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When VHE is not present, KVM needs to save and restores PMSCR_EL1 when
possible. If SPE is used by the host, value of PMSCR_EL1 cannot be saved
for the guest.
If the host starts using SPE between two save+restore on the same vcpu,
restore will write the value of PMSCR_EL1 read during the first save.
Make sure __debug_save_spe_nvhe clears the value of the saved PMSCR_EL1
when the guest cannot use SPE.
Signed-off-by: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com>
Cc: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
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The mtd_check_oob_ops() helper verifies if the operation defined by the
user is correct.
Fix the check that verifies if the entire requested area exists. This
check is too restrictive and will fail anytime the last data byte of the
very last page is included in an operation.
Fixes: 5cdd929da53d ("mtd: Add sanity checks in mtd_write/read_oob()")
Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@free-electrons.com>
Acked-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@free-electrons.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
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This reverts commit 04e35f4495dd560db30c25efca4eecae8ec8c375.
SELinux runs with secureexec for all non-"noatsecure" domain transitions,
which means lots of processes end up hitting the stack hard-limit change
that was introduced in order to fix a race with prlimit(). That race fix
will need to be redesigned.
Reported-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Tomáš Trnka <trnka@scm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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An additional 'ip' will be pushed to the stack, for restoring the
DACR later, if CONFIG_CPU_SW_DOMAIN_PAN defined.
However, the fixup still get the err_ptr by add #8*4 to sp, which
results in the fact that the code area pointed by the LR will be
overwritten, or the kernel will crash if CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA is enabled.
This patch fixes the stack mismatch.
Fixes: a5e090acbf54 ("ARM: software-based priviledged-no-access support")
Signed-off-by: Lvqiang Huang <Lvqiang.Huang@spreadtrum.com>
Signed-off-by: Chunyan Zhang <zhang.lyra@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull Page Table Isolation (PTI) v4.14 backporting base tree from Ingo Molnar:
"This tree contains the v4.14 PTI backport preparatory tree, which
consists of four merges of upstream trees and 7 cherry-picked commits,
which the upcoming PTI work depends on"
NOTE! The resulting tree is exactly the same as the original base tree
(ie the diff between this commit and its immediate first parent is
empty).
The only reason for this merge is literally to have a common point for
the actual PTI changes so that the commits can be shared in both the
4.15 and 4.14 trees.
* 'WIP.x86-pti.base-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/mm/kasan: Don't use vmemmap_populate() to initialize shadow
locking/barriers: Convert users of lockless_dereference() to READ_ONCE()
locking/barriers: Add implicit smp_read_barrier_depends() to READ_ONCE()
bpf: fix build issues on um due to mising bpf_perf_event.h
perf/x86: Enable free running PEBS for REGS_USER/INTR
x86: Make X86_BUG_FXSAVE_LEAK detectable in CPUID on AMD
x86/cpufeature: Add User-Mode Instruction Prevention definitions
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull Page Table Isolation (PTI) preparatory tree from Ingo Molnar:
"This does a rename to free up linux/pti.h to be used by the upcoming
page table isolation feature"
* 'WIP.x86-pti.base.prep-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
drivers/misc/intel/pti: Rename the header file to free up the namespace
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull timer fix from Thomas Gleixner:
"A single bugfix which prevents arbitrary sigev_notify values in
posix-timers"
* 'timers-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
posix-timer: Properly check sigevent->sigev_notify
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git://git.infradead.org/users/vkoul/slave-dma
Pull dmaengine fixes from Vinod Koul:
"This time consisting of fixes in a bunch of drivers and the dmatest
module:
- Fix for disable clk on error path in fsl-edma driver
- Disable clk fail fix in jz4740 driver
- Fix long pending bug in dmatest driver for dangling pointer
- Fix potential NULL pointer dereference in at_hdmac driver
- Error handling path in ioat driver"
* tag 'dmaengine-fix-4.15-rc4' of git://git.infradead.org/users/vkoul/slave-dma:
dmaengine: fsl-edma: disable clks on all error paths
dmaengine: jz4740: disable/unprepare clk if probe fails
dmaengine: dmatest: move callback wait queue to thread context
dmaengine: at_hdmac: fix potential NULL pointer dereference in atc_prep_dma_interleaved
dmaengine: ioat: Fix error handling path
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With CONFIG_MTD=m and CONFIG_CRAMFS=y, we now get a link failure:
fs/cramfs/inode.o: In function `cramfs_mount': inode.c:(.text+0x220): undefined reference to `mount_mtd'
fs/cramfs/inode.o: In function `cramfs_mtd_fill_super':
inode.c:(.text+0x6d8): undefined reference to `mtd_point'
inode.c:(.text+0xae4): undefined reference to `mtd_unpoint'
This adds a more specific Kconfig dependency to avoid the broken
configuration.
Alternatively we could make CRAMFS itself depend on "MTD || !MTD" with a
similar result.
Fixes: 99c18ce580c6 ("cramfs: direct memory access support")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull vfs fixes from Al Viro:
"The alloc_super() one is a regression in this merge window, lazytime
thing is older..."
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
VFS: Handle lazytime in do_mount()
alloc_super(): do ->s_umount initialization earlier
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4
Pull ext4 fixes from Ted Ts'o:
"Fix a regression which caused us to fail to interpret symlinks in very
ancient ext3 file system images.
Also fix two xfstests failures, one of which could cause an OOPS, plus
an additional bug fix caught by fuzz testing"
* tag 'ext4_for_stable' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4:
ext4: fix crash when a directory's i_size is too small
ext4: add missing error check in __ext4_new_inode()
ext4: fix fdatasync(2) after fallocate(2) operation
ext4: support fast symlinks from ext3 file systems
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In testing, I found that the thread stack can be 16 kB when using an irq
stack. Without it, the thread stack needs to be 32 kB. Currently, the irq
stack is 32 kB. While it probably could be 16 kB, I would prefer to leave it
as is for safety.
Signed-off-by: John David Anglin <dave.anglin@bell.net>
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
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This reverts commit 5c38602d83e584047906b41b162ababd4db4106d.
Interrupts can't be enabled early because the register saves are done on
the thread stack prior to switching to the IRQ stack. This caused stack
overflows and the thread stack needed increasing to 32k. Even then,
stack overflows still occasionally occurred.
Background:
Even with a 32 kB thread stack, I have seen instances where the thread
stack overflowed on the mx3210 buildd. Detection of stack overflow only
occurs when we have an external interrupt. When an external interrupt
occurs, we switch to the thread stack if we are not already on a kernel
stack. Then, registers and specials are saved to the kernel stack.
The bug occurs in intr_return where interrupts are reenabled prior to
returning from the interrupt. This was done incase we need to schedule
or deliver signals. However, it introduces the possibility that
multiple external interrupts may occur on the thread stack and cause a
stack overflow. These might not be detected and cause the kernel to
misbehave in random ways.
This patch changes the code back to only reenable interrupts when we are
going to schedule or deliver signals. As a result, we generally return
from an interrupt before reenabling interrupts. This minimizes the
growth of the thread stack.
Fixes: 5c38602d83e5 ("parisc: Re-enable interrupts early")
Signed-off-by: John David Anglin <dave.anglin@bell.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10+
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
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These duplicate includes have been found with scripts/checkincludes.pl
but they have been removed manually to avoid removing false positives.
Signed-off-by: Pravin Shedge <pravin.shedge4linux@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
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Diva GSP card has built-in serial AUX port and ATI graphic card which simply
don't work and which both don't have external connectors. User Guides even
mention that those devices shouldn't be used.
So, prevent that Linux drivers try to enable those devices.
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.0+
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The os_hpmc_size variable sometimes wasn't aligned at word boundary and thus
triggered the unaligned fault handler at startup.
Fix it by aligning it properly.
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.14+
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Static analysis tools complain that we intended to have curly braces
around this indent block. In this case this assumption is wrong, so fix
the indenting.
Fixes: 2f3c7b8137ef ("parisc: Add core code for self-extracting kernel")
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.14+
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Things got moved around between the original bpf_override_return patches
and the final version, and now the ftrace kprobe dispatcher assumes if
you modified the ip that you also enabled preemption. Make a comment of
this and enable preemption, this fixes the lockdep splat that happened
when using this feature.
Fixes: 9802d86585db ("bpf: add a bpf_override_function helper")
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
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netdev_bpf.flags is the input member for installing the program.
netdev_bpf.prog_flags is the output member for querying. Set
the correct one on query.
Fixes: 92f0292b35a0 ("net: xdp: report flags program was installed with on query")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Reviewed-by: Quentin Monnet <quentin.monnet@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
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/bin/sh's exit does not recognize -1 as a number, leading to
the following error message:
/bin/sh: 1: exit: Illegal number: -1
Use 1 as the exit code.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Reviewed-by: Quentin Monnet <quentin.monnet@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
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Alexei Starovoitov says:
====================
First of all huge thank you to Daniel, John, Jakub, Edward and others who
reviewed multiple iterations of this patch set over the last many months
and to Dave and others who gave critical feedback during netconf/netdev.
The patch is solid enough and we thought through numerous corner cases,
but it's not the end. More followups with code reorg and features to follow.
TLDR: Allow arbitrary function calls from bpf function to another bpf function.
Since the beginning of bpf all bpf programs were represented as a single function
and program authors were forced to use always_inline for all functions
in their C code. That was causing llvm to unnecessary inflate the code size
and forcing developers to move code to header files with little code reuse.
With a bit of additional complexity teach verifier to recognize
arbitrary function calls from one bpf function to another as long as
all of functions are presented to the verifier as a single bpf program.
Extended program layout:
..
r1 = .. // arg1
r2 = .. // arg2
call pc+1 // function call pc-relative
exit
.. = r1 // access arg1
.. = r2 // access arg2
..
call pc+20 // second level of function call
...
It allows for better optimized code and finally allows to introduce
the core bpf libraries that can be reused in different projects,
since programs are no longer limited by single elf file.
With function calls bpf can be compiled into multiple .o files.
This patch is the first step. It detects programs that contain
multiple functions and checks that calls between them are valid.
It splits the sequence of bpf instructions (one program) into a set
of bpf functions that call each other. Calls to only known
functions are allowed. Since all functions are presented to
the verifier at once conceptually it is 'static linking'.
Future plans:
- introduce BPF_PROG_TYPE_LIBRARY and allow a set of bpf functions
to be loaded into the kernel that can be later linked to other
programs with concrete program types. Aka 'dynamic linking'.
- introduce function pointer type and indirect calls to allow
bpf functions call other dynamically loaded bpf functions while
the caller bpf function is already executing. Aka 'runtime linking'.
This will be more generic and more flexible alternative
to bpf_tail_calls.
FAQ:
Q: Interpreter and JIT changes mean that new instruction is introduced ?
A: No. The call instruction technically stays the same. Now it can call
both kernel helpers and other bpf functions.
Calling convention stays the same as well.
From uapi point of view the call insn got new 'relocation' BPF_PSEUDO_CALL
similar to BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD 'relocation' of bpf_ldimm64 insn.
Q: What had to change on LLVM side?
A: Trivial LLVM patch to allow calls was applied to upcoming 6.0 release:
https://reviews.llvm.org/rL318614
with few bugfixes as well.
Make sure to build the latest llvm to have bpf_call support.
More details in the patches.
====================
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
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Add some additional checks for few more corner cases.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
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similar to x64 add support for bpf-to-bpf calls.
When program has calls to in-kernel helpers the target call offset
is known at JIT time and arm64 architecture needs 2 passes.
With bpf-to-bpf calls the dynamically allocated function start
is unknown until all functions of the program are JITed.
Therefore (just like x64) arm64 JIT needs one extra pass over
the program to emit correct call offsets.
Implementation detail:
Avoid being too clever in 64-bit immediate moves and
always use 4 instructions (instead of 3-4 depending on the address)
to make sure only one extra pass is needed.
If some future optimization would make it worth while to optimize
'call 64-bit imm' further, the JIT would need to do 4 passes
over the program instead of 3 as in this patch.
For typical bpf program address the mov needs 3 or 4 insns,
so unconditional 4 insns to save extra pass is a worthy trade off
at this state of JIT.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
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Typical JIT does several passes over bpf instructions to
compute total size and relative offsets of jumps and calls.
With multitple bpf functions calling each other all relative calls
will have invalid offsets intially therefore we need to additional
last pass over the program to emit calls with correct offsets.
For example in case of three bpf functions:
main:
call foo
call bpf_map_lookup
exit
foo:
call bar
exit
bar:
exit
We will call bpf_int_jit_compile() indepedently for main(), foo() and bar()
x64 JIT typically does 4-5 passes to converge.
After these initial passes the image for these 3 functions
will be good except call targets, since start addresses of
foo() and bar() are unknown when we were JITing main()
(note that call bpf_map_lookup will be resolved properly
during initial passes).
Once start addresses of 3 functions are known we patch
call_insn->imm to point to right functions and call
bpf_int_jit_compile() again which needs only one pass.
Additional safety checks are done to make sure this
last pass doesn't produce image that is larger or smaller
than previous pass.
When constant blinding is on it's applied to all functions
at the first pass, since doing it once again at the last
pass can change size of the JITed code.
Tested on x64 and arm64 hw with JIT on/off, blinding on/off.
x64 jits bpf-to-bpf calls correctly while arm64 falls back to interpreter.
All other JITs that support normal BPF_CALL will behave the same way
since bpf-to-bpf call is equivalent to bpf-to-kernel call from
JITs point of view.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
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global bpf_jit_enable variable is tested multiple times in JITs,
blinding and verifier core. The malicious root can try to toggle
it while loading the programs. This race condition was accounted
for and there should be no issues, but it's safer to avoid
this race condition.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
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though bpf_call is still the same call instruction and
calling convention 'bpf to bpf' and 'bpf to helper' is the same
the interpreter has to oparate on 'struct bpf_insn *'.
To distinguish these two cases add a kernel internal opcode and
mark call insns with it.
This opcode is seen by interpreter only. JITs will never see it.
Also add tiny bit of debug code to aid interpreter debugging.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
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add large semi-artificial XDP test with 18 functions to stress test
bpf call verification logic
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
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strip always_inline from test_l4lb.c and compile it with -fno-inline
to let verifier go through 11 function with various function arguments
and return values
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
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- recognize relocation emitted by llvm
- since all regular function will be kept in .text section and llvm
takes care of pc-relative offsets in bpf_call instruction
simply copy all of .text to relevant program section while adjusting
bpf_call instructions in program section to point to newly copied
body of instructions from .text
- do so for all programs in the elf file
- set all programs types to the one passed to bpf_prog_load()
Note for elf files with multiple programs that use different
functions in .text section we need to do 'linker' style logic.
This work is still TBD
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
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adjust two tests, since verifier got smarter
and add new one to test stack_zero logic
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
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programs with function calls are often passing various
pointers via stack. When all calls are inlined llvm
flattens stack accesses and optimizes away extra branches.
When functions are not inlined it becomes the job of
the verifier to recognize zero initialized stack to avoid
exploring paths that program will not take.
The following program would fail otherwise:
ptr = &buffer_on_stack;
*ptr = 0;
...
func_call(.., ptr, ...) {
if (..)
*ptr = bpf_map_lookup();
}
...
if (*ptr != 0) {
// Access (*ptr)->field is valid.
// Without stack_zero tracking such (*ptr)->field access
// will be rejected
}
since stack slots are no longer uniform invalid | spill | misc
add liveness marking to all slots, but do it in 8 byte chunks.
So if nothing was read or written in [fp-16, fp-9] range
it will be marked as LIVE_NONE.
If any byte in that range was read, it will be marked LIVE_READ
and stacksafe() check will perform byte-by-byte verification.
If all bytes in the range were written the slot will be
marked as LIVE_WRITTEN.
This significantly speeds up state equality comparison
and reduces total number of states processed.
before after
bpf_lb-DLB_L3.o 2051 2003
bpf_lb-DLB_L4.o 3287 3164
bpf_lb-DUNKNOWN.o 1080 1080
bpf_lxc-DDROP_ALL.o 24980 12361
bpf_lxc-DUNKNOWN.o 34308 16605
bpf_netdev.o 15404 10962
bpf_overlay.o 7191 6679
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
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Add extensive set of tests for bpf_call verification logic:
calls: basic sanity
calls: using r0 returned by callee
calls: callee is using r1
calls: callee using args1
calls: callee using wrong args2
calls: callee using two args
calls: callee changing pkt pointers
calls: two calls with args
calls: two calls with bad jump
calls: recursive call. test1
calls: recursive call. test2
calls: unreachable code
calls: invalid call
calls: jumping across function bodies. test1
calls: jumping across function bodies. test2
calls: call without exit
calls: call into middle of ld_imm64
calls: call into middle of other call
calls: two calls with bad fallthrough
calls: two calls with stack read
calls: two calls with stack write
calls: spill into caller stack frame
calls: two calls with stack write and void return
calls: ambiguous return value
calls: two calls that return map_value
calls: two calls that return map_value with bool condition
calls: two calls that return map_value with incorrect bool check
calls: two calls that receive map_value via arg=ptr_stack_of_caller. test1
calls: two calls that receive map_value via arg=ptr_stack_of_caller. test2
calls: two jumps that receive map_value via arg=ptr_stack_of_jumper. test3
calls: two calls that receive map_value_ptr_or_null via arg. test1
calls: two calls that receive map_value_ptr_or_null via arg. test2
calls: pkt_ptr spill into caller stack
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
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Allow arbitrary function calls from bpf function to another bpf function.
To recognize such set of bpf functions the verifier does:
1. runs control flow analysis to detect function boundaries
2. proceeds with verification of all functions starting from main(root) function
It recognizes that the stack of the caller can be accessed by the callee
(if the caller passed a pointer to its stack to the callee) and the callee
can store map_value and other pointers into the stack of the caller.
3. keeps track of the stack_depth of each function to make sure that total
stack depth is still less than 512 bytes
4. disallows pointers to the callee stack to be stored into the caller stack,
since they will be invalid as soon as the callee returns
5. to reuse all of the existing state_pruning logic each function call
is considered to be independent call from the verifier point of view.
The verifier pretends to inline all function calls it sees are being called.
It stores the callsite instruction index as part of the state to make sure
that two calls to the same callee from two different places in the caller
will be different from state pruning point of view
6. more safety checks are added to liveness analysis
Implementation details:
. struct bpf_verifier_state is now consists of all stack frames that
led to this function
. struct bpf_func_state represent one stack frame. It consists of
registers in the given frame and its stack
. propagate_liveness() logic had a premature optimization where
mark_reg_read() and mark_stack_slot_read() were manually inlined
with loop iterating over parents for each register or stack slot.
Undo this optimization to reuse more complex mark_*_read() logic
. skip_callee() logic is not necessary from safety point of view,
but without it mark_*_read() markings become too conservative,
since after returning from the funciton call a read of r6-r9
will incorrectly propagate the read marks into callee causing
inefficient pruning later
. mark_*_read() logic is now aware of control flow which makes it
more complex. In the future the plan is to rewrite liveness
to be hierarchical. So that liveness can be done within
basic block only and control flow will be responsible for
propagation of liveness information along cfg and between calls.
. tail_calls and ld_abs insns are not allowed in the programs with
bpf-to-bpf calls
. returning stack pointers to the caller or storing them into stack
frame of the caller is not allowed
Testing:
. no difference in cilium processed_insn numbers
. large number of tests follows in next patches
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
|
|
Allow arbitrary function calls from bpf function to another bpf function.
Since the beginning of bpf all bpf programs were represented as a single function
and program authors were forced to use always_inline for all functions
in their C code. That was causing llvm to unnecessary inflate the code size
and forcing developers to move code to header files with little code reuse.
With a bit of additional complexity teach verifier to recognize
arbitrary function calls from one bpf function to another as long as
all of functions are presented to the verifier as a single bpf program.
New program layout:
r6 = r1 // some code
..
r1 = .. // arg1
r2 = .. // arg2
call pc+1 // function call pc-relative
exit
.. = r1 // access arg1
.. = r2 // access arg2
..
call pc+20 // second level of function call
...
It allows for better optimized code and finally allows to introduce
the core bpf libraries that can be reused in different projects,
since programs are no longer limited by single elf file.
With function calls bpf can be compiled into multiple .o files.
This patch is the first step. It detects programs that contain
multiple functions and checks that calls between them are valid.
It splits the sequence of bpf instructions (one program) into a set
of bpf functions that call each other. Calls to only known
functions are allowed. In the future the verifier may allow
calls to unresolved functions and will do dynamic linking.
This logic supports statically linked bpf functions only.
Such function boundary detection could have been done as part of
control flow graph building in check_cfg(), but it's cleaner to
separate function boundary detection vs control flow checks within
a subprogram (function) into logically indepedent steps.
Follow up patches may split check_cfg() further, but not check_subprogs().
Only allow bpf-to-bpf calls for root only and for non-hw-offloaded programs.
These restrictions can be relaxed in the future.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
|
|
There is currently no way to force CPU bug bits like CPU feature bits. That
makes it impossible to set a bug bit once at boot and have it stick for all
upcoming CPUs.
Extend the force set/clear arrays to handle bug bits as well.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.992156574@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
|
There is no generic way to test whether a kernel is running on a specific
hypervisor. But that's required to prevent the upcoming user address space
separation feature in certain guest modes.
Make the hypervisor type enum unconditionally available and provide a
helper function which allows to test for a specific type.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.912938129@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
|
native_flush_tlb_single() will be changed with the upcoming
PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION feature. This requires to have more code in
there than INVLPG.
Remove the paravirt patching for it.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: michael.schwarz@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: moritz.lipp@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: richard.fellner@student.tugraz.at
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.828111617@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
|
The TSS is a fairly juicy target for exploits, and, now that the TSS
is in the cpu_entry_area, it's no longer protected by kASLR. Make it
read-only on x86_64.
On x86_32, it can't be RO because it's written by the CPU during task
switches, and we use a task gate for double faults. I'd also be
nervous about errata if we tried to make it RO even on configurations
without double fault handling.
[ tglx: AMD confirmed that there is no problem on 64-bit with TSS RO. So
it's probably safe to assume that it's a non issue, though Intel
might have been creative in that area. Still waiting for
confirmation. ]
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.733700132@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
|
The existing code was a mess, mainly because C arrays are nasty. Turn
SYSENTER_stack into a struct, add a helper to find it, and do all the
obvious cleanups this enables.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.653244723@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
|
Now that the SYSENTER stack has a guard page, there's no need for a canary
to detect overflow after the fact.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.572577316@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
|
The IST stacks are needed when an IST exception occurs and are accessed
before any kernel code at all runs. Move them into struct cpu_entry_area.
The IST stacks are unlike the rest of cpu_entry_area: they're used even for
entries from kernel mode. This means that they should be set up before we
load the final IDT. Move cpu_entry_area setup to trap_init() for the boot
CPU and set it up for all possible CPUs at once in native_smp_prepare_cpus().
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.480598743@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
|
Handling SYSCALL is tricky: the SYSCALL handler is entered with every
single register (except FLAGS), including RSP, live. It somehow needs
to set RSP to point to a valid stack, which means it needs to save the
user RSP somewhere and find its own stack pointer. The canonical way
to do this is with SWAPGS, which lets us access percpu data using the
%gs prefix.
With PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION-like pagetable switching, this is
problematic. Without a scratch register, switching CR3 is impossible, so
%gs-based percpu memory would need to be mapped in the user pagetables.
Doing that without information leaks is difficult or impossible.
Instead, use a different sneaky trick. Map a copy of the first part
of the SYSCALL asm at a different address for each CPU. Now RIP
varies depending on the CPU, so we can use RIP-relative memory access
to access percpu memory. By putting the relevant information (one
scratch slot and the stack address) at a constant offset relative to
RIP, we can make SYSCALL work without relying on %gs.
A nice thing about this approach is that we can easily switch it on
and off if we want pagetable switching to be configurable.
The compat variant of SYSCALL doesn't have this problem in the first
place -- there are plenty of scratch registers, since we don't care
about preserving r8-r15. This patch therefore doesn't touch SYSCALL32
at all.
This patch actually seems to be a small speedup. With this patch,
SYSCALL touches an extra cache line and an extra virtual page, but
the pipeline no longer stalls waiting for SWAPGS. It seems that, at
least in a tight loop, the latter outweights the former.
Thanks to David Laight for an optimization tip.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.403607157@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
|
By itself, this is useless. It gives us the ability to run some final code
before exit that cannnot run on the kernel stack. This could include a CR3
switch a la PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION or some kernel stack erasing, for
example. (Or even weird things like *changing* which kernel stack gets
used as an ASLR-strengthening mechanism.)
The SYSRET32 path is not covered yet. It could be in the future or
we could just ignore it and force the slow path if needed.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.306546484@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
|
Historically, IDT entries from usermode have always gone directly
to the running task's kernel stack. Rearrange it so that we enter on
a per-CPU trampoline stack and then manually switch to the task's stack.
This touches a couple of extra cachelines, but it gives us a chance
to run some code before we touch the kernel stack.
The asm isn't exactly beautiful, but I think that fully refactoring
it can wait.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.225330557@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
|
When we start using an entry trampoline, a #GP from userspace will
be delivered on the entry stack, not on the task stack. Fix the
espfix64 #DF fixup to set up #GP according to TSS.SP0, rather than
assuming that pt_regs + 1 == SP0. This won't change anything
without an entry stack, but it will make the code continue to work
when an entry stack is added.
While we're at it, improve the comments to explain what's actually
going on.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.130778051@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
|
On 64-bit kernels, we used to assume that TSS.sp0 was the current
top of stack. With the addition of an entry trampoline, this will
no longer be the case. Store the current top of stack in TSS.sp1,
which is otherwise unused but shares the same cacheline.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.050864668@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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This has a secondary purpose: it puts the entry stack into a region
with a well-controlled layout. A subsequent patch will take
advantage of this to streamline the SYSCALL entry code to be able to
find it more easily.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150605.962042855@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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SYSENTER_stack should have reliable overflow detection, which
means that it needs to be at the bottom of a page, not the top.
Move it to the beginning of struct tss_struct and page-align it.
Also add an assertion to make sure that the fixed hardware TSS
doesn't cross a page boundary.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150605.881827433@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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We currently special-case stack overflow on the task stack. We're
going to start putting special stacks in the fixmap with a custom
layout, so they'll have guard pages, too. Teach the unwinder to be
able to unwind an overflow of any of the stacks.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150605.802057305@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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