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2025-05-18Linux 6.14.7v6.14.7Greg Kroah-Hartman
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250512172044.326436266@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: Jon Hunter <jonathanh@nvidia.com> Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> Tested-by: Ron Economos <re@w6rz.net> Tested-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Tested-by: Takeshi Ogasawara <takeshi.ogasawara@futuring-girl.com> Tested-by: Florian Fainelli <florian.fainelli@broadcom.com> Tested-by: Markus Reichelt <lkt+2023@mareichelt.com> Tested-by: Peter Schneider <pschneider1968@googlemail.com> Tested-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org> Tested-by: Christian Heusel <christian@heusel.eu> Tested-by: Hardik Garg <hargar@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250514125625.496402993@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: Jon Hunter <jonathanh@nvidia.com> Tested-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Tested-by: Florian Fainelli <florian.fainelli@broadcom.com> Tested-by: Takeshi Ogasawara <takeshi.ogasawara@futuring-girl.com> Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft@linaro.org> Tested-by: Peter Schneider <pschneider1968@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18x86/its: FineIBT-paranoid vs ITSPeter Zijlstra
commit e52c1dc7455d32c8a55f9949d300e5e87d011fa6 upstream. FineIBT-paranoid was using the retpoline bytes for the paranoid check, disabling retpolines, because all parts that have IBT also have eIBRS and thus don't need no stinking retpolines. Except... ITS needs the retpolines for indirect calls must not be in the first half of a cacheline :-/ So what was the paranoid call sequence: <fineibt_paranoid_start>: 0: 41 ba 78 56 34 12 mov $0x12345678, %r10d 6: 45 3b 53 f7 cmp -0x9(%r11), %r10d a: 4d 8d 5b <f0> lea -0x10(%r11), %r11 e: 75 fd jne d <fineibt_paranoid_start+0xd> 10: 41 ff d3 call *%r11 13: 90 nop Now becomes: <fineibt_paranoid_start>: 0: 41 ba 78 56 34 12 mov $0x12345678, %r10d 6: 45 3b 53 f7 cmp -0x9(%r11), %r10d a: 4d 8d 5b f0 lea -0x10(%r11), %r11 e: 2e e8 XX XX XX XX cs call __x86_indirect_paranoid_thunk_r11 Where the paranoid_thunk looks like: 1d: <ea> (bad) __x86_indirect_paranoid_thunk_r11: 1e: 75 fd jne 1d __x86_indirect_its_thunk_r11: 20: 41 ff eb jmp *%r11 23: cc int3 [ dhansen: remove initialization to false ] Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> [ Just a portion of the original commit, in order to fix a build issue in stable kernels due to backports ] Tested-by: Holger Hoffstätte <holger@applied-asynchrony.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250514113952.GB16434@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18x86/its: Fix build errors when CONFIG_MODULES=nEric Biggers
commit 9f35e33144ae5377d6a8de86dd3bd4d995c6ac65 upstream. Fix several build errors when CONFIG_MODULES=n, including the following: ../arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c:195:25: error: incomplete definition of type 'struct module' 195 | for (int i = 0; i < mod->its_num_pages; i++) { Fixes: 872df34d7c51 ("x86/its: Use dynamic thunks for indirect branches") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Tested-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18selftest/x86/bugs: Add selftests for ITSPawan Gupta
commit 7a9b709e7cc5ce1ffb84ce07bf6d157e1de758df upstream. Below are the tests added for Indirect Target Selection (ITS): - its_sysfs.py - Check if sysfs reflects the correct mitigation status for the mitigation selected via the kernel cmdline. - its_permutations.py - tests mitigation selection with cmdline permutations with other bugs like spectre_v2 and retbleed. - its_indirect_alignment.py - verifies that for addresses in .retpoline_sites section that belong to lower half of cacheline are patched to ITS-safe thunk. Typical output looks like below: Site 49: function symbol: __x64_sys_restart_syscall+0x1f <0xffffffffbb1509af> # vmlinux: 0xffffffff813509af: jmp 0xffffffff81f5a8e0 # kcore: 0xffffffffbb1509af: jmpq *%rax # ITS thunk NOT expected for site 49 # PASSED: Found *%rax # Site 50: function symbol: __resched_curr+0xb0 <0xffffffffbb181910> # vmlinux: 0xffffffff81381910: jmp 0xffffffff81f5a8e0 # kcore: 0xffffffffbb181910: jmp 0xffffffffc02000fc # ITS thunk expected for site 50 # PASSED: Found 0xffffffffc02000fc -> jmpq *%rax <scattered-thunk?> - its_ret_alignment.py - verifies that for addresses in .return_sites section that belong to lower half of cacheline are patched to its_return_thunk. Typical output looks like below: Site 97: function symbol: collect_event+0x48 <0xffffffffbb007f18> # vmlinux: 0xffffffff81207f18: jmp 0xffffffff81f5b500 # kcore: 0xffffffffbb007f18: jmp 0xffffffffbbd5b560 # PASSED: Found jmp 0xffffffffbbd5b560 <its_return_thunk> # Site 98: function symbol: collect_event+0xa4 <0xffffffffbb007f74> # vmlinux: 0xffffffff81207f74: jmp 0xffffffff81f5b500 # kcore: 0xffffffffbb007f74: retq # PASSED: Found retq Some of these tests have dependency on tools like virtme-ng[1] and drgn[2]. When the dependencies are not met, the test will be skipped. [1] https://github.com/arighi/virtme-ng [2] https://github.com/osandov/drgn Co-developed-by: Tao Zhang <tao1.zhang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tao Zhang <tao1.zhang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18x86/its: Use dynamic thunks for indirect branchesPeter Zijlstra
commit 872df34d7c51a79523820ea6a14860398c639b87 upstream. ITS mitigation moves the unsafe indirect branches to a safe thunk. This could degrade the prediction accuracy as the source address of indirect branches becomes same for different execution paths. To improve the predictions, and hence the performance, assign a separate thunk for each indirect callsite. This is also a defense-in-depth measure to avoid indirect branches aliasing with each other. As an example, 5000 dynamic thunks would utilize around 16 bits of the address space, thereby gaining entropy. For a BTB that uses 32 bits for indexing, dynamic thunks could provide better prediction accuracy over fixed thunks. Have ITS thunks be variable sized and use EXECMEM_MODULE_TEXT such that they are both more flexible (got to extend them later) and live in 2M TLBs, just like kernel code, avoiding undue TLB pressure. [ pawan: CONFIG_EXECMEM_ROX is not supported on backport kernel, made adjustments to set memory to RW and ROX ] Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18x86/ibt: Keep IBT disabled during alternative patchingPawan Gupta
commit ebebe30794d38c51f71fe4951ba6af4159d9837d upstream. cfi_rewrite_callers() updates the fineIBT hash matching at the caller side, but except for paranoid-mode it relies on apply_retpoline() and friends for any ENDBR relocation. This could temporarily cause an indirect branch to land on a poisoned ENDBR. For instance, with para-virtualization enabled, a simple wrmsrl() could have an indirect branch pointing to native_write_msr() who's ENDBR has been relocated due to fineIBT: <wrmsrl>: push %rbp mov %rsp,%rbp mov %esi,%eax mov %rsi,%rdx shr $0x20,%rdx mov %edi,%edi mov %rax,%rsi call *0x21e65d0(%rip) # <pv_ops+0xb8> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Such an indirect call during the alternative patching could #CP if the caller is not *yet* adjusted for the new target ENDBR. To prevent a false #CP, keep CET-IBT disabled until all callers are patched. Patching during the module load does not need to be guarded by IBT-disable because the module code is not executed until the patching is complete. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18x86/its: Align RETs in BHB clear sequence to avoid thunkingPawan Gupta
commit f0cd7091cc5a032c8870b4285305d9172569d126 upstream. The software mitigation for BHI is to execute BHB clear sequence at syscall entry, and possibly after a cBPF program. ITS mitigation thunks RETs in the lower half of the cacheline. This causes the RETs in the BHB clear sequence to be thunked as well, adding unnecessary branches to the BHB clear sequence. Since the sequence is in hot path, align the RET instructions in the sequence to avoid thunking. This is how disassembly clear_bhb_loop() looks like after this change: 0x44 <+4>: mov $0x5,%ecx 0x49 <+9>: call 0xffffffff81001d9b <clear_bhb_loop+91> 0x4e <+14>: jmp 0xffffffff81001de5 <clear_bhb_loop+165> 0x53 <+19>: int3 ... 0x9b <+91>: call 0xffffffff81001dce <clear_bhb_loop+142> 0xa0 <+96>: ret 0xa1 <+97>: int3 ... 0xce <+142>: mov $0x5,%eax 0xd3 <+147>: jmp 0xffffffff81001dd6 <clear_bhb_loop+150> 0xd5 <+149>: nop 0xd6 <+150>: sub $0x1,%eax 0xd9 <+153>: jne 0xffffffff81001dd3 <clear_bhb_loop+147> 0xdb <+155>: sub $0x1,%ecx 0xde <+158>: jne 0xffffffff81001d9b <clear_bhb_loop+91> 0xe0 <+160>: ret 0xe1 <+161>: int3 0xe2 <+162>: int3 0xe3 <+163>: int3 0xe4 <+164>: int3 0xe5 <+165>: lfence 0xe8 <+168>: pop %rbp 0xe9 <+169>: ret Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18x86/its: Add support for RSB stuffing mitigationPawan Gupta
commit facd226f7e0c8ca936ac114aba43cb3e8b94e41e upstream. When retpoline mitigation is enabled for spectre-v2, enabling call-depth-tracking and RSB stuffing also mitigates ITS. Add cmdline option indirect_target_selection=stuff to allow enabling RSB stuffing mitigation. When retpoline mitigation is not enabled, =stuff option is ignored, and default mitigation for ITS is deployed. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18x86/its: Add "vmexit" option to skip mitigation on some CPUsPawan Gupta
commit 2665281a07e19550944e8354a2024635a7b2714a upstream. Ice Lake generation CPUs are not affected by guest/host isolation part of ITS. If a user is only concerned about KVM guests, they can now choose a new cmdline option "vmexit" that will not deploy the ITS mitigation when CPU is not affected by guest/host isolation. This saves the performance overhead of ITS mitigation on Ice Lake gen CPUs. When "vmexit" option selected, if the CPU is affected by ITS guest/host isolation, the default ITS mitigation is deployed. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18x86/its: Enable Indirect Target Selection mitigationPawan Gupta
commit f4818881c47fd91fcb6d62373c57c7844e3de1c0 upstream. Indirect Target Selection (ITS) is a bug in some pre-ADL Intel CPUs with eIBRS. It affects prediction of indirect branch and RETs in the lower half of cacheline. Due to ITS such branches may get wrongly predicted to a target of (direct or indirect) branch that is located in the upper half of the cacheline. Scope of impact =============== Guest/host isolation -------------------- When eIBRS is used for guest/host isolation, the indirect branches in the VMM may still be predicted with targets corresponding to branches in the guest. Intra-mode ---------- cBPF or other native gadgets can be used for intra-mode training and disclosure using ITS. User/kernel isolation --------------------- When eIBRS is enabled user/kernel isolation is not impacted. Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB) ----------------------------------------- After an IBPB, indirect branches may be predicted with targets corresponding to direct branches which were executed prior to IBPB. This is mitigated by a microcode update. Add cmdline parameter indirect_target_selection=off|on|force to control the mitigation to relocate the affected branches to an ITS-safe thunk i.e. located in the upper half of cacheline. Also add the sysfs reporting. When retpoline mitigation is deployed, ITS safe-thunks are not needed, because retpoline sequence is already ITS-safe. Similarly, when call depth tracking (CDT) mitigation is deployed (retbleed=stuff), ITS safe return thunk is not used, as CDT prevents RSB-underflow. To not overcomplicate things, ITS mitigation is not supported with spectre-v2 lfence;jmp mitigation. Moreover, it is less practical to deploy lfence;jmp mitigation on ITS affected parts anyways. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18x86/its: Add support for ITS-safe return thunkPawan Gupta
commit a75bf27fe41abe658c53276a0c486c4bf9adecfc upstream. RETs in the lower half of cacheline may be affected by ITS bug, specifically when the RSB-underflows. Use ITS-safe return thunk for such RETs. RETs that are not patched: - RET in retpoline sequence does not need to be patched, because the sequence itself fills an RSB before RET. - RET in Call Depth Tracking (CDT) thunks __x86_indirect_{call|jump}_thunk and call_depth_return_thunk are not patched because CDT by design prevents RSB-underflow. - RETs in .init section are not reachable after init. - RETs that are explicitly marked safe with ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18x86/its: Add support for ITS-safe indirect thunkPawan Gupta
commit 8754e67ad4ac692c67ff1f99c0d07156f04ae40c upstream. Due to ITS, indirect branches in the lower half of a cacheline may be vulnerable to branch target injection attack. Introduce ITS-safe thunks to patch indirect branches in the lower half of cacheline with the thunk. Also thunk any eBPF generated indirect branches in emit_indirect_jump(). Below category of indirect branches are not mitigated: - Indirect branches in the .init section are not mitigated because they are discarded after boot. - Indirect branches that are explicitly marked retpoline-safe. Note that retpoline also mitigates the indirect branches against ITS. This is because the retpoline sequence fills an RSB entry before RET, and it does not suffer from RSB-underflow part of the ITS. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18x86/its: Enumerate Indirect Target Selection (ITS) bugPawan Gupta
commit 159013a7ca18c271ff64192deb62a689b622d860 upstream. ITS bug in some pre-Alderlake Intel CPUs may allow indirect branches in the first half of a cache line get predicted to a target of a branch located in the second half of the cache line. Set X86_BUG_ITS on affected CPUs. Mitigation to follow in later commits. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18Documentation: x86/bugs/its: Add ITS documentationPawan Gupta
commit 1ac116ce6468670eeda39345a5585df308243dca upstream. Add the admin-guide for Indirect Target Selection (ITS). Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18x86/bhi: Do not set BHI_DIS_S in 32-bit modePawan Gupta
commit 073fdbe02c69c43fb7c0d547ec265c7747d4a646 upstream. With the possibility of intra-mode BHI via cBPF, complete mitigation for BHI is to use IBHF (history fence) instruction with BHI_DIS_S set. Since this new instruction is only available in 64-bit mode, setting BHI_DIS_S in 32-bit mode is only a partial mitigation. Do not set BHI_DIS_S in 32-bit mode so as to avoid reporting misleading mitigated status. With this change IBHF won't be used in 32-bit mode, also remove the CONFIG_X86_64 check from emit_spectre_bhb_barrier(). Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18x86/bpf: Add IBHF call at end of classic BPFDaniel Sneddon
commit 9f725eec8fc0b39bdc07dcc8897283c367c1a163 upstream. Classic BPF programs can be run by unprivileged users, allowing unprivileged code to execute inside the kernel. Attackers can use this to craft branch history in kernel mode that can influence the target of indirect branches. BHI_DIS_S provides user-kernel isolation of branch history, but cBPF can be used to bypass this protection by crafting branch history in kernel mode. To stop intra-mode attacks via cBPF programs, Intel created a new instruction Indirect Branch History Fence (IBHF). IBHF prevents the predicted targets of subsequent indirect branches from being influenced by branch history prior to the IBHF. IBHF is only effective while BHI_DIS_S is enabled. Add the IBHF instruction to cBPF jitted code's exit path. Add the new fence when the hardware mitigation is enabled (i.e., X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_HW is set) or after the software sequence (X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP) is being used in a virtual machine. Note that X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_HW and X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP are mutually exclusive, so the JIT compiler will only emit the new fence, not the SW sequence, when X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_HW is set. Hardware that enumerates BHI_NO basically has BHI_DIS_S protections always enabled, regardless of the value of BHI_DIS_S. Since BHI_DIS_S doesn't protect against intra-mode attacks, enumerate BHI bug on BHI_NO hardware as well. Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18x86/bpf: Call branch history clearing sequence on exitDaniel Sneddon
commit d4e89d212d401672e9cdfe825d947ee3a9fbe3f5 upstream. Classic BPF programs have been identified as potential vectors for intra-mode Branch Target Injection (BTI) attacks. Classic BPF programs can be run by unprivileged users. They allow unprivileged code to execute inside the kernel. Attackers can use unprivileged cBPF to craft branch history in kernel mode that can influence the target of indirect branches. Introduce a branch history buffer (BHB) clearing sequence during the JIT compilation of classic BPF programs. The clearing sequence is the same as is used in previous mitigations to protect syscalls. Since eBPF programs already have their own mitigations in place, only insert the call on classic programs that aren't run by privileged users. Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18arm64: proton-pack: Add new CPUs 'k' values for branch mitigationJames Morse
commit efe676a1a7554219eae0b0dcfe1e0cdcc9ef9aef upstream. Update the list of 'k' values for the branch mitigation from arm's website. Add the values for Cortex-X1C. The MIDR_EL1 value can be found here: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/101968/0002/Register-descriptions/AArch> Link: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/110280/2-0/?lang=en Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18arm64: bpf: Only mitigate cBPF programs loaded by unprivileged usersJames Morse
commit f300769ead032513a68e4a02e806393402e626f8 upstream. Support for eBPF programs loaded by unprivileged users is typically disabled. This means only cBPF programs need to be mitigated for BHB. In addition, only mitigate cBPF programs that were loaded by an unprivileged user. Privileged users can also load the same program via eBPF, making the mitigation pointless. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18arm64: bpf: Add BHB mitigation to the epilogue for cBPF programsJames Morse
commit 0dfefc2ea2f29ced2416017d7e5b1253a54c2735 upstream. A malicious BPF program may manipulate the branch history to influence what the hardware speculates will happen next. On exit from a BPF program, emit the BHB mititgation sequence. This is only applied for 'classic' cBPF programs that are loaded by seccomp. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18arm64: proton-pack: Expose whether the branchy loop k valueJames Morse
commit a1152be30a043d2d4dcb1683415f328bf3c51978 upstream. Add a helper to expose the k value of the branchy loop. This is needed by the BPF JIT to generate the mitigation sequence in BPF programs. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18arm64: proton-pack: Expose whether the platform is mitigated by firmwareJames Morse
commit e7956c92f396a44eeeb6eaf7a5b5e1ad24db6748 upstream. is_spectre_bhb_fw_affected() allows the caller to determine if the CPU is known to need a firmware mitigation. CPUs are either on the list of CPUs we know about, or firmware has been queried and reported that the platform is affected - and mitigated by firmware. This helper is not useful to determine if the platform is mitigated by firmware. A CPU could be on the know list, but the firmware may not be implemented. Its affected but not mitigated. spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation() handles this distinction by checking the firmware state before enabling the mitigation. Add a helper to expose this state. This will be used by the BPF JIT to determine if calling firmware for a mitigation is necessary and supported. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18arm64: insn: Add support for encoding DSBJames Morse
commit 63de8abd97ddb9b758bd8f915ecbd18e1f1a87a0 upstream. To generate code in the eBPF epilogue that uses the DSB instruction, insn.c needs a heler to encode the type and domain. Re-use the crm encoding logic from the DMB instruction. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18mm: page_alloc: speed up fallbacks in rmqueue_bulk()Johannes Weiner
commit 90abee6d7895d5eef18c91d870d8168be4e76e9d upstream. The test robot identified c2f6ea38fc1b ("mm: page_alloc: don't steal single pages from biggest buddy") as the root cause of a 56.4% regression in vm-scalability::lru-file-mmap-read. Carlos reports an earlier patch, c0cd6f557b90 ("mm: page_alloc: fix freelist movement during block conversion"), as the root cause for a regression in worst-case zone->lock+irqoff hold times. Both of these patches modify the page allocator's fallback path to be less greedy in an effort to stave off fragmentation. The flip side of this is that fallbacks are also less productive each time around, which means the fallback search can run much more frequently. Carlos' traces point to rmqueue_bulk() specifically, which tries to refill the percpu cache by allocating a large batch of pages in a loop. It highlights how once the native freelists are exhausted, the fallback code first scans orders top-down for whole blocks to claim, then falls back to a bottom-up search for the smallest buddy to steal. For the next batch page, it goes through the same thing again. This can be made more efficient. Since rmqueue_bulk() holds the zone->lock over the entire batch, the freelists are not subject to outside changes; when the search for a block to claim has already failed, there is no point in trying again for the next page. Modify __rmqueue() to remember the last successful fallback mode, and restart directly from there on the next rmqueue_bulk() iteration. Oliver confirms that this improves beyond the regression that the test robot reported against c2f6ea38fc1b: commit: f3b92176f4 ("tools/selftests: add guard region test for /proc/$pid/pagemap") c2f6ea38fc ("mm: page_alloc: don't steal single pages from biggest buddy") acc4d5ff0b ("Merge tag 'net-6.15-rc0' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net") 2c847f27c3 ("mm: page_alloc: speed up fallbacks in rmqueue_bulk()") <--- your patch f3b92176f4f7100f c2f6ea38fc1b640aa7a2e155cc1 acc4d5ff0b61eb1715c498b6536 2c847f27c37da65a93d23c237c5 ---------------- --------------------------- --------------------------- --------------------------- %stddev %change %stddev %change %stddev %change %stddev \ | \ | \ | \ 25525364 ± 3% -56.4% 11135467 -57.8% 10779336 +31.6% 33581409 vm-scalability.throughput Carlos confirms that worst-case times are almost fully recovered compared to before the earlier culprit patch: 2dd482ba627d (before freelist hygiene): 1ms c0cd6f557b90 (after freelist hygiene): 90ms next-20250319 (steal smallest buddy): 280ms this patch : 8ms [jackmanb@google.com: comment updates] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/D92AC0P9594X.3BML64MUKTF8Z@google.com [hannes@cmpxchg.org: reset rmqueue_mode in rmqueue_buddy() error loop, per Yunsheng Lin] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250409140023.GA2313@cmpxchg.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250407180154.63348-1-hannes@cmpxchg.org Fixes: c0cd6f557b90 ("mm: page_alloc: fix freelist movement during block conversion") Fixes: c2f6ea38fc1b ("mm: page_alloc: don't steal single pages from biggest buddy") Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Signed-off-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com> Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com> Reported-by: Carlos Song <carlos.song@nxp.com> Tested-by: Carlos Song <carlos.song@nxp.com> Tested-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/202503271547.fc08b188-lkp@intel.com Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com> Tested-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com> Acked-by: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [6.10+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18mm: page_alloc: don't steal single pages from biggest buddyJohannes Weiner
commit c2f6ea38fc1b640aa7a2e155cc1c0410ff91afa2 upstream. The fallback code searches for the biggest buddy first in an attempt to steal the whole block and encourage type grouping down the line. The approach used to be this: - Non-movable requests will split the largest buddy and steal the remainder. This splits up contiguity, but it allows subsequent requests of this type to fall back into adjacent space. - Movable requests go and look for the smallest buddy instead. The thinking is that movable requests can be compacted, so grouping is less important than retaining contiguity. c0cd6f557b90 ("mm: page_alloc: fix freelist movement during block conversion") enforces freelist type hygiene, which restricts stealing to either claiming the whole block or just taking the requested chunk; no additional pages or buddy remainders can be stolen any more. The patch mishandled when to switch to finding the smallest buddy in that new reality. As a result, it may steal the exact request size, but from the biggest buddy. This causes fracturing for no good reason. Fix this by committing to the new behavior: either steal the whole block, or fall back to the smallest buddy. Remove single-page stealing from steal_suitable_fallback(). Rename it to try_to_steal_block() to make the intentions clear. If this fails, always fall back to the smallest buddy. The following is from 4 runs of mmtest's thpchallenge. "Pollute" is single page fallback, "steal" is conversion of a partially used block. The numbers for free block conversions (omitted) are comparable. vanilla patched @pollute[unmovable from reclaimable]: 27 106 @pollute[unmovable from movable]: 82 46 @pollute[reclaimable from unmovable]: 256 83 @pollute[reclaimable from movable]: 46 8 @pollute[movable from unmovable]: 4841 868 @pollute[movable from reclaimable]: 5278 12568 @steal[unmovable from reclaimable]: 11 12 @steal[unmovable from movable]: 113 49 @steal[reclaimable from unmovable]: 19 34 @steal[reclaimable from movable]: 47 21 @steal[movable from unmovable]: 250 183 @steal[movable from reclaimable]: 81 93 The allocator appears to do a better job at keeping stealing and polluting to the first fallback preference. As a result, the numbers for "from movable" - the least preferred fallback option, and most detrimental to compactability - are down across the board. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250225001023.1494422-2-hannes@cmpxchg.org Fixes: c0cd6f557b90 ("mm: page_alloc: fix freelist movement during block conversion") Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18Bluetooth: btmtk: Remove the resetting step before downloading the fwHao Qin
commit 33634e2ab7c6369391e0ca4b9b97dc861e33d20e upstream. Remove the resetting step before downloading the fw, as it may cause other usb devices to fail to initialise when connected during boot on kernels 6.11 and newer. Signed-off-by: Hao Qin <hao.qin@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Cc: "Geoffrey D. Bennett" <g@b4.vu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18io_uring: always arm linked timeouts prior to issueJens Axboe
Commit b53e523261bf058ea4a518b482222e7a277b186b upstream. There are a few spots where linked timeouts are armed, and not all of them adhere to the pre-arm, attempt issue, post-arm pattern. This can be problematic if the linked request returns that it will trigger a callback later, and does so before the linked timeout is fully armed. Consolidate all the linked timeout handling into __io_issue_sqe(), rather than have it spread throughout the various issue entry points. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://github.com/axboe/liburing/issues/1390 Reported-by: Chase Hiltz <chase@path.net> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18rust: clean Rust 1.88.0's `clippy::uninlined_format_args` lintMiguel Ojeda
commit 211dcf77856db64c73e0c3b9ce0c624ec855daca upstream. Starting with Rust 1.88.0 (expected 2025-06-26) [1], `rustc` may move back the `uninlined_format_args` to `style` from `pedantic` (it was there waiting for rust-analyzer suppotr), and thus we will start to see lints like: warning: variables can be used directly in the `format!` string --> rust/macros/kunit.rs:105:37 | 105 | let kunit_wrapper_fn_name = format!("kunit_rust_wrapper_{}", test); | ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ | = help: for further information visit https://rust-lang.github.io/rust-clippy/master/index.html#uninlined_format_args help: change this to | 105 - let kunit_wrapper_fn_name = format!("kunit_rust_wrapper_{}", test); 105 + let kunit_wrapper_fn_name = format!("kunit_rust_wrapper_{test}"); There is even a case that is a pure removal: warning: variables can be used directly in the `format!` string --> rust/macros/module.rs:51:13 | 51 | format!("{field}={content}\0", field = field, content = content) | ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ | = help: for further information visit https://rust-lang.github.io/rust-clippy/master/index.html#uninlined_format_args help: change this to | 51 - format!("{field}={content}\0", field = field, content = content) 51 + format!("{field}={content}\0") The lints all seem like nice cleanups, thus just apply them. We may want to disable `allow-mixed-uninlined-format-args` in the future. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # Needed in 6.12.y and later (Rust is pinned in older LTSs). Link: https://github.com/rust-lang/rust-clippy/pull/14160 [1] Acked-by: Benno Lossin <lossin@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Tamir Duberstein <tamird@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250502140237.1659624-6-ojeda@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18rust: allow Rust 1.87.0's `clippy::ptr_eq` lintMiguel Ojeda
commit a39f3087092716f2bd531d6fdc20403c3dc2a879 upstream. Starting with Rust 1.87.0 (expected 2025-05-15) [1], Clippy may expand the `ptr_eq` lint, e.g.: error: use `core::ptr::eq` when comparing raw pointers --> rust/kernel/list.rs:438:12 | 438 | if self.first == item { | ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ help: try: `core::ptr::eq(self.first, item)` | = help: for further information visit https://rust-lang.github.io/rust-clippy/master/index.html#ptr_eq = note: `-D clippy::ptr-eq` implied by `-D warnings` = help: to override `-D warnings` add `#[allow(clippy::ptr_eq)]` It is expected that a PR to relax the lint will be backported [2] by the time Rust 1.87.0 releases, since the lint was considered too eager (at least by default) [3]. Thus allow the lint temporarily just in case. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # Needed in 6.12.y and later (Rust is pinned in older LTSs). Link: https://github.com/rust-lang/rust-clippy/pull/14339 [1] Link: https://github.com/rust-lang/rust-clippy/pull/14526 [2] Link: https://github.com/rust-lang/rust-clippy/issues/14525 [3] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250502140237.1659624-3-ojeda@kernel.org [ Converted to `allow`s since backport was confirmed. - Miguel ] Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18do_umount(): add missing barrier before refcount checks in sync caseAl Viro
[ Upstream commit 65781e19dcfcb4aed1167d87a3ffcc2a0c071d47 ] do_umount() analogue of the race fixed in 119e1ef80ecf "fix __legitimize_mnt()/mntput() race". Here we want to make sure that if __legitimize_mnt() doesn't notice our lock_mount_hash(), we will notice their refcount increment. Harder to hit than mntput_no_expire() one, fortunately, and consequences are milder (sync umount acting like umount -l on a rare race with RCU pathwalk hitting at just the wrong time instead of use-after-free galore mntput_no_expire() counterpart used to be hit). Still a bug... Fixes: 48a066e72d97 ("RCU'd vfsmounts") Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-05-18io_uring/sqpoll: Increase task_work submission batch sizeGabriel Krisman Bertazi
[ Upstream commit 92835cebab120f8a5f023a26a792a2ac3f816c4f ] Our QA team reported a 10%-23%, throughput reduction on an io_uring sqpoll testcase doing IO to a null_blk, that I traced back to a reduction of the device submission queue depth utilization. It turns out that, after commit af5d68f8892f ("io_uring/sqpoll: manage task_work privately"), we capped the number of task_work entries that can be completed from a single spin of sqpoll to only 8 entries, before the sqpoll goes around to (potentially) sleep. While this cap doesn't drive the submission side directly, it impacts the completion behavior, which affects the number of IO queued by fio per sqpoll cycle on the submission side, and io_uring ends up seeing less ios per sqpoll cycle. As a result, block layer plugging is less effective, and we see more time spent inside the block layer in profilings charts, and increased submission latency measured by fio. There are other places that have increased overhead once sqpoll sleeps more often, such as the sqpoll utilization calculation. But, in this microbenchmark, those were not representative enough in perf charts, and their removal didn't yield measurable changes in throughput. The major overhead comes from the fact we plug less, and less often, when submitting to the block layer. My benchmark is: fio --ioengine=io_uring --direct=1 --iodepth=128 --runtime=300 --bs=4k \ --invalidate=1 --time_based --ramp_time=10 --group_reporting=1 \ --filename=/dev/nullb0 --name=RandomReads-direct-nullb-sqpoll-4k-1 \ --rw=randread --numjobs=1 --sqthread_poll In one machine, tested on top of Linux 6.15-rc1, we have the following baseline: READ: bw=4994MiB/s (5236MB/s), 4994MiB/s-4994MiB/s (5236MB/s-5236MB/s), io=439GiB (471GB), run=90001-90001msec With this patch: READ: bw=5762MiB/s (6042MB/s), 5762MiB/s-5762MiB/s (6042MB/s-6042MB/s), io=506GiB (544GB), run=90001-90001msec which is a 15% improvement in measured bandwidth. The average submission latency is noticeably lowered too. As measured by fio: Baseline: lat (usec): min=20, max=241, avg=99.81, stdev=3.38 Patched: lat (usec): min=26, max=226, avg=86.48, stdev=4.82 If we look at blktrace, we can also see the plugging behavior is improved. In the baseline, we end up limited to plugging 8 requests in the block layer regardless of the device queue depth size, while after patching we can drive more io, and we manage to utilize the full device queue. In the baseline, after a stabilization phase, an ordinary submission looks like: 254,0 1 49942 0.016028795 5977 U N [iou-sqp-5976] 7 After patching, I see consistently more requests per unplug. 254,0 1 4996 0.001432872 3145 U N [iou-sqp-3144] 32 Ideally, the cap size would at least be the deep enough to fill the device queue, but we can't predict that behavior, or assume all IO goes to a single device, and thus can't guess the ideal batch size. We also don't want to let the tw run unbounded, though I'm not sure it would really be a problem. Instead, let's just give it a more sensible value that will allow for more efficient batching. I've tested with different cap values, and initially proposed to increase the cap to 1024. Jens argued it is too big of a bump and I observed that, with 32, I'm no longer able to observe this bottleneck in any of my machines. Fixes: af5d68f8892f ("io_uring/sqpoll: manage task_work privately") Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250508181203.3785544-1-krisman@suse.de Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-05-18drm/xe: Release force wake first then runtime powerShuicheng Lin
[ Upstream commit 9d271a4f5ba52520e448ab223b1a91c6e35f17c7 ] xe_force_wake_get() is dependent on xe_pm_runtime_get(), so for the release path, xe_force_wake_put() should be called first then xe_pm_runtime_put(). Combine the error path and normal path together with goto. Fixes: 85d547608ef5 ("drm/xe/xe_gt_debugfs: Update handling of xe_force_wake_get return") Cc: Himal Prasad Ghimiray <himal.prasad.ghimiray@intel.com> Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Shuicheng Lin <shuicheng.lin@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Himal Prasad Ghimiray <himal.prasad.ghimiray@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250507022302.2187527-1-shuicheng.lin@intel.com Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com> (cherry picked from commit 432cd94efdca06296cc5e76d673546f58aa90ee1) Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-05-18drm/xe/tests/mocs: Hold XE_FORCEWAKE_ALL for LNCF regsTejas Upadhyay
[ Upstream commit 51c0ee84e4dc339287b2d7335f2b54d747794c83 ] LNCF registers report wrong values when XE_FORCEWAKE_GT only is held. Holding XE_FORCEWAKE_ALL ensures correct operations on LNCF regs. V2(Himal): - Use xe_force_wake_ref_has_domain Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/xe/kernel/-/issues/1999 Fixes: a6a4ea6d7d37 ("drm/xe: Add mocs kunit") Reviewed-by: Himal Prasad Ghimiray <himal.prasad.ghimiray@intel.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20250428082357.1730068-1-tejas.upadhyay@intel.com Signed-off-by: Tejas Upadhyay <tejas.upadhyay@intel.com> (cherry picked from commit 70a2585e582058e94fe4381a337be42dec800337) Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-05-18riscv: Disallow PR_GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL without SupmSamuel Holland
[ Upstream commit 7f1c3de1370bc6a8ad5157336b258067dac0ae9c ] When the prctl() interface for pointer masking was added, it did not check that the pointer masking ISA extension was supported, only the individual submodes. Userspace could still attempt to disable pointer masking and query the pointer masking state. commit 81de1afb2dd1 ("riscv: Fix kernel crash due to PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL") disallowed the former, as the senvcfg write could crash on older systems. PR_GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL state does not crash, because it reads only kernel-internal state and not senvcfg, but it should still be disallowed for consistency. Fixes: 09d6775f503b ("riscv: Add support for userspace pointer masking") Signed-off-by: Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@sifive.com> Reviewed-by: Nam Cao <namcao@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250507145230.2272871-1-samuel.holland@sifive.com Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-05-18riscv: misaligned: enable IRQs while handling misaligned accessesClément Léger
[ Upstream commit 453805f0a28fc5091e46145e6560c776f7c7a611 ] We can safely reenable IRQs if coming from userspace. This allows to access user memory that could potentially trigger a page fault. Fixes: b686ecdeacf6 ("riscv: misaligned: Restrict user access to kernel memory") Signed-off-by: Clément Léger <cleger@rivosinc.com> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250422162324.956065-3-cleger@rivosinc.com Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-05-18riscv: misaligned: factorize trap handlingClément Léger
[ Upstream commit fd94de9f9e7aac11ec659e386b9db1203d502023 ] Since both load/store and user/kernel should use almost the same path and that we are going to add some code around that, factorize it. Signed-off-by: Clément Léger <cleger@rivosinc.com> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250422162324.956065-2-cleger@rivosinc.com Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com> Stable-dep-of: 453805f0a28f ("riscv: misaligned: enable IRQs while handling misaligned accesses") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-05-18nvme: unblock ctrl state transition for firmware updateDaniel Wagner
[ Upstream commit 650415fca0a97472fdd79725e35152614d1aad76 ] The original nvme subsystem design didn't have a CONNECTING state; the state machine allowed transitions from RESETTING to LIVE directly. With the introduction of nvme fabrics the CONNECTING state was introduce. Over time the nvme-pci started to use the CONNECTING state as well. Eventually, a bug fix for the nvme-fc started to depend that the only valid transition to LIVE was from CONNECTING. Though this change didn't update the firmware update handler which was still depending on RESETTING to LIVE transition. The simplest way to address it for the time being is to switch into CONNECTING state before going to LIVE state. Fixes: d2fe192348f9 ("nvme: only allow entering LIVE from CONNECTING state") Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Wagner <wagi@kernel.org> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/0134ea15-8d5f-41f7-9e9a-d7e6d82accaa@roeck-us.net Reviewed-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me> Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-05-18drm/panel: simple: Update timings for AUO G101EVN010Kevin Baker
[ Upstream commit 7c6fa1797a725732981f2d77711c867166737719 ] Switch to panel timings based on datasheet for the AUO G101EVN01.0 LVDS panel. Default timings were tested on the panel. Previous mode-based timings resulted in horizontal display shift. Signed-off-by: Kevin Baker <kevinb@ventureresearch.com> Fixes: 4fb86404a977 ("drm/panel: simple: Add AUO G101EVN010 panel support") Reviewed-by: Neil Armstrong <neil.armstrong@linaro.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250505170256.1385113-1-kevinb@ventureresearch.com Signed-off-by: Neil Armstrong <neil.armstrong@linaro.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250505170256.1385113-1-kevinb@ventureresearch.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-05-18loop: Add sanity check for read/write_iterLizhi Xu
[ Upstream commit f5c84eff634ba003326aa034c414e2a9dcb7c6a7 ] Some file systems do not support read_iter/write_iter, such as selinuxfs in this issue. So before calling them, first confirm that the interface is supported and then call it. It is releavant in that vfs_iter_read/write have the check, and removal of their used caused szybot to be able to hit this issue. Fixes: f2fed441c69b ("loop: stop using vfs_iter__{read,write} for buffered I/O") Reported-by: syzbot+6af973a3b8dfd2faefdc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=6af973a3b8dfd2faefdc Signed-off-by: Lizhi Xu <lizhi.xu@windriver.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250428143626.3318717-1-lizhi.xu@windriver.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-05-18loop: factor out a loop_assign_backing_file helperChristoph Hellwig
[ Upstream commit d278164832618bf2775c6a89e6434e2633de1eed ] Split the code for setting up a backing file into a helper in preparation of adding more code to this path. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250131120120.1315125-2-hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Stable-dep-of: f5c84eff634b ("loop: Add sanity check for read/write_iter") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-05-18riscv: misaligned: Add handling for ZCB instructionsNylon Chen
[ Upstream commit eb16b3727c05ed36420c90eca1e8f0e279514c1c ] Add support for the Zcb extension's compressed half-word instructions (C.LHU, C.LH, and C.SH) in the RISC-V misaligned access trap handler. Signed-off-by: Zong Li <zong.li@sifive.com> Signed-off-by: Nylon Chen <nylon.chen@sifive.com> Fixes: 956d705dd279 ("riscv: Unaligned load/store handling for M_MODE") Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250411073850.3699180-2-nylon.chen@sifive.com Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-05-18MIPS: Fix MAX_REG_OFFSETThorsten Blum
[ Upstream commit c44572e0cc13c9afff83fd333135a0aa9b27ba26 ] Fix MAX_REG_OFFSET to point to the last register in 'pt_regs' and not to the marker itself, which could allow regs_get_register() to return an invalid offset. Fixes: 40e084a506eb ("MIPS: Add uprobes support.") Suggested-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@orcam.me.uk> Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev> Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-05-18accel/ivpu: Correct mutex unlock order in job submissionKarol Wachowski
[ Upstream commit 75680b7cd461b169c7ccd2a0fba7542868b7fce2 ] The mutex unlock for vdev->submitted_jobs_lock was incorrectly placed before unlocking file_priv->lock. Change order of unlocks to avoid potential race conditions. Fixes: 5bbccadaf33e ("accel/ivpu: Abort all jobs after command queue unregister") Signed-off-by: Karol Wachowski <karol.wachowski@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Hugo <jeff.hugo@oss.qualcomm.com> Signed-off-by: Jacek Lawrynowicz <jacek.lawrynowicz@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250425093656.2228168-1-jacek.lawrynowicz@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-05-18accel/ivpu: Separate DB ID and CMDQ ID allocations from CMDQ allocationKarol Wachowski
[ Upstream commit 950942b4813f8c44dbec683fdb140cf4a238516b ] Move doorbell ID and command queue ID XArray allocations from command queue memory allocation function. This will allow ID allocations to be done without the need for actual memory allocation. Signed-off-by: Karol Wachowski <karol.wachowski@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Maciej Falkowski <maciej.falkowski@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jacek Lawrynowicz <jacek.lawrynowicz@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jacek Lawrynowicz <jacek.lawrynowicz@linux.intel.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20250107173238.381120-2-maciej.falkowski@linux.intel.com Stable-dep-of: 75680b7cd461 ("accel/ivpu: Correct mutex unlock order in job submission") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-05-18timekeeping: Prevent coarse clocks going backwardsThomas Gleixner
[ Upstream commit b71f9804f66c2592d4c3a2397b7374a4039005a5 ] Lei Chen raised an issue with CLOCK_MONOTONIC_COARSE seeing time inconsistencies. Lei tracked down that this was being caused by the adjustment: tk->tkr_mono.xtime_nsec -= offset; which is made to compensate for the unaccumulated cycles in offset when the multiplicator is adjusted forward, so that the non-_COARSE clockids don't see inconsistencies. However, the _COARSE clockid getter functions use the adjusted xtime_nsec value directly and do not compensate the negative offset via the clocksource delta multiplied with the new multiplicator. In that case the caller can observe time going backwards in consecutive calls. By design, this negative adjustment should be fine, because the logic run from timekeeping_adjust() is done after it accumulated approximately multiplicator * interval_cycles into xtime_nsec. The accumulated value is always larger then the mult_adj * offset value, which is subtracted from xtime_nsec. Both operations are done together under the tk_core.lock, so the net change to xtime_nsec is always always be positive. However, do_adjtimex() calls into timekeeping_advance() as well, to apply the NTP frequency adjustment immediately. In this case, timekeeping_advance() does not return early when the offset is smaller then interval_cycles. In that case there is no time accumulated into xtime_nsec. But the subsequent call into timekeeping_adjust(), which modifies the multiplicator, subtracts from xtime_nsec to correct for the new multiplicator. Here because there was no accumulation, xtime_nsec becomes smaller than before, which opens a window up to the next accumulation, where the _COARSE clockid getters, which don't compensate for the offset, can observe the inconsistency. This has been tried to be fixed by forwarding the timekeeper in the case that adjtimex() adjusts the multiplier, which resets the offset to zero: 757b000f7b93 ("timekeeping: Fix possible inconsistencies in _COARSE clockids") That works correctly, but unfortunately causes a regression on the adjtimex() side. There are two issues: 1) The forwarding of the base time moves the update out of the original period and establishes a new one. 2) The clearing of the accumulated NTP error is changing the behaviour as well. User-space expects that multiplier/frequency updates are in effect, when the syscall returns, so delaying the update to the next tick is not solving the problem either. Commit 757b000f7b93 was reverted so that the established expectations of user space implementations (ntpd, chronyd) are restored, but that obviously brought the inconsistencies back. One of the initial approaches to fix this was to establish a separate storage for the coarse time getter nanoseconds part by calculating it from the offset. That was dropped on the floor because not having yet another state to maintain was simpler. But given the result of the above exercise, this solution turns out to be the right one. Bring it back in a slightly modified form. Thus introduce timekeeper::coarse_nsec and store that nanoseconds part in it, switch the time getter functions and the VDSO update to use that value. coarse_nsec is set on operations which forward or initialize the timekeeper and after time was accumulated during a tick. If there is no accumulation the timestamp is unchanged. This leaves the adjtimex() behaviour unmodified and prevents coarse time from going backwards. [ jstultz: Simplified the coarse_nsec calculation and kept behavior so coarse clockids aren't adjusted on each inter-tick adjtimex call, slightly reworked the comments and commit message ] Fixes: da15cfdae033 ("time: Introduce CLOCK_REALTIME_COARSE") Reported-by: Lei Chen <lei.chen@smartx.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: John Stultz <jstultz@google.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250419054706.2319105-1-jstultz@google.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20250310030004.3705801-1-lei.chen@smartx.com/ Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-05-18iio: adc: dln2: Use aligned_s64 for timestampJonathan Cameron
[ Upstream commit 5097eaae98e53f9ab9d35801c70da819b92ca907 ] Here the lack of marking allows the overall structure to not be sufficiently aligned resulting in misplacement of the timestamp in iio_push_to_buffers_with_timestamp(). Use aligned_s64 to force the alignment on all architectures. Fixes: 7c0299e879dd ("iio: adc: Add support for DLN2 ADC") Reported-by: David Lechner <dlechner@baylibre.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Nuno Sá <nuno.sa@analog.com> Reviewed-by: David Lechner <dlechner@baylibre.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250413103443.2420727-4-jic23@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-05-18iio: accel: adxl355: Make timestamp 64-bit aligned using aligned_s64Jonathan Cameron
[ Upstream commit 1bb942287e05dc4c304a003ea85e6dd9a5e7db39 ] The IIO ABI requires 64-bit aligned timestamps. In this case insufficient padding would have been added on architectures where an s64 is only 32-bit aligned. Use aligned_s64 to enforce the correct alignment. Fixes: 327a0eaf19d5 ("iio: accel: adxl355: Add triggered buffer support") Reported-by: David Lechner <dlechner@baylibre.com> Reviewed-by: Nuno Sá <nuno.sa@analog.com> Reviewed-by: David Lechner <dlechner@baylibre.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250413103443.2420727-5-jic23@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-05-18iio: temp: maxim-thermocouple: Fix potential lack of DMA safe buffer.Jonathan Cameron
[ Upstream commit f79aeb6c631b57395f37acbfbe59727e355a714c ] The trick of using __aligned(IIO_DMA_MINALIGN) ensures that there is no overlap between buffers used for DMA and those used for driver state storage that are before the marking. It doesn't ensure anything above state variables found after the marking. Hence move this particular bit of state earlier in the structure. Fixes: 10897f34309b ("iio: temp: maxim_thermocouple: Fix alignment for DMA safety") Reviewed-by: David Lechner <dlechner@baylibre.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250413103443.2420727-14-jic23@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-05-18iio: accel: adxl367: fix setting odr for activity time updateLothar Rubusch
[ Upstream commit 38f67d0264929762e54ae5948703a21f841fe706 ] Fix setting the odr value to update activity time based on frequency derrived by recent odr, and not by obsolete odr value. The [small] bug: When _adxl367_set_odr() is called with a new odr value, it first writes the new odr value to the hardware register ADXL367_REG_FILTER_CTL. Second, it calls _adxl367_set_act_time_ms(), which calls adxl367_time_ms_to_samples(). Here st->odr still holds the old odr value. This st->odr member is used to derrive a frequency value, which is applied to update ADXL367_REG_TIME_ACT. Hence, the idea is to update activity time, based on possibilities and power consumption by the current ODR rate. Finally, when the function calls return, again in _adxl367_set_odr() the new ODR is assigned to st->odr. The fix: When setting a new ODR value is set to ADXL367_REG_FILTER_CTL, also ADXL367_REG_TIME_ACT should probably be updated with a frequency based on the recent ODR value and not the old one. Changing the location of the assignment to st->odr fixes this. Fixes: cbab791c5e2a5 ("iio: accel: add ADXL367 driver") Signed-off-by: Lothar Rubusch <l.rubusch@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Marcelo Schmitt <marcelo.schmitt1@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250309193515.2974-1-l.rubusch@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-05-18iio: imu: bmi270: fix initial sampling frequency configurationGustavo Silva
[ Upstream commit 6d03811d7a99e08d5928f58120acb45b8ba22b08 ] In the bmi270_configure_imu() function, the accelerometer and gyroscope configuration registers are incorrectly written with the mask BMI270_PWR_CONF_ADV_PWR_SAVE_MSK, which is unrelated to these registers. As a result, the accelerometer's sampling frequency is set to 200 Hz instead of the intended 100 Hz. Remove the mask to ensure the correct bits are set in the configuration registers. Fixes: 3ea51548d6b2 ("iio: imu: Add i2c driver for bmi270 imu") Signed-off-by: Gustavo Silva <gustavograzs@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alex Lanzano <lanzano.alex@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250304-bmi270-odr-fix-v1-1-384dbcd699fb@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2025-08-04 10:41:08 +0000