diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst | 8 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 7 |
2 files changed, 5 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst index 0585d02b9a6cb..ad15417d39f99 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst @@ -29,14 +29,6 @@ Below is the list of affected Intel processors [#f1]_: RAPTORLAKE_S 06_BFH =================== ============ -As an exception to this table, Intel Xeon E family parts ALDERLAKE(06_97H) and -RAPTORLAKE(06_B7H) codenamed Catlow are not affected. They are reported as -vulnerable in Linux because they share the same family/model with an affected -part. Unlike their affected counterparts, they do not enumerate RFDS_CLEAR or -CPUID.HYBRID. This information could be used to distinguish between the -affected and unaffected parts, but it is deemed not worth adding complexity as -the reporting is fixed automatically when these parts enumerate RFDS_NO. - Mitigation ========== Intel released a microcode update that enables software to clear sensitive diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 5809534ecc983..a2b9a7907cbda 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -1203,6 +1203,9 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = { #define VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(vfm, max_stepping, issues) \ X86_MATCH_VFM_STEPS(vfm, X86_STEP_MIN, max_stepping, issues) +#define VULNBL_INTEL_TYPE(vfm, cpu_type, issues) \ + X86_MATCH_VFM_CPU_TYPE(vfm, INTEL_CPU_TYPE_##cpu_type, issues) + #define VULNBL_AMD(family, blacklist) \ VULNBL(AMD, family, X86_MODEL_ANY, blacklist) @@ -1251,9 +1254,9 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = { VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_TIGERLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, GDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_LAKEFIELD, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ALDERLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, RFDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_TYPE(INTEL_ALDERLAKE, ATOM, RFDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ALDERLAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, RFDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_RAPTORLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, RFDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_TYPE(INTEL_RAPTORLAKE, ATOM, RFDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_RAPTORLAKE_P, X86_STEP_MAX, RFDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_RAPTORLAKE_S, X86_STEP_MAX, RFDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ATOM_GRACEMONT, X86_STEP_MAX, RFDS), |