diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/exec.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/exec.c | 20 |
1 files changed, 18 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c index 2f0acef8908e..d58b061c5e42 100644 --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -892,7 +892,8 @@ static struct file *do_open_execat(int fd, struct filename *name, int flags) .lookup_flags = LOOKUP_FOLLOW, }; - if ((flags & ~(AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW | AT_EMPTY_PATH)) != 0) + if ((flags & + ~(AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW | AT_EMPTY_PATH | AT_EXECVE_CHECK)) != 0) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); if (flags & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) open_exec_flags.lookup_flags &= ~LOOKUP_FOLLOW; @@ -1564,6 +1565,21 @@ static struct linux_binprm *alloc_bprm(int fd, struct filename *filename, int fl } bprm->interp = bprm->filename; + /* + * At this point, security_file_open() has already been called (with + * __FMODE_EXEC) and access control checks for AT_EXECVE_CHECK will + * stop just after the security_bprm_creds_for_exec() call in + * bprm_execve(). Indeed, the kernel should not try to parse the + * content of the file with exec_binprm() nor change the calling + * thread, which means that the following security functions will not + * be called: + * - security_bprm_check() + * - security_bprm_creds_from_file() + * - security_bprm_committing_creds() + * - security_bprm_committed_creds() + */ + bprm->is_check = !!(flags & AT_EXECVE_CHECK); + retval = bprm_mm_init(bprm); if (!retval) return bprm; @@ -1845,7 +1861,7 @@ static int bprm_execve(struct linux_binprm *bprm) /* Set the unchanging part of bprm->cred */ retval = security_bprm_creds_for_exec(bprm); - if (retval) + if (retval || bprm->is_check) goto out; retval = exec_binprm(bprm); |