner tracks the page as allocated
[672.777][T736] page last allocated via order 3, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0xd2040(__GFP_IO|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC), pid 88
[672.779][T736] get_page_from_freelist+0x119c/0x2d50
[672.779][T736] __alloc_pages+0x1cb/0x4a0
[672.776][T736] alloc_pages+0x1aa/0x270
[672.773][T736] allocate_slab+0x260/0x390
[672.771][T736] ___slab_alloc+0xa9a/0x13e0
[672.778][T736] __slab_alloc.constprop.0+0x56/0xb0
[672.771][T736] __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x136/0x320
[672.789][T736] __kmalloc+0x4e/0x1a0
[672.783][T736] tomoyo_realpath_from_path+0xc3/0x600
[672.781][T736] tomoyo_path_perm+0x22f/0x420
[672.782][T736] tomoyo_path_unlink+0x92/0xd0
[672.780][T736] security_path_unlink+0xdb/0x150
[672.788][T736] do_unlinkat+0x377/0x680
[672.788][T736] __x64_sys_unlink+0xca/0x110
[672.789][T736] do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0
[672.783][T736] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[672.784][T736] page last free stack trace:
[672.787][T736] free_pcp_prepare+0x4e5/0x920
[672.787][T736] free_unref_page+0x1d/0x4e0
[672.784][T736] __unfreeze_partials+0x17c/0x1a0
[672.797][T736] qlist_free_all+0x6a/0x180
[672.796][T736] kasan_quarantine_reduce+0x189/0x1d0
[672.797][T736] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x64/0x90
[672.793][T736] kmem_cache_alloc+0x17c/0x3c0
[672.799][T736] getname_flags.part.0+0x50/0x4e0
[672.799][T736] getname_flags+0x9e/0xe0
[672.792][T736] vfs_fstatat+0x77/0xb0
[672.791][T736] __do_sys_newlstat+0x84/0x100
[672.798][T736] do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0
[672.796][T736] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[672.790][T736]
[672.791][T736] Memory state around the buggy address:
[672.799][T736] ffff888022ec0100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[672.805][T736] ffff888022ec0180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[672.802][T736] >ffff888022ec0200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[672.809][T736] ^
[672.809][T736] ffff888022ec0280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[672.809][T736] ffff888022ec0300: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
Fix this by having the qgroup assign ioctl take the qgroup ioctl mutex
before calling btrfs_run_qgroups(), which is what all qgroup ioctls should
call.
Reported-by: butt3rflyh4ck <butterflyhuangxx@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/CAFcO6XN3VD8ogmHwqRk4kbiwtpUSNySu2VAxN8waEPciCHJvMA@mail.gmail.com/
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
|
|
LOOP_CONFIGURE is, as far as I understand it, supposed to be a way to
combine LOOP_SET_FD and LOOP_SET_STATUS64 into a single syscall. When
using LOOP_SET_FD+LOOP_SET_STATUS64, a single uevent would be sent for
each partition found on the loop device after the second ioctl(), but
when using LOOP_CONFIGURE, no such uevent was being sent.
In the old setup, uevents are disabled for LOOP_SET_FD, but not for
LOOP_SET_STATUS64. This makes sense, as it prevents uevents being
sent for a partially configured device during LOOP_SET_FD - they're
only sent at the end of LOOP_SET_STATUS64. But for LOOP_CONFIGURE,
uevents were disabled for the entire operation, so that final
notification was never issued. To fix this, reduce the critical
section to exclude the loop_reread_partitions() call, which causes
the uevents to be issued, to after uevents are re-enabled, matching
the behaviour of the LOOP_SET_FD+LOOP_SET_STATUS64 combination.
I noticed this because Busybox's losetup program recently changed from
using LOOP_SET_FD+LOOP_SET_STATUS64 to LOOP_CONFIGURE, and this broke
my setup, for which I want a notification from the kernel any time a
new partition becomes available.
Signed-off-by: Alyssa Ross <hi@alyssa.is>
[hch: reduced the critical section]
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Fixes: 3448914e8cc5 ("loop: Add LOOP_CONFIGURE ioctl")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230320125430.55367-1-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
"RISC-V:
- Fix VM hang in case of timer delta being zero
ARM:
- MMU fixes:
- Read the MMU notifier seq before dropping the mmap lock to guard
against reading a potentially stale VMA
- Disable interrupts when walking user page tables to protect
against the page table being freed
- Read the MTE permissions for the VMA within the mmap lock
critical section, avoiding the use of a potentally stale VMA
pointer
- vPMU fixes:
- Return the sum of the current perf event value and PMC snapshot
for reads from userspace
- Don't save the value of guest writes to PMCR_EL0.{C,P}, which
could otherwise lead to userspace erroneously resetting the vPMU
during VM save/restore"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
riscv/kvm: Fix VM hang in case of timer delta being zero.
KVM: arm64: Check for kvm_vma_mte_allowed in the critical section
KVM: arm64: Disable interrupts while walking userspace PTs
KVM: arm64: Retry fault if vma_lookup() results become invalid
KVM: arm64: PMU: Don't save PMCR_EL0.{C,P} for the vCPU
KVM: arm64: PMU: Fix GET_ONE_REG for vPMC regs to return the current value
|
|
For ACPI drivers that provide a ->notify() callback and set
ACPI_DRIVER_ALL_NOTIFY_EVENTS in their flags, that callback can be
invoked while either the ->add() or the ->remove() callback is running
without any synchronization at the bus type level which is counter to
the common-sense expectation that notification handling should only be
enabled when the driver is actually bound to the device. As a result,
if the driver is not careful enough, it's ->notify() callback may crash
when it is invoked too early or too late [1].
This issue has been amplified by commit d6fb6ee1820c ("ACPI: bus: Drop
driver member of struct acpi_device") that made acpi_bus_notify() check
for the presence of the driver and its ->notify() callback directly
instead of using an extra driver pointer that was only set and cleared
by the bus type code, but it was present before that commit although
it was harder to reproduce then.
It can be addressed by using the observation that
acpi_device_install_notify_handler() can be modified to install the
handler for all types of events when ACPI_DRIVER_ALL_NOTIFY_EVENTS is
set in the driver flags, in which case acpi_bus_notify() will not need
to invoke the driver's ->notify() callback any more and that callback
will only be invoked after acpi_device_install_notify_handler() has run
and before acpi_device_remove_notify_handler() runs, which implies the
correct ordering with respect to the other ACPI driver callbacks.
Modify the code accordingly and while at it, drop two redundant local
variables from acpi_bus_notify() and turn its description comment into
a proper kerneldoc one.
Fixes: d6fb6ee1820c ("ACPI: bus: Drop driver member of struct acpi_device")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-acpi/9f6cba7a8a57e5a687c934e8e406e28c.squirrel@mail.panix.com # [1]
Reported-by: Pierre Asselin <pa@panix.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Tested-by: Pierre Asselin <pa@panix.com>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pdx86/platform-drivers-x86
Pull x86 platform driver fixes from Hans de Goede:
- Intel tpmi/vsec fixes
- think-lmi fixes
- two other small fixes / hw-id additions
* tag 'platform-drivers-x86-v6.3-3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pdx86/platform-drivers-x86:
platform/surface: aggregator: Add missing fwnode_handle_put()
platform/x86: think-lmi: Add possible_values for ThinkStation
platform/x86: think-lmi: only display possible_values if available
platform/x86: think-lmi: use correct possible_values delimiters
platform/x86: think-lmi: add missing type attribute
platform/x86 (gigabyte-wmi): Add support for A320M-S2H V2
platform/x86/intel: tpmi: Revise the comment of intel_vsec_add_aux
platform/x86/intel: tpmi: Fix double free in tpmi_create_device()
platform/x86/intel: vsec: Fix a memory leak in intel_vsec_add_aux
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mtd/linux
Pull MTD fixes from Miquel Raynal:
"Raw NAND controller driver fixes:
- meson:
- Invalidate cache on polling ECC bit
- Initialize struct with zeroes
- nandsim: Artificially prevent sequential page reads
ECC engine driver fixes:
- mxic-ecc: Fix mxic_ecc_data_xfer_wait_for_completion() when irq is
used
Binging fixes:
- jedec,spi-nor: Document CPOL/CPHA support"
* tag 'mtd/fixes-for-6.3-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mtd/linux:
mtd: rawnand: meson: invalidate cache on polling ECC bit
mtd: rawnand: nandsim: Artificially prevent sequential page reads
dt-bindings: mtd: jedec,spi-nor: Document CPOL/CPHA support
mtd: nand: mxic-ecc: Fix mxic_ecc_data_xfer_wait_for_completion() when irq is used
mtd: rawnand: meson: initialize struct with zeroes
|
|
Return -EFAULT if put_user() for the PTRACE_GET_LAST_BREAK
request fails, instead of silently ignoring it.
Reviewed-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
|
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Expolines depend on scripts/basic/fixdep. And build of expolines can now
race with the fixdep build:
make[1]: *** Deleting file 'arch/s390/lib/expoline/expoline.o'
/bin/sh: line 1: scripts/basic/fixdep: Permission denied
make[1]: *** [../scripts/Makefile.build:385: arch/s390/lib/expoline/expoline.o] Error 126
make: *** [../arch/s390/Makefile:166: expoline_prepare] Error 2
The dependence was removed in the below Fixes: commit. So reintroduce
the dependence on scripts.
Fixes: a0b0987a7811 ("s390/nospec: remove unneeded header includes")
Cc: Joe Lawrence <joe.lawrence@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby (SUSE) <jirislaby@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230316112809.7903-1-jirislaby@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
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The device release callback function invoked to release the matrix device
uses the dev_get_drvdata(device *dev) function to retrieve the
pointer to the vfio_matrix_dev object in order to free its storage. The
problem is, this object is not stored as drvdata with the device; since the
kfree function will accept a NULL pointer, the memory for the
vfio_matrix_dev object is never freed.
Since the device being released is contained within the vfio_matrix_dev
object, the container_of macro will be used to retrieve its pointer.
Fixes: 1fde573413b5 ("s390: vfio-ap: base implementation of VFIO AP device driver")
Signed-off-by: Tony Krowiak <akrowiak@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230320150447.34557-1-akrowiak@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
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Add missing earlyclobber annotation to size, to, and tmp2 operands of the
__clear_user() inline assembly since they are modified or written to before
the last usage of all input operands. This can lead to incorrect register
allocation for the inline assembly.
Fixes: 6c2a9e6df604 ("[S390] Use alternative user-copy operations for new hardware.")
Reported-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230321122514.1743889-3-mark.rutland@arm.com/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
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Don't report an error code to L1 when synthesizing a nested VM-Exit and
L2 is in Real Mode. Per Intel's SDM, regarding the error code valid bit:
This bit is always 0 if the VM exit occurred while the logical processor
was in real-address mode (CR0.PE=0).
The bug was introduced by a recent fix for AMD's Paged Real Mode, which
moved the error code suppression from the common "queue exception" path
to the "inject exception" path, but missed VMX's "synthesize VM-Exit"
path.
Fixes: b97f07458373 ("KVM: x86: determine if an exception has an error code only when injecting it.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20230322143300.2209476-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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When injecting an exception into a vCPU in Real Mode, suppress the error
code by clearing the flag that tracks whether the error code is valid, not
by clearing the error code itself. The "typo" was introduced by recent
fix for SVM's funky Paged Real Mode.
Opportunistically hoist the logic above the tracepoint so that the trace
is coherent with respect to what is actually injected (this was also the
behavior prior to the buggy commit).
Fixes: b97f07458373 ("KVM: x86: determine if an exception has an error code only when injecting it.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20230322143300.2209476-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
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Clear vcpu->mmio_needed when injecting an exception from the emulator to
squash a (legitimate) warning about vcpu->mmio_needed being true at the
start of KVM_RUN without a callback being registered to complete the
userspace MMIO exit. Suppressing the MMIO write exit is inarguably wrong
from an architectural perspective, but it is the least awful hack-a-fix
due to shortcomings in KVM's uAPI, not to mention that KVM already
suppresses MMIO writes in this scenario.
Outside of REP string instructions, KVM doesn't provide a way to resume
an instruction at the exact point where it was "interrupted" if said
instruction partially completed before encountering an MMIO access. For
MMIO reads, KVM immediately exits to userspace upon detecting MMIO as
userspace provides the to-be-read value in a buffer, and so KVM can safely
(more or less) restart the instruction from the beginning. When the
emulator re-encounters the MMIO read, KVM will service the MMIO by getting
the value from the buffer instead of exiting to userspace, i.e. KVM won't
put the vCPU into an infinite loop.
On an emulated MMIO write, KVM finishes the instruction before exiting to
userspace, as exiting immediately would ultimately hang the vCPU due to
the aforementioned shortcoming of KVM not being able to resume emulation
in the middle of an instruction.
For the vast majority of _emulated_ instructions, deferring the userspace
exit doesn't cause problems as very few x86 instructions (again ignoring
string operations) generate multiple writes. But for instructions that
generate multiple writes, e.g. PUSHA (multiple pushes onto the stack),
deferring the exit effectively results in only the final write triggering
an exit to userspace. KVM does support multiple MMIO "fragments", but
only for page splits; if an instruction performs multiple distinct MMIO
writes, the number of fragments gets reset when the next MMIO write comes
along and any previous MMIO writes are dropped.
Circling back to the warning, if a deferred MMIO write coincides with an
exception, e.g. in this case a #SS due to PUSHA underflowing the stack
after queueing a write to an MMIO page on a previous push, KVM injects
the exceptions and leaves the deferred MMIO pending without registering a
callback, thus triggering the splat.
Sweep the problem under the proverbial rug as dropping MMIO writes is not
unique to the exception scenario (see above), i.e. instructions like PUSHA
are fundamentally broken with respect to MMIO, and have been since KVM's
inception.
Reported-by: zhangjianguo <zhangjianguo18@huawei.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+760a73552f47a8cd0fd9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+8accb43ddc6bd1f5713a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20230322141220.2206241-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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KVM irqfd based emulation of level-triggered interrupts doesn't work
quite correctly in some cases, particularly in the case of interrupts
that are handled in a Linux guest as oneshot interrupts (IRQF_ONESHOT).
Such an interrupt is acked to the device in its threaded irq handler,
i.e. later than it is acked to the interrupt controller (EOI at the end
of hardirq), not earlier.
Linux keeps such interrupt masked until its threaded handler finishes,
to prevent the EOI from re-asserting an unacknowledged interrupt.
However, with KVM + vfio (or whatever is listening on the resamplefd)
we always notify resamplefd at the EOI, so vfio prematurely unmasks the
host physical IRQ, thus a new physical interrupt is fired in the host.
This extra interrupt in the host is not a problem per se. The problem is
that it is unconditionally queued for injection into the guest, so the
guest sees an extra bogus interrupt. [*]
There are observed at least 2 user-visible issues caused by those
extra erroneous interrupts for a oneshot irq in the guest:
1. System suspend aborted due to a pending wakeup interrupt from
ChromeOS EC (drivers/platform/chrome/cros_ec.c).
2. Annoying "invalid report id data" errors from ELAN0000 touchpad
(drivers/input/mouse/elan_i2c_core.c), flooding the guest dmesg
every time the touchpad is touched.
The core issue here is that by the time when the guest unmasks the IRQ,
the physical IRQ line is no longer asserted (since the guest has
acked the interrupt to the device in the meantime), yet we
unconditionally inject the interrupt queued into the guest by the
previous resampling. So to fix the issue, we need a way to detect that
the IRQ is no longer pending, and cancel the queued interrupt in this
case.
With IOAPIC we are not able to probe the physical IRQ line state
directly (at least not if the underlying physical interrupt controller
is an IOAPIC too), so in this patch we use irqfd resampler for that.
Namely, instead of injecting the queued interrupt, we just notify the
resampler that this interrupt is done. If the IRQ line is actually
already deasserted, we are done. If it is still asserted, a new
interrupt will be shortly triggered through irqfd and injected into the
guest.
In the case if there is no irqfd resampler registered for this IRQ, we
cannot fix the issue, so we keep the existing behavior: immediately
unconditionally inject the queued interrupt.
This patch fixes the issue for x86 IOAPIC only. In the long run, we can
fix it for other irqchips and other architectures too, possibly taking
advantage of reading the physical state of the IRQ line, which is
possible with some other irqchips (e.g. with arm64 GIC, maybe even with
the legacy x86 PIC).
[*] In this description we assume that the interrupt is a physical host
interrupt forwarded to the guest e.g. by vfio. Potentially the same
issue may occur also with a purely virtual interrupt from an
emulated device, e.g. if the guest handles this interrupt, again, as
a oneshot interrupt.
Signed-off-by: Dmytro Maluka <dmy@semihalf.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/31420943-8c5f-125c-a5ee-d2fde2700083@semihalf.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/87o7wrug0w.wl-maz@kernel.org/
Message-Id: <20230322204344.50138-3-dmy@semihalf.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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It is useful to be able to do read-only traversal of the list of all the
registered irqfd resamplers without locking the resampler_lock mutex.
In particular, we are going to traverse it to search for a resampler
registered for the given irq of an irqchip, and that will be done with
an irqchip spinlock (ioapic->lock) held, so it is undesirable to lock a
mutex in this context. So turn this list into an RCU list.
For protecting the read side, reuse kvm->irq_srcu which is already used
for protecting a number of irq related things (kvm->irq_routing,
irqfd->resampler->list, kvm->irq_ack_notifier_list,
kvm->arch.mask_notifier_list).
Signed-off-by: Dmytro Maluka <dmy@semihalf.com>
Message-Id: <20230322204344.50138-2-dmy@semihalf.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The Hyper-V "EnlightenedNptTlb" enlightenment is always enabled when KVM
is running on top of Hyper-V and Hyper-V exposes support for it (which
is always). On AMD CPUs this enlightenment results in ASID invalidations
not flushing TLB entries derived from the NPT. To force the underlying
(L0) hypervisor to rebuild its shadow page tables, an explicit hypercall
is needed.
The original KVM implementation of Hyper-V's "EnlightenedNptTlb" on SVM
only added remote TLB flush hooks. This worked out fine for a while, as
sufficient remote TLB flushes where being issued in KVM to mask the
problem. Since v5.17, changes in the TDP code reduced the number of
flushes and the out-of-sync TLB prevents guests from booting
successfully.
Split svm_flush_tlb_current() into separate callbacks for the 3 cases
(guest/all/current), and issue the required Hyper-V hypercall when a
Hyper-V TLB flush is needed. The most important case where the TLB flush
was missing is when loading a new PGD, which is followed by what is now
svm_flush_tlb_current().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.17+
Fixes: 1e0c7d40758b ("KVM: SVM: hyper-v: Remote TLB flush for SVM")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/43980946-7bbf-dcef-7e40-af904c456250@linux.microsoft.com/
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20230324145233.4585-1-jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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HEAD
KVM/riscv fixes for 6.3, take #1
- Fix VM hang in case of timer delta being zero
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD
KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.3, part #2
Fixes for a rather interesting set of bugs relating to the MMU:
- Read the MMU notifier seq before dropping the mmap lock to guard
against reading a potentially stale VMA
- Disable interrupts when walking user page tables to protect against
the page table being freed
- Read the MTE permissions for the VMA within the mmap lock critical
section, avoiding the use of a potentally stale VMA pointer
Additionally, some fixes targeting the vPMU:
- Return the sum of the current perf event value and PMC snapshot for
reads from userspace
- Don't save the value of guest writes to PMCR_EL0.{C,P}, which could
otherwise lead to userspace erroneously resetting the vPMU during VM
save/restore
|
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This has been reported as working.
Suggested-by: got3nks <got3nks@users.noreply.github.com>
Link: https://github.com/t-8ch/linux-gigabyte-wmi-driver/issues/15#issuecomment-1483942966
Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <linux@weissschuh.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230327-gigabyte-wmi-b650-elite-ax-v1-1-d4d645c21d0b@weissschuh.net
Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
|
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Syzkaller reported the following issue:
=====================================================
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in aio_rw_done fs/aio.c:1520 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in aio_write+0x899/0x950 fs/aio.c:1600
aio_rw_done fs/aio.c:1520 [inline]
aio_write+0x899/0x950 fs/aio.c:1600
io_submit_one+0x1d1c/0x3bf0 fs/aio.c:2019
__do_sys_io_submit fs/aio.c:2078 [inline]
__se_sys_io_submit+0x293/0x770 fs/aio.c:2048
__x64_sys_io_submit+0x92/0xd0 fs/aio.c:2048
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
Uninit was created at:
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:766 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3452 [inline]
__kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x71f/0xce0 mm/slub.c:3491
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:967 [inline]
__kmalloc+0x11d/0x3b0 mm/slab_common.c:981
kmalloc_array include/linux/slab.h:636 [inline]
bcm_tx_setup+0x80e/0x29d0 net/can/bcm.c:930
bcm_sendmsg+0x3a2/0xce0 net/can/bcm.c:1351
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:734 [inline]
sock_write_iter+0x495/0x5e0 net/socket.c:1108
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2189 [inline]
aio_write+0x63a/0x950 fs/aio.c:1600
io_submit_one+0x1d1c/0x3bf0 fs/aio.c:2019
__do_sys_io_submit fs/aio.c:2078 [inline]
__se_sys_io_submit+0x293/0x770 fs/aio.c:2048
__x64_sys_io_submit+0x92/0xd0 fs/aio.c:2048
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
CPU: 1 PID: 5034 Comm: syz-executor350 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc6-syzkaller-80422-geda666ff2276 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/12/2023
=====================================================
We can follow the call chain and find that 'bcm_tx_setup' function
calls 'memcpy_from_msg' to copy some content to the newly allocated
frame of 'op->frames'. After that the 'len' field of copied structure
being compared with some constant value (64 or 8). However, if
'memcpy_from_msg' returns an error, we will compare some uninitialized
memory. This triggers 'uninit-value' issue.
This patch will add 'memcpy_from_msg' possible errors processing to
avoid uninit-value issue.
Tested via syzkaller
Reported-by: syzbot+c9bfd85eca611ebf5db1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=47f897f8ad958bbde5790ebf389b5e7e0a345089
Signed-off-by: Ivan Orlov <ivan.orlov0322@gmail.com>
Fixes: 6f3b911d5f29b ("can: bcm: add support for CAN FD frames")
Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230314120445.12407-1-ivan.orlov0322@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
|
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For platforms with Alder Lake PCH (Alder Lake S and Raptor Lake S) the
slp_s0_residency attribute has been reporting the wrong value. Unlike other
platforms, ADL PCH does not have a counter for the time that the SLP_S0
signal was asserted. Instead, firmware uses the aggregate of the Low Power
Mode (LPM) substate counters as the S0ix value. Since the LPM counters run
at a different frequency, this lead to misreporting of the S0ix time.
Add a check for Alder Lake PCH and adjust the frequency accordingly when
display slp_s0_residency.
Fixes: bbab31101f44 ("platform/x86/intel: pmc/core: Add Alderlake support to pmc core driver")
Signed-off-by: Rajvi Jingar <rajvi.jingar@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David E. Box <david.e.box@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Rajneesh Bhardwaj <irenic.rajneesh@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230320212029.3154407-1-david.e.box@linux.intel.com
Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
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If we fail to adjust the GuC run-control on opening the perf stream,
make sure we unwind the wakeref just taken.
v2: Retain old goto label names (Ashutosh)
v3: Drop bitfield boolean
Fixes: 01e742746785 ("drm/i915/guc: Support OA when Wa_16011777198 is enabled")
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris.p.wilson@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ashutosh Dixit <ashutosh.dixit@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Umesh Nerlige Ramappa <umesh.nerlige.ramappa@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230323225901.3743681-2-umesh.nerlige.ramappa@intel.com
(cherry picked from commit 2810ac6c753d17ee2572ffb57fe2382a786a080a)
Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>
|
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Currently i915_gem_object_is_framebuffer() doesn't treat the
BO containing the framebuffer's DPT as a framebuffer itself.
This means eg. that the shrinker can evict the DPT BO while
leaving the actual FB BO bound, when the DPT is allocated
from regular shmem.
That causes an immediate oops during hibernate as we
try to rewrite the PTEs inside the already evicted
DPT obj.
TODO: presumably this might also be the reason for the
DPT related display faults under heavy memory pressure,
but I'm still not sure how that would happen as the object
should be pinned by intel_dpt_pin() while in active use by
the display engine...
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Juha-Pekka Heikkila <juhapekka.heikkila@gmail.com>
Cc: Matthew Auld <matthew.auld@intel.com>
Cc: Imre Deak <imre.deak@intel.com>
Fixes: 0dc987b699ce ("drm/i915/display: Add smem fallback allocation for dpt")
Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230320090522.9909-2-ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com
Reviewed-by: Juha-Pekka Heikkila <juhapekka.heikkila@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 779cb5ba64ec7df80675a956c9022929514f517a)
Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>
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i915_gem_object_create_lmem_from_data() lacks the flush of the data
written to lmem to ensure the object is marked as dirty and the writes
flushed to the backing store. Once created, we can immediately release
the obj->mm.mapping caching of the vmap.
Fixes: 7acbbc7cf485 ("drm/i915/guc: put all guc objects in lmem when available")
Cc: Matthew Auld <matthew.auld@intel.com>
Cc: Daniele Ceraolo Spurio <daniele.ceraolospurio@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Shyti <andi.shyti@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Cc: John Harrison <John.C.Harrison@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris.p.wilson@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.16+
Signed-off-by: Nirmoy Das <nirmoy.das@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andi Shyti <andi.shyti@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Nirmoy Das <nirmoy.das@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230316165918.13074-1-nirmoy.das@intel.com
(cherry picked from commit e2ee10474ce766686e7a7496585cdfaf79e3a1bf)
Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>
|
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The commit renaming icl_tc_phy_is_in_safe_mode() to
icl_tc_phy_take_ownership() didn't flip the function's return value
accordingly, fix this up.
This didn't cause an actual problem besides state check errors, since
the function is only used during HW readout.
Cc: José Roberto de Souza <jose.souza@intel.com>
Fixes: f53979d68a77 ("drm/i915/display/tc: Rename safe_mode functions ownership")
Reviewed-by: José Roberto de Souza <jose.souza@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Imre Deak <imre.deak@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230316131724.359612-4-imre.deak@intel.com
(cherry picked from commit f2c7959dda614d9b7c6a41510492de39d31705ec)
Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>
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Keeping DC states enabled is incompatible with the _noarm()/_arm()
split we use for writing pipe/plane registers. When DC5 and PSR
are enabled, all pipe/plane registers effectively become self-arming
on account of DC5 exit arming the update, and PSR exit latching it.
What probably saves us most of the time is that (with PIPE_MISC[21]=0)
all pipe register writes themselves trigger PSR exit, and then
we don't re-enter PSR until the idle frame count has elapsed.
So it may be that the PSR exit happens already before we've
updated the state too much.
Also the PSR1 panel (at least on this KBL) seems to discard the first
frame we trasmit, presumably still scanning out from its internal
framebuffer at that point. So only the second frame we transmit is
actually visible. But I suppose that could also be panel specific
behaviour. I haven't checked out how other PSR panels behave, nor
did I bother to check what the eDP spec has to say about this.
And since this really is all about DC states, let's switch from
the MODESET domain to the DC_OFF domain. Functionally they are
100% identical. We should probably remove the MODESET domain...
And for good measure let's toss in an assert to the place where
we do the _noarm() register writes to make sure DC states are
in fact off.
v2: Just use intel_display_power_is_enabled() (Imre)
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #v5.17+
Cc: Manasi Navare <navaremanasi@google.com>
Cc: Drew Davenport <ddavenport@chromium.org>
Cc: Jouni Högander <jouni.hogander@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Imre Deak <imre.deak@intel.com>
Fixes: d13dde449580 ("drm/i915: Split pipe+output CSC programming to noarm+arm pair")
Fixes: f8a005eb8972 ("drm/i915: Optimize icl+ universal plane programming")
Fixes: 890b6ec4a522 ("drm/i915: Split skl+ plane update into noarm+arm pair")
Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230320183532.17727-1-ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com
(cherry picked from commit 41b4c7fe72b6105a4b49395eea9aa40cef94288d)
Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>
|
|
Unlike SKL/GLK the ICL CSC unit suffers from a new issue where
CSC_MODE arming is sticky. That is, once armed it remains armed
causing the CSC coeff/offset registers to become effectively
self-arming.
CSC coeff/offset registers writes no longer disarm the CSC,
but fortunately register read still do. So we can use that
to disarm the CSC unit once the registers for the current
frame have been latched. This avoid s the self-arming behaviour
from persisting into the next frame's .color_commit_noarm()
call.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #v5.19+
Cc: Manasi Navare <navaremanasi@google.com>
Cc: Drew Davenport <ddavenport@chromium.org>
Cc: Imre Deak <imre.deak@intel.com>
Cc: Jouni Högander <jouni.hogander@intel.com>
Fixes: d13dde449580 ("drm/i915: Split pipe+output CSC programming to noarm+arm pair")
Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230320095438.17328-5-ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com
Reviewed-by: Imre Deak <imre.deak@intel.com>
(cherry picked from commit 92736f1b452bbb8a66bdb5b1d263ad00e04dd3b8)
Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>
|
|
We're going to need stuff after the color management
register latching has happened. Add a corresponding hook.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #v5.19+
Cc: Manasi Navare <navaremanasi@google.com>
Cc: Drew Davenport <ddavenport@chromium.org>
Cc: Imre Deak <imre.deak@intel.com>
Cc: Jouni Högander <jouni.hogander@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230320095438.17328-4-ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com
Reviewed-by: Imre Deak <imre.deak@intel.com>
(cherry picked from commit 3962ca4e080a525fc9eae87aa6b2286f1fae351d)
Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>
|
|
skl/glk
SKL/GLK CSC unit suffers from a nasty issue where a CSC
coeff/offset register read or write between DC5 exit and
PSR exit will undo the CSC arming performed by DMC, and
then during PSR exit the hardware will latch zeroes into
the active CSC registers. This causes any plane going
through the CSC to output all black.
We can sidestep the issue by making sure the PSR exit has
already actually happened before we touch the CSC coeff/offset
registers. Easiest way to guarantee that is to just move the
CSC programming back into the .color_commir_arm() as we force
a PSR exit (and crucially wait for it to actually happen)
prior to touching the arming registers.
When PSR (and thus also DC states) are disabled we don't
have anything to worry about, so we can keep using the
more optional _noarm() hook for writing the CSC registers.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #v5.19+
Cc: Manasi Navare <navaremanasi@google.com>
Cc: Drew Davenport <ddavenport@chromium.org>
Cc: Imre Deak <imre.deak@intel.com>
Cc: Jouni Högander <jouni.hogander@intel.com>
Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/-/issues/8283
Fixes: d13dde449580 ("drm/i915: Split pipe+output CSC programming to noarm+arm pair")
Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230320095438.17328-3-ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com
Reviewed-by: Imre Deak <imre.deak@intel.com>
(cherry picked from commit 80a892a4c2428b65366721599fc5fe50eaed35fd)
Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>
|
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We're going to want different behavior for skl/glk vs. icl
in .color_commit_noarm(), so split the hook into two. Arguably
we already had slightly different behaviour since
csc_enable/gamma_enable are never set on icl+, so the old
code was perhaps a bit confusing as well.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #v5.19+
Cc: Manasi Navare <navaremanasi@google.com>
Cc: Drew Davenport <ddavenport@chromium.org>
Cc: Imre Deak <imre.deak@intel.com>
Cc: Jouni Högander <jouni.hogander@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230320095438.17328-2-ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com
Reviewed-by: Imre Deak <imre.deak@intel.com>
(cherry picked from commit f161eb01f50ab31f2084975b43bce54b7b671e17)
Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>
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Expose intel_rps_read_actual_frequency_fw to read the actual freq without
taking forcewake for use by PMU. The code is refactored to use a common set
of functions across sysfs and PMU. Using common functions with sysfs in PMU
solves the issues of missing support for MTL and missing support for older
generations (prior to Gen6). It also future proofs the PMU where sometimes
code has been updated for sysfs and PMU has been missed.
v2: Remove runtime_pm_if_in_use from read_actual_frequency_fw (Tvrtko)
v3: (Tvrtko)
- Remove goto in __read_cagf
- Unexport intel_rps_get_cagf and intel_rps_read_punit_req
Fixes: 22009b6dad66 ("drm/i915/mtl: Modify CAGF functions for MTL")
Link: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/-/issues/8280
Signed-off-by: Ashutosh Dixit <ashutosh.dixit@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230316004800.2539753-1-ashutosh.dixit@intel.com
(cherry picked from commit 44df42e66139b5fac8db49ee354be279210f9816)
Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>
|
|
The blamed commit has introduced the following tests to
dwmac4_add_hw_vlan_rx_fltr(), called from stmmac_vlan_rx_add_vid():
if (hw->promisc) {
netdev_err(dev,
"Adding VLAN in promisc mode not supported\n");
return -EPERM;
}
"VLAN promiscuous" mode is keyed in this driver to IFF_PROMISC, and so,
vlan_vid_add() and vlan_vid_del() calls cannot take place in IFF_PROMISC
mode. I have the following 2 arguments that this restriction is.... hm,
how shall I put it nicely... unproductive :)
First, take the case of a Linux bridge. If the kernel is compiled with
CONFIG_BRIDGE_VLAN_FILTERING=y, then this bridge shall have a VLAN
database. The bridge shall try to call vlan_add_vid() on its bridge
ports for each VLAN in the VLAN table. It will do this irrespectively of
whether that port is *currently* VLAN-aware or not. So it will do this
even when the bridge was created with vlan_filtering 0.
But the Linux bridge, in VLAN-unaware mode, configures its ports in
promiscuous (IFF_PROMISC) mode, so that they accept packets with any
MAC DA (a switch must do this in order to forward those packets which
are not directly targeted to its MAC address).
As a result, the stmmac driver does not work as a bridge port, when the
kernel is compiled with CONFIG_BRIDGE_VLAN_FILTERING=y.
$ ip link add br0 type bridge && ip link set br0 up
$ ip link set eth0 master br0 && ip link set eth0 up
[ 2333.943296] br0: port 1(eth0) entered blocking state
[ 2333.943381] br0: port 1(eth0) entered disabled state
[ 2333.943782] device eth0 entered promiscuous mode
[ 2333.944080] 4033c000.ethernet eth0: Adding VLAN in promisc mode not supported
[ 2333.976509] 4033c000.ethernet eth0: failed to initialize vlan filtering on this port
RTNETLINK answers: Operation not permitted
Secondly, take the case of stmmac as DSA master. Some switch tagging
protocols are based on 802.1Q VLANs (tag_sja1105.c), and as such,
tag_8021q.c uses vlan_vid_add() to work with VLAN-filtering DSA masters.
But also, when a DSA port becomes promiscuous (for example when it joins
a bridge), the DSA framework also makes the DSA master promiscuous.
Moreover, for every VLAN that a DSA switch sends to the CPU, DSA also
programs a VLAN filter on the DSA master, because if the the DSA switch
uses a tail tag, then the hardware frame parser of the DSA master will
see VLAN as VLAN, and might filter them out, for being unknown.
Due to the above 2 reasons, my belief is that the stmmac driver does not
get to choose to not accept vlan_vid_add() calls while IFF_PROMISC is
enabled, because the 2 are completely independent and there are code
paths in the network stack which directly lead to this situation
occurring, without the user's direct input.
In fact, my belief is that "VLAN promiscuous" mode should have never
been keyed on IFF_PROMISC in the first place, but rather, on the
NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_FILTER feature flag which can be toggled by the
user through ethtool -k, when present in netdev->hw_features.
In the stmmac driver, NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_FILTER is only present in
"features", making this feature "on [fixed]".
I have this belief because I am unaware of any definition of promiscuity
which implies having an effect on anything other than MAC DA (therefore
not VLAN). However, I seem to be rather alone in having this opinion,
looking back at the disagreements from this discussion:
https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20201110153958.ci5ekor3o2ekg3ky@ipetronik.com/
In any case, to remove the vlan_vid_add() dependency on !IFF_PROMISC,
one would need to remove the check and see what fails. I guess the test
was there because of the way in which dwmac4_vlan_promisc_enable() is
implemented.
For context, the dwmac4 supports Perfect Filtering for a limited number
of VLANs - dwmac4_get_num_vlan(), priv->hw->num_vlan, with a fallback on
Hash Filtering - priv->dma_cap.vlhash - see stmmac_vlan_update(), also
visible in cat /sys/kernel/debug/stmmaceth/eth0/dma_cap | grep 'VLAN
Hash Filtering'.
The perfect filtering is based on MAC_VLAN_Tag_Filter/MAC_VLAN_Tag_Data
registers, accessed in the driver through dwmac4_write_vlan_filter().
The hash filtering is based on the MAC_VLAN_Hash_Table register, named
GMAC_VLAN_HASH_TABLE in the driver and accessed by dwmac4_update_vlan_hash().
The control bit for enabling hash filtering is GMAC_VLAN_VTHM
(MAC_VLAN_Tag_Ctrl bit VTHM: VLAN Tag Hash Table Match Enable).
Now, the description of dwmac4_vlan_promisc_enable() is that it iterates
through the driver's cache of perfect filter entries (hw->vlan_filter[i],
added by dwmac4_add_hw_vlan_rx_fltr()), and evicts them from hardware by
unsetting their GMAC_VLAN_TAG_DATA_VEN (MAC_VLAN_Tag_Data bit VEN - VLAN
Tag Enable) bit. Then it unsets the GMAC_VLAN_VTHM bit, which disables
hash matching.
This leaves the MAC, according to table "VLAN Match Status" from the
documentation, to always enter these data paths:
VID |VLAN Perfect Filter |VTHM Bit |VLAN Hash Filter |Final VLAN Match
|Match Result | |Match Result |Status
-------|--------------------|---------|-----------------|----------------
VID!=0 |Fail |0 |don't care |Pass
So, dwmac4_vlan_promisc_enable() does its job, but by unsetting
GMAC_VLAN_VTHM, it conflicts with the other code path which controls
this bit: dwmac4_update_vlan_hash(), called through stmmac_update_vlan_hash()
from stmmac_vlan_rx_add_vid() and from stmmac_vlan_rx_kill_vid().
This is, I guess, why dwmac4_add_hw_vlan_rx_fltr() is not allowed to run
after dwmac4_vlan_promisc_enable() has unset GMAC_VLAN_VTHM: because if
it did, then dwmac4_update_vlan_hash() would set GMAC_VLAN_VTHM again,
breaking the "VLAN promiscuity".
It turns out that dwmac4_vlan_promisc_enable() is way too complicated
for what needs to be done. The MAC_Packet_Filter register also has the
VTFE bit (VLAN Tag Filter Enable), which simply controls whether VLAN
tagged packets which don't match the filtering tables (either perfect or
hash) are dropped or not. At the moment, this driver unconditionally
sets GMAC_PACKET_FILTER_VTFE if NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_FILTER was detected
through the priv->dma_cap.vlhash capability bits of the device, in
stmmac_dvr_probe().
I would suggest deleting the unnecessarily complex logic from
dwmac4_vlan_promisc_enable(), and simply unsetting GMAC_PACKET_FILTER_VTFE
when becoming IFF_PROMISC, which has the same effect of allowing packets
with any VLAN tags, but has the additional benefit of being able to run
concurrently with stmmac_vlan_rx_add_vid() and stmmac_vlan_rx_kill_vid().
As much as I believe that the VTFE bit should have been exclusively
controlled by NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_FILTER through ethtool, and not by
IFF_PROMISC, changing that is not a punctual fix to the problem, and it
would probably break the VFFQ feature added by the later commit
e0f9956a3862 ("net: stmmac: Add option for VLAN filter fail queue
enable"). From the commit description, VFFQ needs IFF_PROMISC=on and
VTFE=off in order to work (and this change respects that). But if VTFE
was changed to be controlled through ethtool -k, then a user-visible
change would have been introduced in Intel's scripts (a need to run
"ethtool -k eth0 rx-vlan-filter off" which did not exist before).
The patch was tested with this set of commands:
ip link set eth0 up
ip link add link eth0 name eth0.100 type vlan id 100
ip addr add 192.168.100.2/24 dev eth0.100 && ip link set eth0.100 up
ip link set eth0 promisc on
ip link add link eth0 name eth0.101 type vlan id 101
ip addr add 192.168.101.2/24 dev eth0.101 && ip link set eth0.101 up
ip link set eth0 promisc off
ping -c 5 192.168.100.1
ping -c 5 192.168.101.1
ip link set eth0 promisc on
ping -c 5 192.168.100.1
ping -c 5 192.168.101.1
ip link del eth0.100
ip link del eth0.101
# Wait for VLAN-tagged pings from the other end...
# Check with "tcpdump -i eth0 -e -n -p" and we should see them
ip link set eth0 promisc off
# Wait for VLAN-tagged pings from the other end...
# Check with "tcpdump -i eth0 -e -n -p" and we shouldn't see them
# anymore, but remove the "-p" argument from tcpdump and they're there.
Fixes: c89f44ff10fd ("net: stmmac: Add support for VLAN promiscuous mode")
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This commit addresses a deadlock situation that can occur in certain
scenarios, such as when running data TP/ETP transfer and subscribing to
the error queue while receiving a net down event. The deadlock involves
locks in the following order:
3
j1939_session_list_lock -> active_session_list_lock
j1939_session_activate
...
j1939_sk_queue_activate_next -> sk_session_queue_lock
...
j1939_xtp_rx_eoma_one
2
j1939_sk_queue_drop_all -> sk_session_queue_lock
...
j1939_sk_netdev_event_netdown -> j1939_socks_lock
j1939_netdev_notify
1
j1939_sk_errqueue -> j1939_socks_lock
__j1939_session_cancel -> active_session_list_lock
j1939_tp_rxtimer
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&priv->active_session_list_lock);
lock(&jsk->sk_session_queue_lock);
lock(&priv->active_session_list_lock);
lock(&priv->j1939_socks_lock);
The solution implemented in this commit is to move the
j1939_sk_errqueue() call out of the active_session_list_lock context,
thus preventing the deadlock situation.
Reported-by: syzbot+ee1cd780f69483a8616b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 5b9272e93f2e ("can: j1939: extend UAPI to notify about RX status")
Co-developed-by: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com>
Signed-off-by: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230324130141.2132787-1-o.rempel@pengutronix.de
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
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Implement phy_read16() and phy_write16() ops for B53 MMAP to avoid accessing
B53_PORT_MII_PAGE registers which hangs the device.
This access should be done through the MDIO Mux bus controller.
Signed-off-by: Álvaro Fernández Rojas <noltari@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The KSZ9131RNX incorrectly shows EEE capabilities in its registers.
Although the "EEE control and capability 1" (Register 3.20) is set to 0,
indicating no EEE support, the "EEE advertisement 1" (Register 7.60) is
set to 0x6, advertising EEE support for 1000BaseT/Full and
100BaseT/Full.
This inconsistency causes PHYlib to assume there is no EEE support,
preventing control over EEE advertisement, which is enabled by default.
This patch resolves the issue by utilizing the ksz9477_get_features()
function to correctly set the EEE capabilities for the KSZ9131RNX. This
adjustment allows proper control over EEE advertisement and ensures
accurate representation of the device's capabilities.
Fixes: 8b68710a3121 ("net: phy: start using genphy_c45_ethtool_get/set_eee()")
Reported-by: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de>
Tested-by: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de>
Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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pkt_list_lock was used before commit 71dc9ec9ac7d ("virtio/vsock:
replace virtio_vsock_pkt with sk_buff") to protect the packet queue.
After that commit we switched to sk_buff and we are using
sk_buff_head.lock in almost every place to protect the packet queue
except in vsock_loopback_work() when we call skb_queue_splice_init().
As reported by syzbot, this caused unlocked concurrent access to the
packet queue between vsock_loopback_work() and
vsock_loopback_cancel_pkt() since it is not holding pkt_list_lock.
With the introduction of sk_buff_head, pkt_list_lock is redundant and
can cause confusion, so let's remove it and use sk_buff_head.lock
everywhere to protect the packet queue access.
Fixes: 71dc9ec9ac7d ("virtio/vsock: replace virtio_vsock_pkt with sk_buff")
Cc: bobby.eshleman@bytedance.com
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+befff0a9536049e7902e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bobby Eshleman <bobby.eshleman@bytedance.com>
Reviewed-by: Arseniy Krasnov <AVKrasnov@sberdevices.ru>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Russell King says:
====================
Constify a few sfp/phy fwnodes
This series constifies a bunch of fwnode_handle pointers that are only
used to refer to but not modify the contents of the fwnode structures.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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fwnode_get_phy_node() does not motify the fwnode structure, so make
the argument const,
Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Constify sfp-bus internal fwnode uses, since we do not modify the
fwnode structures.
Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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sfp_bus_find_fwnode() does not write to the fwnode, so let's make it
const.
Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The failover txq is inited as 16 queues.
when a packet is transmitted from the failover device firstly,
the failover device will select the queue which is returned from
the primary device if the primary device is UP and running.
If the primary device txq is bigger than the default 16,
it can lead to the following warning:
eth0 selects TX queue 18, but real number of TX queues is 16
The warning backtrace is:
[ 32.146376] CPU: 18 PID: 9134 Comm: chronyd Tainted: G E 6.2.8-1.el7.centos.x86_64 #1
[ 32.147175] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.10.2-3.el7_4.1 04/01/2014
[ 32.147730] Call Trace:
[ 32.147971] <TASK>
[ 32.148183] dump_stack_lvl+0x48/0x70
[ 32.148514] dump_stack+0x10/0x20
[ 32.148820] netdev_core_pick_tx+0xb1/0xe0
[ 32.149180] __dev_queue_xmit+0x529/0xcf0
[ 32.149533] ? __check_object_size.part.0+0x21c/0x2c0
[ 32.149967] ip_finish_output2+0x278/0x560
[ 32.150327] __ip_finish_output+0x1fe/0x2f0
[ 32.150690] ip_finish_output+0x2a/0xd0
[ 32.151032] ip_output+0x7a/0x110
[ 32.151337] ? __pfx_ip_finish_output+0x10/0x10
[ 32.151733] ip_local_out+0x5e/0x70
[ 32.152054] ip_send_skb+0x19/0x50
[ 32.152366] udp_send_skb.isra.0+0x163/0x3a0
[ 32.152736] udp_sendmsg+0xba8/0xec0
[ 32.153060] ? __folio_memcg_unlock+0x25/0x60
[ 32.153445] ? __pfx_ip_generic_getfrag+0x10/0x10
[ 32.153854] ? sock_has_perm+0x85/0xa0
[ 32.154190] inet_sendmsg+0x6d/0x80
[ 32.154508] ? inet_sendmsg+0x6d/0x80
[ 32.154838] sock_sendmsg+0x62/0x70
[ 32.155152] ____sys_sendmsg+0x134/0x290
[ 32.155499] ___sys_sendmsg+0x81/0xc0
[ 32.155828] ? _get_random_bytes.part.0+0x79/0x1a0
[ 32.156240] ? ip4_datagram_release_cb+0x5f/0x1e0
[ 32.156649] ? get_random_u16+0x69/0xf0
[ 32.156989] ? __fget_light+0xcf/0x110
[ 32.157326] __sys_sendmmsg+0xc4/0x210
[ 32.157657] ? __sys_connect+0xb7/0xe0
[ 32.157995] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xce/0x140
[ 32.158388] ? syscall_trace_enter.isra.0+0x12c/0x1a0
[ 32.158820] __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x24/0x30
[ 32.159171] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[ 32.159493] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
Fix that by reducing txq number as the non-existent primary-dev does.
Fixes: cfc80d9a1163 ("net: Introduce net_failover driver")
Signed-off-by: Faicker Mo <faicker.mo@ucloud.cn>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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devm_clk_get() can return -EPROBE_DEFER. So it is better to return the
error code from devm_clk_get(), instead of a hard coded -ENOENT.
This gives more opportunities to successfully probe the driver.
Fixes: 8959e5324485 ("regulator: fixed: add possibility to enable by clock")
Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/18459fae3d017a66313699c7c8456b28158b2dd0.1679819354.git.christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
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