3 files changed, 30 insertions, 12 deletions

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
index a5239ecbc2c6..8c257db23d90 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -1286,14 +1286,14 @@ bool cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode(void)
 {
 	u8 fam = boot_cpu_data.x86;
 
-	if (fam == 0x17) {
-		/* Zen1/2 IBPB flushes branch type predictions too. */
+	/* Zen1/2 IBPB flushes branch type predictions too. */
+	if (fam == 0x17)
 		return boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB);
-	} else if (fam == 0x19) {
+	/* Poke the MSR bit on Zen3/4 to check its presence. */
+	else if (fam == 0x19)
+		return !wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_SBPB);
+	else
 		return false;
-	}
-
-	return false;
 }
 
 static void zenbleed_check_cpu(void *unused)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 90a91ef0fc64..7bb6750fbd75 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -56,6 +56,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
 DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64, x86_spec_ctrl_current);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_current);
 
+u64 x86_pred_cmd __ro_after_init = PRED_CMD_IBPB;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_pred_cmd);
+
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(spec_ctrl_mutex);
 
 /* Update SPEC_CTRL MSR and its cached copy unconditionally */
@@ -2284,7 +2287,7 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
 	bool has_microcode;
 
 	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO) || cpu_mitigations_off())
-		return;
+		goto pred_cmd;
 
 	/*
 	 * The first check is for the kernel running as a guest in order
@@ -2297,9 +2300,18 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
 	} else {
 		/*
 		 * Enable the synthetic (even if in a real CPUID leaf)
-		 * flag for guests.
+		 * flags for guests.
 		 */
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE);
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SBPB);
+
+		/*
+		 * Zen1/2 with SMT off aren't vulnerable after the right
+		 * IBPB microcode has been applied.
+		 */
+		if ((boot_cpu_data.x86 < 0x19) &&
+		    (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_DISABLED))
+			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO);
 	}
 
 	switch (srso_cmd) {
@@ -2322,16 +2334,20 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
 			srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET;
 		} else {
 			pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_SRSO.\n");
-			return;
+			goto pred_cmd;
 		}
 		break;
 
 	default:
 		break;
-
 	}
 
 	pr_info("%s%s\n", srso_strings[srso_mitigation], (has_microcode ? "" : ", no microcode"));
+
+pred_cmd:
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO) ||
+	    srso_cmd == SRSO_CMD_OFF)
+		x86_pred_cmd = PRED_CMD_SBPB;
 }
 
 #undef pr_fmt
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index a924608ccf04..f437efbb7e76 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1300,8 +1300,10 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	    boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_GDS);
 
-	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SRSO))
-		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO);
+	if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO)) {
+		if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SRSO))
+			setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO);
+	}
 
 	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
 		return;