summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/security/selinux/hooks.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux/hooks.c')
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c76
1 files changed, 50 insertions, 26 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 1bbd53321d13..f553c370397e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@
#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
#include <linux/fanotify.h>
+#include <linux/io_uring.h>
#include "avc.h"
#include "objsec.h"
@@ -640,7 +641,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
* we need to skip the double mount verification.
*
* This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
- * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
+ * mount using this sb set explicit options and a second mount using
* this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
* will be used for both mounts)
*/
@@ -944,10 +945,12 @@ out:
return rc;
}
+/*
+ * NOTE: the caller is resposible for freeing the memory even if on error.
+ */
static int selinux_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts)
{
struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = *mnt_opts;
- bool is_alloc_opts = false;
u32 *dst_sid;
int rc;
@@ -955,7 +958,7 @@ static int selinux_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts)
/* eaten and completely ignored */
return 0;
if (!s)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ return -EINVAL;
if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) {
pr_warn("SELinux: Unable to set superblock options before the security server is initialized\n");
@@ -967,7 +970,6 @@ static int selinux_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts)
if (!opts)
return -ENOMEM;
*mnt_opts = opts;
- is_alloc_opts = true;
}
switch (token) {
@@ -1002,10 +1004,6 @@ static int selinux_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts)
return rc;
err:
- if (is_alloc_opts) {
- kfree(opts);
- *mnt_opts = NULL;
- }
pr_warn(SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -1019,7 +1017,7 @@ static int show_sid(struct seq_file *m, u32 sid)
rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid,
&context, &len);
if (!rc) {
- bool has_comma = context && strchr(context, ',');
+ bool has_comma = strchr(context, ',');
seq_putc(m, '=');
if (has_comma)
@@ -4224,6 +4222,14 @@ static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
}
+static int selinux_userns_create(const struct cred *cred)
+{
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_USER_NAMESPACE,
+ USER_NAMESPACE__CREATE, NULL);
+}
+
/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
@@ -5989,7 +5995,6 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
u32 sid = current_sid();
- int rc;
isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
@@ -5997,10 +6002,9 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
- rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
- sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
- MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
- return rc;
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
+ MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
}
static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
@@ -6128,7 +6132,6 @@ static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
u32 sid = current_sid();
- int rc;
isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SHM);
@@ -6136,10 +6139,9 @@ static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
- rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
- sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
- SHM__CREATE, &ad);
- return rc;
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
+ SHM__CREATE, &ad);
}
static int selinux_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
@@ -6213,7 +6215,6 @@ static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
u32 sid = current_sid();
- int rc;
isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SEM);
@@ -6221,10 +6222,9 @@ static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
- rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
- sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
- SEM__CREATE, &ad);
- return rc;
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
+ SEM__CREATE, &ad);
}
static int selinux_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg)
@@ -6330,7 +6330,7 @@ static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
}
static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
- char *name, char **value)
+ const char *name, char **value)
{
const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
u32 sid;
@@ -6792,7 +6792,7 @@ static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode)
}
/* This function will check the file pass through unix socket or binder to see
- * if it is a bpf related object. And apply correspinding checks on the bpf
+ * if it is a bpf related object. And apply corresponding checks on the bpf
* object based on the type. The bpf maps and programs, not like other files and
* socket, are using a shared anonymous inode inside the kernel as their inode.
* So checking that inode cannot identify if the process have privilege to
@@ -6990,6 +6990,28 @@ static int selinux_uring_sqpoll(void)
return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid,
SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__SQPOLL, NULL);
}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_uring_cmd - check if IORING_OP_URING_CMD is allowed
+ * @ioucmd: the io_uring command structure
+ *
+ * Check to see if the current domain is allowed to execute an
+ * IORING_OP_URING_CMD against the device/file specified in @ioucmd.
+ *
+ */
+static int selinux_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
+{
+ struct file *file = ioucmd->file;
+ struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
+ ad.u.file = file;
+
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), isec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__CMD, &ad);
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
/*
@@ -7114,6 +7136,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(userns_create, selinux_userns_create),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid),
@@ -7234,6 +7257,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, selinux_uring_override_creds),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, selinux_uring_sqpoll),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_cmd, selinux_uring_cmd),
#endif
/*
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.46.0) at 2025-10-06 17:44:23 +0000