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Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Stable-tree-only change.
Due to the way the GDS and SRSO patches flowed into the stable tree, it
was a 50% chance that the merge of the which value GDS and SRSO should
be. Of course, I lost that bet, and chose the opposite of what Linus
chose in commit 64094e7e3118 ("Merge tag 'gds-for-linus-2023-08-01' of
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip")
Fix this up by switching the values to match what is now in Linus's tree
as that is the correct value to mirror.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 534fc31d09b706a16d83533e16b5dc855caf7576 upstream.
It is possible that a guest can send a packet that contains a head + 18
slots and yet has a len <= XEN_NETBACK_TX_COPY_LEN. This causes nr_slots
to underflow in xenvif_get_requests() which then causes the subsequent
loop's termination condition to be wrong, causing a buffer overrun of
queue->tx_map_ops.
Rework the code to account for the extra frag_overflow slots.
This is CVE-2023-34319 / XSA-432.
Fixes: ad7f402ae4f4 ("xen/netback: Ensure protocol headers don't fall in the non-linear area")
Signed-off-by: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5a15d8348881e9371afdf9f5357a135489496955 upstream.
The SBPB bit in MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD is supported only after a microcode
patch has been applied so set X86_FEATURE_SBPB only then. Otherwise,
guests would attempt to set that bit and #GP on the MSR write.
While at it, make SMT detection more robust as some guests - depending
on how and what CPUID leafs their report - lead to cpu_smt_control
getting set to CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED but SRSO_NO should be set for any
guest incarnation where one simply cannot do SMT, for whatever reason.
Fixes: fb3bd914b3ec ("x86/srso: Add a Speculative RAS Overflow mitigation")
Reported-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reported-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Upstream commit: 3bbbe97ad83db8d9df06daf027b0840188de625d
Fix:
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: .export_symbol+0x29e40: data relocation to !ENDBR: srso_untrain_ret_alias+0x0
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Upstream commit: 238ec850b95a02dcdff3edc86781aa913549282f
Set X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK when enabling the SRSO mitigation so that
generated code (e.g., ftrace, static call, eBPF) generates "jmp
__x86_return_thunk" instead of RET.
[ bp: Add a comment. ]
Fixes: fb3bd914b3ec ("x86/srso: Add a Speculative RAS Overflow mitigation")
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Upstream commit: d893832d0e1ef41c72cdae444268c1d64a2be8ad
Add the option to flush IBPB only on VMEXIT in order to protect from
malicious guests but one otherwise trusts the software that runs on the
hypervisor.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Upstream commit: 233d6f68b98d480a7c42ebe78c38f79d44741ca9
Add the option to mitigate using IBPB on a kernel entry. Pull in the
Retbleed alternative so that the IBPB call from there can be used. Also,
if Retbleed mitigation is done using IBPB, the same mitigation can and
must be used here.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Upstream commit: 1b5277c0ea0b247393a9c426769fde18cff5e2f6
Add support for the CPUID flag which denotes that the CPU is not
affected by SRSO.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Upstream commit: 79113e4060aba744787a81edb9014f2865193854
Add support for the synthetic CPUID flag which "if this bit is 1,
it indicates that MSR 49h (PRED_CMD) bit 0 (IBPB) flushes all branch
type predictions from the CPU branch predictor."
This flag is there so that this capability in guests can be detected
easily (otherwise one would have to track microcode revisions which is
impossible for guests).
It is also needed only for Zen3 and -4. The other two (Zen1 and -2)
always flush branch type predictions by default.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Upstream commit: fb3bd914b3ec28f5fb697ac55c4846ac2d542855
Add a mitigation for the speculative return address stack overflow
vulnerability found on AMD processors.
The mitigation works by ensuring all RET instructions speculate to
a controlled location, similar to how speculation is controlled in the
retpoline sequence. To accomplish this, the __x86_return_thunk forces
the CPU to mispredict every function return using a 'safe return'
sequence.
To ensure the safety of this mitigation, the kernel must ensure that the
safe return sequence is itself free from attacker interference. In Zen3
and Zen4, this is accomplished by creating a BTB alias between the
untraining function srso_untrain_ret_alias() and the safe return
function srso_safe_ret_alias() which results in evicting a potentially
poisoned BTB entry and using that safe one for all function returns.
In older Zen1 and Zen2, this is accomplished using a reinterpretation
technique similar to Retbleed one: srso_untrain_ret() and
srso_safe_ret().
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Upstream commit: 0e52740ffd10c6c316837c6c128f460f1aaba1ea
There was never a doubt in my mind that they would not fit into a single
u32 eventually.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1b0fc0345f2852ffe54fb9ae0e12e2ee69ad6a20 upstream
These options clearly turn *off* XSAVE YMM support. Correct the
typo.
Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Fixes: 553a5c03e90a ("x86/speculation: Add force option to GDS mitigation")
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit fe3e0a13e597c1c8617814bf9b42ab732db5c26e upstream.
Moving the call of fpu__init_cpu() from cpu_init() to start_secondary()
broke Xen PV guests, as those don't call start_secondary() for APs.
Call fpu__init_cpu() in Xen's cpu_bringup(), which is the Xen PV
replacement of start_secondary().
Fixes: b81fac906a8f ("x86/fpu: Move FPU initialization into arch_cpu_finalize_init()")
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230703130032.22916-1-jgross@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0a9567ac5e6a40cdd9c8cd15b19a62a15250f450 upstream.
Moving mem_encrypt_init() broke the AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT=n because the
declaration of that function was under #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT and
the obvious placement for the inline stub was the #else path.
This is a leftover of commit 20f07a044a76 ("x86/sev: Move common memory
encryption code to mem_encrypt.c") which made mem_encrypt_init() depend on
X86_MEM_ENCRYPT without moving the prototype. That did not fail back then
because there was no stub inline as the core init code had a weak function.
Move both the declaration and the stub out of the CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
section and guard it with CONFIG_X86_MEM_ENCRYPT.
Fixes: 439e17576eb4 ("init, x86: Move mem_encrypt_init() into arch_cpu_finalize_init()")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202306170247.eQtCJPE8-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 81ac7e5d741742d650b4ed6186c4826c1a0631a7 upstream
Gather Data Sampling (GDS) is a transient execution attack using
gather instructions from the AVX2 and AVX512 extensions. This attack
allows malicious code to infer data that was previously stored in
vector registers. Systems that are not vulnerable to GDS will set the
GDS_NO bit of the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR. This is useful for VM
guests that may think they are on vulnerable systems that are, in
fact, not affected. Guests that are running on affected hosts where
the mitigation is enabled are protected as if they were running
on an unaffected system.
On all hosts that are not affected or that are mitigated, set the
GDS_NO bit.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 53cf5797f114ba2bd86d23a862302119848eff19 upstream
Gather Data Sampling (GDS) is mitigated in microcode. However, on
systems that haven't received the updated microcode, disabling AVX
can act as a mitigation. Add a Kconfig option that uses the microcode
mitigation if available and disables AVX otherwise. Setting this
option has no effect on systems not affected by GDS. This is the
equivalent of setting gather_data_sampling=force.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 553a5c03e90a6087e88f8ff878335ef0621536fb upstream
The Gather Data Sampling (GDS) vulnerability allows malicious software
to infer stale data previously stored in vector registers. This may
include sensitive data such as cryptographic keys. GDS is mitigated in
microcode, and systems with up-to-date microcode are protected by
default. However, any affected system that is running with older
microcode will still be vulnerable to GDS attacks.
Since the gather instructions used by the attacker are part of the
AVX2 and AVX512 extensions, disabling these extensions prevents gather
instructions from being executed, thereby mitigating the system from
GDS. Disabling AVX2 is sufficient, but we don't have the granularity
to do this. The XCR0[2] disables AVX, with no option to just disable
AVX2.
Add a kernel parameter gather_data_sampling=force that will enable the
microcode mitigation if available, otherwise it will disable AVX on
affected systems.
This option will be ignored if cmdline mitigations=off.
This is a *big* hammer. It is known to break buggy userspace that
uses incomplete, buggy AVX enumeration. Unfortunately, such userspace
does exist in the wild:
https://www.mail-archive.com/bug-coreutils@gnu.org/msg33046.html
[ dhansen: add some more ominous warnings about disabling AVX ]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8974eb588283b7d44a7c91fa09fcbaf380339f3a upstream
Gather Data Sampling (GDS) is a hardware vulnerability which allows
unprivileged speculative access to data which was previously stored in
vector registers.
Intel processors that support AVX2 and AVX512 have gather instructions
that fetch non-contiguous data elements from memory. On vulnerable
hardware, when a gather instruction is transiently executed and
encounters a fault, stale data from architectural or internal vector
registers may get transiently stored to the destination vector
register allowing an attacker to infer the stale data using typical
side channel techniques like cache timing attacks.
This mitigation is different from many earlier ones for two reasons.
First, it is enabled by default and a bit must be set to *DISABLE* it.
This is the opposite of normal mitigation polarity. This means GDS can
be mitigated simply by updating microcode and leaving the new control
bit alone.
Second, GDS has a "lock" bit. This lock bit is there because the
mitigation affects the hardware security features KeyLocker and SGX.
It needs to be enabled and *STAY* enabled for these features to be
mitigated against GDS.
The mitigation is enabled in the microcode by default. Disable it by
setting gather_data_sampling=off or by disabling all mitigations with
mitigations=off. The mitigation status can be checked by reading:
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/gather_data_sampling
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b81fac906a8f9e682e513ddd95697ec7a20878d4 upstream
Initializing the FPU during the early boot process is a pointless
exercise. Early boot is convoluted and fragile enough.
Nothing requires that the FPU is set up early. It has to be initialized
before fork_init() because the task_struct size depends on the FPU register
buffer size.
Move the initialization to arch_cpu_finalize_init() which is the perfect
place to do so.
No functional change.
This allows to remove quite some of the custom early command line parsing,
but that's subject to the next installment.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.902376621@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1703db2b90c91b2eb2d699519fc505fe431dde0e upstream
No point in keeping them around.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.841685728@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1f34bb2a24643e0087652d81078e4f616562738d upstream
Nothing in the call chain requires it
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.783704297@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 54d9a91a3d6713d1332e93be13b4eaf0fa54349d upstream
No point in doing this during really early boot. Move it to an early
initcall so that it is set up before possible user mode helpers are started
during device initialization.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.727330699@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 439e17576eb47f26b78c5bbc72e344d4206d2327 upstream
Invoke the X86ism mem_encrypt_init() from X86 arch_cpu_finalize_init() and
remove the weak fallback from the core code.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.670360645@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9df9d2f0471b4c4702670380b8d8a45b40b23a7d upstream
X86 is reworking the boot process so that initializations which are not
required during early boot can be moved into the late boot process and out
of the fragile and restricted initial boot phase.
arch_cpu_finalize_init() is the obvious place to do such initializations,
but arch_cpu_finalize_init() is invoked too late in start_kernel() e.g. for
initializing the FPU completely. fork_init() requires that the FPU is
initialized as the size of task_struct on X86 depends on the size of the
required FPU register buffer.
Fortunately none of the init calls between calibrate_delay() and
arch_cpu_finalize_init() is relevant for the functionality of
arch_cpu_finalize_init().
Invoke it right after calibrate_delay() where everything which is relevant
for arch_cpu_finalize_init() has been set up already.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.612182854@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 61235b24b9cb37c13fcad5b9596d59a1afdcec30 upstream
Everything is converted over to arch_cpu_finalize_init(). Remove the
check_bugs() leftovers including the empty stubs in asm-generic, alpha,
parisc, powerpc and xtensa.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.553215951@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9349b5cd0908f8afe95529fc7a8cbb1417df9b0c upstream
check_bugs() is about to be phased out. Switch over to the new
arch_cpu_finalize_init() implementation.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.493148694@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 44ade508e3bfac45ae97864587de29eb1a881ec0 upstream
check_bugs() is about to be phased out. Switch over to the new
arch_cpu_finalize_init() implementation.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.431995857@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 01eb454e9bfe593f320ecbc9aaec60bf87cd453d upstream
check_bugs() is about to be phased out. Switch over to the new
arch_cpu_finalize_init() implementation.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.371697797@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7f066a22fe353a827a402ee2835e81f045b1574d upstream
check_bugs() is about to be phased out. Switch over to the new
arch_cpu_finalize_init() implementation.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.312438573@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9ceecc2589b9d7cef6b321339ed8de484eac4b20 upstream
check_bugs() is about to be phased out. Switch over to the new
arch_cpu_finalize_init() implementation.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.254342916@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9841c423164787feb8f1442f922b7d80a70c82f1 upstream
check_bugs() is about to be phased out. Switch over to the new
arch_cpu_finalize_init() implementation.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.195288218@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6c38e3005621800263f117fb00d6787a76e16de7 upstream
check_bugs() is about to be phased out. Switch over to the new
arch_cpu_finalize_init() implementation.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.137045745@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ee31bb0524a2e7c99b03f50249a411cc1eaa411f upstream
check_bugs() is about to be phased out. Switch over to the new
arch_cpu_finalize_init() implementation.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.078124882@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7c7077a72674402654f3291354720cd73cdf649e upstream
check_bugs() is a dumping ground for finalizing the CPU bringup. Only parts of
it has to do with actual CPU bugs.
Split it apart into arch_cpu_finalize_init() and cpu_select_mitigations().
Fixup the bogus 32bit comments while at it.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.019583869@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7725acaa4f0c04fbefb0e0d342635b967bb7d414 upstream
check_bugs() has become a dumping ground for all sorts of activities to
finalize the CPU initialization before running the rest of the init code.
Most are empty, a few do actual bug checks, some do alternative patching
and some cobble a CPU advertisement string together....
Aside of that the current implementation requires duplicated function
declaration and mostly empty header files for them.
Provide a new function arch_cpu_finalize_init(). Provide a generic
declaration if CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT is selected and a stub
inline otherwise.
This requires a temporary #ifdef in start_kernel() which will be removed
along with check_bugs() once the architectures are converted over.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224544.957805717@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230801091925.659598007@linuxfoundation.org
Tested-by: Ronald Warsow <rwarsow@gmx.de>
Tested-by: Jon Hunter <jonathanh@nvidia.com>
Tested-by: Conor Dooley <conor.dooley@microchip.com>
Tested-by: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Tested-by: Florian Fainelli <florian.fainelli@broadcom.com>
Tested-by: Ron Economos <re@w6rz.net>
Tested-by: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230802065501.780725463@linuxfoundation.org
Tested-by: Chris Paterson (CIP) <chris.paterson2@renesas.com>
Tested-by: Ronald Warsow <rwarsow@gmx.de>
Tested-by: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Ron Economos <re@w6rz.net>
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Tested-by: Florian Fainelli <florian.fainelli@broadcom.com>
Tested-by: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 00ae1491f970acc454be0df63f50942d94825860 upstream.
Smatch detected potential error pointer dereference.
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_syncobj.c:888 drm_syncobj_transfer_to_timeline()
error: 'fence' dereferencing possible ERR_PTR()
The error pointer comes from dma_fence_allocate_private_stub(). One
caller expected error pointers and one expected NULL pointers. Change
it to return NULL and update the caller which expected error pointers,
drm_syncobj_assign_null_handle(), to check for NULL instead.
Fixes: f781f661e8c9 ("dma-buf: keep the signaling time of merged fences v3")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/b09f1996-3838-4fa2-9193-832b68262e43@moroto.mountain
Cc: Jindong Yue <jindong.yue@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f781f661e8c99b0cb34129f2e374234d61864e77 upstream.
Some Android CTS is testing if the signaling time keeps consistent
during merges.
v2: use the current time if the fence is still in the signaling path and
the timestamp not yet available.
v3: improve comment, fix one more case to use the correct timestamp
Signed-off-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <luben.tuikov@amd.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230630120041.109216-1-christian.koenig@amd.com
Cc: Jindong Yue <jindong.yue@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6c21e066f9256ea1df6f88768f6ae1080b7cf509 upstream.
mbind() calls down into vma_replace_policy() without taking the per-VMA
locks, replaces the VMA's vma->vm_policy pointer, and frees the old
policy. That's bad; a concurrent page fault might still be using the
old policy (in vma_alloc_folio()), resulting in use-after-free.
Normally this will manifest as a use-after-free read first, but it can
result in memory corruption, including because vma_alloc_folio() can
call mpol_cond_put() on the freed policy, which conditionally changes
the policy's refcount member.
This bug is specific to CONFIG_NUMA, but it does also affect non-NUMA
systems as long as the kernel was built with CONFIG_NUMA.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Fixes: 5e31275cc997 ("mm: add per-VMA lock and helper functions to control it")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6c54312f9689fbe27c70db5d42eebd29d04b672e upstream.
It was pointed out[1] that using folio_test_hwpoison() is wrong as we need
to check the indiviual page that has poison. folio_test_hwpoison() only
checks the head page so go back to using PageHWPoison().
User-visible effects include existing hwpoison-inject tests possibly
failing as unpoisoning a single subpage could lead to unpoisoning an
entire folio. Memory unpoisoning could also not work as expected as
the function will break early due to only checking the head page and
not the actually poisoned subpage.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ZLIbZygG7LqSI9xe@casper.infradead.org/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230717181812.167757-1-sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com
Fixes: a6fddef49eef ("mm/memory-failure: convert unpoison_memory() to folios")
Signed-off-by: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com>
Reported-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b1f02b95758d05b799731d939e76a0bd6da312db upstream.
mm->mm_lock_seq effectively functions as a read/write lock; therefore it
must be used with acquire/release semantics.
A specific example is the interaction between userfaultfd_register() and
lock_vma_under_rcu().
userfaultfd_register() does the following from the point where it changes
a VMA's flags to the point where concurrent readers are permitted again
(in a simple scenario where only a single private VMA is accessed and no
merging/splitting is involved):
userfaultfd_register
userfaultfd_set_vm_flags
vm_flags_reset
vma_start_write
down_write(&vma->vm_lock->lock)
vma->vm_lock_seq = mm_lock_seq [marks VMA as busy]
up_write(&vma->vm_lock->lock)
vm_flags_init
[sets VM_UFFD_* in __vm_flags]
vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx = ctx
mmap_write_unlock
vma_end_write_all
WRITE_ONCE(mm->mm_lock_seq, mm->mm_lock_seq + 1) [unlocks VMA]
There are no memory barriers in between the __vm_flags update and the
mm->mm_lock_seq update that unlocks the VMA, so the unlock can be
reordered to above the `vm_flags_init()` call, which means from the
perspective of a concurrent reader, a VMA can be marked as a userfaultfd
VMA while it is not VMA-locked. That's bad, we definitely need a
store-release for the unlock operation.
The non-atomic write to vma->vm_lock_seq in vma_start_write() is mostly
fine because all accesses to vma->vm_lock_seq that matter are always
protected by the VMA lock. There is a racy read in vma_start_read()
though that can tolerate false-positives, so we should be using
WRITE_ONCE() to keep things tidy and data-race-free (including for KCSAN).
On the other side, lock_vma_under_rcu() works as follows in the relevant
region for locking and userfaultfd check:
lock_vma_under_rcu
vma_start_read
vma->vm_lock_seq == READ_ONCE(vma->vm_mm->mm_lock_seq) [early bailout]
down_read_trylock(&vma->vm_lock->lock)
vma->vm_lock_seq == READ_ONCE(vma->vm_mm->mm_lock_seq) [main check]
userfaultfd_armed
checks vma->vm_flags & __VM_UFFD_FLAGS
Here, the interesting aspect is how far down the mm->mm_lock_seq read can
be reordered - if this read is reordered down below the vma->vm_flags
access, this could cause lock_vma_under_rcu() to partly operate on
information that was read while the VMA was supposed to be locked. To
prevent this kind of downwards bleeding of the mm->mm_lock_seq read, we
need to read it with a load-acquire.
Some of the comment wording is based on suggestions by Suren.
BACKPORT WARNING: One of the functions changed by this patch (which I've
written against Linus' tree) is vma_try_start_write(), but this function
no longer exists in mm/mm-everything. I don't know whether the merged
version of this patch will be ordered before or after the patch that
removes vma_try_start_write(). If you're backporting this patch to a tree
with vma_try_start_write(), make sure this patch changes that function.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230721225107.942336-1-jannh@google.com
Fixes: 5e31275cc997 ("mm: add per-VMA lock and helper functions to control it")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d8ab9f7b644a2c9b64de405c1953c905ff219dc9 upstream.
When VMAs are merged, dup_anon_vma() is called with `dst` pointing to the
VMA that is being expanded to cover the area previously occupied by
another VMA. This currently happens while `dst` is not write-locked.
This means that, in the `src->anon_vma && !dst->anon_vma` case, as soon as
the assignment `dst->anon_vma = src->anon_vma` has happened, concurrent
page faults can happen on `dst` under the per-VMA lock. This is already
icky in itself, since such page faults can now install pages into `dst`
that are attached to an `anon_vma` that is not yet tied back to the
`anon_vma` with an `anon_vma_chain`. But if `anon_vma_clone()` fails due
to an out-of-memory error, things get much worse: `anon_vma_clone()` then
reverts `dst->anon_vma` back to NULL, and `dst` remains completely
unconnected to the `anon_vma`, even though we can have pages in the area
covered by `dst` that point to the `anon_vma`.
This means the `anon_vma` of such pages can be freed while the pages are
still mapped into userspace, which leads to UAF when a helper like
folio_lock_anon_vma_read() tries to look up the anon_vma of such a page.
This theoretically is a security bug, but I believe it is really hard to
actually trigger as an unprivileged user because it requires that you can
make an order-0 GFP_KERNEL allocation fail, and the page allocator tries
pretty hard to prevent that.
I think doing the vma_start_write() call inside dup_anon_vma() is the most
straightforward fix for now.
For a kernel-assisted reproducer, see the notes section of the patch mail.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230721034643.616851-1-jannh@google.com
Fixes: 5e31275cc997 ("mm: add per-VMA lock and helper functions to control it")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 588159009d5b7a09c3e5904cffddbe4a4e170301 upstream.
An attempt to acquire exclusive lock can race with the current lock
owner closing the image:
1. lock is held by client123, rbd_lock() returns -EBUSY
2. get_lock_owner_info() returns client123 instance details
3. client123 closes the image, lock is released
4. find_watcher() returns 0 as there is no matching watcher anymore
5. client123 instance gets erroneously blocklisted
Particularly impacted is mirror snapshot scheduler in snapshot-based
mirroring since it happens to open and close images a lot (images are
opened only for as long as it takes to take the next mirror snapshot,
the same client instance is used for all images).
To reduce the potential for erroneous blocklisting, retrieve the lock
owner again after find_watcher() returns 0. If it's still there, make
sure it matches the previously detected lock owner.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # f38cb9d9c204: rbd: make get_lock_owner_info() return a single locker or NULL
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 8ff2c64c9765: rbd: harden get_lock_owner_info() a bit
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Dongsheng Yang <dongsheng.yang@easystack.cn>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8ff2c64c9765446c3cef804fb99da04916603e27 upstream.
- we want the exclusive lock type, so test for it directly
- use sscanf() to actually parse the lock cookie and avoid admitting
invalid handles
- bail if locker has a blank address
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Dongsheng Yang <dongsheng.yang@easystack.cn>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f38cb9d9c2045dad16eead4a2e1aedfddd94603b upstream.
Make the "num_lockers can be only 0 or 1" assumption explicit and
simplify the API by getting rid of output parameters in preparation
for calling get_lock_owner_info() twice before blocklisting.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Dongsheng Yang <dongsheng.yang@easystack.cn>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1e4ab7b4c881cf26c1c72b3f56519e03475486fb upstream.
When using the cleaner policy to decommission the cache, there is
never any writeback started from the cache as it is constantly delayed
due to normal I/O keeping the device busy. Meaning @idle=false was
always being passed to clean_target_met()
Fix this by adding a specific 'cleaner' flag that is set when the
cleaner policy is configured. This flag serves to always allow the
cleaner's writeback work to be queued until the cache is
decommissioned (even if the cache isn't idle).
Reported-by: David Jeffery <djeffery@redhat.com>
Fixes: b29d4986d0da ("dm cache: significant rework to leverage dm-bio-prison-v2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3844ed5e78823eebb5f0f1edefc403310693d402 upstream.
Dpt objects that are created from internal get evicted when there is
memory pressure and do not get restored when pinned during scanout. The
pinned page table entries look corrupted and programming the display
engine with the incorrect pte's result in DE throwing pipe faults.
Create DPT objects from shmem and mark the object as dirty when pinning so
that the object is restored when shrinker evicts an unpinned buffer object.
v2: Unconditionally mark the dpt objects dirty during pinning(Chris).
Fixes: 0dc987b699ce ("drm/i915/display: Add smem fallback allocation for dpt")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.0+
Cc: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@linux.intel.com>
Suggested-by: Chris Wilson <chris.p.wilson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Fei Yang <fei.yang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Radhakrishna Sripada <radhakrishna.sripada@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230718225118.2562132-1-radhakrishna.sripada@intel.com
(cherry picked from commit e91a777a6e602ba0e3366e053e4e094a334a1244)
Signed-off-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 50164507f6b7b7ed85d8c3ac0266849fbd908db7 upstream.
Even the 'disable_send_metrics' is true so when the session is
being opened it will always trigger to send the metric for the
first time.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Venky Shankar <vshankar@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ac4436a5b20e0ef1f608a9ef46c08d5d142f8da6 upstream.
Since commit 3d439b1a2ad3 ("thermal/core: Alloc-copy-free the thermal
zone parameters structure"), thermal_zone_device_register() allocates
a copy of the tzp argument and frees it when unregistering, so
thermal_of_zone_register() now ends up leaking its original tzp and
double-freeing the tzp copy. Fix this by locating tzp on stack instead.
Fixes: 3d439b1a2ad3 ("thermal/core: Alloc-copy-free the thermal zone parameters structure")
Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
Acked-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org>
Cc: 6.4+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 6.4+: 8bcbb18c61d6: thermal: core: constify params in thermal_zone_device_register
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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