diff options
| author | Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> | 2023-08-05 00:06:43 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2023-08-11 11:57:56 +0200 |
| commit | b6fc2fbf89089ecfb8eb9a89a7fc91d444f4fec7 (patch) | |
| tree | 754efea0f56f92789305f87bb782083291df705e | |
| parent | 98b7ab5e8d88694c3407292a728dd3b53ad560cd (diff) | |
x86/CPU/AMD: Do not leak quotient data after a division by 0
commit 77245f1c3c6495521f6a3af082696ee2f8ce3921 upstream.
Under certain circumstances, an integer division by 0 which faults, can
leave stale quotient data from a previous division operation on Zen1
microarchitectures.
Do a dummy division 0/1 before returning from the #DE exception handler
in order to avoid any leaks of potentially sensitive data.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 19 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 2 |
4 files changed, 24 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 2c0c495b9cb6..5a54c3685a06 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -451,4 +451,5 @@ /* BUG word 2 */ #define X86_BUG_SRSO X86_BUG(1*32 + 0) /* AMD SRSO bug */ +#define X86_BUG_DIV0 X86_BUG(1*32 + 1) /* AMD DIV0 speculation bug */ #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h index 6a9de5b1fe45..2dd9b661a5fd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h @@ -809,10 +809,12 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, msr_misc_features_shadow); extern u16 amd_get_nb_id(int cpu); extern u32 amd_get_nodes_per_socket(void); extern bool cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode(void); +extern void amd_clear_divider(void); #else static inline u16 amd_get_nb_id(int cpu) { return 0; } static inline u32 amd_get_nodes_per_socket(void) { return 0; } static inline bool cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode(void) { return false; } +static inline void amd_clear_divider(void) { } #endif static inline uint32_t hypervisor_cpuid_base(const char *sig, uint32_t leaves) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c index ffecf4e9444e..da38765aa74c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c @@ -76,6 +76,10 @@ static const int amd_zenbleed[] = AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0x60, 0x0, 0x7f, 0xf), AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0xa0, 0x0, 0xaf, 0xf)); +static const int amd_div0[] = + AMD_LEGACY_ERRATUM(AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0x00, 0x0, 0x2f, 0xf), + AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0x50, 0x0, 0x5f, 0xf)); + static bool cpu_has_amd_erratum(struct cpuinfo_x86 *cpu, const int *erratum) { int osvw_id = *erratum++; @@ -1168,6 +1172,11 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) check_null_seg_clears_base(c); zenbleed_check(c); + + if (cpu_has_amd_erratum(c, amd_div0)) { + pr_notice_once("AMD Zen1 DIV0 bug detected. Disable SMT for full protection.\n"); + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_DIV0); + } } #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 @@ -1312,3 +1321,13 @@ void amd_check_microcode(void) { on_each_cpu(zenbleed_check_cpu, NULL, 1); } + +/* + * Issue a DIV 0/1 insn to clear any division data from previous DIV + * operations. + */ +void noinstr amd_clear_divider(void) +{ + asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("", "div %2\n\t", X86_BUG_DIV0) + :: "a" (0), "d" (0), "r" (1)); +} diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c index 98838b784524..28f5cc0a9dec 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c @@ -198,6 +198,8 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY(exc_divide_error) { do_error_trap(regs, 0, "divide error", X86_TRAP_DE, SIGFPE, FPE_INTDIV, error_get_trap_addr(regs)); + + amd_clear_divider(); } DEFINE_IDTENTRY(exc_overflow) |